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Summary
This study is primarily concerned with making an 
assessment of the social and economic policies pursued by the 
People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) of Grenada between 
1979 to 1983. It is the first sociological study of the 
Grenadian revolution, and is longer and more detailed than any 
other study that has been written on the subject. The thesis 
mainly examines developments inside Grenada. It therefore 
breaks entirely new ground since most of the existing literature 
views the revolution from the perspective of international 
relations. The principal methods of investigation used were 
library research in London and the Caribbean; and six months of 
field work in Grenada, Barbados and Jamaica, where I attended 
important political events and conducted interviews with 
politicians, businessmen, government officials and representatives' 
of international agencies.
The thesis is divided into ten chapters. Chapter one sets 
the scene for the study by providing information on the culture, 
geography, history, sociology and economy of Grenada, and traces 
the events that led to the revolutionary seizure of power in 
1979. Chapter two discusses the main theoretical issues raised 
by the revolution, and chapter three analyses the institutions 
of popular power established by the PRG. Chapters four to eight 
examine the principal features of the economic strategy of the 
revolutionary government, and chapter nine seeks to explain 
the factors that led to the downfall of the revolution. The 
concluding chapter contains a very brief summary of the main 
findings of the study.
The central argument put forward in the thesis is that the. 
revolutionary ideology which guided the PRG was highly 
authoritarian in character, and led to the implementation of 
policies that were not suited to Grenadian society. The ultimate 
downfall of the revolution was caused by the authoritarian 
practices of the PRG which resulted in a vicious power struggle 
in which the Prime Minister and over 100 of his supporters lost 
their lives. This implosion of the post-revolutionary regime 
gave the United States' government an adequate pretext to invade 
Grenada and dismantle the institutions of the revolution.
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Chapter One
The Pre-revolutionary Background
An Island Society
The state of Grenada, which comprises the islands of 
Grenada, Carriacou, Petite Martinique and a number of islets, 
has a combined surface area of 133 square miles and a population 
of around 100,000 people. As such, it is one of the smallest 
nations in the world. Grenada is the most southerly of the 
four Caribbean islands known as the Windward Islands, which 
also includes Dominica, St. Lucia and St. Vincent, and lies 
ninety miles north of Trinidad and Tobago. Grenada is the 
smallest territory of the Windward Islands group and has the 
highest population density. It is also a mountainous country. 
Although Carriacou is undulating in topography, the rest of the 
country has a rugged terrain. The island of Grenada has an 
axial range of mountains of volcanic origin running north and 
south with spurs extending on the western and eastern sides. 
Grenada's mountains do not rise as high as those in other 
Windward Islands, nevertheless several peaks climb to over
2,000 feet, with the highest, Mount St. Catherine volcano in the 
North,reaching a height of 2,755 feet. There are no active 
volcanoes, and in the craters of extinct volcanoes two 
picturesque lakes have formed: Lake Antoine and Grand Etang.
2The mountain region is dissected by steep-sided valleys 
containing widely meandering streams. There are also a number 
of mineral and other springs. In the southern part of the island, 
where hills have stepped slopes, the v/alleys run parallel to 
one another. The interfluves between them stretch into the sea 
for several miles as narrow peninsulas. This coastal section, 
therefore, has embayments as have none of the other Windward 
Islands, creating a very distinct ria coast.'''
Grenada is lush in vegetation and enjoys a good climate all 
the year round. Temperatures vary little, ranging from 65°F 
during the nights in January and February in the mountainous 
areas to a daytime temperature of 90°F in the lowlands during 
the hot months, August to September. An average shade temperature 
of about 85°F can be expected most days of the year. The 
average annual rainfall ranges from 50 inches in coastal areas 
to about 160 inches in the mountainous interior. The rainfall 
pattern shows an alteration of dry and wet seasons corresponding 
roughly with the first and last halves of the year. The dry 
season varies in length and intensity from six to seven months 
in the extreme North-east and South-west to less than two 
months in the highest areas. Carriacou and the smaller islands 
are normally drier. Carriacou has an average annual rainfall of 
45 inches.
Grenada's capital, St. George's, has a population of only
8 , 0 0 0  residents yet serves as a metropolis in that most people 
who work there commute from various parts of the country.
Lying on the leeward coast in the South-east, St. George's is 
the administrative, political and commercial centre of Grenada.
It is connected by roads with all parts of the island and 
handles the entire export trade. St. George's is reputed to be 
one of the most beautiful ports in the world with its old
%
3Georgian buildings and narrow streets running down steep 
hillsides to an ornamental harbour and bay. Owing to the high 
relief only parts of the town could be built in the geometrical 
layout which is otherwise very common among Caribbean 
settlements. The other principal towns are, like St. George's, 
located on the coast and have a small number of residents. They 
include, Grenville in the East, Sauteurs in the North and 
Victoria and Gouyave in the West. Scattered villages, located 
along the country's tortuous roads, account for the overwhelming 
majority of Grenada's inhabitants. Most people either live in 
these linear settlements or in houses clustered around them.
As is the case in other English-speaking territories in the 
Caribbean, Grenada is divided into parishes. There are six 
in all: St. George, St. John, St. Mark, St. Patrick, St. Andrew 
and St. David.
Grenada's'diminutive size, mountainous landscape, 
salubrious climate and dispersed settlement pattern have 
exerted a strong influence on the social and cultural traits 
of Grenadians. These factors have produced a sturdy people who 
are in many ways insular and deeply parochial. Predominantly 
agrarian in their customs and lifestyles, most ordinary 
Grenadians have a tolerant, if not reverant attitude towards the 
country's low level of development and the infelicities caused 
by this. This relaxed and lenient temperament is captured 
with witty nostalgia by Frances Kay in a popular
introduction to Grenada first published in the 1960s: 'Grenada 
is not only a somewhat oval spot on the map - it is also a 
state of mind. Visitors return. And sometimes stay.
And why do they stay? Grenada is far from perfect. Though 
it may be just south of paradise it is also just north of 
frustration. But the stayers end up taking pride even in their
f'V. £2Ett
frustration. "I had to go to Barbados to get a coffee pot."
"It took tiiio weeks for me to get a letter from St. Vincent - 
air mail." "They have 83 x 11 typewriter paper but only 8 x 10 
carbon paper." "IMo one has been in their office for a week - 
they've all gone to the test matches in Trinidad." There 
becomes a definite flavor of boasting in these statements. And 
if a newcomer complains about this kind of thing he is told 
pityingly, "But this is Grenada. " 1 2
The Historical Background
One of the most important events in the early history of 
Grenada was the fierce resistace mounted by the indigenous 
people, the Carib Indians, against numerous attempts at 
conquest by colonial forces sent from France. The French 
finally subordinated the island in 1654, when, in a tragic 
incident that epitomised the fate of the inhabitants of the 
Caribbean in that era, the surviving Indian fighters threw 
themselves to a collective death over a cliff later named 
La Morne de Sauteurs (Leapers1 Hill), near the present town of 
Sauteurs. The French proceeded to introduce sugar, slaves and 
plantation agriculture. After a century of their rule the 
island had 82 sugar plantations and over a hundred mills; 
sugar exports had reached 4,000 tons a year. Grenada had been 
transformed into a small but highly productive factory-farm 
where none of the original inhabitants remained alive and over
12.000 slaves shipped from West Africa laboured for a 
population of 1 , 2 0 0  whites.
French rule was broken by the British who took control of 
the island under the terms of the Treaty of Paris (1763) that 
ended the Seven Years' War. The policy of Grenada's new 
owners was to accelerate production: by 1774 sugar exports 
had been doubled and the number of slaves increased to
35.000 so that they now outnumbered their white masters by 
more than 25 to one. The island also became a trading centre 
for slaves; during the last decade of the eighteenth century 
nearly 50,000 Africans passed through Grenada on their way 
to work in other centres of sugar production.
6Under the British, slave resistance escalated markedly, 
and in 1767 the new colonial power was confronted by an 
island-wide rebellion. Following the War of American 
Independence, a new conflict broke out between Britain and 
France, resulting in the re-possession of Grenada by the 
French in 1779. In 1783 the British retrieved the island 
under the Treaty of Versailles but it was not long before 
they felt the tremors of the French revolution, which had 
a considerable impact on the slave societies of the Caribbean. 
The slogans 'Liberty, Fraternity, Equality' found a receptive 
audience among the French creole planters who had by now 
suffered discrimination and repression at the hands of the 
British. In 1795 Juien Fedon, a French creole planter, led a 
rebellion which adopted the symbols and slogans of the French 
revolution. Although the rebellion was initiated by the French 
creole planters it quickly drew the support of the slaves, 
for whom the ideals of freedom and equality were even more 
pertinent, and it was the slaves who bore the main brunt of 
the fifteen month campaign against the British. The rebellion 
succeeded in gaining control over all the island except the 
area around St. George's, and was then crushed with great 
ferocity. Notwithstanding the defeat, this mass uprising 
came to be celebrated as the first and most emphatic episode 
in the Grenadian people's struggle for national liberation.
Following emancipation in 1834 and apprenticeship in 
1838, Grenada could be distinguished from most of the 
other British territories by the exceptionally rapid decline 
of its sugar industry. The precipitate downfall of King Sugar 
was brought about by the unsuitability of Grenadian topography 
for large-scale sugar cultivation and the difficulties 
involved in getting labour to work the estates. As a
7consequence, the island's output of sugar fell from 4 , 0 0 0  tons 
in 1846 to less than 1,000 tons in 1881. The possibilities 
that existed for making an independent livelihood away from 
the plantations also led to the inordinate growth of a 
peasant class. In 1881 3,000 of the 9,000 males in the colony 
owned land in lots form 1 to 50 acres^ The Grenadian 
peasantry formed a greater proportion of society than in any 
other territory in the Leeward and Windward Islands group*?
Grenada's planter class tried desperately to hang on 
to sugar production and attempted to obtain the necessary 
labour through indenture schemes. Labour was imported from 
Malta, Madeira and West Africa. These schemes proved to be 
unsuccessful, however, and in 1848 the metayage system, a 
form of sharecropping, was introduced to resolve the problem 
of labour shortage. While metayage was introduced in a 
number of Caribbean islands as a short term measure that .
g
planters abandoned in periods of rising prices, in Grenada 
the system persisted with little modification right up until 
the late 1930s. Under the metayage system, sugar lands were 
transformed into orchads of cocoa, a less labour intensive 
operation. Cocoa production soared. Exports rose from
7374,686 pounds in 1846 to 5,864,090 in 1886. The slump in 
cocoa prices during the 1920s, however, gave an impetus to 
the cultivation of nutmegs. Produced under the same metayage 
system, by the late 1930s nutmeg exports were roughly equal 
in value to those of cocoa.
In 1887 the local assembly controlled by the planter class 
was disbanded and the system of Crown Colony government was 
introduced. This resulted in direct control by the Colonial 
Office in London which appointed and issued orders to the 
Governor of the colony. The planter class did not mount any
8serious challenge to tighter Imperial administration, and the 
Crown Colony status quo languished without any real opposition 
until 1915, when T.A. Marryshow, a black journalist of humble 
origins, and C.F.P. Renwick, a lawyer, founded the West Indian 
newspaper. Over the next twenty years the West Indian moulded 
middle class opinion in Grenada and succeeded in aligning 
that sector behind the call for reforms in the system of 
government and the creation of a federation of the West Indies. 
The paper's slogan, 'The West Indies must be West Indian', 
symbolized Marryshow's anti-colonia1 ism and his profound 
conviction that Caribbean unity could bring about self-rule.
Two years after establishing the West Indian, flarryshow and 
his associates founded the Representative Government Association 
(RGA) to pressure the British for a local voice in the 
running of Grenada's affairs. The RGA was not radical in its 
goals or methods, but it represented a major challenge to the 
Crown Colony system and finally succeeded in forcing the 
British to devolve powers to a local assembly once again.
t
By the 1930s Marryshow's political views had undergone a 
distinct evolution. Thus, in contrast to his earlier stress 
on the need for racial harmony in the Caribbean, he now 
called on West Indians to take pride in their race, to see 
themselves as black West Indians and to stop trying to be
Dblack Englishmen? Around this time also, Marryshow began to 
embrace a socialist ideology. During a visit to Britain he 
was profoundly influenced by the activities and policies of 
the Labour Party, and upon returning to Grenada he sought to 
apply some of these. In 1931 he established the Grenada 
Workingmen's Assocation (GWA), a loosely-knit body that 
fulfilled some of the functions of a trade union. Like a 
number of Caribbean political figures during this period,
Marryshow's policies mere directly based on advice he received
from the Labour Party headquarters in London. His adoption of
socialism strengthened his opposition to British colonialism
yet made him believe that West Indian progress would be
determined by the goodwill and conscience of a Labour Government 
9in Britain. Marryshow was, however, even more servile in 
following diktats from London than most of his contempories, 
in that he accepted without question the notion of 'responsible 
trade unionism' peddled by the Colonial Office. Derived from 
the experience of the trade union-based Labour government in 
Britain, responsible trade unionism required that union 
leaders specialise in trade union functions leaving political 
representation to some other unspecified source. In the 
colonies this precept was used to marginalise or manipulate 
the most militant working class leaders that emerged1 ^Marryshow 
followed colonial orthodoxy on this question and thus rejected 
the view that trade unions should become political parties, 
putting up candidates in elections. In doing so he effectively 
placed himself outside the historical process taking place in 
the Caribbean. For, in other territories labour leaders were 
highly successful in taking on the tasks of political 
mobilization. As Emmanuel notes in his study of the Marryshow 
period: 'So fundamental was this question of trade unionism 
and politics that attitudes towards it were a primary indicator 
of the capacity to visualize the requirements of the new 
era of mass politics. That Clarryshow failed, intellectually 
and practically, to perceive this essential inter-connection 
was perhaps the clearest possible sign of his own political 
decay.^Thus, as a result of Marryshow's own political 
limitations and certain objective factors the GWA fared badly. 
The bulk of its adherents were disgruntled members of the
10
fledgling middle class, comprising lower-paid civil servants, 
commercial clerks and teachers. The Association failed to 
extend its support to the *barefoot man*, to use an expression 
of that period. After a number of initial successes, the GUJA 
collapsed. Although Harryshoui renamed it the Grenada Labour 
Party and tried to give it a more political character, it 
lacked a solid basis of support and by 1937 had faded from 
the political scene. Marryshow himself was subsequently 
won over and co-opted by the colonial administration. In 1943 
he was made a Commander of the British Empire (CBE) and the 
following year he was appointed to the hitherto elitist 
Executive Council. It was not until the 1950s that a vibrant 
working class movement emerged and organised political 
activity developed in Grenada.
11
The Advent of Gairyism
In 1949 Eric Mathew Gairy, a black former school teacher 
of peasant origins, was deported from- Aruba for labour 
agitation against the Esso Company. Returning to his home town 
of Grenville, Gairy was concerned at the plight of Grenada's 
rural poor. He wrote petitions on behalf of poor peasants who 
had grievances against the colonial authority and big estate 
owners. In early 1950 he waged a campaign to get compensation 
for a group of workers who had been evicted from an 
estate in his locality. The campaign was a success. In July 
1950 Gairy registered the Grenada Mental and Manual Workers' 
Union (GMMWU) with himself designated President for Life, and 
led a recruitment drive in the countryside. Prior to the 
creation of the GMMWU bargaining rights for agricultural 
workers was held by two urban-based trade unions - the General 
Workers' Union (GWU) based in St. John's, and the Workers' 
Union (WU) with its head office in St. George's. Established 
in 1946, these unions were registered under the Trade Unions 
and Trade Disputes Ordinance of 1943, which removed the 
remaining legal obstacles in the path of unfettered trade 
union rights. The planter class, organized in the Agricultural 
Association, recognized the GWU and WU as bargaining agents 
for the mass of rural workers even though these unions had 
neither an apparatus nor support in the countryside. In 1949 
the combined membership of both unions amounted to 2,951, 
comprising port workers and store clerks in the main, whereas 
over 5,700 workers were recorded as being employed in 
agriculture in that year.^ After the expiry of the first 
agreement between the employers and the unions, however, the
tujo sides reached deadlock. Henceforth, wages and conditions in 
agriculture were set by a labour committee set up by the 
Legislative Council. Thus, the establishment of the GMMWU 
represented the first attempt to actually organise rural 
labour and constituted a direct challenge to the existing 
industrial relations set up. Created at a time of great 
hardship in the country caused by the depressed prices for 
Grenada's agricultural exports, the GMMWU met with an 
enthusiastic response and grew rapidly. When the Agricultural 
Association refused to recognise the new union and attempted 
to do a deal with the urban trade unions, Gairy took the 
unprecedented step of calling a general strike. Beginning in 
February 1951, the strike brought the island to a standstill 
and the local police proved unable to maintain control. Gairy 
was arrested and British naval personnel were brought in from 
other islands. But these actions only enhanced popular anger, 
which was now brewing up into a challenge to colonial rule 
itself. Unable to control public order, the authorities 
attempted to defuse the situation by releasing Gairy from 
jail, promising to recognise the GMMWU and offering to 
negotiate over its demands for pay increases. This did nothing 
to quell the discontent, however, so the Governor was forced 
to negotiate with Gairy. After some time Gairy came round, and 
in March he made a radio address in which he announced that 
an understanding had been reached and called on his followers 
to end the strike. This effectively halted popular anger and 
marked the young labour leader's rise to political prominence 
inside the colonial system.
The formation of the GMMWU and the 1951 general strike
13
brought Grenada into line with the larger territories of the 
Caribbean where the labour movement erupted onto the political 
scene in the 1930s. In St. Kitts, Jamaica, Guyana, St. Vincent, 
Trinidad and Barbados working class rebellions took place 
throwing up a number of labour leaders who were to play an 
important role in the subsequent history of the region. Gairy 
had been influenced by this Caribbean uprising and was a keen 
admirer of T.Uriah Butler, a Grenadian by birth who worked in 
the oilfields of Trinidad, where he led one of the most militant 
struggles of this period. In response to the revolts 
of the 1930s the British government took steps to introduce 
universal adult suffrage in the Caribbean colonies, and by the 
1950s the Windward Islands were drawn into this process. This 
shift in colonial policy was essentially designed to incarcerate 
the plenipotentiaries of the working class in the dilitoriness 
of colonial administration. Colonial Office control was 
guaranteed through the increased powers invested in the 
Governor. Nevertheless, the calling of elections based on 
universal adult suffrage just six months after the general 
strike provided Gairy with a golden opportunity. He rapidly 
created the Grenada People's Party (GPP) which won a landslide 
victory, taking six out of eight Legislative Council seats. 
Hence, Gairy, the undisputed hero of the working class and 
the most powerful trade union leader in the country, had made 
a meteoric rise to power.
The GPP drew its support from the new class of black 
estate owners that had emerged in the country, certain middle 
class elements and the rural poor. Thus Gairy entered 
government with broad backing. Always an astute opportunist, 
Gairy sought recognition from the white elite and the colonial
14
government, and became Increasingly divorced from the sentiments
of the mass of poor islanders. However, even if Gairy did
wish to mount a challenge to the colonial status quo he
would have encountered formidable obstacles. Under the 1951
constitution the Governor was empowered to override the
decisions of the Legislative Council and was assigned fiscal
14control of government. Hamstrung by these restrictions and 
lacking a political ideology that could incorporate a global 
alternative to constitutional advance, Gairy's government 
introduced few reforms.
In the 1954 elections Gairy's party, now renamed the 
Grenada United Labour Party (GULP), was returned to power but wit 
a less impressive result. By 1957, however, the Grenada National 
Party (GNP) led by Herbert Blaize, and another electoral 
alliance called the People's Democratic Movement (PDM) came 
forth to challenge the GULP. In the outcome, although the 
GULP won the largest share of the votes (44 per cent) the 
party won only two seats, suffering its first defeat. The GNP 
and PDM which won two seats each, combined with two successful 
independents, Marryshow and R.K.Douglas, to form a coalition 
administration. The coalition was dominated by the GNP and 
its parliamentary leader, Herbert Blaize. The GNP's founder 
was Dr. John Watts, a medical doctor, and it was his 
philosophy which guided the party. Like Marryshow, Watts 
clung to the notion of 'responsible trade unionism' so the 
GNP did not try to seek trade union connections, and from 
the very beginning claimed to have a 'mu Iti-class' appeal.
This did not prevent the party from developing a very special 
relationship with the island's old elite - the white 
plantocracy and its comprador and professional allies. In terms
15
of actual policy, there was little difference between the 
GIMP and the GULP. It was the personality of Eric Mathew Gairy 
that was anathema to the GIMP and those it represented. 
Nevertheless, under the GNP there emerged a dual budgetary 
strategy of quantitative programme expansion within the 
existing socio-economic structure combined with incentives 
and other policies geared towards the private sector.'*'5
In 1960 Grenada's constitution was altered once again to 
give elected representatives the decisive power. The 1960 
constitution provided for executive power to be exercised 
through an Executive Council presided over by an Administrator 
and consisting of a chief minister, three other ministers, 
one other member and one ex-officio member. The legislature 
consisted of one ex-officio member, two nominated members and 
ten elected legislators. In 1961 general elections were held 
under this new constitutional arrangement. Gairy could not 
run in these elections because of an incident back in 1957 
when he had led a steelband through an opponent's political 
meeting, resulting in the loss of his elected franchise. 
Therefore Joshua Thorne, a leading member of the GULP stood as 
the party's representative. On this occasion the GULP won 
80 per cent of the seats with 53 per cent of the votes. Soon 
after the GULP assumed office Thorne, in accordance with a 
pre-arranged plan, resigned, and in a bye-election on 24 July 
1961 Gairy was elected to the vacated post. In the following 
month he became chief minister of state. With the increased 
powers in his hands provided for in the 1960 constitution, 
Gairy soon began to indulge in corrupt and 'unconstitutional' 
practices. Less than a year after coming to power Gairy's 
government was ousted by the colonial authorities because of
corruption. Evidence of corrupt practices under the GULP 
regime had been compiled by a commission of inquiry appointed 
by the Queen's representative in Grenada, James M . Lloyd.
This was published in what came to be called the 'Squandermania 
Report', which accused the Gairy government of misusing 
public funds so flagrantly as to threaten 'the control of
I  Cpublic expenditure and the morale of the Civil Service'. 
Although the allegations of corruption were real enough, one 
has to view the Squandermania issue as part of an attack by 
the Colonial Office and its local allies on Gairy's populist 
brand of politics. For corruption was commonplace in the 
Caribbean at this time and not all political leaders who 
engaged in it were dealt with in such a draconian fashion. 
Because of this political dimension of the episode there was 
deep division in the country over it. The working class and 
rural poor supported Gairy, while the middle and upper 
classes were against him. In any event, the scandal caused 
great damage to Gairy's party and this paved the way for the 
GNP's return to power in the 1962 elections.
After his defeat in 1962 Gairy returned to his union 
roots and agitated for wage rises in a context where the 
governing party showed little concern for the plight of the 
poor. Gairy also made great play of the fact that the GNP had 
failed to deliver the promise it made in the 1962 elections 
to create a unitary state with Trinidad. Because of the 
historical connections between Grenada and Trinidad and the 
employment and other opportunities that the latter provided, 
the GNP's support for a unitary state had won it the votes of 
many GULP supporters. With the GNP's failure to implement 
its electoral commitment, Gairy was able to win back many of
17
his followers. He rebuilt his popular appeal and the memory 
of his own corruption and lack of action faded.
From the late 1950s growing discord between West Indians 
and the British government obliged the Colonial Office to 
concede advances towards independence. While the larger and 
relatively more developed islands, such as Jamaica, obtained 
full political self-determination in the early 1960s, the 
small and severely impoverished territories of the eastern 
Caribbean were led through a graduated administrative 
process towards full statehood in the 1970s. In the case of 
Grenada full independence was preceded by an intermediate 
status known as Associated Statehood, which granted increased 
powers of self-rule. The 1967 elections were held under this 
new constitutional arrangement. As a result, when Gairy easily 
defeated the GNP he became premier with greater powers than 
ever before. This did not greatly please the British, who 
were responsible for the island's external affairs and, in the 
light of the experience of the previous decade, distrusted 
Gairy as an erratic demagogue. Yet the consequences of GULP'S 
victory were considerably more severe for Grenadians since 
the next twelve years of Gairy's government were marked by 
economic stagnation, domestic repression and personal 
c or r upt i on.
f
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The Economic Background
Up until the 1950s Grenada was one of the wealthier and
better administered territories in thp Windwards Islands chain,
as was indicated by the better standard of roads and the more
widespread educational system that it had up until that
period. Due to the havoc wreaked by Hurricane Janet in 1955,
however, Grenada lost its position of viability on recurrent
expenditure and in 1958 became dependent upon the British
government for budgetary assistance, called grant-in-aid. Of
course, Grenada's prosperity had only been relative to that
of other Windward Islands territories. In absolute terms
Grenada remained a bitterly impoverished country whose
socio-economic structure had changed little in the last one
hundred years. Moreover, recurrent viability was achieved
through foregoing development and social expenditure. To
quote Jacobs and Jacobs: 'The cornerstone of colonial financial
policy was the capitalist orientated concept which viewed
the attainment of budgetary surpluses as more essential than
attempts to alleviate the poor socio-economic conditions of
17the working class.' Nevertheless, the advent of grant-in-aid 
did inaugurate an important shift in the relationship between 
the colony and the metropolis since the principal facet 
of this system was direct financial control from the Colonial 
Office. Grant-in-aid gave Britain virtually unlimited powers 
over the expenditure of Grenada, and resulted in delays in 
approving budgets and supplemantary expenditure as the 
Colonial Office was unable at a distance to distinguish between 
frivolous requests and urgent, genuine needs. This situation 
prevailed in all the grant-assisted territories of the
Caribbean, and in response to criticism the Colonial Office
sought to blame the colonies because the grants mere not
always spent to the schedule planned. Investigation of this
problem, referred to by O'Loughlin, showed, however, that of
the three causes of such delays, (i) inability of the islands
to organize the work; (ii) delays in the Colonial Office;
(iii) delays in the receipt of materials ordered, the first
18could only be blamed to a minor extent. Grant-in-aid also
served to stifle development by inhibiting the adoption of
new methods or new departures in any field. One of the worst
aspects of the system was its limiting influence on the
expansion of national debt. In order to keep down the level of
assistance the Colonial Office imposed rules that all revenues
from public utilities were to be paid into a consolidated fund,
and could not be used for such purposes as increasing or
replacing the capital assets of the industries concerned. The
amount of capital available to the territory was also
limited by the low rate of sinking fund permitted - less than
2 per cent per annum - and the restrictions placed on j
borrowing in the British money markets. It is this system that
was primarily responsible for the low standard of public
utilities which became a feature of Grenada and other Eastern 
19Caribbean islands.
Gairy resented the economic straightjacket that British 
aid entailed and in 1969 rejected further assistance. This move 
was not as radical as it might appear, since the aid was 
being phased out anyway. But it did provide an insight into 
Gairy's thinking on the question of external assistance. These 
views became somewhat clearer in 1972 when, in broaching the 
question of independence he adopted the slogan: 'Independence 
will support Grenada, the people of Grenada do not have to
20
support independence.' What Gairy had in mind were the 
financial resources of the IMF, UN, World Bank and other 
international institutions that Grenada mould have access to 
upon the attainment of independence.
In structural terms, the basic feature of the Grenadian 
economy before the revolution mas its heavy dependence on 
three agricultural products - cocoa, nutmegs and bananas - 
for the bulk of its earnings. (See table l). These earnings 
mere insufficient, homever, to cover the growing costs of 
imports that provided a large proportion of the country's 
food requirements (see table 2 ) and virtually all the 
manufactured goods, ram materials and fuel used in the 
country. This gave rise to a persistent and groming balance 
of trade deficit on visible earnings that mas balanced by 
infloms from the tourist industry, established in the 1960s, 
and remittances from Grenadians resident abroad. Added to this 
sturctural dependence on primary production for export and 
tourism, mas the high per capita cost of government mhich a 
population size of around 100,000 persons entailed. Studies 
conducted at the time of the West Indian Federation shomed that 
the political integration of Grenada mith the neighbouring 
islands mould not produce any spectacular savings in 
government expenditure, even in the cost of administration, 
and still less in the major recurrent expenditure of education, 
medical and public health service, agriculture and public 
works. In order for Grenada to get the same standard of social 
amenities as larger countries mith an'equivalent per capita 
income, she mould have to divert a higher proportion of 
national income to government. This explains mhy , in spite of 
relatively high tax rates, Grenada had difficulty managing 
mithout grant-in-aid, and mhy the standard of services in
20
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TABLE 1
SHARES AND RATES OF CHANGE 
OF SELECTED MERCHANDISE 
EXPORTS - 1973-1978
As a Percentage of Domestic Exports(a)
1975 1976 1977 1978
Cocoa 2 6 .15 26 .0 5 23.98 43.99
Bananas 25.23 23.27 23.32 20.93
Nutmeg 38.39 37.89 43.22 24.15
Mace 5.53 8.42 4.37 3.94
Fresh Fruit 0.34 0.24 0.36 1 .2 7
Furniture - 0.40 1.0 9 1.64
Clothing 1.51 1 .0 3 2.04 2.31
Other 2.93 2.62 1.60 1.88
(a) Totals may not add up due to rounding
Source: International Monetary Fund, Grenada: Recent Economic 
Developments. 1981, p.01. "
m
TABLE 2
FOOD IMPORTS BEFORE THE REVOLUTION: 1970-1978
Year
Food
Imports
I
Total
Imports
3C|
Food Imports 
as % of 
Total 
Imports
1970 10,996,582 M+,6 3 1,756 2*+.6
1971 12,985,96*+ *+6,051,213 28.2
1972 13,292,000 *+2,811,69*+ 31.0
1973 l*+,5*+0,*+08 *+2,*+87,129 3^.2
197*+ 1 5 ,0 83,813 37,079,822 *+1.0
1975 1 8 ,256,*+59 5 2,818,000 3^.6
1976 23,0*+2,870 66,215,392 35.0
1977 2 9,667,000* 8*+,763,336 35.0*
1978 33*69*^,000* 96,268,7*+6 35.0*
* Estimates
Source: Garth A. Southwell, Background Data on Rural
Development Policies and Programmes in Granada;
Paper prepared for the 15th West Indieui Agricultural 
Economics Conference, St« George’s, 13-19 July 1980, 
p. 9.
f
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relation to per capita expenditure was not much higher.
Another result of small size was an extremely low 
efficiency of capital utilization in Grenada. A World Bank 
study published in 1976 suggested an 'incremental capital
output ratio' (ICOR) of six; a very high figure for an
22economy such as the Grenadian. The high ICOR was, however, 
only partly due to diseconomies of scale and the high overhead 
costs of investment in infrastructure which could be spread 
over a small population. It was also a reflection of government 
policy and the unproductive utilisation of investment funds, 
factors that will be examined shortly.
Table 3 shows the modest changes which took place in 
the structure of the Grenadian economy during the 1960s and 
1970s. In the first place, it highlights the continued 
importance of export agriculture whose contribution to GDP 
fluctuated marginally at around 33 per cent. The manufacturing 
sector remained stagnant, never having contributed more than 
4 per cent to GDP. The favourable performance made by the 
construction sector in 1960 was the result of the initial 
impetus given by the tourist industry in the form of hotel 
building. The progressive diminution of this sector provides a 
graphic illustration of the inability of tourism to sustain 
this activity. The tourist industry did, however, have a 
sustained impact on the services sector whose contribution to 
GDP stayed constant between 14 and 16 per cent. Wholesale and 
retail trade persisted as one of the most important sectors 
of economic activity, a corollary of the high import content of 
the economy and the preponderant role played by merchant 
capital. Finally, the growing importance of government services 
is also depicted.
Subsequent to the attainment of full independence in 1974
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under Gairy, the Grenadian economy went into reverse gear. It
23has been estimated that the disturbances of 1973-74 brought
about a catastrophic 33 per cent fall in GNP between 1972 and 
241974. A World Bank report published i'n 1979 pointed out that
real per capita income was below the level it had been at the
25beginning of the decade. An indication of the retrogression is 
provided in table 4. Of course, the enduring depression of the 
Grenadian economy was not solely due to Gairyism. It was also 
caused by Grenada’s external dependence and the obstacle to 
economic activity engendered by the relations of production 
in the country. The stultifying form of Gairy's government only 
exacerbated the situation. A consideration of agricultural 
production will make this point clearer.
After the massive destruction caused by Hurricane Janet 
to Grenada's nutmeg and cocoa crop, a recovery programme was 
launched which included the development of bananas. By the 
late 1960s, cocoa had recovered pre-hurricane levels and 
banana production doubled; production of nutmeg and its outer- 
covering, mace, were about one-half of their early 1950s 
levels because the nutmeg tree takes twenty-five years to reach 
its prime production period. During the 1970s agricultural 
activity declined. Between 1975 to 1980 annual production of 
cocoa was on average 17 per cent below its 1965-70 average 
level, bananas were 39 per cent below, while nutmeg and mace
O Creached their pre-hurricane levels. At the same time a number 
of estates dropped out of agricultural.production, while those 
that remained had vast acreages of idle land. An indication
26
TABLE 4
Real gross domestic product 1970-77 (selected years) 
EC$m (1970 prices)
1970 1974 1975 1976 1977 (est.)
Real GDP 60 34 36 30 28
Source: Adapted from Trinidad and Tobago Review. May 1979» p. 6
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of the decline in farm acreage which occurred was
provided by the agricultural census carried out by the
Bishop regime in August 1981. In that’ year the census
identified a total farm acreage of 34,243 acres. In 1961 and
1975, the comparable figures obtained were 50,693 and
34,432 acres respectively. Thus, between 1961 and 1975 total
farm acreage declined at an annual rate of 1.9 per cent,
and for the period 1975-81 the rate of decrease was 2.1 per
cent. As regards the number of landholders in the country,
comparison of census data is difficult because of
definitional problems. In 1961 and 1975 there were
15,319 and 12,565 landholders respectively, indicating an
annual fall of 1.4 per cent in the agricultural population.
In 1981 the number of landholders was 8,205. Because of the
different basis of classification used in that year, however,
the decline since 1975 was not as great as it might
appear. In fact, taking this factor into account the
annual rate of decrease over the period 1975-91 was
27around 1.5 per cent.
Several factors were responsible for the decline 
in agricultural activity. First of all, the terms 
of trade with the West deteriorated markedly. In 
1966 the total value generated by Grenada's nutmeg exports
was ECS58 million and of this amount Grenada received
EC$6 million. By 1977 the corresponding figures were ECI15D
million and ECI15 million respectively. (See table 5). Grenada's
situation vis à vis the West has been summarized by Brizan in
historical terms: 'In the eighteenth century, Grenada
exchanged sugar and coffee for wines and horses. The sugar
was then processed in England. That was the era of the Old
Mercantilism. Today, the structure is the same all that has
changed is the form. Instead of sugar it is cocoa and nutmegs
and instead of a horse it is a car. This is the era of the 
28New Mercantilism.' The other main factor that caused the 
demise of agriculture were the policies of the Gairy 
administration. In the early 1970s Gairy launched a land reform 
programme, called 'Land for the Landless'. Under this scheme 
the government acquired around twenty-six estates in the 
country. Landowners sold their estates to the government 
because of fear of take-over, increasing labour costs and 
the difficulties involved in getting labour to work on the 
land. The net effect of the policy, however, was to reduce 
the amount of land in productive use. Among the reasons for
this was the fact that some of the land acquired was non-
/
productive; and of those lands that were actually distributed 
most were sold in very small lots, in some cases to previous 
tenants and squatters. Some of the lands had no..clear 
boundaries or titles, thus making both payment and development 
quite difficult. By withholding compensation to those 
landowners he disliked, Gairy used the scheme as a political 
weapon. It also served as a basis for political patronage.
The lands were made available to supporters of Gairy, and 
it was his followers that were employed on the estates that
29
TABLE 5
GRENADA'S SHARE OF TOTAL VALUE 
IN THE NUTMEG TRADE: 1966-1977
Volume of 
exports 
Nutmeg Mace 
lbs million
Total final 
value of Grendada's 
exports 
EC$ million
Grenada's share 
of total value
EC$ million
1966 3.103 0.431 58.60 6.156
1967 1.158 0.109 22.20 2.332
1968 3.019 0.333 28.60 2.978
1969 3.155 0.401 29.43 3.003
1970 3.228 0.374 37.20 3.796
1971 3.735 0.521 39.02 3.982
1972 4.348 0.734 41.06 4.190
1973 2.888 0.629 37.28 3.804
1974 3.015 0.452 73.95 7.546
1975 2.645 0.221 80.07 8.170
1976 6.529 0.763 144.75 14.771
1977 5.819 0.741 150.03 15.304
Total 42.642 5.709 742.19 75.972
Source: George Brizan, The Nutmeg Industry: Grenada's Black Gold. 
St. George's, 1979, p. 18.
remained intact. Produce from the estates was used to supply 
the restaurants and hotels which Gairy acquired as his own 
personal property and the state farming sector as a whole 
served as a power base in the c ountr y.side. Gairy further upset 
the agricultural industry by tampering with the island's 
three marketing associations, the Grenada Co-operative Nutmeg 
Association (GCNA), the Grenada Banana Co-operative Society 
(GBCS) and the Grenada Cocoa Association (GCA). These are 
statutory bodies that have exclusive powers to buy the entire 
crop they represent, market it and, after deducting an 
operating commission, pay producers according to output.
In the early 1970s there were fears that Gariy was trying to 
get access to the funds of the associations and in response 
the GCNA transferred its money to a bank in Barbados. Gairy 
retaliated by introducing a law prohibiting the associations 
depositing money abroad. Subsequently Gairy moved to take 
control of the associations. Alleging that the GCNA was
'acting more like a political organisation rather than a 
2 9co-operative', in 1975 the Gairy regime dissolved the 
association's board of directors and appointed an interim 
board of planters who supported the GULP. At the same time 
the right of growers to elect members of the board was withdrawn
and local area meetings were discontinued. Similar measures 
were introduced in the GCA and the GBCS.
The overall effect of Gairy's capricious and autocratic 
inroads into agriculture was to drastically reduce the 
confidence of the remaining estate owners in agricultural 
production. Since these owners held important economic and
31
ideological influence over society as a whole, the 
consequences were quite pervasive. As the Chamber of Commerce 
remonstrated in its 1978 annual report: 'Excessive acquisition 
of estates is a disincentive to investment in agriculture 
as well as in the manufacturing sector especially as 
dispossessed owners experience much difficulty in receiving 
compensation.1
Like estate owners, the peasantry also 
fared badly under Gairy. Peasant agriculture in Grenada has 
been severely handicapped by the widespread incidence of 
parcelling and subdivision of holdings. This has largely been 
a consequence of the system of joint inheritance, under which 
each family member receives an equal share of the family 
property unless otherwise denoted in a will. In a study of 
small farming in Grenada, Brierley gives a specific example 
of how this system can impede agricultural production:
'... a farmer in St. Patrick's parish, because he had been 
unable to inform his two brothers in England of their father's 
death and therefore lacked their consent to work the family 
land, felt obliged to work only half an acre as a subsistence 
plot, and had left over seven acres of fertile, unfragmented 
land in an unproductive state for eight years .^Excessive 
fragmentation of holdings encumbered agriculture in a number 
of other ways. These included the high degree of land 
wastage caused by the superfluous number of footpaths and 
fences, the added costs incorred from the time and expense 
involved in shifting inputs from one plot to another, the 
increased burden of supervision, the problems involved in 
developing adequate drainage and irrigation systems, the 
difficulties of applying advanced farming techniques and 
chemical inputs, and the added risks of praedial larceny in
32
a society of rural deprivation. While the Grenadian peasant 
traditionally provided a considerable proportion of the 
country's agricultural produce - 63 per cent of nutmegs, 30 
per cent of bananas, 50 per cent of cocoa, 85 per cent of 
food and vegetable crops, 93 per cent of sugar cane - he or 
she faced considerable problems in obtaining credit. The 
requirements of the four foreign-owned commercial banks - 
Barclays Bank International, Royal Bank of Canada, Bank of 
Nova Scotia, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce - were such 
that the majority of peasants were unable to utilize their 
facilities. Moreover, the Grenada Agricultural and Industrial 
Development Corporation (GAIDC) set up by the Gairy regime 
to assist industry and agriculture, disbursed an insignificant 
number of loans to peasants and soon became a major casualty 
of government corruption. Table 6 shows that up to 1975 loans 
made available by the GAIDC were dominated by the traditional 
export crops. However, the relative proportion of loans 
disbursed to that sector steadily dcreased after 1974. But it 
was fishing and student loans and not domestic agriculture 
which replaced export agriculture. Moreover, the total number
of loans made was very small in comparison to the number of
32potential clients - over 12,000. As regards GAIDCs finances, 
some 50 per cent of the original ECS2.5 million loaned to 
the Corporation by the Gairy regime could not be accounted 
for. Two of the managers appointed by the GAIDC, George 
Marryshow and Roy Banfield, were stooges of Gairy who allowed 
him to direct the Corporation and channel its fund to his 
supporters. In 1977 the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), 
which from 1972 onwards provided all the Corporation's funding, 
refused to make any more loan disbursements because of the 
corruption. Referring to this and other instances of
33
© % L O
-  .o 
©
—^ ■*— t o o
©
cr*
o
o
L O S
LOcr* cr* 00cr* v o
3 C\J 00 CO o cr* H - CO t o
rH
cd O cr* L O eg •^r t o v o t o
> eg ■»— T— eg
VO cr* eg LO t o _^o t o t o 1 eg VO
&
v .o
a s %
v o
© $
' eg eg o
t o 00 _^ oo 8 v o© O J -v T t o 00 LO e g
3 i n t o cr* cr* VO t o v o
rH
cd VO •<— 00 t o 00 cr* t o VO
> t O eg *— VO L O ^—
e g
* 00 eg eg t o CO cr v o
o C"- o *— eg
' t o
t o
• g .
V O
, ,
tt o ^— eg eg
'r _
© L O
o 00
c*- s C -cr* 8
3 C*- 00 00 t o 00rH l i
cd VO L O t o t o
« 6>■ GO t o 00 o -
e g
C " cr eg t o e g
o O t - o i i i O
eg
* t o L O v.o& i i
v o
L O n 2
©
O'*
eg O
o
t o
t o & a C ^
0 00 t o 00 ^— 'v f vo
rH •> 1 i
cd cr O o VO cr* o
>■ eg t o v— eg -«— ■*— t o
e g
• L O L O eg VO vo 0 0o t o eg eg i i v o
55 eg to
VO 1 i
▼— o
‘T—
VO cr* v rto O VO O e g
c— t - e g cr t o eg ■H"
1 i 1
0 8 to c— cr* E r COVO i— I VO 00 CO L O
cr* 03 eg ■r— t o t o
►>
eg to
• to to e - eg svo L O O i 1 i
0 0 T— c\j
•S co3
0 0
rH O ttp O f-t -P 0o •H tf) co © ©u < o 0c ttf M •0 PI 0o o © 0 ©CO •H o CO LH -P -P
t -PCO -PCO 0 A rH 0© COHo © © x o rH Td COp. 0 > co u $X O •H •H 0 0 -P 0w (0 l-q Pn Pi CO CO CO So
ur
ce
: 
Sm
al
l 
Fa
rm
in
g 
in
 t
he
 L
es
s 
De
ve
lo
pe
d 
Co
un
tr
ie
s 
of
 t
he
 C
ar
ib
be
an
.
34
'inadequate managing and accounting practices', the 1979 World
Bank report on Grenada commented dryly: 'More than the other
LDCs /Less Developed Countries of the Caribbean Community/
Grenada has been hampered by the weakness of its institutions.^^
In any event, at the end of 1978 the CDB resumed making loans
to the Corporation when a new manager, Charles Alleyne, was 
34appointed. The Grenadian peasantry also suffered as a result 
of the disorganization of Grenada's domestic marketing 
organization. Between 1960 to 1965 the marketing organisation 
sustained losses in excess of $58,400, not including 
the salaries of administrative and clerical staff and sundry 
incidentals. Along with inadequate storage facilities, 
mismanagement was the major reason for the losses. In 1978 the 
Board had no duly appointed manager. It had not been provided 
with funding nor operating capital. In that year the total
produce handled amounted to only EC$5,700.^^
During the 1960s and 1970s Grenada's agricultural 
industry was also affected by the exodus of young people from 
the countryside. Increasingly exposed to the demonstration 
effects of Western tourism, the young people of Grenada lost 
interest in working on the lands owned by their parents; and 
in ever larger numbers they sought alternative means of 
employment through migration or in the informal and tertiary 
sectors associated with the tourist industry. Although 
significant in local terms, compared to other Caribbean 
islands the movement from the countryside was modest. Between 
1960 and 1970, the net annual rate of rural-urban migration 
was 0.6 per cent - a low figure. Fur+h ermore , data compiled on 
the age distribution of farm employment in 1975 found that a 
significant proportion of the country's youth were still
35
found to be living and working in the agricultural sectorThus, 
Grenada was somewhat out of line with most other Caribbean 
territories where a mass exodus from the countryside had 
swelled the environs of the chief urban centres and given rise 
to an acute social crisis. In any event, as a result of the 
rural exodus and the other factors already mentioned, serious 
labour shortages developed and were pushed to levels which 
rendered farming unprofitable in many instances.
Apart from providing alternative means of employment for
Grenada's rural inhabitants, the advent of tourism brought
about social changes and was also responsible for some of the
structural changes that took place in the economy. In concluding
his study of the economics of tourism development in the
Eastern Caribbean in the 1970s, John M . Bryden presents an
analysis which is highly germane to the Grenadian situation:
'... there is reason to suppose that tourists and/or expatriate
employees, qua reference groups, may well influence the
consumption patterns of indigenes with whom they come into
direct or indirect contact. Such an influence would almost
inevitably mean a switch from locally produced to imported
commodities. Such a process, operating through the supply of
factors, and the demand for locally produced commodities,
would explain many of the structural changes which have taken
place in those islands which have experienced rapid growth in
their tourist sectors during the decade, notably a tendency
for the propensity to import to rise, and for both domestic
agricultural production and production of agricultural
37commodities for export to decline.' The main feature of the 
Grenadian tourist industry was its high class nature, most of 
the hotels being small and exhibiting a high ratio of staff 
to guests. The industry was also characterised by a significant
»
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amount of excess capacity. In 1977 bed occupancies averaged 
26.6 per cent and room occupancies about 45 per cent; the 
latter rose to a high-season figure of 75-80 per cent and fell
-Z Qto a low season figure of 20-25 per cent. The overwhelming
majority of visitors to Grenada mere cruise ship passengers
who spend much less money than stay-over visitors. The economic
impact of tourism was also constrained by the high leakage of
visitor expenditure into imports, which in 1976 was put as
39high as 50 per cent. Thus, tourism reinforced the high import 
content of the economy. It also led to a substantial growth 
of real estate. A large number of foreigners built holiday 
and retirement homes in some of the most congenial parts of 
the country, and this gave rise to a substantial increase in 
land prices and speculation. A large amount of the agricultural 
land that dropped out of production either shifted to, or was 
reserved for private residential development. The effects of
Gairyism on the tourist industry were as devastating as those
. 4 0in agriculture. The events of 1973-74 and the image
that emerged of Gairy as a ruthless despot, caused a dislocation
of the industry from which it did not recover until 1978.
(See table 7) .
Turning to construction, road building was another tale of 
woe under Gairy. Poor roads had long been recognised as a 
serious problem, and in 1975 a contract was awarded to a 
foreign company to complete some 30 miles of feeder roads in 
three years. In June 1977, however, construction activities 
came to a halt with only 6 miles completed. Work which had 
been started on another 9 miles was suspended. Four main 
reasons were responsible for the collapse of the project: 
poor management, bad allocation of personnel, corruption; 
and the attempt by the firm to utilize non-labour intensive
If
*
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techniques in a situation of high unemployment and where road 
work u/as 'an important part of the political patronage 
system' .
Grenada's comprador bourgeoisie was frustrated by the
policies of the Gairy regime. The importance of this class in
economic affairs was shown in the statistics released by
the foreign-owned commercial banks. In 1978 bank loans made
available to the distributive trades sector amounted to
EC$18,456,000. At the same time, loans to agriculture,
manufacturing and tourism totalled EC$6,322,000, E C U , 134,000
and EC$4,454,000 respectively. (See table 8). For its part,
the comprador bourgeoisie was not content with carrying out
its traditional import and export functions and aspired to
set up industrial enterprises. However, Gairy's economic
policies hardly generated a climate of confidence among the
business class. The annual reports of the Chamber of Commerce
for the years 1978 and 1979 provide some information on this.
In 1978 the Chamber demurred that potential investors were
disinclined to come to Grenada because of the Gairy government's
failure to provide vital information and statistics about the
country. The Chamber called on the government to take active
measures to promote industry and encourage investment. In
putting its case, the Chamber referred to proposals made in
a recent study prepared by the London-based Economist
Intelligence Unit. Citing this study the Chamber noted: 'The
recommendation that government should enter into an
internationally binding agreement to guarantee investors agianst
the arbitrary seizure of their property is also considered 
42important.r The 1979 annual report returned to the theme of 
industrial promotion. It pointed to a certain ambivalence and 
incompetence in the Gairy regime's attempt to take steps in
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this direction: 'The Chamber's representative on the Board 
of Directors of the Agricultural and Industrial Development 
Corporation reported before resigning from the Board, that he 
had moved a motion in the terms of the mandate given to him to 
get the Corporation to fully implement, as a matter of urgency, 
the recommendation of the Economist Intelligence Unit with 
regard to the active promotion of industry. The motion was 
enthusiastically received and was passed unanimously. The 
Corporation thereupon wrote the Minister of Finance, Trade 
and Industry in July 1978 requesting provision for the 
necessary qualified staff. It was thought that technical aid 
would have been provided by one of the United Nations agencies 
but it appears that no action was taken on the Corporation's 
application. However, the Prime Minister subsequently appointed 
the Operation Industrialisation and Employment Bootstring 
Committee to encourage rapid development of small industry by 
the provision of assistance in plant and machinery and by 
Government participation by taking shareholding in exchange 
for the plant and machinery up to a maximum of 49 per cent. It 
appears that the Committee was unable to achieve any positive 
results and it is hoped that the Corporation, which was 
established by law for the purpose, would be given the
necessary 'tools for the job' at an early date so that some
43progress could be made in the promotion of industry.^ In subtle 
but no less uncertain terms, the Chamber drew attention to 
the Gairy government's floundering and incapacity to 
institute an effective programme of industrialization.
Notwithstanding the importance which he himself placed on 
external assistance, Gairy also displayed incompetence in 
providing adequate channels for obtaining outside aid.
Mention has already been made of the incident involving the
40
41
CDB in 1977. In the same year, foreign governments and
international agencies pledged ECI21.8 million to Grenada. On
account of the inefficiency and malpractices, however, only
ECS2.8 million was actually taken up. Moreover, because of the
failure to pay constitutional levies, Grenada was, in the
last year under Gairy on the verge of losing its vote and
participation in bodies such as the UN, UNESCO, the World
Health Organisation and the University of the West Indies^
Because of the state of disorganization, these bodies had
come to play an important role in the economy. As a CDB study
noted: 'Government planning ...has been fitful, and has
essentially been a function of the disposition of the various
45
international agencies.' Furthermore, because of the absence 
of loeal financial resources the great bulk of capital 
spending on the island came from these regional and 
international sources. The drying up of these funds therefore 
signalled the termination of what little economic development 
was in progress.
42
Class Formation in Grenada
On account of the country's diminutive size it is extremely
difficult to apply class analysis to the Grenadian social
formation. In such a tiny nation, family ties are ubiquitous and
are usually more determinant of an individual's behaviour than
his or her relationship to the means of production. Moreover,
Grenada is a society of migration. Ever since the ending of
slavery Grenadians have travelled far and wide in search of
work, and their earnings abroad and the remittances they send
home have greatly influenced the process of class formation in 
46country. Today there are reported to be twice as many Grenadians
in Trinidad and Tobago than in Grenada, and twice as many again
in the US and Britain. The problem of class analysis is
further complicated by the distortion introduced by colour. As
in other Caribbean states, the traumatic experience of chattel
slavery has given rise to a fixation on race which both
47mediates and obscures class conflict. Finally, perhaps to a 
greater extent than many other countries in the region, all 
classes in Grenada still have ties to the land. Hence, 
attitudes and customs borne of land ownership are quite 
generalized. In spite of these difficulties, however, it is 
possible to delineate the principal social classes in 
Grenadian society and identify their main characteristics. 
Furthermore, it is incumbent upon us to make such an analysis, 
since without one it would not be possible to explain
48adequately the class-based policies of the Bishop regime.
Starting at the top of the class structure, it is 
relatively easy to demarcate the planter class. The modern
43
plantocracy bears little resemblance to its white slave-based 
predecessor in that most big landowners are black Grenadians. 
The de Gale family, owners of the River Antoine estate in 
St. Andrews, are the only significant group of planters who 
can trace their origins back to the period of slavery. Their 
forbears once owned vast acreages all over Grenada. With family 
ties and other interests in Britain, they are also one of 
Grenada's small group of absentee landowners. Most other 
planters acquired their properties in the twentieth century. 
Some, such as Percy Campbell, were the former managers of 
estates owned by long established planters. Another group, 
represented by the East Indian Ramdhanny family, acquired their 
estates through activities in agriculture. Legal services 
provided another means of obtaining an estate in that lawyers 
were sometimes given an estate in part payment for services 
rendered to a planter in financial difficulty. It is said that 
Sir Dennis Henry, a prominent Grenadian lawyer, acquired the 
Mirabeau estate in St. Andrews in this fashion. Finally, a 
number of planters made their money working abroad. Thus, the 
present day planter class is broad-based and includes whites, 
blacks and East Indians.
In formal terms at least, the plantocracy became a 
capitalist class at the end of the 1930s when the metayage 
system was discontinued and wage labour was introduced on the 
plantations. It was, however, to be a very retrograde capitalist 
class in that there was no introduction of modern technology 
and work methods remained pretty much the same as they had been 
during slavery^As the Financial Times commented in 1971:'... 
the planting elite is not noted for its progressive ideas: 
estates are still run on primitive lines and the average 
plantation worker is a sullen individual whose job is a social
44
stigma. A change in the system could well do some good.'
re -y o \c .
The agricultural census carried out by the Bishop, providesA
some data on the size of the planter class. At this time the 
revolutionary government had not yet expanded the state farming 
sector, so the figures depict the situation before the 
government's intervention. The estates acquired by the Gairy 
regime accounted for some 10 per cent of farm acreage and 
33 per cent of the farms over 100 acres. If one defines a 
planter in Grenada as a person who owns more than 100 acres of 
land, then in 1981 the planter class, representing less than 
0.3 per cent of all landholders, owned 20 per cent of the total 
acreage. (See table 9).
The second and most powerful component of Grenada's
capitalist class is the merchant class or the comprador
bourgeoisie. A number of merchants in Grenada are also
plantation owners, and many of those who are not have familiy
and other direct connections with the planter class. As an
open economy heavily reliant upon trade with the outside world,
throughout Grenada's history merchants have been the most
important social group. Up until the mid-twentieth cenury, the
marketing of agricultural products was in the hands of private
dealers. As a result, the peasantry and the planter class
suffered severe exploitation, with agricultural produce being
the target for thieves. It is alleged that stolen cocoa was
sometimes transported at night in coffins, apparently to
52
terrify the curious. From the 1930s onwards, however, the 
colonial government took steps to control the marketing of 
cocoa and nutmegs and remove the private dealers from 
agriculture. In 1946 the Nutmeg Industry Ordinance was 
introduced which established the GCNA. Although the dealers 
protested vehemently and got their supporter, J.B. Renwick, to
51
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TABLE 9
LAMB DISTRIBUTION! 1981
SIZE OF FARMS 
Acres
ACREAGE
ft
FARMERS^
ft
0 0.00 3.59
0 - 0.5 2.48 27.79
0.5 - 1 4.01 18.05
1 - 2 7.63 18.59
2 - 5 16.93 20.28
5 - 1 0 12.01 6.90
10 - 15 6.07 1.98
1 5 - 2 0 3.90 0.91
20 - 25 2.24 0.40
25 - 50 6.12 0.71
50 - 100 7.56 0.45
1004- 31.00 0.29
(a) Includes private, state and co-operative farms.
Source: Ministry of Planning, Final Report on Grenada
Agricultural Census 1981, St. George’s 1982, p.28
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campaign in the Legislative Council on their behalf, the
53
monopoly position of the Association remained intact. In the 
1960s the GCA and the GBCS were created.
With its avenues for development in agriculture blocked, 
Grenada's merchant class expanded its operations in the whole­
sale and retail trade and gained a predominant interest in the 
country's tourist industry. The three largest companies on the 
island are merchant houses which are roughly equal in size. The 
oldest, Jonas Browne and Hubbard (Grenada) Ltd, started 
operations in the 1830s. Originally owned by an English family, 
the company was taken over by Grenadians who now own over 90 
per cent of the shares. Ownership is broad-based with no 
shareholder owning more than 15 per cent of the share capital. 
The companies activities include shipping, insurance, trading 
in lumber and hardware and retailing household goods, food and 
motor vehicles. Hubbards' interests extend to some of the most 
expensive real estate in Grenada, including the Grand Anse
shopping centre and the Food Fair retail complex on the
54Carenage in St. George's. The second of Grenada's leading 
companies, Geo. F. Huggins (Grenada) Ltd, was established in the 
1920s as a subsidiary of Geo. F. Huggins (Trinidad) Ltd based 
in Trinidad. In the early 1970s the parent company was bought 
by Geddes Grant Ltd, one of the largest domestic companies in 
Trinidad and Tobago^and the Grenadian company became a 
subsidiary of Geddes Grant. Huggins engages in similar 
activities to those of Hubbards. It is also an important tour 
operator and owns an important factory called Caribbean Agro 
Industries, which produces flour for domestic consumption and
C Cexport. L/.E. Julien and Co Ltd is the third leading merchant 
house and was founded in 1937 by U.E. Julien and several other 
Grenadian entrepreneurs. Today the company is primarily in the
hands of the Julien family, who also own property in Barbados, 
and the Taylor family based in Grenada. Again, Juliens carries
out standard wholesale and retail activities and also controls
5 7the localCocA&Uf actory , Grenada Bottling Plant Ltd. Complement­
ing the activities of the three largest companies are a host of 
smaller family based merchant houses whose operations are more 
specialized. Included amongst these are Bain and Sons Ltd,
L.L. Ramdhanny and Co Ltd, M .A. Bullen and Sons Ltd and L.A. 
Puree 11.
The preponderant role played by merchants in Grenada, a 
corollary of the dependent and 'open' nature of the economy, 
has itself given rise to a trading mentality which permeates the 
capitalist class. As Kenrick Radix, the Minister for Justice, 
Industrial Development and Fisheries under the Bishop regime, 
explained in an address given in 1981: 'In fact one can say 
quite honestly that the situation in Grenada and indeed, in 
the so-called less developed countries is that a historic 
attitude has been developed in a class, whereby it simply gets 
a letter form, puts on a 10e stamp and writes off to England or 
the United States and says, "would you send me down ten yards 
of cloth please, two dozen needles and a couple of pairs of 
shoes?" And then that comes back and a high mark up is put on 
and they make the money that way. This is part of the historical 
legacy of this region.^In concluding this discussion of the 
capitalist class, mention shold also be made of the hotel 
owners, who are in the main Grenadian, and a number of other 
enterprises that are owned by foreign companies. Regional and 
international firms dominate banking and insurance and control 
several commercial outlets and industrial establishments.
The intermediate classes in Grenada, the petty bourgeoisie 
and the middle class, have family, ethnic and economic links
48
59with the capitalist class. As in many other Third World
countries, the petty bourgeoisie has a large mercantile 
80fraction. The marketing of foodstuffs for domestic consumption
is mainly performed by itinerant and sedentary vendors called
hucksters. They are also responsible for the main bulk of
Grenada's exports of fruits and vegetables to neighbouring
states. The produce is transported in privately-owned boats.
Boat-building and sea transport are also important domains of
the petty bourgeoisie. Most of the boats are built in Carriacou
and form the basis of the 'Bobul trade' or smuggling, which is
6 1a major source of income for Carriacouans. The boats are also
used for fishing which is a full- or part-time activity for
many people living on the coast. It is estimated that in 1976
there were 1,450 fishermen, 300 fish vendors and around 850
6 2fishing boats in the country. Road transport is another
preserve of the Grenadian petty bourgeoisie. Prior to the
revolution all private transport in the country was privately
owned. Country buses, consisting of an imported chassis and
a locally made wooden body, transport both people and
agricultural produce to towns. Since the 1960s enterprising
individuals have purchased imported minibuses which rapidly
became the most popular form of public transport. Minibuses are
also used to carry tourists. The more affluent tourists,
however, are served by a fleet of individually owned taxis
which provide a substantial but intermittent income for a 
63number of people. Another component of the petty bourgeoisie 
is the small shopkeeper. Included in this category are 
many professionals who use part of their homes for retail 
purposes. Due to the importance of tourism and migration, the 
letting of accomodation is another source of income for a 
broad cross-section of society. Family-owned guest houses and
49
private homes supplement the accomodation provided by hotels, 
and Grenadian nationals resident abroad have built houses 
which their relatives let as a source of income. On account of 
the country's extremely low level of development, Grenada is 
served by a network of tradesmen and artisans. Among these, 
motor mechanics are an important group because of the poor state 
of the country's roads.
Grenada's informal sector, the unemployed and under­
employed who engage in 'marginal' activitiesf^may be viewed as
6 5a lower stratum of the petty bourgeoisie. In 1970 some 42 per 
cent of the population was unemployed, and underemployment 
extended to another 20 per cent of Grenadians. (See tables 10 
and 11). So one can see that the category under discussion is 
a significant one. As in other Caribbean islands, tourism 
provides the basis for the somewhat precarious livelihood of 
the informal sector. Into this group should be placed beach 
vendors, usually older women selling home-made clothes, fruits 
and spices to tourists, beach boys, who provide drugs, 
companionship and sexual services, prostitutes and 'walking 
taxis', that is young children who offer to take tourists on 
guided tours. Declasse layers also obtain an income and food 
from praedial larceny, a phenomenon that has been facilitated 
by the disorganized state of the country's agriculture. And 
remittances from abroad are sometimes sufficient to enable an 
'unemployed' person to forgo the need for wage labour.
Turning to the agricultural section of the petty 
bourgeoisie, the peasantry, great care should be exercised 
when trying to demarcate its ranks. For, as mentioned above, 
all social strata in Grenada have ties to the land. Thus, it 
necessary to differentiate the true peasantry, namely those 
who are primarily dependent upon the land for their
50
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TABLE 11
NUMBER OF MONTHS WORKED 
IN LAST 12 MONTHS - 1970
NUMBER OP MONTHS MALE FEMALE TOTAL
Under 2 months 351 407 738
2 - 3  months 510 392 902
4 - 5  months 718 621 1 ,339
6 - 7  months 1 ,567 1 ,167 2,734
8 - 9  months 1 ,800 1,063 2,863
10-11 months 984 575 1,559
12 months 9,826 5,489 15,315
Nil or not stated 3,673 15,086 18,759
TOTAL 19,409 24,800 44,209
Source: Grenada Abstract of Statistics 1979. p. 21
52
livelihood, from other categories who simply derive a portion
of their income from the land. The 1981 agricultural census
showed that 49.07 per cent of landholders in Grenada worked in
agriculture full-time, that is derived all of their income from
the land. Of those who worked part-time, 30.5 per cent were
estate workers, 20.8 per cent were employed with government
and 19.2 per cent were tradesmen and artisans. Smaller
percentages were employed as taxi drivers, shopkeepers,
6 6fishermen, professionals and businessmen. Thus, an important
segment of the Grenadian peasantry may be described as a
semi-proletariat, that is an intermediate layer which retains
ownership of its means of production in agriculture or service
6 Vtrades but is obliged to work part of the time as wage labour. 
This stratum should be borne when we come to our analysis of 
the proletariat.
It is also possible to use data from the agricultural 
census to differentiate other segments of the peasantry. Thus, 
the census provided information on the extreme diversification 
of Grenada's agriculture. More than 20 per cent of landholders 
cultivated seven different crops. This is a reflection of 
environmental conditions, the low level of farming expertise 
and the landholders' concern to avoid risk by investing in more 
than one crop. Given the mixed nature of farming in Grenada 
some five acres is required to support a family in agriculture. 
This figure enables us to distinguish between the poor 
peasants and the middle peasants. Those landholders owning 
five acres and more are not obliged to sell their labour 
power and are therefore in a different situation to those 
owning less than this amount who must supplemnt their inccme 
with some other pursuit or live in a state of dire impoverish-
53
merit. Some of those owning less than five acres, however, are 
professionals and other high income categories, and it would be 
necessary to identify these in order to arrive at a precise 
figure for the number of poor peasants. In any event, it is 
instructive to note that according to the census 88.30 per cent 
of landholders owned less than five acres and accounted for 
just 16.93 per cent of the total farm acreage. (See table 9). 
The problem of strata that are only partially based in 
agriculture is much less significant when it comes to 
landholders owning over five acres because the vast majority 
of them work full time in agriculture.
The distinction between middle peasants and rich peasants
is based on the size of landholdings and the nature of the
labour that is employed. Middle peasants are independent
smallholders who rely on family labour and that of associates
to cultivate their land. Rich peasants, on the other hand,
own significantly greater amounts of land, and although they
often participate in farm work they are mainly dependent
upon wage labour. Unlike planters, who own estates and employ
managers to run them, rich peasants are directly involved in
R flthe business of farming. Thus, using the admittedly 
arbitrary figure of 20 acres as the dividing line between 
middle and rich peasants, in 1981 the middle peasantry 
comprised 9.7 per cent of landholders and accounted for 
21.98 per cent of the land and rich peasants (owning less than 
100 acres) comprised 1.56 per cent of landholders and 
accounted for 15.92 per cent of the land. (See table 9).
From what has been said so far, one can see that the 
Grenadian peasantry is primarily a poor peasantry, owning 
small parcels of land scattered all over the country's 
mountainous terrain. Moreover, land ownership and 'peasant
54
consciousness' is a feature of numerous strata in society, 
making petty bourgeois attitudes and aspirations pervasive. 
Without doubt, the petty bourgeoisie has deep roots in 
Grenadian society and in numerical terms is the most 
important class of all. This is reflected in housing tenure 
statistics that show that the vast majority of Grenadian 
families own their own homes. (See table 12).
We can now turn to the pivotal component of the 
intermediate classes, namely the middle class. Like other 
Caribbean islands, the Grenadian middle class is an 
outgrowth of the colonial state bureaucracy. As Grenada 
progressed along the road to full statehood, the white 
officials sent from Britain were replaced by light skinned 
Grenadians who aped the customs and political values of their 
Anglo-Saxon predecessors. Also, the increasing sophistication 
of the Grenadian economy created a demand for lawyers to 
handle contracts, and managers, clerks, book keepers and shop 
assistants to keep goods in circulation. And as more and 
more schools were established, the number of teachers in 
the country grew. CLR James has provided us with a very 
perceptive analysis of the political ootlook of the Caribbean 
middle classes spawned by British colonialism: 'For generations 
their sole aim in life was to be admitted to the positions 
to which their talents and education entitled them, and from 
which they were unjustly excluded. On rare occasions an 
unexpected and difficult situation opened a way for an 
exceptional individual, but for the most part they developed 
political skill only in crawling or worming their way into 
recognition by government or big business. When they did get 
into the charmed government circles or government itself, 
they either did their best to show that they could be as good
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TABLE 12
HOUSING TENURE 1 970
TENURE
Owned 15,051
Leased 50
Rented 2,708
Rent Free 1,355
Squatted 8
Other 91
Not stated 399
(a) All non-institutional households
Sources Grenada Abstract of Statistics 1979. p. 25
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servants of the Colonial Office as any, or when they rose to
become elected members in the legislature, some of them
maintained a loud (but safe) attack on the government. They
actually did little. They were not responsible for anything,
so they achieved a cheap popularity without any danger to 
6 9themselves.' While James' description of the political outlook 
of the Caribbean middle class is accurate for the colonial perioc 
we shall see that by the 1970s the offspring of this class 
had undergone a process of radica1isation. find a subgroup of 
this young middle class, namely the intelligentsia, was to 
play a decisive role in the Grenadian revolution.
The Grenadian proletariat is a somewhat amorphous 
ctass. It is based in agriculture and the service activities
associated with commerce and tourism. The changes that took 
place in the economy from the 1950s onwards strengthened the 
position of the urban and tertiary strata at the expense of 
the rural working class. Thus, whereas the agricultural work­
force dropped from 12,432 in 1946 to 8,662 in 1970, a fall of 
some 30 per cent, the number employed in the service sector 
rose sharply to a figure of 5,758 in 1970. Between 1960 and 
1970 the workforce increased by around 33 per cent in 
construction, and 48 per cent in transport and communication.
(For the 1970 figures see table 10). As for the manufacturing 
sector, the number employed did not rise appreciably. A survey 
completed in 1977 identified 120 manufacturing units, of which 
more than half were cottage industries with fewer than five
employees. The largest employer in manufacturing was the
70brewery with seventy-six permanent jobs. The greatest concen­
tration of workers in Grenada, however, is to be found on the 
docks. Thus, the urban and industrial segments of the working 
class are not only small in numerical terms but also extremely
atomised. When one takes into account the predominantly petty 
bourgeois configuration of the society at large and its geo-: 
graphical and social features, one can readily appreciate that 
proletarian class consciousness would tend to be extremely
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feeble. Many of those employed in hotels, commercial 
establishments and shops obtain their jobs through family, 
religious and other social connections and therefore have 
extra-economic obligations to the enterprise in question. 
Because of their farming interests and responsibilities many 
urban workers consider paid employment to be a priuelege and 
therefore readily succumb to the dictates of employers. Again, 
on account of the fact that most employers are persons of high 
social status deference to the employing class is commonplace. 
Under Gairy patronage and nepotism were given a free rein in 
public employment. And Gairy himself would personally appoint 
to posts in government departments women who took his fancy. 
This encouraged the spread of 'sexploitation', the sexual abuse 
of women in employment. All of these factors served to impede 
the maturation of proletarian class consciousness.
If one examines the rural working class, a similar 
picture emerges. Reference has already been made to the ambiva­
lent position of the semi-proletariat. Due to the tree crop 
nature of agricultural production and the country's topography, 
most estates do not extend beyond 400 acres and employ less 
than sixty workers. Moreover, working conditions and the 
farming methods used do not facilitate the emergence of a 
collective identity. Although probably the most volatile 
section of the proletariat, plantation workers in Grenada are 
also the most conservative. Gairy's patronage network in 
agriculture only reinforced this phenomenon. In 1980 the 
Bishop regime obtained documentary information about working 
conditions in the countryside from the commission of inquiry 
set up to investigate the circumstances that led to the
occupation of the River Antoine estate in February that year. 
Based on an inspection of the plantation made by commission
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members and the oral statements of estate workers, the 
commission's report presented a stark picture of patronage, 
exploitation and ignorance. River Antoine produces cocoa, 
coconuts, bananas and sugar cane, and is renowned for the 
rum that is also made. The estate covers over 400 acres. At 
the time of the inquiry fifty-three workers were employed; 
thirty men and twenty-three women. The workforce consisted of 
a principal gang of field labourers and a group of specialist 
workers who worked in the distillery. Field workers were paid 
only EClB.15 (men) and ECI5.15 (women) a day after deductions, 
while specialist workers earned slightly higher wages at 
different grades. Retired workers received a pension of 
ECI16 a fortnight, having contributed up to 35 cents out of 
their daily wage to the estate's provident fund. Most retired 
workers were dissatisfied with the pension they received.
The majority of workers lived in the nearby village of 
La Poterie in greatly overcrowded houses. On average, there 
were seven persons to a house whose measurements were 10 feet 
in height and 7 feet and 10 feet in width and length 
respectively. Starting at 8.00 in the morning, the field 
labourers worked according to task; each day a different set 
of instructions would be given. In the main, the work 
consisted of harvesting cocoa and coconuts and cutting sugar 
cane. Those who worked according to task were entitled to 
a half hour lunch break and would finish work at around 2.00 
pm. Many workers protested that the area they were given to 
work in was usually too large, resulting in them leaving 
work later than expected. The estate did not provide meals 
and there was no pipe-borne water; workers had to drink from 
the river or carry their own water. Changing facilities were 
not provided and there was only one pit latrine in a
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deplorable condition. Workers were required to provide their 
own clothing and farm implements. No health facilities were 
provided for workers on the estate; not even first Aid. If 
a worker did get injured, however, the manager undertook to 
take him to a doctor at the expense of the estate. This was 
provided for in an insurance contribution made by workers. 
During the period of absence from work caused by sickness, 
workers were entitled to half pay on the recommendation of a 
doctor. Workers did not receive holiday pay. In a statement 
to the commission of inquiry, Gellineau James, secretary of 
the rural trade union established by the Bishop regime, 
reported on the prevalence of child labour: 'I observe many 
cases of early drop-outs at ages 10-12. Some children are 
forced to go to the estate to assist their parents in doing 
the work. It is against the law but it is done. Some parents 
have to leave for work so early that they are not able to
monitor the childrens (sic) movements and see that they go 
72to school.' James later went on to draw attention to a
somewhat bizarre and callous feature of life on the River
Antoine estate: 'The only other point I would like to state
is not really a problem but something which poses a certain
amount of embarassment to workers. In the distillery section
of the estate there are coffins in the lodge which made some
of the workers feel that they are working for a coffin. A
kind of bad psychological effect and we asked Management to 
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remove them.' Percy Campbell, who was at the time the manager 
of the estate, stated that the estate provided free coffins 
as a benefit to the families of workers who died and claimed 
that workers had never complained to him about where the 
coffins were kept. He did not proffer any views on the 
psychological effects that the coffins may have caused.
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The Neii) Jewel Houement and the March 13 Revolution
In 1970 Maurice Bishop, a young lau/yer, returned to 
Grenada from law studies at Gray's Inn in London. His
arrival opened up a new era in Grenadian politics. Bishop was 
born in 1944 on the island of Aruba in the Dutch Antilles.
His father, Rupert, had migrated to the Dutch island to work 
in the Standard Oil refinery, one of the biggest in the 
Western Hemisphere. In 1951 the Bishop family returned to 
Grenada, and with the money he had made in Aruba Rupert 
Bishop started a small merchant house. A devout Roman Catholic, 
Rupert sent Maurice to St. George's Roman Catholic school. 
Subsequently, the young Bishop won a scholarship to Presentation 
College, the best academic school in Grenada run by a group 
of Irish teaching brothers. It was here that Maurice Bishop 
distinguished himself as a political activist, becoming the 
editor of the school magazine and a we 11-respected debater.
At 19 Bishop left Grenada to take up law studies, and continued 
his political involvement with the West Indian Students' Union 
and the Standing Conference of West Indian Organizations. He 
also helped to establish a legal aid clinic in Notting 
Hill Gate, the depressed district of inner London with a 
large number of black inhabitants. In this formative period 
of his political development Bishop was influenced by the 
writings of Kwame Nkrumah, Frantz Fanon, Malcolm X, Fidel 
Castro, Che Guevara and CLR James, and the Black Power revolts 
in the US in the mid-1960s further instilled in the young 
lawyer a deep antipathy towards racial and class oppression.
In 1966, the year after he qualified, Bishop married Angela 
Redhead, by whom he had two children, John and Nadi. Following
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law studies, Bishop took a job in the British civil service 
inhere he mas employed examining the accounts of surtax 
payers.
By 1970 the lively young Grenadign lawyer was on his 
way back to his homeland. Just prior to his arrival in Grenada 
Bishop personally witnessed the Black Power revolt in 
Trinidad and Tobago in February that year. Several months 
later Bishop attended the meeting of Black Power activists 
from the Eastern Caribbean held in Rat Island off the coast 
of St Lucia. The Rat Island meeting established Forum, a loose 
organisation of radicals who agreed to keep in touch with 
one another as they carried out political tasks in their 
respective islands. In Grenada Bishop organised Forum as an 
opposition force to Gairy and called a number of demonstrations. 
These demonstrations were poorly attended and by the end of 
the year Forum folded up. In November, however, Bishop was 
able to make his first successful political intervention in 
Grenadian politics. At that time a group of nurses took to 
the streets to demonstrate against the state of the St. George's 
General Hospital, where there was an acute shortage of 
medicines and a lack of basic hygiene. Because many people 
had suffered personally as a result of the disarray at the 
hospital, the nurses' demonstration quickly gathered popular 
support. Gairy responded with repression. Although the crowd 
was large, the issue on which it was demanding action was both 
limited and justified, and a more enlightened government 
would have avoided trouble by offering to negotiate with the 
protesters. But the Gairy regime was no such government.
Incensed by even the most moderate expression of discontent . 
with his rule, Gairy sent in his police force to break up the
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march, and a number of people mere arrested including Bishop. 
When charges mere brought against the demonstrators Bishop 
and another young lawyer, Kenrick Radix, mho had recently 
finished his legal studies at University College, Dublin, 
undertook the defence of the tmenty-tmo nurses charged. In a 
case mhich lasted for seven months and aroused great interest 
throughout the Caribbean, Bishop defended mith skill and 
aplomb and finally obtained the acquittal of all those 
charged. Maurice Bishop became a household name in Caribbean 
poli t ic s . ^
At about the time of Gairy's landslide victory in the 
1972 elections, mhich shomed horn ineffective the GNP had 
become as an opposition, Bishop joined mith Radix to form 
another small organisation called the Movement for the 
Advancement of Community Effort (MACE); this group mas 'far 
more precise in the perception of its political role and the
75method of achieving its aims than mas Forum, its forerunner.'
In October 1972 MACE mas transformed into a nem political 
entity knomn as the Movement for the Assembly of the Peoples 
(MAP). The main objective of this organisation mas to 
attain state pomer and progressively transform the Westminster 
type state apparatus into one based on more popular control 
through 'assemblies of the people'. This strategy of 
revolutionary transformation had its origins in the mritings 
of CLR James mho had an important influence on the Caribbean 
Black Pomer movement. James put formard the thesis that Lenin's 
theory of the vanguard party had been superseded by historical 
events in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, and suggested that
the morking class, acting through their omn organisations,
7 6could spontaneously transform society.
! ' y -
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Around the time of the formation of MACE, another radical 
organization was set up in Grenada. This was the Joint Effort 
for Welfare and Liberation (JEWEL), founded by Unison 
Whiteman who had recently completed a. Master's degree in 
Economics at Howard University in Washington DC. Towards the 
end of 1972 JEWEL won a significant political victory. Lord 
Brownlow, a wealthy British landowner, caused an outrage by 
closing a road through his estate at La Sagesse in St David's. 
The road gave access to a popular beach. People in the area 
protested to the Gairy government but received no assistance. 
They then turned to JEWEL who organized a number of mass 
protests culminating in a 'People's Trial', which convicted 
Lord Brownlow in absentia of encrouchment on the people's 
rights. On 26 January 1973 a huge demonstration took place 
which tore down the fence blocking the road and re-opened 
the way to the beach. Two months later JEWEL merged with MAP 
to form the New Jewel Movement (NJM). Hence, the NJM 
embraced the young radical intelligentsia in the island that 
had already won a following through their successful 
leadership of popular struggles. Drawing their inspiration 
from the international Black Power movement, the national 
liberation movements in southern Africa and the Cuban 
revolution, the radical intelligentsia formed the main cadres 
of the NJM.
The early NJM modelled itself on the New Beginning Move­
ment (NBM), a Black Power organisation of Jamesian persuasion 
based in Trinidad and Tobago. One of the leading intellectual 
figures in the fledgling NJM, Franklyn Harvey, worked with 
the NBM while studying at the University of the West Indies in 
Trinidad and Tobago. Harvey, a Grenadian by birth, was
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involved in the Black Pouier revolt in Trinidad and Tobago 
and greatly influenced Maurice Bishop. Harvey was the 
main author of the NJM's manifesto which was issued several
encapsulated the Black Power and Jamesian ideology of the NJM. 
Essentially a radical democratic programme, the principal 
themes of the manifesto were 'genuine independence1 ,
'self reliance', 'anti-Gairyism' and ' anti-imperialism' . At 
the level of the economy the document proposed a series of 
anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist measures. It advocated 
'the complete nationalization of all foreign-owned hotels as 
well as foreign-owned housing settlements', the nationalization 
of banks and insurance companies, and called for the setting 
up of a National Import Board to handle all goods brought into 
the island. With regard to the question of agrarian reform the 
manifesto was somewhat more moderate in that it advocated 
negotiations with estate owners to set up co-operative farms 
and the provision of cheap credit and technical equipment to 
poor peasants. A significant amount of attention was paid to 
the procurement of funds from regional and international 
lending agencies which, it was argued, would look upon Grenada 
in a more favourable light once the trauma of Gairyism had 
been anaesthitized: 'It is worth noting that in a recent 
report by Sir Arthur Lewis, the Presiden' the Caribbean
Development Bank, he pointed out that some^I million were 
awaiting Grenada and a few other islands. The money is 
available but cannot be touched because of the corruption and
It was at the level of political institutions that the 
Jamesian influence manifested itself. Rejecting the Westminster 
model of parliamentary democracy, the manifesto called for
7 7months after the formation of the party. The manifesto
7 8lack of planning existing in these islands.'
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the establishment of a provisional government u/hich would be 
made up of 'representatives of workers and unions, farmers, 
police, civil servants, nurses, teachers, businessmen and 
students'. The task of this interim administration was to 
set up 'people's assemblies' which would send delegates to a 
National Assembly. The National Assembly would constitute the 
'government of the land', and the system of 'people's 
assemblies', it was maintained, would end the deep division 
and victimization of the people found under the party system'
7 9and 'involve all the people in decision-making all the time'. 
This was a blue-print for a non-party state run by local 
councils and the NJM saw its goal as bringing such a state 
into being .
At around the time of the creation of the NJM Gairy made 
plans to obtain independence from Britain. This move was 
welcomed in London, since Britain was eager that the 
associated statehood scheme would be replaced by full 
independence as quickly as possible. In Grenada, by contrast, 
Gairy's pursuit of complete administrative autonomy from 
Britain was greeted with shock and suspicion. Independence 
would give even greater powers to a man who had already shown 
strong dictatorial and megalomaniaca 1 tendencies. Of those who 
opposed the independence deal the NJM was the most active and 
vociferous. In raising the demand for 'genuine independence', 
it insisted that Britain pay at least USS30 million in 
compensation for all the wealth it had extracted during the 
colonial era. At the beginning June 1973, just two month after 
the formation of the party, the NJM held a 'People's Convention 
on Independence' which was attended by thousands of people.
The convention denounced the Gairy government and the terms 
under which it was seeking independence. Boosted by the success
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of its first political initiative, on 4 November the NJM held 
another of the mock trials which had proved so effective in 
the Brownlow case. On that day a 'People's Congress' summoned 
at Seamoon in St. Andrew's, tried Gairy in absentia and found 
him guilty of twenty-seven crimes against the people, ranging 
from murder to corruption. The meeting ended with a call that 
Gairy should resign within a fortnight or face a general strike. 
In response, Gairy made a radio broadcast in which he vowed 
that he would 'bring the NJM rebels to their senses and wake 
them up f m m  their dreams in a very short time for 54 different
o nreasons, including sedition and treason.'
Two weeks after the second convention six leaders of the 
NJM - Maurice Bishop, Unison Whiteman, Selwyn Strachan,
Hudson Austin, Kenrick Radix and Simon Daniel - went to 
Grenville to discuss the planned strike with business leaders. 
Informed of the visit, Gairy attempted to halt the escalation 
of opposition by resorting to violence. The NJM militants 
were shot at and then brutally beaten by the Mongoose Gang, 
a group of thugs recruited by Gairy in 1967 to impose his 
wishes when official police action was either insufficient or 
clearly impermissible. Paid out of state coffers but without 
any official status, the Mongoose Gang was responsible for 
most of the pro-government violence under Gairy and on occasions 
turned its attentions to members of the police who were 
reluctant to break the code of conduct inherited from the 
British. On the day in question, 18 November, the Gang was 
particularly vicious and some of their victims were beaten 
unconscious.
'Bloody Sunday', as it came to be called, proved to be a 
serious error on the part of the government and marked a
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turning point in the development of the opposition movement. 
This now included a very broad section of Grenadian society, 
which abhorred the increasing use of violence in a country 
which, following the abolition of slavery, had an intermittent 
history but no tradition of repression. With the NJN leadership 
in jail, where it was left without medical attention for an 
unpardonable length of time, the anti-Gairy elements of the 
business class stepped forward and formed a coalition known as 
the Committee of Twenty-Two. This included the Grenada Union 
of Teachers, the Civil Service Association, the Chamber of 
Commerce, various unions, all the churches and several middle 
class groups like the Rotary Club. In no sense could these 
organizations be labelled left-wing; they had banded together 
over an issue of fundamental democratic liberty that on this 
occasion they shared with the NJN. On 19 November the 
Committee of Twenty-Two called an island-wide strike, demanding 
that Gairy arrest those members of the police and the Nongoose 
Gang responsible for 'Bloody Sunday' and immediately 
dismantle all coercive bodies. Sensing a major crisis in the 
offing, Gairy quickly agreed to those terms and the Committee 
called off its strike after a week.
However, with the exception of the formal appointment of 
an independent commission of inquiry, the prime minister 
failed to keep the promises he had made in November. The 
Committee of Twenty-Two and the NJN leadership, now released 
on bail, called for a new strike beginning on 1 January 1974. 
This stoppage proved to be highly effective and paralysed the 
island's economy. Refusing to negotiate, Gairy resorted 
once again to police action, which greatly increased political 
tension. On 21 January - 'Bloody Nonday' - the police shot
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and killed Rupert Bishop as he attempted to block the doorway 
of a building where women and children had taken refuge from 
the violence in the street. The strike lasted three months 
and was accompanied by frequent mass protests, police violence 
and popular reprisals against the forces of the state.
In the midst of this crisis Gairy begged Britain for 
help. The Foreign Office maintained that Grenada’s status of 
associated statehood prevented London from intervening in the 
island's internal affairs, but the British eventually stepped 
in with an 'independence gift' of £100,000. This payment 
enabled Gairy to increase the wages of the civil service and 
the police and thereby guarantee their support for the government 
at a time when it was under extreme pressure. Gairy was also 
greatly aided by the fact that although the country was at a 
standstill and submerged in a major political crisis, London 
went ahead in granting independence, which came into effect on 
7 February 1974. As predicted by the opposition, independence 
became a powerful political tool for Gairy, who now projected 
himself as the 'father of the nation' and exercised unhampered 
control over all affairs of state. Waking use of his entry into 
the UN and the Organization of American States (0AS), the 
prime minister denounced his opponents as communists and 
called for concerted action to be taken against the left 
throughout the Caribbean. In the same vein, he subsequently 
went on to receive military aid from the Pinochet dictatorship 
in Chile and established close links with the authoritarian 
regime of Park Chun Hee in South Korea.
After the failure of the general strike, which was finally
fl 1called off in March 1974, the NJM sought to consolidate 
itself more firmly and intensified its educational and
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organizational work. Within two years the party's paper,
The New Jewel, had expanded its circulation to over 10,000 
copies, becoming the most widely read newspaper in an island 
which, despite its lack of educational facilities, was 
largely literate. Attuned to the day to day realities of 
Grenadian society, in which gossip and innuendo are important 
means of political communication, the IMJM used its paper to 
publicise rumours about the 'many sins, crimes and corrupt 
practices of Gairy' . The NJM's ability to provide a public 
forum for anti-Gairy gossip was a central ingredient in the
p yparty's success in winning the support of ordinary Grenadians. 
Soon, local 'support groups' were set up in almost every 
village and held frequent public meetings, although these 
were sometimes interrupted or broken up by Gairy's supporters. 
Special NJM organizations were established for women and 
young people as well as for urban workers and the unemployed.
The great majority of people who attended the meetings of 
these groups were not full party members, but they supported 
NJM policies and identified closely with its leaders. By 
1975 the party had succeeded in securing and broadening its 
popular appeal and fortified its claim to represent the 
interests of a broad cross-section of the Grenadian population. 
Yet it still remained more of a movement than a party in the 
sense that it was fighting on a clear set of concrete issues 
but was somewhat ambivalent about its strategic programme 
and lacked a coherent internal organization. This state of 
affairs began to change in 1976 with the return to Grenada 
of Bernard Coard.
Bernard was the son of a prominent Grenadian civil 
servant, Frederick McDermott Coard, who was also the author
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8 3of an important study of the Grenadian civil service.
Bernard Coard did a first degree in Sociology and Economics 
at Brandeis University in Massachussets and then went on to 
do an MA in Economics at the University of Sussex in Britain. 
During his time at Sussex, Coard fell under the spell of the 
British Communist Party, and after he graduated his association 
with the Communist Party developed. Taking a job as a school 
teacher in London, Coard distinguished himself politically 
as a radical campaigner against racism in education. He wrote 
a book called How the West Indian Child is Made Educationally 
Sub-normal in the British School System, which was hailed as
g a
a seminal work by black parents and teachers in London.
By 1974 Coard had left England and was working at the University 
of the West Indies in Jamaica. This was an important period 
in the evolution of the progressive movement in the Caribbean.
By this time the Black Power organisations in the US were in 
disarray and many of their leaders began to embrace different 
concepts and ideologies. This had an effect in the Caribbean.
At the same time, radicals from the region increasingly looked 
to Cuba as a model of revolutionary change after a number 
of Commonwealth Caribbean states established diplomatic 
relations with Havana in the early 1970s. By this time also, 
the Castro leadership in Cuba had made a political 
rapprochement with the Soviet Union and the Communist Parties 
of Latin America and the Caribbean, and official communist 
formulae began to'be adopted in the Castro regime's 
interpretation of domestic and international events. Cuba's 
projection of a pro-Soviet ideology had a profound effect on 
a number of Caribbean radicals who now saw the limitations 
of Black Power. Moscow's influence in the region was also 
boosted by the victory of the Vietnamese revolution and the
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decisive role played by the Soviet Union, along with Cuba, 
in the victory of the MPLA in the Angolan civil war. The 
growing stature of the Soviet Union in Africa had a strong 
impact on former Black Power advocates who still maintained
Q  Ca close affinity with their black homeland. In December 1974 
Trevor ilunroe , a former leader of the Black Power Abeng Group, 
founded the pro-Moscow Worker's Liberation League (WLL), which 
subsequently changed its name to the Worker's Party of 
Jamaica (WPJ). Coard considered Nunroe to be the leading 
Marxist intellectual in the English-speaking Caribbean and 
became a member of the newly-formed party. Coard's wife, Phyllis, 
a member of the prosperous Evans family who were large 
shareholders in the Jamaican company which produces the Tia 
Maria coffee liqueur, also joined the WLL. Imbibing their 
Marxism from Munroe and texts emanating from the Soviet Union, 
Bernard and Phyllis Coard developed a coherent but authoritarian 
theory of revolution.
Bernard Coard's arrival in Grenada was welcomed by 
Maurice Bishop and other leaders of the NJM who greatly 
respected his academic achievements. Coard was extremely 
tactical in seeking to introduce official communist ideas into 
the NJM. Taking advantage of his intellectual stature in the 
party, he concentrated on organizational tasks and adhered to 
the policies spelt out in the manifesto. At the same time, 
he began to propagate a Soviet brand of Marxism-Leninism and 
set up a study group called the Organisation of Revolutionary 
Education and Liberation (OREL). OREL attracted some of the 
most enthusiastic and impressionable members of the party, 
many of whom had aquired political experience in student 
councils, the Catholic youth movement and other youth
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organizations. A good number of these individuals subsequently 
became school teachers. Among the most dedicated members of 
OREL were Liam James, John Ventour, Ewart Layne, Leon Cornwall, 
and Chris Stroude. Although Bishop was never a member of 
OREL, he also became more receptive to official communist 
ideas although he always maintained an open mind on the 
subject. However, on account of the total absence of a Marxist 
tradition in the country and the semi-clandestine conditions 
under which the party had to operate, the adoption of 
'Marxism-Leninism' was not openly announced.
Greatly assisted by Coard and his followers in OREL, the 
NJM had radically transformed itself by the time of the 1976 
elections. In line with the broad anti-Gairy policy that the 
party had been following over the past three years of its 
existence, it entered the election campaign as part of a bloc - 
the People's Alliance - along with the GNP and the United 
People's Party (UPP), which had earlier split from the GNP.
The Alliance won forty-eight per cent of the vote and six 
seats in the chamber; the NJM took three seats and Maurice 
Bishop became leader of the opposition. This result was a 
major achievement since the honesty of the poll was highly 
questionable. All election officials were government employees, 
only government candidates were permitted to use loudspeakers 
or had access to the radio, a great many 'phantom voters' 
appeared on the government-organized electoral register, and 
the Mongoose Gang was extremely active in breaking up Alliance 
meetings. GULP won nine seats and returned to power, but 
Gairy's legitimacy had been substantially eroded.®®
Although the opposition denounced the electoral fraud, 
it did not call for a boycott or refuse to participate in
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the assembly, on the grounds that it could be used as a forum 
for criticism of the government and the presentation of 
alternative policies. This the NJM began to do, but 
parliamentary opposition had little effect, as the party now 
learnt through experience. Gairy's response to questioning in 
the chamber was to impose with vigour the statutes he had 
already introduced to curb those who held an opinion contrary 
to his own: the Firearms Act (1968), which rescinded all 
firearms permits to members of the opposition and made them 
extremely vulnerable to the Mongoose Gang; the Public Order 
Act (1974), which banned the use of loudspeakers not 
authorised by the police; the Newspaper Act (1975), which 
required a deposit of nearly US$9,000 to be made to the 
government before publication was allowed and thereby 
effectively outlawed the popular but impoverished The New 
Jewe 1; and the Essential Services and Port Authority Acts, 
which prohibited strikes of any kind in the sectors where 
the NJM had many followers. Gairy also adopted the practice 
of only issuing licenses to new businesses that agreed to 
give the bargaining rights for their workforce to the GMMUU.
Totally disregarding the sentiments of his people,
Gairy continued to accumulate property for himself, disburse 
official funds at whim, force sexual favours from women in 
the civil service, and indulge with great ostentation his 
fascination with the supernatural. All this was done with 
little thought to the country's reputation and still less to 
its depleted financial reserves. Whilst Grenadians might have 
become accustomed to their prime minister's antics, such as 
erecting a massive illuminated cross on a hill top overlooking 
St. George's and claiming that he ruled by divine right and
'belonged to the mystical world', it came as some surprise 
to foreigners to hear him plead in the UN for funds to be 
set aside for 'psychic research' into unidentified flying 
objects or to learn that he was a judge when Miss Grenada 
won the Miss World beauty contest.
Such behaviour reflected not just an extraordinary 
arrogance but also the loss of political acumen. As Gairy's 
activities became more outlandish, the NJM was able to 
win leading positions in some of the urban trade unipns 
which always displayed an antipathy towards their eccentric 
prime minister. During late 1978 and early 1979, NJM leader 
l/incent Noel led a militant struggle at Barclay's Bank in 
St. George's over recognition of his newly-formed Bank and 
General Worker's Union (BGWU). In the countryside, party 
activists eroded the support of the GMMWU. Substantial inroads 
were also made amongst youth and women. More decisively, some 
of the NJM's key supporters now came from the police force 
and the army, which had certainly been closely identified 
with the persecution of the party but were also sufficiently 
institutionalised for some of their members to hold severe 
reservations over the government's cavalier attitude to 
the law. It should also be borne in mind that Grenada is more 
of a community than a country and therefore many of these 
officers knew the NJM leaders personally and were undoubtedly 
impressed by their middle class backgrounds, high level of 
education, and commitment to a complete alteration of the 
island's society based on standards of efficiency and 
propriety as well as egalitarianism.
These contacts in the security forces proved vital to 
the NJM's eventual capture of state power. Inspired by the
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revolutionary upheavals in Iran, which received widespread 
publicity, the armed detachment of the party set up in the 
early days began to acquire more arms. Through its recruits 
in the security forces the NJM leadership learnt on 10 March 
1979 that Gairy had ordered them to be arrested and 'liquidated' 
□n Monday 12 March, following the prime minister's departure 
from the island - which the NJM took to confirm the information 
it had received - the party decided to launch an all-out 
offensive against the regime. Early on 13 March some 40 persons, 
which was the entire party membership, took control of the 
army barracks at True Blue and began to mobilise the people 
by radio. There was a massive response in support, and people 
took over the island's police stations despite the fact that 
they were often only armed with knives and cutlasses. Patrols 
were set up, private vehicles lent, and domestic kitchens 
opened up for public usage. The entire operation lasted less 
than twelve hours; there was no concerted resistance and only 
three people lost their lives, a testament to the leniency 
as well as the discipline of the revolutionary forces. For 
the people of Grenada the overthrow of Gairy was a matter of 
great relief and much celebration. The NJM was no less 
joyous, but if was now confronted with the daunting prospect 
of taking responsibility for and administering profound social 
and economic change in a tiny island that was one of the 
most underdeveloped countries in the world and inextricably 
linked to international markets for products over which it 
had absolutely minimal control. The party had fought 
persistently for its ideals and now enjoyed unprecedented 
popular support, but these now had to be put to the test

Chapter Tuo
The Post-Revolutionary Order
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The New Jewel Movement and Socialist Orientation
The overthrow of the Gairy regime in Grenada was the first 
armed seizure of power to take place in the English-speaking 
Caribbean. It constitued an historic break from the political 
traditions of the Anglophone states, and brought the Commonwealth 
Caribbean into the maelstrom of revolutionary change which 
has affected other parts of the Third li/orld.1 In spite of the 
brevity of the armed confrontation in Grenada it was, 
nevertheless, a genuine revolution in that it marked the 
apogee of a political campaign mounted by a political party 
that enjoyed the overwhelming support of the people. At the 
same time, the Grenadian insurrection was more of a political 
revolution than a social revolution since it was not borne 
of an economic or social crisis, and the driving force of 
the process was a small band of revolutionary intellectuals 
who mobilised the people around the question of democratic 
rights rather than class oppression. In this sense, the 
Grenadian revolution could be described as a ’revolution from 
above' in the way in which this term is used by Halliday and 
Clolyneux: 'The central thesis of the concept 'revolution from 
above' is that profound transformations of social and political
structures can occur in a particular country, meriting the
term ’revolutionary* yet initiated and controlled not by a 
mass movement but by a sector of the pre-existing state 
apparatus. The concept is designed to identify a particular 
set of historical phenomena and to distinguish them both from 
coups d'etat - a transfer of power between state personnel - 
and from mass revolutions, 'revolutions from below' . Grenada's 
peculiarity, in terms of this taxonomy, is that while a 
section of the pre-existing state apparatus defected to the 
revolutionary cause, it was a political party that organised 
and led the revolutionary seizure of power. An examination of 
the composition and ideology of this party is therefore 
crucial to any understanding of the Grenadian revolution.
We have seen that most of the cadres of the NJM came 
from the intelligentsia, and in this respect Grenada fits in 
with the general pattern of Third World revolutions where 
this social stratum has played a central role. However, 
because of the miniscule size and parochial nature of Grenadian 
society, in which educated individuals perform many social and 
economic roles, the intelligentsia is of greater importance 
than in any other country that has experienced a revolutionary 
transformation. The alienation of the intelligentsia under 
the Gairy regime led it onto a path of radicalization 
analagous to that which has occured in other Third World 
countries. This process of radicalization of the intelligentsia 
has been analyzed in class terms by Lowy: 'In our opinion, the 
opposition of the intellectuals to the bourgeoisie, far from 
being an internecine struggle within the 'ruling group' or 
a conflict between two fractions of the bourgeoisie, is above 
all related to their links with a different social class: the 
petty bourgeoisie. The spontaneous ideology of the so-called
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'democratic petty bourgeoisie', of which intellectuals comprise 
the most vocal and active segment, is not bourgeois 
liberalism but rather jacobinism; the specific combination of 
plebeian democracy and romantic moralism of which Rousseau and 
Robespierre were the first historical representatives. In the 
countries of 'belated' capitalist development (e.g. Germany in 
the nineteenth or Russia in the early-twentieth centuries), 
where the bourgeoisie was non-revolutionary and allied by fear 
of the masses with landowners and/or imperialism, this petty 
bourgeois jacobism tended to become radicalized. In some 
cases, such a radicalization eventually led sections of the 
petty bourgeoisie, particularly the intellectuals, to a 
complete break with the bourgeoisie and to the adoption of a 
socialist stance. The two classic examples were, first, the 
case of Marx himself and the 'Hegelian left' in Germany before 
1848, and, second, the Russian intelligentsia at the end of 
the nineteenth century. ... During the twentieth century ... 
this process of the radicalizatioh of the intellegentsia in 
the countries of peripheral capitalism has become increasingly 
massive. This is the combined result of the growing penetration 
of imperialism (and its destructive impact on native culture, 
bitterly resented by nationalist intellectuals), the 
conciliatory or even openly pro-imperialist positions of the 
local bourgeoisie and the cumulative impact of the victorious 
socialist revolutions. The convergence of these three 
developments has produced an explosive fusion of anti-imperialist , 
anti-bourgeois and socialist sympathies in broad sections of 
the intelligentsia.'"^ Undoubtedly, this process occurred in
a number of Caribbean countries during the 1970s, so it 
remains to be explained why it led to to a revolution in
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Grenada and not in any of the other territories of the region. 
Indeed, the NJM was only one of a gamut of Black Power 
organisations that appeared during this period. Why did it 
succeed in capturing state power while most of the other 
groups either vanished or became a marginal force in their 
respective countries? Several factors would seem to provide 
an answer to this question, first of all, the Gairy regime was 
the most philistine and autocratic in the entire English- 
speaking Caribbean so th%at the alienation of the intelligentsia 
was particularly pronounced in Grenada. Secondly, at its 
inception the NJM played a leading role in a major revolt 
against the Gairy regime, and it was NJM militants and their 
families who suffered the most at the hands of the security 
forces. Only the National Joint Action Council (NJAC) and 
the NBM in Trinidad and Tobago participated in such a popular 
uprising. A third factor concerns the extreme pusillanimity 
and disorganization of Grenada's principal opposition party, 
the GNP . Within less than a year after its formation the NJM 
had eclipsed the GNP, whereas in other territories, most 
notably Jamaica, the established opposition parties won over 
a number of Black Power advocates. The GNP maintained the 
political outlook of the colonial middle class and was 
impervious to the process of radicalization that occurred 
during the 1970s. Finally, the other main factor which 
contributed to the NJM's success was the transformation of 
the organisation from a movement to a vanguard party. While 
several of their sister groups in neighbouring territories 
remained ambivalent about the type of organisation they wished 
to build and their strategy for attaining state power, the 
NJfl had a clear position on these questions. Bernard Coard's 
introduction of official communist ideas about party building,
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class alliances and armed struggle was a sine qua non in the 
making of the Grenadian revolution by the NJM.
Coard tutored the party in the theory of the non-capitalist 
path of development or socialist orientation, the strategy 
of socialist transformation advocated by the official 
communist movement in Third World countries. Originally 
formulated in the mid-1950s, the elaboration of the theory of 
the non-capita 1ist path of development coincided with a 
shift in Soviet policy during this period, away from neglect 
of the Third World and towards a more favourable assessment 
of certain nationalist regimes in Africa and Asia which were 
marked by a strong state control of the economy and opposition 
to Western policies. The first official reference to the
theory that has been documented is contained in the Declaration 
of the I960 Conference of Communist Parties: 'After winning 
political independence, the peoples seek solutions to the 
social problems raised by life and to the problems of 
reinforcing national independence. Different classes and parties 
offer different solutions. Which course of development to 
choose is the internal affair of the peoples themselves. As 
social contradictions grow, the national bourgeoisie inclines 
more and more to compromising with domestic reaction and 
imperialism. The people, however, begin to see that the best 
way to abolish age-long backwardness and improve their living 
standards is that of non-capitalist development. Only thus 
can the peoples free themselves from exploitation, poverty and 
hunger. The working class and the broad peasant masses will 
play the leading part in solving this basic social problem.
The assertion was that there existed a non-revolutionary 
road to socialism. Subsequently, the theory was elaborated 
by the eminent Soviet scholars, R.A. Ulyanovsky,^ V. Solodov-
0 7nikov and V. Bogoslovosky and I. Andreyev/. They put forward 
the thesis that it was possible to avert capitalist development 
in underdeveloped countries, yet postulated that in order to 
accomplish this a new stage of development must be traversed 
which is neither capitalism nor a direct transition to 
socialism. Andreyev expresses this as follows: '... the non­
capitalist way is not socialist development proper but a 
specific period of creating the material, social and cultural 
conditions for transition to socialist development - a pre­
socialist stage, when the national-democratic state follows 
a socialism-oriented policy at the democratic, that is, anti- 
imperialist and anti-feudal stage of the revolution. The 
formula reflects the qualitatively distinct stages of the 
revolution: on the one hand, it maintains and emphasises the 
social progress inherent in noncapitalist development, putting 
it in the correct, socialist perspective, and, on the other,
Odoes not confuse or identify it with socialism.' This pre- 
socialist period is conceived as a phase of intense class 
struggle which may lead to a return to the 'capitalist path' 
if the revolutionary forces are not victorious. Nevertheless, 
'scientific socialists' are instructed to enter into a long 
term strategic alliance with the 'patriotic national bourgeoisie 
which, like the proletariat is considered to be in contradiction 
with imperialism. According to Soviet writers it is the 
existence of the socialist system which gives the opportunity 
for underdeveloped countries 'to bypass the more advanced
forms of class antagonistic relations, the capitalist
gsocio-economic formation above all.' In their view, an 
alliance between world socialism and national democratic forces 
which incorporate the working class, the peasantry, the urban 
petty bourgeoisie and the patriotic national bourgeoisie, can
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lay the basis for socialist development in the Third World.
As a theory of revolutionary change, non-capita1ist 
development is beset with many problems and contradictions. 
Although Soviet writers trace the political provenance of 
the theory to Marx, Engels and Lenin, non-capitalist develop­
ment departs in several important ways from the ideas about 
revolution in backward countries expressed by these writers. 
Marx and Engels, for instance, in their reflections on the 
possibility of revolution in Eastern Europe, hypothesized that 
the Russian rural commune could form the basis of a direct 
transition to socialism. They saw such a development, however, 
being linked to a proletarian insurgency in the West. Moreover, 
after Marx's death, Engels dispelled the hopes that he and 
Marx had invested in the possibility of a non-capitalist path 
in Russia, since the rapid development of industrial capitalism 
there after 1890 radically transformed class relations in the 
countryside.^
Several of Lenin's remarks are adduced by Soviet writers 
in support of non-capitalist development. The most often 
quoted reference to Lenin concerns his deliberations at the 
Second Congress of the Communist International, where he 
postulated that the establishment of Soviet governments in 
Russia opened the possibility of bypassing capitalist 
development in backward countries: 'The question was posed 
as follows: are we to consider as correct the assertion that 
the capitalist stage of economic development is inevitable 
for backward nations now on the road to emancipation and 
among whom a certain forward progress is to be seen since the 
war? We replied in the negative. If the victorious revolutionary 
proletariat conducts systematic propaganda among them, and 
the Soviet governments come to their aid with all the means
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at their disposal - in that event it will be mistaken to 
assume that the backward peoples must inevitably go through 
the capitalist stage of development. Not only should uie 
create independent contingents of fighters and party organisa­
tions in the colonies and the backward countries, not only 
at once launch propaganda for the organisation of peasants' 
Soviets and strive to adapt them to the pre-capitalist 
conditions, but the Communist International should advance 
the proposition, with the appropriate theoretical grounding, 
that with the aid of the proletariat of the advanced countries, 
backward countries can go over to the Soviet system and, 
through certain stages of development, to communism, without 
having to pass through the capitalist stage.’'*'*' Two points 
should be made about Lenin's argument here. First of all,
Lenin stressed the need to set up independent party organisation 
and mobilise the peasantry as an autonomous political force.
It is true that in other remarks made at the Congress he 
considered the possibility of an alliance with the bourgeoisie, 
but he insisted that such an alliance should be temporary and
the independence of the working class and its party had to 
12be maintained. There is no hint here of an extended period 
of political alliance with the capitalist class. Secondly,
Lenin, like Marx and Engels before him, pointed to the 
importance of assistance from a socialist state in a more 
advanced country in assisting backward countries in taking 
a non-capitalist path. And yet it is in this area that the 
theory of non-capitalist development shows its greatest 
weakness. For while the Soviet Union and the other countries 
of Eastern Europe do provide a certain amount of economic 
aid to countries that are considered to be following the
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non-capitalist path, the ouerwhelming majority of them are
dependent upon the world capitalist system, and, moreover,
are instructed by official communist theoreticians to become
self-sufficient or obtain credits from Western sources. Because
the countries of the Soviet bloc are themselves short of
foreign exchange and do not possess technical equipment or
professional expertise relevant to Third World countries, they
are unable to provide meaningful support to the non-capitalist
statesl^Hence, rather than facilitate a transition to
socialism, assistance from the Soviet bloc to the periphery
often results in a greater subordination of these countries
to world capitalism and a reinforcement of capitalist property
relations within them. This thesis has been put forward by
14Frank in an important study of this question.
The other ideas advanced by Lenin that are frequently 
referred to by Soviet ideologues come from his post-revolutionary 
texts on state capitalism. In these writings, Lenin appears 
to suggest a continuity between the nationalised sector in 
its state capitalist and socialist forms. Lenin's thinking on 
this question, however, was strongly influenced by his 
exclusive pre-occupation on the main task facing the Bolsheviks 
in the immediate aftermath of the revolution: how to reduce 
the amount of time spent by the masses in production in order 
to allow them to take control of the affairs of the state.
To quote Paul Keleman: 'The continuity between state capitalism 
and socialism existed for /TTenirV/ by virtue of the proletariat 
holding state power. He neglected the importance for the 
advance of socialism of the transformation of the social 
relations of production in the state sector not because he 
ignored the need for the proletariat to exercise power but 
because he considered it purely in its political form, its
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control of the state. The same cannot be said for the theory
of the non-capitalist path of development, in which the
continuity between state capitalism and socialism is established
without any regard to the issue of working class power either
in the form of control of the state or in the form of control
of the direct process of production.1 Keleman correctly
argues that the theory of non-capitalist development breaks
with the classical Marxist analysis of the state as the
organized form of 'class domination', and, in his critique of
Halliday and Molyneux's book on 'non-capitalist' Ethiopia,
from which the above passage is taken, he explains how these
writers 'give theoretical expression to the ideology of the 
16Ethiopian state', because they share many of the assumptions 
of the theory of non-capitalist development. Thus, to sum up 
the argument so far, only to the extent that non-capitalist 
development postulates that backward countries do not have 
to go through a capitalist stage of development can the 
writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin be marshalled in support of 
the theory. These writings do not, however, lend weight to 
the particular economic and political strategy that is 
ascribed to the non-capitalist path.
A second major objection to the theory of non-capitalist 
development concerns the repressive and undemocratic nature 
of many states that have been designated 'non-capitalist', 
several of which even outlawed the local communist party. This 
criticism has been made in a most emphatic and systematic 
fashion by C.Y. Thomas in a study of the theory published in 
1978. In Thomas' view, proponents of the non-capita 1ist path 
held a cavalier attitude towards democratic rights. Individual 
and collective rights, such as freedom of speech, association
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and publication, and the independence of the judiciary were 
termed 'bourgeois' and therefore considered to be luxuries.
Such an approach did not take into account the fact that many 
of these rights had been won on the basis of mass struggle.
As an economist based in Guyana who had seen first-hand the 
authoritarian tendencies of the self-proclaimed 'Co-operatiue 
Socialist Repulic' of Forbes Burnham, Thomas had a personal 
aquaintance with the dangers of this form of argument. In 
pointing to the undemocratic nature of the ideas propounded 
by non-capitalist path advocates, Thomas invoked the heritage 
of classical Marxism: 'Anyone who has read Marx must know that 
the concept 'dictatorship of the proletariat' refers to the 
sociological domination of the working class. This domination 
does not mean any any such trite and superficial political 
notion as authoritarian and tyrannical government ... Marxist
theory has always been explicitly based on the creative
17interaction of socialism and democratic development.' But 
Thomas was not only concerned with this aspect of the theory. 
Drawing on the tragic experience of the Allende regime in 
Chile, which had been hailed by the official communist movement 
as an example of the political strategy it advocated, Thomas 
made five other major criticisms: (i) a workers' party in 
effective control is a crucial factor in ensuring the 
transition from national liberation to socialism; (ii) the 
ability to pursue non-capitalist tasks is heavily contingent 
on the ability to cope with economic sabotage and other 
dimensions of 'destabilization' as counter-revolutionary 
activities; (iii) elements of the national bourgeoisie 
cannot be relied upon beyond an anti-fascist front; (iv) given 
their highly visible roles, the analysis of the military in
these countries remains very unsatisfactory; (v) the literature 
on non-capitalist development has not considered in anything 
like enough detail the conceptualization of an economic 
strategy consistent with the development of socialism in these 
countries . '*'®
Another commentator, Patrick Emmanuel, has questioned the 
applicability of non-capitalist development to the Caribbean.
He highlights an important peculiarity of Caribbean historical
development; namely that 'the peasantry was borne out of
19proletarian conditions and not the other way around.' This 
factor, Emmanuel surmises, has produced 'a peasant state of 
mind or outlook ... unreceptive to socialist conceptions of 
collectivization.' The fact that Eastern Caribbean 
societies have remained predominantly agricultural has given 
an added significance to this phenomenon. Hence, a major 
problem for non-capitalist development in the region is how 
to lay the basis for a socialist transformation in societies 
where the principal class is the petty bourgeoisie (including 
the peasantry) and petty bourgeois sentiments and aspirations 
are preponderant. For, as a class the petty bourgeoisie has 
a tendency to vacillate in the face of revolutionary situations. 
Emmanuel considered that this problem could be resolved by 
firm revolutionary leadership, yet observed that the cadres
of socialist organisations in the region were young and
21recently initiated.
Probably the biggest problem with the theory of non­
capitalist development relates to the historical record of 
states that have been designated 'non-capita1ist' by the 
official communist movement. For many of the countries hailed 
at one time or another as exemplars of the 'non-capitalist
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road' evolved in an openly pro-capitalist and anti-Soviet 
direction. In some of the countries the governments were 
overthrown by military coups and replaced by more overtly 
right wing administrations (Indonesia 1965, Ghana 1966, Mali 
1968). But a greater challenge to the theory arisises in the 
case of those countries where no such break in political 
continuity occurred, but rather the 'non-capita 1ist' government 
itself changed direction. The most important examples of 
this were Egypt, Iraq, Somalia and the Sudan. In the Caribbean 
the two countries that were regarded as non-capitalist by 
official communist theoreticians in the region have also 
fared badly. The Manley government in Jamaica was voted out 
of office in 1980 in the midst of an economic crisis and 
replaced by the US-backed administration of Edward Seaga; 
and the Burnham regime in Guyana has presided over a major 
collapse of the economy and is currently making overtures to 
the US and the military dictatorships of Latin America. It 
was in response to developments such as these and political 
criticisms levelled against the theory, which in the mid-1970s 
led Soviet writers to develop a new theory called socialist 
orientation. This new theory clung to the same basic tenets 
of the non-capitalist path of development, but was much more 
explicit about the non-socialist features of the societies in 
question and the problems which this posed for socialist 
transformation. Earlier writings had not considered in any 
detail the possible forms of reversal of the 'non-capitalist 
road', apart from predictable references to imperialist 
intervention and counter-revolutionary action. Based on the 
experiences of some of the states just mentioned, the later 
writings did take the possibility of reversal more seriously.
go
The solutions that were put forward to prevent this development, 
however, were essentially of a militaristic and ideological 
character. In the case of Ghana and Mali it was pointed out 
that the state machine as a whole and also its key components, 
such as the army, police and security organs, were not brought 
under party control. In order to forestall reversals of this 
type in the future, Soviet writers stressed that it 'is a
matter of the utmost importance for the party to strengthen
22its leading role in the armed forces.' Emphasis was also 
placed on the ideological formation of the party into a 
Marxist-Lenlnist vanguard party. It was also argued that 
ideologically hybrid movements of the 'Arab Socialist' variety, 
as seen in Egypt or Iraq, were unable to complete the process 
of socialist orientation. The new theory highlighted the 
importance of a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party in leading 
Third World states to the socialist transition. At the same 
time, the growing importance of the party in countries like 
Tanzania, Burma, Angola and Mozambique was welcomed, and these
countries were held up as examples of the correct strategy to
23follow during socialist orientation.
The ideas that have been put forward by Soviet writers 
to explain the failure of non-capitalist development in a 
number of Third World countries are . Too
much emphasis has been placed on the particular sequence of 
events that led to the change in direction in the country 
concerned, and not enough attention has been devoted to the 
underlying class forces involved. While a number of pertinent 
observations have been made about the process of class 
formation in these societies which laid the basis for an 
acceptance of capitalism, Soviet writers do not seem to
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appreciate that these developments undermine the whole basis 
of their theory of socialist orientation. For whatever the 
conjunctural factors were that led to the termination of the 
non-capitalist road, the pro-capitalist evolution of these 
regimes was rooted in their disinclination to suppress 
private ownership of the means of production. The possessing 
classes in these societies were not expropriated; they simply 
underwent a transmutation. And the accumulation of capital 
that was permitted led to their consolidation and subsequently 
laid the basis for an acceptance of capitalism. Mandel has 
made some pertinent comments on this matter; '... there is an 
enormous difference between the nationalization of the greater 
portion of private property in a country and the suppression 
of the right to private property in the constitution of that 
country. ... It is a pre-eminently economic, and very practical,
matter. That which is eliminated oan be easily reconstituted 
if it is not forbidden - and by that I do not mean forbidden 
de facto. That this is not a formal point is shown by the 
evolution of Egypt. Many companies were nationalized during 
the 'radical' period of the Nasser regime, but their owners 
were paid compensation, and with this compensation they were 
able to accumulate capital. They could not buy large factories, 
since that was forbidden, but they could buy land, properties 
in real estate, stocks, and other items. The result was that 
although much property was nationalized, the capitalist class 
was not expropriated. It was therefore relatively easy to 
de-nationalize what had previously been nationalized, without 
the slightest social upheaval and with no discontinuity of 
the state apparatus. It therefore makes a big difference 
whether private property is eliminated in just a few fields - 
even if this applies to a good deal of industry in the
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underdeveloped countries - or whether it is simply outlawed.
In the latter case, of course, some accumulation of private 
property can continue, but only illegally, and that again 
makes a big difference.
... The direction of /the dynamic of primitive accumulation 
of capital by state functionarie^7 is shown by what has been 
happening in Egypt over the past several years, a process 
which is also occurring in Syria and Algeria and will, we 
believe, happen in Mozambique and Angola in the future unless 
there is a new victorious revolution of a socialist character. 
The new bourgeoisie in these countries is quite visible, 
everybody knows their names. They are the people contacted by 
the multinationals when they engage in operations in these 
countries. On the whole, the individuals who compose this new 
bourgeoisie are not recruited from the old pashas or merchant 
classes. Many of them are former cabinet ministers or high 
functionaries who used their offices to accumulate large 
amounts of money that was later turned into capital. This 
is not at all the same thing as acquiring a refrigerator and 
an Alfa Romeo. These fortunes are accumulated in the form of 
stocks and bonds, and the next logical step is to invest them 
and use them to build up private industrial empires. It is 
usually at that point - when there is a significant number of 
such people who have amassed sufficiently large amounts of 
money waiting to be 'productively' invested - that the state 
begins the process of de-nationalization, opening up outlets 
for potential investors,'^ The problem with Mandel's 
analysis is that he does not for a moment consider whether a 
'revolution of a socialist character' is politically and 
economically feasible in all Third World states in the context
of present-day world politics. For in those countries of the 
Third World where socialist revolutions have taken place, most 
importantly China, Cuba and Vietnam, Soviet bloc economic 
assistance was decisive in enabling the revolutionary forces 
to overthrow the possessing classes and establish a socialist 
state. Today the Soviet bloc is neither able nor willing to 
provide any such aid and the domestic resources of many Third 
World states are not adequate for political leaders to 
contemplate a direct confrontation with the local exploiting 
classes and the international capitalist system. In such 
circumstances, is not a path of 'progressive state capitalism' 
the only viable option? This question must be posed in any 
critique of socialist orientation, since it is always incumbent 
on critics to offer an alternative to the theories and 
strategies they criticize. Indeed, as a strategy of socialist 
transformation socialist orientation may be described as a 
path of radical state capitalist ec onomic development combined 
with the establishment of Soviet-type political institutions. 
And close relations with the Soviet Union is considered by 
proponents of the theory to be the main indicator of a state's 
progression and in practice has been the basis of Soviet 
categorisation of Third World countries, as the changes made 
to successive lists of 'non-capitalist states' shows. The 
problem with socialist orientation as a path of 'progressive 
state capitalism', however, is that Soviet-type political 
institutions and close ties with the Soviet Union and its 
closest political ally in the Third World, Cuba, can provoke 
a reaction on the part of local and foreign capital which 
undermines state capitalist development itself. In such 
circumstances, the 'progressive state capitalist regime' may
be obliged to weaken its political ties with the Soviet 
Union and Cuba in order to obtain assistance from the West. 
This is the sort of scenario which occurred in Egypt and 
appears to be taking place in Mozambique and Angola today.
We shall see further on in this study that this question of 
economic reliance on the West and political relations with 
the Soviet Union and Cuba was the central contradiction of 
the Bishop regime in Grenada. Before doing so, however, it 
is necessary to identify the main features of socialist 
orientation that Bernard Coard attempted to apply to Grenada.
Coard was somewhat fanatical in his political allegiance 
to Moscow and carefully studied the latest writings of 
Soviet scholars on socialist orientation in the Third World. 
Coard also imbibed the unofficial criticisms that the Soviet 
leadership has levelled against the Castro regime in Cuba. 
These criticisms concern the ultraleftist errors made by the 
Cubans in domestic and foreign policy during the 1960s, 
the complaint that Cuba was an inefficient recipient of 
Soviet aid, the purge of pro-Soviet cadres from the Cuban 
Communist Party in 1968 and reservations about Fidel Castro's 
personal domination of government and party organs. Coard was 
determined that Grenada would not repeat these mistakes and 
'deviations' and he always insisted that the l\IJM maintain its 
autonomy from the Cuban leadership. If one examines the 
socialist orientation literature studied by Coard and the NJM, 
including the 'official' account of the revolution written 
by Jacobs and Jacobs?^one can identify ten principal features 
of the socialist orientation strategy that was applied to 
Grenada:
1. The removal of imperialist and national bourgeois
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elements from the highest offices of state and the 
placing of the state machine, in particular its 
coercive apparatus, under the control of a Marxist- 
Leninist vanguard party.
2. The creation of a broad alliance between the proletariat, 
the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the 
patriotic national bourgeoisie under the hegemony of
the party .
3. The abolition of imperialism's political domination 
and the progressive elimination of its economic 
contr ol.
4. The consolidation of the mixed structure of the economy 
and its developement into one in which the state and 
co-operative sectors become dominant.
5. The adoption of appropriate planning techniques and 
organisational methods to develop the productive forces.
5. A raising of the cultural, scientific and material 
level of living of the mass of the people.
7. The imposition of state control over the media.
8. The transformation of the political culture towards 
socialist values and the promotion of new attitudes 
towards work and production.
9. The publicizing of the economic, social and technological 
achievements of the socialist countries and the 
development of economic and political relations with
the Soviet bloc.
10. Support for the Soviet bloc in international affairs.
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The Post-Reuolutionary State
On account of the predominantly comprador and petty 
bourgeois configuration of Grenada's class structure, the 
open nature of the economy and the extreme vulnerability of the 
society as a whole, the NJM was very cautious in its 
implementation of the socialist orientation strategy. As Jacobs 
and Jacobs explained: 'To adopt an overtly Warxist-Leninist
path in such circumstances is to court alienation and take a
2 6deliberately long route to national liberation.' When asked 
about the political complexion of their regime, NJM leaders 
always avoided the label 'Marxist-Leninist' and insisted that 
they be judged by their actions. Bishop's reply to a question 
put to him by the Grenadian journalist, Alister Hughes, in an 
interview conducted seven months after the revolution was 
typical in this respect: 'We say we are socialist. We have 
defined what we mean by socialism. We've done it 100 times. 
Every time we stand on a platform we are doing it. Every time 
we defend a particular issue we are doing it.
I know what we are. I know what I am. I call myself
'Socialist', and I say that there is a programme and a policy
27we follow, that will tell you what we are.' This pragmatic
and tactical use of Marxism-Leninism gave members of the NJM 
a good deal of latitude in formulating policies and allowed 
the party to enter in alliances with diverse individuals and 
political currents both at home and abroad. Nevertheless, the 
party did operate within the framwork of certain axioms that 
were derived from the Black Power and official communist ideas 
held by the leading intellectual figures in the party, Bishop 
and Coard. One of these axioms was the firm belief in the need
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for a one-party state. This is an interesting question. The 
manifesto of the party called for the establishment of a non- 
party state based on 'people's assemblies', because, it was 
argued, political parties tend to divide the people into 
rival factions which saps the creative energy of a country.
The introduction of official communist ideas into the NJM 
led to a reformulation of its position on the question of the 
party. It was now accepted that a Marxist-Leninist vanguard 
party was crucial in leading the masses to the conquest of 
state power and beginning the process of socialist transformation 
However, the party still adhered to its original views about 
party politics so that now its criticisms of the Westminster 
model of parliamentary democracy were used in support of a 
one party state. This was the NJM's public stance. Inside the 
NJM, however, the one-party state was justified in terms of 
official communist orthodoxy: only one party could genuinely 
represent the interests of the working class and any other party 
that was created could only serve the interests of the 
bourgeoisie in trying to overthrow the revolution. It is true 
that the socialist orientation strategy provided for a 
strategic alliance with the 'patriotic national bourgeoisie', 
but this was conceived essentially in economic terms. The 
private sector was called upon to play a major role in the 
economic strategy of the |\|JI*I and various incentives were 
made available. But it was not conceded the right to form 
political parties. The representatives of the bourgeoisie that 
were given portfolios in the government were placed there to 
maintain the confidence of the capitalist class as a whole, 
and the bourgeois ministers were considered to be 'under the 
hegemony of the party'. Bishop's Grenada was, however, a
one-party state de facto and not de jure since no laws were
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passed proscribing political parties. The NJFI's political
monopoly was maintained by altogether different means. Shortly
after the revolution the GNP attempted to stage two public
meetings, but each gathering was broken up by NJM supporters.
The party presented these events as the spontaneous rage of
the masses against the discredited bourgeois party, although
according to Alister Hughes, who attended both meetings, there
appeared to be a certain amount of organization involved.
Furthermore, when Hughes approached Bishop about these
occurrences he was told that the NJM wanted to maintain the
unity of the revolutionary process and nobody would be allowed
2 9to sow dissension and discord. The GNP was deeply intimidated 
by the protests, and after having failed to get some form of 
recognition of its right to exist the party disappeared from 
the political scene. It should be pointed out that if the GNP 
had been able to mobilise appreciable public support it would 
not have faded away without discernible popular discontent. In 
fact, the NJM's heavy-handed approach drew minimal criticism 
inside the country and was greeted with enthusiasm by many 
supporters of the ruling party. The class background of the 
GNP leadership and their failure to play any significant role 
in the overthrow of Gairy made many people suspicious of their 
motives and receptive towards the NJM's arguments. Nevertheless, 
the ban on all political activities outside the control of the 
party allowed the NJM to control and manipulate political 
debate in the country and greatly intimidated a number of 
prominent people in the country who were otherwise favourably 
disposed towards the revolution.
Another tenet which the NJM adhered to was that the party 
should be monolithic. Here again there was an amalgamation of
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Black Power and official communist ideas. In line with the 
Jamesian reservations about the hierarchical structure of the 
vanguard party, the early NJM operated along collective lines. 
After lengthy debate decisions were arrived at by consensus. 
Votes were never taken and minority viewpoints were not 
allowed to take on an organized form. This mode of operation, 
which corresponded to the conciliatory political style of 
Bishop, continued after the introduction of official communist 
ideas. However, the transformation of the l\IJM into a vanguard 
party led to this practice being rationalized in terms of 
official communist orthodoxy. It was now stated that as a 
Marxist-Leninist party the NJM should be monolithic and politics 
tendencies and factions should not be allowed to develop. In 
practice, however, Bernard Coard organized his followers in 
OREL as a cabal of true Marxist-Leninists. In 1975 when OREL 
was formed it published a newspaper called Spark and remained 
outside the NJM. It criticized the NJM as a petty bourgeois 
party, yet approached Bishop proposing an amalgamation into 
the NJM on one condition: that the NJM transform itself into 
a Marxist-Leninist party along the lines of the WPJ in 
Jamaica. The NJM refused to accept this proposal, but Coard and 
his followers in OREL joined the party anyhow, dropping any 
pre-conditions. They then set about introducing official 
communist ideas in a more piecemeal fashion. However, as far 
back as 1975 whan they characterised the NJM as petty bourgeois 
their analysis was that only they were theoretically qualified 
and competent enough to steer the NJM in a Marxist-Leninist 
direction and ensure that the revolution would reach a 
second stage, a Marxist-Leninist stage.^ Because of his 
intellectual stature, Coard was acknowledged as the chief 
theoretician of the party and given the authority to handpick
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members of the Central Committee that was established. Coard 
used this authority to progressively increase the number of 
OREL members on the Central Committee. Thus, in spite of the 
formal adherence to the concept of a monolithic party, from 
1975 onwards one could distinguish two distinct factions inside 
the NJM. The first faction was headed by Bishop and Radix 
and comprised the 'older' founding members of the party who 
were the leading intellectual figures in the country and came 
from prominent bourgeois and petty bourgeois families. The 
second faction was headed by Coard, and although a leading 
intellectual of petty bourgeois origins himself, most of his 
followers were the younger, less well-educated members of the 
party who came from poor families. Because of the experience 
and educational background of the Bishop faction they were 
given ministerial positions in the People's Revolutionary 
Government (PRG) that was established shortly after the 
revolution. On the other hand, members of the Coard faction 
tended to take leading positions in the armed forces, internal 
security, the trade unions and the party. Moreover, because 
they did not have ministerial responsibilities the supporters 
of Coard had more time to devote themselves to ideology and 
work in the party.
The NJM's flexible approach towards Marxism-Leninism 
enabled it to establish strong ties with a number of 
international organisations and institutions. The closest 
political allies of the party was the official communist 
movement in the English-speaking Caribbean, headed by the UPJ 
in Jamaica and the People's Progressive Party (PPP) in Guyana. 
Firm links were also established with the Cuban Communist 
Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and NJM cadres 
were sent to the party schools in those countries for
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military and ideological training. At the same time the NJM 
joined the Socialist International and gained the active 
support of that movement for the revolutionary process. As has 
been noted by various commentators,^ the response of the 
Socialist International to revolutionary developments in 
Grenada, Nicaragua and El Salvador has differed markedly from 
the way in which it reacted to the Cuban revolution. Although 
West European social democratic parties initially welcomed 
the Cuban revolution, when it came down to defending its 
results, all members of the Socialist International, with the 
exception of the Japanese Social Democratic Party, chose to 
support their ally, the United States. Confronted with the 
revolutionary upheavals in the Caribbean basin in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, however, the Socialist International 
was prepared to defy its North American ally. Several factors 
seem to be involved in this more receptive attitude towards 
revolution in the region on the part of the international 
social democratic movement. First of all, in recent years 
European social democrats have sought to prove to the Third 
World that Europe could provide genuine support to developing 
countries unwilling to tie themselves to either the United 
States or the Soviet Union. The revolutionary movements in 
Central America and the Caribbean were considered to be 
opening up such a 'third road'. Opposition to US policy in the 
region also allowed the Socialist International to distance 
itself from the increasingly belligerent tone of American 
foreign policy. The NJM skillfully exploited the anti-US 
position of the Socialist International in order to build 
a broad-based movement around the world in solidarity with the 
Grenadian revolution and in opposition to any US invasion. 
Inside the Socialist International the NJIYI played down its
official communist ideology and aligned itself with the 
Jamaican People's National Party (PNP) and the more progressive 
social democratic parties in Europe. The NJM leadership 
justified this manoeuvre in terms of the socialist orientation 
strategy. It was argued that since the Grenadian revolution 
was still at the 'national democratic stage' it was legitimate 
for the party to belong to the Socialist International. An 
open political alignment with the official communist movement 
could only take place when the revolution had advanced to a 
higher stage of development. The NJM adopted a similar position 
in relationship to the European Economic Community (EEC). 
Grenada under Bishop remained a signatory to the Lome 
Convention and was therefore entitled to receive concessionary 
assistance from the EEC. Equally, the NJM kept Grenada in the 
British Commonwealth and CARICOM, and sought to gain both 
economic assistance and political leverage from these bodies. 
The Njm also associated themselves with Trotskyists, which, 
given the ideological formation of the party was particularly 
heretical. Like most communists aligned with Moscow, the NJM 
considered Trotskyists to be opportunist and ultra-left. It 
was said, for example, that the Socialist Worker's Party in 
the United States, which was very active in building solidarity 
for the revolution, were being opportunist in that they were 
pro-Grenada, pro-Nicaragua, pro-Cuba but anti-Soviet. 
Nevertheless, the NJM applauded the solidarity work of the 
party and Bishop collaborated with the Socialist Worker's
Party's sister organization in Australia in publishing a
32collection of his speeches. The Trotskyists were also 
tolerated inside Grenada since they were committed supporters 
of the revolution and brought in r\e.e~ol«ct foreign
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exchange; but they were regarded with suspicion.
Within days of the seizure of state power the leadership 
of the NJM started work on a fundamental 'Declaration of the 
Grenada Revolution' and the first laws of the revolution 
called 'People's Laws'. On 25 March 1979 the Declaration and 
a package of ten basic People's Laws froming part of it, were 
proclaimed and endorsed by popular acclamation at a tally at 
Seamoon in the parish of St. Andrew, attended by over
15,000 people. The People's Laws and the Declaration were 
then signed by the country's new Prime Minister, Maurice Bishop, 
and printed and circulated around the island. The Declaration 
pronounced that 'constitutional government in Grenada has 
been interrupted as a consequence of the violations and 
abuses of democracy committed by the administration of Eric 
Matthew Gairy' and announced the establishment of the 
PRG. The PRG pledged 'to return to constitutional rule at an 
early opportunity and to appoint a Consultative Assembly to 
consult with all the people for the purpose of the establishment 
of a new Constitution which will reflect the wishes and 
aspirations of all the people of Grenada. That new Constitution 
will be submitted for popular approval in a referendum. All 
sections, classes and strata will be involved.'^ People's 
Law No. 1 confirmed the suspension from 13 March 1979 of the 
Grenada Constitution Order which had been proclaimed in 
Council by the Queen in 1973 and declared all acts done under 
the authority of the PRG to have been done lawfully. People's 
Law No. 2 established the PRG and vested in it all executive 
and legislative power. People's Law No. 3 confirmed the Queen 
as Head of State and the Governor-General as her representative,
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who was required to perform such functions as the PRG should 
from time to time adv/ise. People's Law No. 4 established a 
Supreme Court for Grenada with the jurisdiction of the 
West Indies Associated States Supreme. Court, which was 
thereby terminated. People's Law No. 5 provided that all 
existing Laws should continue in force unless and until 
specifically repealed or amended. People's Law No. 6 confirmed 
and extended the jurisdiction of the existing Magistrates 
Courts. People's Law No. 7 established the People's Revolutionary 
Army (PRA) whose members were given the powers of arrest and 
search possessed by members of the Police Force. People's 
Law No. 8 introduced the power to order the preventive 
detention of persons considered to be endangering public 
safety and national security and set up a tribunal to review 
the cases of detainees and make recommendations. People's Law 
No. 9 preserved the pension rights of civil servants. Finally, 
People's Law No. 10 declared that all People's Laws should 
take effect upon oral declaration by the Prime Minister on the 
radio or through publication in the Grenada Government Gazette.
Five other People's Laws were proclaimed on 29 March 
1979. People's Law No. 11 of 1979 confirmed the appointment 
of Maurice Bishop as Prime Minister, with responsibility for 
such departments of government as he might deem appropriate 
and authority to appoint and define the responsibilities of 
other ministers. People's Law No. 12 of 1979 confirmed the 
appointment of twenty-three persons to form the PRG. Most of 
those appointed were leading members of the NJM, such as 
Maurice Bishop, Bernard Coard, Unison Whiteman, Vincent Noel, 
Selwyn Strachan, George Lousion, Kenrick Radix, Hudson Austin, 
Leon Cornwall, Liam James, Basil Gahagan and Fitzroy Bain.
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The non-NJM members of the PRG included Dr. Bernard Gittens, 
a medical doctor, Sydney Ambrose, a teacher and two 
representatives of the island’s business class, Norris Bain 
and Lyden Ramdhanny. In line with the socialist orientation 
strategy, the NJM considered the PRG to be a broad alliance 
between the various classes of Grenadian society that was 
subordinate to the party, the guiding force of the revolution. 
Thus, in spite of vesting all legislative and executive 
powers in the PRG, the NJfl believed that the party was the 
primary source and guarantor of revolutionary legitimacy and 
in practice operated as a law unto itself. However, most 
Grenadians identified themselves with the PRG and many people 
had no idea who sat on the party's leading bodies or what 
precise roles they fulfilled. The NJM, for its part, considered 
its relationship with the PRG as tactical and did not make any 
efforts to inform people about it. The non-NJM members of the 
PRG were prominent individuals in the society whom the NJfl 
considered competent and trustworthy. At the same time the 
NJM took into account the problems posed by the class instincts 
of the individuals in question. In respect to Lyden Ramdhanny, 
a talented economist and director of a prominent family 
company, the NJM was optimistic that during the course of the 
revolutionary process he might commit class suicide and join 
the ranks of the proletarian forces. No such optimism 
prevailed with regard to Norris Bain, a prominent merchant 
based in Grenville. He showed few signs of developing into a 
Marxist-Leninist , and it was believed that his enthusiasm for 
the revolution had a good deal to do with the fact that it 
enabled his business to flourish. Nevertheless, the NJIyl made 
maximum use of his abilities and the popularity he enjoyed in
■■■■■M M M h
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the country. The party also made assessments of the other 
non-NJM members of the PRG.
The other People's Laws proclaimed on 29 March 1979 were: 
People's Law IMo. 13 of 1979, which confirmed the appointment of 
the first Ministers; People's Law No. 14 of 1979, which 
provided for the composition and jurisdiction of the two 
branches of the Supreme Court (High Court and Court of Appeal); 
and People's Law No. 15 of 1979 which revived 21 of the 111 
sections of the suspended constitution.
Four days later a further three People's Laws were 
proclaimed; People's Law No. 16 of 1979 defined the functions 
of the Cabinet; People's Law No. 17 extended the definition, 
contained in People's Law No. 8, of persons whose preventive 
detention could be ordered to include persons seeking to 
'subvert or otherwise sabotage the PRG'; People's Law No. 18 
defined the powers and functions of the Governor-General, 
effectively changing his role to that of a figure-head by 
requiring him to act as advised by the Cabinet or the Minister 
responsible . ^
Thus, within the space of sixteen to twenty days, the 
complete structure of government had been laid out, reflecting 
the basic interim arrangements for carrying on the government 
of Grenada according to the law pending the working out of a 
permanent constitutional structure. Although only 21 of the 
111 clauses of the suspended constitution were revived it 
would be incorrect to conclude, on this purely numerical 
basis, that the matters referred to in the remaining 90 
clauses were not regulated according to the law. In fact, 
nearly every aspect of government and administration was 
governed either by statute or the principles of the common 
law. However, it is the case that the PRG retained
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extraordinary powers to detain and hold people without trial, 
and habeus corpus was not always respected.
Shortly after the overthrow of Eairy, Bishop announced 
that the PRG expected a quick return to 'free and fair 
elections'. However, this was an issue of some debate inside 
the NJM, and the PRG refrained from taking any real steps 
towards the re-establishment of Westminster-style constitutional 
rule and elections. At times the PRG would present the system 
of popular power that it had set up as an altogether superior 
form of democracy to that embodied in the Westminster model, 
and it was often said rhetorically that the revolution was 
itself a form of election in that there had been 'one man, 
one gun'. On other occasions the PRG would reiterate its 
pledge to hold elections once a new constitution was drawn up. 
However, it was not until June 1983 that a constitutional 
commission was appointed.
Following the revolution, the PRG arrested and quickly 
brought to trial members of the Mongoose Gang and the secret 
police. After a period the majority of those held were 
released, leaving only the most dangerous still in prison. A 
number of people were also arrested under the 1979 Preventive 
Detention Regulation and the Prevention of Terrorism Law 
passed in 1980. The acts enabled the PRG to detain without 
trial individuals suspected of terrorist offences. Although 
some of the NJM's accusations subsequently proved to be 
without foundation, a number of those people detained were 
manifestly involved in conspiracies aimed at toppling the 
government. These included figures implicated in the November 
1979 'De Raviniere Plot', in which some police officers, 
members of the UPP and right-wing academics working in the 
US had collected arms and planned to co-ordinate mercenary
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landings, and members of the 'Budhlall Gang', which in the 
spring of 1980 mobilised young Rastafarians and attacked 
army camps. The authors of the bombing of the Heroes' Day 
rally on 19 June 1980, when three young women were killed, and 
the assassins of four young men at St. Patrick's on 17 November 
1980, were not captured, but these incidents gave weight to 
the PRG's assertions that it faced an internal as well as an 
external subversive campaign and undoubtedly encouraged it to 
detain people about whom it had suspicions. Nonetheless, some 
of those held without trial, such as the ex-NJM leader 
Lloyd Noel, and the constantly harassed journalist Alister 
Hughes, were patently guilty of political opposition rather 
than conspiracy.
Two types of criticism were levelled against the PRG 
over the detainee issue. First, organisations such as Amnesty 
International and the local Catholic church criticised the 
regime purely and simply for holding prisoners for extended 
periods without any semblance of judicial process. The PRG 
responded by claiming that there was a lack of competent 
lawyers on the island and that the legal system which it had 
inherited had broken down. The government also maintained that 
political cases should be tried under the new constitution, a 
position that was somewhat disingenous in view of the lack of 
movement towards establishing a new charter. The second type 
of criticism was markedly less honourably inspired and 
emananated from the US government, conservative Caribbean states 
and the right-wing media, all of which alleged with greater 
or lesser hyperbole and vehemence that political detainees 
were being brutally tortured. Church leaders who visited the 
prison at no stage made any complaint about the treatment of 
those whose cases they were investigating, and delegations
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from the Caribbean Council of Churches and the OAS also 
indicated that they had found no instance of maltreatment.
There does, however, remain some doubt over the total number 
of political detainees: in June 1983 Bishop gave the figure 
for those held without trial as thirty-five, but Amnesty 
considered that there were at least ninety and maybe more.
As with so many other aspects of its activity, the 
PRG's attitude towards political detentions was shaped by the 
official communist ideology of the NJM. It was argued that 
the revolution had to be protected at all costs, and that it 
was legitimate in a revolution to detain people who one 'knew 
were guilty' even if one did not have any shred of evidence.
The PRG's attitude towards political detentions was also 
partly determined by very real constraints in that Grenada did 
lack an adequate judicial system. Nevertheless, the failure to 
adopt a measured policy towards domestic opposition rebounded 
to the government's disadvantage. One critical factor in this 
regard was the imbalance between the relatively open character 
of the PRG itself and the increasingly tight and inflexible 
positions emerging within the party. The contradictions of 
this relationship did not become clear, however, until forces 
inside the NJIY1 sought a complete imposition of their party-based 
conception of discipline and public order on the state. When 
this occurred, in October 1983, the precedents established by 
the PRG played an important part in determining how the 
Central Committee of the NJP'l moved against the PRG itself.
There was no inescapable logic in this process - prisoners 
were released at quite regular intervals and the numbers 
involved in no sense constituted a pogrom - but it is difficult 
to deny the link.
A
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The PRG's policy tou/ards the media was also somewhat 
authoritarian in character. In October 1979 the revolutionary 
government closed down the island's only capitalist newspaper, 
Torchlight . The PRG argued with some justification that 
Torchlight had revealed the location of a PRA training camp, 
had acguired the habit of reprinting anti-PRG articles taken 
from foreign publications, which often contained libellous 
and completely untrue material, and manifested a total 
commitment to removing the new administration. Whether this 
meant that the paper was, as claimed, working in harness 
with the CIA, is open to guestion. The final act which led to 
the closure of the paper was an article entitled 'Rastas to 
Protest', which the PRG considered was deliberately designed to 
exacerbate discontent amongst the Rastafarian community. As 
part of the action against Torchlight the PRG passed the 
Newspapers (Amendment) Law which limited an individual's 
shareholding in a newspaper publishing company to 4 per cent. 
Under the provisions of that law, all shares held by individuals 
in excess of 4 per cent of the shareholding in Grenada 
Publishers Ltd, the owners of Torchlight , were automatically 
vested in the PRG. Bishop announced that these shares would be 
sold to the public, but this was never done so that the PRG 
remained in effective control of the newspaper. The clause 
restricting an individual's shareholding to 4 per cent was a 
direct challenge to the Trinidadian newspaper, Trinidad 
Express, which owned a massive 4,062 shares in Torchlight .
The Trinidad Express was itself highly critical of the 
Grenadian revolution, and used its influence in Torchlight 
to print editorials hostile to the PRG. According to Don 
Rojas, who served as a publicity secretary to Maurice Bishop,
I l l
the PRG attempted to do a deal with the management of Torchliqht 
before taking the decision to close the paper. The PRG 
proposed that they be given the right to appoint the newspaper's 
editor, and Rojas was put forward as their candidate for the 
post. After giving a hearing to the PRG's proposition, the 
management of Torch1iqht hardened their position and insisted 
that they retain the right to appoint the newspaper's editor.
It was at this stage that the PRG took the decision to close 
the newspaper.^  The management of Torchliqht remained in 
contention with the PRG until August 1981, when workers at the 
company took it over and set up their own co-operative. The 
workers action was prompted by the fact that the management of 
the company had abandoned them owing them substantial arrears 
of salary.
In May 1981 a 'Committee of 26' was formed composed of 
local businessmen and other prominent individuals who published 
in St. George's a new newspaper called The Grenadian Voice.
In bringing out the paper the 'Committee of 26' went to great 
lengths in seeking to comply with the provisions of the 1979 
Newspaper Law. Nevertheless, the PRG closed down the paper 
after only its first issue claiming that it was linked to a 
CIA plot against the revolution. This accusation was primarily 
based on the fact that a US State Department official in 
Barbados made a comment to Kenrick Radix, the Minister of Justice 
and Industrial Development, to the effect that Grenada would 
shortly see the publication of a new newspaper. This was 
interpreted as a slip of the tongue which proved that the 
State Department was behind The Grenadian \l oice. This was quite 
an extrapolation to make. It could well have been that the US 
official was deliberately making this remark in order to
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provoke an over-reaction on the part of the PRG that would 
discredit the revolution both at home and abroad. Whether this 
was the intention of the US official or not, such an 
over-react ion did take place. The PRG detained the printers 
and harassed members of the 'Committee of 26' including 
Alister Hughes who was dealt with in a particularly harsh 
fashion. At the same time the PRG mobilised its supporters in 
demonstrations against the 'Committee of 26', and published 
letters from people around the country who supported the 
government's action. In a major speech given at the 'Heroes'
Day' rally held on 19 June at the Queen's Park, St. George's, 
Bishop explained why the PRG had taken such drastic action 
against The Grenadian \/oice . The main argument he put forward 
was that the 'Committee of 26' was composed of reactionary 
landowners and capitalists who did not speak on behalf of the 
Grenadian masses and that these 'stooges' were being manipulated 
by the CIA. He then outlined why he considered The Grenadian 
Voice to be illegal: 'This is not a question of legality or 
illegality, it is a question of using legality as a red 
herring to try to pretend that the question is legalisation, if 
legality is about the law. We reject the bourgeois concept in 
trying to define the law, we reject the meaning the bourgeoisie 
put to the question of press freedom. We say that - in this 
country today, in this popular people's revolution - the time 
of the masses having come, the ideas of the masses must 
predominate. In counter-revolution under press cover, we reject 
the fact that it is a legal paper. We say no: The paper is 
illegal.
It is illegal for five reasons.
The first reason is that they used their own procedure
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when they tried to create their newspaper company law. That is 
a legalistic reason, we gav/e it to them so they can be happy 
with it. They used the wrong procedure - they must fire 
Lloyd Noel next time and get a real lawyer.
The second reason is that when the Torchlight was closed 
down the general of the revolution, the Commander of the 
Revolution Comrade Austin went on the radio and warned these 
elements that they must not put out a newspaper again until 
further notice. They have violated the voice of the revolution.
The third reason is that - when, in their second attempt, 
the Catholic Focus was closed down, for the same illegal 
reasons - we warned them that they must not put out any more 
papers trying to use illegal means under the Newspaper Act.
The fourth reason is, we have warned them on several 
occasions that they will have to wait until a media code, 
a media policy for newspapers, is formulated and implemented 
before they can bring out any newpaper , and they refused to 
listen.
And the fifth and most important reason of all: This is a 
revolution, we live in a revolutionary Grenada, this is a 
revolutionary condition, and there is a revolutionary legality, 
and they will have to abide by the laws of the revolution.
When the revolution speaks, it must be heard, listened to. 
Whatever the revolution decrees, it must be obeyed; when the 
revolution commands, it must be carried out; when the revolution 
talks, no parasite must bark in their corner. The voice of the 
masses must be listened to, their rules must be obeyed, their 
ideas must receive priority, their needs must be addressed;
when the masses speak, they must be heard. When the revolution
»  3 5orders, it must be obeyed. The revolution must be respected.
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In demagogic and plain terms, Bishop articulated the
authoritarian views held by the NJM in regard to the question
of press freedom. Underlying Bishop's statement was a
substitutionist conception of the role of the party in a
revolutionary process, whereby the decisions and decrees of the
revolutionary leadership are regarded as 'the voice of the
masses' . Towards the end of his speech, Bishop disclosed that
a new newspaper law had been passed earlier in the day. This
law, called the Newspaper (Publications) Law 1981, prohibited
the production, printing, publishing and distribution in
Grenada of any newspaper, but exempted any newspaper already
being published and which had been continuously in existence
37since 29 October 1979. This latter clause was included to 
allow for the legal publication of the government-owned 
newspaper, the Free West Indian, and several other newspapers 
produced by the party and the mass organisations. The 
introduction of this law provides a further indication of the 
substitutionist ideas held by the NJM and the effects of this 
on the law-making process in the country. Having failed to 
formulate an official media policy, the PRG responded to the 
publication of a newspaper with repression, and then, in order 
to legitimise this operation ex post facto, introduced a 
newspaper law banning the publication of independent newspapers'? 
In addition to the views expressed by Bishop in his speech at 
the Heroes Day rally, the PRG defended its position on the 
question of press freedom by pointing to the 'broad range of 
views' that were expressed in the Free UJest Indian and the 
existence of a number of papers produced by the mass 
organisations and the party. It also made mention of the fact 
that foreign magazines, such as Time and Newsweek, and
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newspapers like the Express and the Trinidad Guardian, were 
allowed to circulate despite the fact that they were highly 
critical of the PRG. It should also be noted that Grenadian 
radios could receive the fiercely critical Voice of America, 
broadcast from Antigua, as well as the stations of other 
islands controlled by governments and organisations far from 
sympathetic to the PRG.
On balance, then, one can say, that although the PRG's 
attitude towards the question of press freedom was not as 
totalitarian as the image presented by Washington and the 
capitalist press in the Caribbean, the revolutionary government 
handled the issue in an authoritarian and clumsy manner and 
opened itself to unnecessary criticisms over freedom of 
expression. Uppermost in the minds of the NJM leadership was 
the central role played by newspapers such as El Mercurio 
in Chile and the Daily Gleaner in Jamaica in destabilizing the 
much stronger left-wing governments of Salvador Allende and 
Michael Manley respectively. But, in following the guidelines 
of socialist orientation, the NJM lacked the tactical 
flexibility of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, which 
allows the publication of the opposition La Prensa even at a 
time of considerable tension and undeclared war.
A month or so after the confrontation with the 'Committee 
of 26' the PRG launched the Media Workers Association of Free 
Grenada (MWAFG) to carry out its policy in relation to the 
media. The MWAFG was composed of workers from the government- 
controlled media: Radio Free Grenada (RFG), Free West Indian 
(FWI), Television Free Grenada (TFG) and the Government 
Information Service (GIS). In his feature address at the 
launching ceremony of the MWAFG, Bishop told the 500 people 
gathered that the MWAFG's launching was an important first
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step in combating the negative propaganda against Grenada
'because there is a need for us, at a national level, to
become more organized and unified to begin to counter the
39negative flow of information to and f^om our country.'
The enunciation of the official policy of the MWAFG was left 
to its First Vice President, Don Rojas. Reading from a 
document of the Association, he said that the MUJAFG states 
'our firm support for a publicly owned media, which reflects 
the interests and aspirations of the real people of Free 
Grenada, the people who are working daily to better thier 
lives, who are struggling against tremendous odds to build an 
attractive future for their children and for generations to 
come.' Rojas added that the MUIAFG unites all media workers, 
from drivers to managers. 'As an organization, we will fight 
for the rights of progressive journalists throughout the 
world, and will join the militant and universal struggle for 
a new international information o r d e r . I n  October 1981 
the MUIAFG joined the International Organisation of Journalists 
(IOJ), the international movement of journalists aligned with 
Moscow.^ Subsequently the Grenadian media began to disseminate 
a greater amount of information on economic and political 
developments in the Soviet Union and the official communist 
movement. There appeared to be a calculated strategy of 
inculcating socialist ideas in the society by reporting on the 
positive features of the Soviet Union and then presenting 
information on crime, unemployment and other 'decadent' 
features of life in the United States. At the same time, 
friendship societies were formed with the Soviet Union and 
Cuba, which organized films, arts displays, public meetings 
and book fairs on life in the socialist countries. And in
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September 1981 the Cuban government installed a new 50,000 
watts medium wave transmitter at RFG which allowed the station 
to be heard in the ragion and as far as North America.^ Thus, 
in conformity with the guidelines of socialist orientation 
the PRG imposed a state monopoly over the media and used it to 
educate the masses about anti-imperialist struggles and the 
'virtues of life under socialism'.
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Popular Education
Under colonialism Grenada's education system was designed 
to inculcate British values and produce a local elite that 
could administer the island on behalf of the mother country. 
Most Grenadians never reached beyond elementary education, 
and many children left primary school at an early age because 
of exorbitant school fees and the need to make a contribution 
to the meagre family income. The text books that were used in 
schools, called Royal Readers, reflected the British way of 
life and most of what the students learnt dealt with what 
happened in Britain. In an address given at the National 
Education Conference held four months after the revolution, 
Bishop drew attention to the stultyfying effects of the 
colonial education system: 'Perhaps the worst crime that 
Colonialism left our country, as indeed it left all former 
colonies, is the Education system. This is so, because the 
way in which that system developed, the way in which that 
system was used, was to teach our people an attitude of self- 
hate to get them to abandon our history, our culture, our 
values; to get them to accept the principles of White 
superiority; to destroy our confidence; to stifle our creativity 
to perpetuate in our society class privilege and class 
difference. The Colonial masters recognized very early on that 
if you get a subject people to think like them, the 
colonialists, and if those subjects are made to forget their 
own history and their own culture, and made to develop a 
system of Education that is going to have relevance to the 
outward needs of the colonialists and almost entirely no 
relevance to our internal needs, then they have already won
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the job of keeping us inperpetual (sic) domination and 
exploitation. Our Educational process, therefore, was used 
mainly as a tool of the ruling elite. ...
Our Educational System was used in this way to encourage 
a number of myths, a number of illusions, a number of 
deep-seated fallacies. It was meant to create the belief that 
social mobility was the most important factor to be had from 
Education. It was meant to foster the illusion that the most 
important reason why anyone should receive Education was so 
that he or she could acquire individual wealth. It helped to 
teach us most of the negative attitudes and values that today 
we still see in certain sectors of our society.
Attitudes of racist beliefs, racism, priorities and 
chauvinist attitudes that make many of the men in our society 
look at the women as being not an equal partner but as being a 
tool for personal use and enjoyment. An attitude of narrow 
nationalism and of isolationism that has taught us to believe 
that each of us in each of the several Caribbean islands must 
always remain seperate and apart, and our French, and Spanish, 
and Dutch speaking (sic) brothers and sisters have no 
relevance to those of us who live in the English speaking (sic) 
section of the Caribbean. It has taught us to accept attitudes 
of authoritarian rule, and a hierachial (sic) structure that 
says that the people do not have any rights to participate, do 
not have any rights to have their voices heard; that 
discourages political affairs and political activity of students, 
whom they compartmentalize. At one time in your life you are 
deemed a student and during that period you are not supposed 
to be involved in any of the other affairs of the real world 
outside. So the Education process, made us believe that during
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the eighteen or nineteen years (for those who are able to get 
secondary education) that you are so-called "students" that 
your only role is to study, and this study must be completely 
unrelated to what is happening in our society.
An attitude which also continued to teach us, a hundred 
and forty something years after the abolition of slavery is 
that our sole function was to continue to be producers of raw 
materials and raw goods for the colonial masters.'1 The coming 
to power of Gairy did little to change the philosophical basis 
of the colonial education system, and under his regime the 
primary school system virtually collapsed. Thousands of dollars 
which should have gone to the education budget were siphoned 
off and squandered by Gairy and his hirelings. In his speech 
at the National Education Conference, Bishop presented some 
stark facts on the educational wasteland which the PRG 
inherited: 'The physical condition of our schools is a sin 
crying to heaven for vengeance. Of the sixty-two primary schools 
in Grenada twelve are totally delapidated. Children need to 
go to school with umbrellas because if the rain falls they 
would not be-able to sit inside. Twenty-five more of them 
need complete refurbishing and every single one of them is in 
desperate need of repairs of some sort. In fact there are only 
five schools in the entire country that the recent survey has 
passed as being acceptable or desirable - five schools in the 
entire country. All of our schools, or the vast majority of them 
are overcrowded.' Most teachers in the country were 
unqualified: '... of our teachers at the Primary level less 
than one third, in fact only thirty per cent, have received 
any form of professional training at all. At the secondary 
level the picture is even worse. It is something like 7 per 
cent of all the teachers who have received some form of
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professional training and at the Pre-primary level the vast 
majority have in fact received no form of professional 
training . 1  ^ Bishop also provided information on the high rate 
of failure in schools: ’Of those doing primary school leaving 
exams in 1978 - of the nine hundred and sixty-eight persons 
who sat that exam - only twenty-eight persons passed. ... At 
the secondary school level, of all the people, of all the 
youths and students in our country who go through the school 
system, only ten to fourteen per cent ever got the opportunity 
of entering secondary school. The rest are condemned to 
primary education, li/hen you look at the results of O' levels, 
of the one hundred and ninety-four students who took the exam 
last year, only twenty four got four or more O'levels. All the 
rest either failed or picked up one or two. Between 1970 and 
1979, in other words over the last nine years, only twenty per 
cent of all students who came out of our school system were able 
to find jobs.'^ Finally, Bishop argued that illiteracy was 
the most serious problem faced by the PRG: 'Sisters and 
brothers, we inherited very many problems on the 13th of March. 
Perhaps the most fundamental problem of all is the one that 
many people like to pretend does not exist, and that is the 
problem of illiteracy. People like to wave around certain facts 
and figures, and glorify it by way of statistics. They say 
that in Grenada the percentage of illiteracy is very small.
But what they mean by that is that most people or perhaps many 
people are able to sign their names, and the process of being 
able to scratch a signature on a piece of paper is deemed 
literacy and therefore we say there is no problem of illiteracy. 
But the reality that in fact confronts us, is that the vast 
majority of our people are still unable to read or to write
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in a functional manner; are still unable to take a newspaper 
and to appreciate what is written on that paper; are still 
unable to listen to a radio broadcast and to discern in an 
intelligent, in an enquiring, in a serious way what is being 
said; because they have not been given the opportunity for 
such development . And one of the most crying shames of the 
recent history of our country is the fact that no one is yet 
able to assess how many thousands of geniuses might have 
been uncovered, might have been discovered, might have come 
forth and flowered if they had had the opportunity of receiving 
some form of further education.1^
It is evident from Bishop's speech that the PRG saw 
education as a crucial area in need of radical change. Toward 
this end, three major educational programmes were launched 
in 1980: the Centre for Popular Education (CPE), the National 
In-Service Teacher Education Programme (NISTEP), and the 
Community-School Day Programme (CSPD).
The CPE was headed by a National Advisory Committee 
representing a cross-section of society and chaired by the 
Minister of Education (initially George Louison and after 
August 1981 Jaqueline Creft). Launched under the slogan 
'Each One Teach One, Let Us Learn Together', the literacy 
campaign was divided into two phases. Phase One involved basic 
literacy training for those without any education, and attempted 
to bring about one-third of the estimated 2,738 illiterates to 
a condition of basic literacy in the space of six months 
(August 1980 to February 1981). The campaign relied on 
volunteer teachers who were organized into village committees. 
The committees met weekly to monitor the progress of the classes 
and to discuss organizational and educational problems. To
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assist the CPE, the PRG brought in two consultants to 
Grenada: Paulo Freire , head of the World Council of Churches 
literacy programme, and Angel Arrechea, a literacy expert 
from Cuba. These advisors made important political and 
practical suggestions. However, there were a number of 
pedagogical problems unique to Grenada which could only be 
solved by Caribbean teachers through trial and error. At the 
end of Phase One, 881 persons satisfactorily completed the 
course and learned to read and write for the first time in 
their lives.
The CPE's Phase Two began in October 1982, and was in 
essence a post-literacy programme. The objectives of Phase 
Two were spelt out in the CPE manual prepared for teachers:
(i) to raise the cultural level, political and ideological 
consciousness of all our people generally, and in particular 
create a deeper awareness of the need and importance of 
education in the revolutionary process of building the new 
society; (ii) to provide primary education for all the adults 
in our country who need it, in a two-year course; (iii) to 
provide avenues for our communities to develop organisational 
skills and a deeper understanding of the need for co-operative 
effort to solve the common problems faced by the people; and 
(iv) to assist other departments, ministries, national 
programmes etc. in popular education of the masses on issues
0relevant to the particular programme, projects or institutions. 
The curriculum of this second phase included five basic 
courses: mathematics, English, Grenadian history, geography 
and natural science. Classes were held at night so the working 
day was not interrupted, and the programme was closely linked 
to the needs and interests of working adults.
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One of the most important aspects of CPE mas its
cultural component. While the CPE developed knowledge and
confidence in the Standard English it sought to remove the
stigma from Creole by drawing on Grenadian folklore to provide
illustrations in lessons. At the same time, people were
encouraged to express themselves through poetry, drama, song
and dance. Thus,in many ways the CPE promoted two languages:
Standard English and Creole. In no sense was there a replacing
7of one with another.
The PRG declared 1983 as 'The Year of Political and
Academic Education', and the CPE was accorded pride of place
in the work of the revolutionary government. This was
explained by Bishop in his New Year's address to the nation:
'The main academic or educational task for 1983 must be to push
ahead vigorously with the Centre for Popular Education (CPE),
to bring thousands more of our working people into this
programme because of its fundamental relevance to the social,
0political and economic development of the masses.' He added 
that CPE certificates would become a critical asset in the 
new job opportunities that were being created and 'an 
equally important asset in the areas of training and promotion'. 
Bishop stated that the PRG's overall objective in 1983 was to 
'make our country and revolution a big popular school',^  and 
listed seven main tasks for the year: (i) worker education 
in both public and private workplaces; (ii) CPE in all villages; 
(iii) CPE for workers; (iv) total trade union involvement in 
CPE and worker education; (v) more work-study programmes for 
students; (vi) more seminars and training courses to be 
organized by the mass organisations; (vii) and more technical 
seminars for different categories of workers to improve their
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skills.'*''*' Following Bishop's address, recruitment to the CPE 
was stepped up and more people were called upon to undergo 
training to become volunteer teachers. The CPE classes were 
increasingly used as political organs in which people were 
informed about government policies and called upon to take 
part in voluntary work brigades and political campaigns.
The CPE was undoubtedly one of the major accomplishments 
of the revolution and was highly successful in raising popular 
consciousness and creating a new sense of Grenadian identity, 
patriotism and pride. Yet at the same time, the programme 
was severely handicapped by the shortcomings of the country's 
social and educational infrastructure. Regular electricity 
outages caused many CPE classes to be cancelled, although 
gallant attempts were sometimes made to conduct classes under 
candle-light. Many potential students were deterred from 
attending CPE classes by the difficulties involved in getting 
transport late at night. Since a large number of CPE teachers 
were also active in other programmes of the revolution students 
often went to classes to find that there was no teacher. These 
and other problems resulted in a high rate of absenteeism 
amongst students. The PRG responded to the absenteeism by 
making frequent appeals for support at public events and in 
the media, but seemed unable to provide a solution to the 
infrastructural and organizational problems which existed.
The further development of the CPE programme was dependent 
upon the overall progress of the revolution.
The second educational programme launched by the PRG, 
NISTEP, was designed to tackle the problem of unqualified and 
undertrained teachers. Before the revolution the Grenada 
Teachers' College graduated an average of forty-five teachers
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per year, while something like half that number of qualified 
teachers left the profession each year for emigration. Under 
these circumstances it would have been extremely slow and 
costly to upgrade teaching standards in the traditional 
manner. Because of this, the revolutionary government decided 
on an in-service teacher training programme as the most 
practical and efficient for Grenada. NISTEP aimed at upgrading 
612 untrained teachers over a three-year period at an estimated 
cost of ECS3.7 million. The programme centred upon tutors and 
'teacher-partners' , whereby experienced teachers were attached 
to a group of co-operating untrained colleagues to develop 
their skills for one day a week. During the remaining four 
days of the week the untrained teachers put into practice 
what they had learnt. Besides raising educational standards, 
NISTEP had two other important objectives: to develop a 
standardized curriculum to be used by schools throughout 
Grenada; and to establish teaching as a serious profession in 
order to expunge the notion that it is merely a stepping-stone 
to more prestigious and lucrative employment. By raising the 
professionalism, prestige and pay of Grenada's teachers (those 
who completed the programme were given increments in salary), 
the PRG hoped to retain a higher percentage of qualified 
teachers in the schools on a long-term basis.
NISTEP was an exceptionally bold and innovative 
programme and was unique in the Caribbean. However, Grenada's 
limited resources and the inefficiency of the administrative 
machinery led to organizational and technical problems. Some 
of the training provided by tutors was too academic and there 
was inadequate supervision of teachers. In addition, complaints 
of project relevance were often heard. Nevertheless, standards 
were raised significantly and the prestige of the teaching
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profession was enhanced.
The CSPD was originally conceived as a practical strategy 
to occupy primary school pupils on the one day each week when 
the teachers were out of school for their in-service training. 
However, the programme soon developed a rationale of its 
own. CSPD sought to have community volunteers and other persons 
conduct practical activities in the schools on the days when 
teachers were absent. The purpose of the exercise was twofold: 
first, to develop closer community-school relationships and, 
second, to provide a more relevant education through the 
introduction of more broad-based curricula and the work-study 
approach. As regards the former, CSPD affirmed: 'The school 
must not only inform the community but must now also see 
itself as being informed by the community. The school and the 
community must be meshed as one unit struggling together for 
the creation of a new Educational Process and Programme ... The 
skills of the community must be a resource pool on which the
school can and must draw if the new system and its programmes
12are to be relevant to the needs of society...' Improved 
community-school relationship went hand-in-hand with the 
introduction of work-study. The work-study model is based on 
the principle that the world of work is based on praxis and 
it cannot be properly understood by passive reading. UJork-study 
is experience-based and seeks to assist pupils in finding 
satisfaction in manual skills and technical efficiency and to 
acquire the recommended knowledge, values and behaviour 
patterns. In Grenada, the experience of similar models in Cuba 
was extensively drawn upon.
Like IMISTEP, CSPD suffered from bureaucratic inefficiency 
and limited resources. There was also a substantial amount of
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indifference and resistance to the programme, particularly 
at the local level, where there was little or no tradition of 
community involvement in schools. In those places where the 
programme was successful, it tended to perpetuate the 'two- 
track' problem in schools. Because secondary education was 
only open to those who passed the entrance examination, slower 
pupils in many primary schools were given lessons in gardening, 
woodwork and home economics, while their brighter colleagues 
followed more academic subjects. Under the CSPD, those schools 
which had the most untrained teachers became, in effect, 
'half-work, half-study' establishments in sharp contrast to 
those better endowed. By 1983, serious concern about this 
was beginning to be expressed. Nevertheless, these problems 
were not insurmountable and could have been resolved in the 
space of time.^
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The Mass Organisations
One of the most widely acclaimed features of the Grenadian 
revolution was the impetus which it gave to the seIf-organisation 
of society as large. On account of legislation and intiatives 
spearheaded by the NJM( there was a prodigious growth in the 
organizational strength of the 'mass organizations': the trade 
unions, the Productive Farmers' Union (PFU), the National 
Women's Organization (NWO), the National Youth Organization 
(NYO) and the National School Student's Council (NSSC). In 
accordance with guidelines of socialist orientation, the NJM 
sought to create a mass base amongst the oppressed in order 
to bolster the PRG and curtail the influence of the surviving 
capitalist class. The mass organizations played a key role in 
popularizing the goals of the revolution and mobilising 
voluntary labour brigades. All of the organizations were 
represented on state or statutory bodies appropriate to the 
promotion of their specific interests so as to ensure that 
government organs were responsive to the needs of the people.
In addition, the leader of each of the principal mass 
organizations -was represented on the PRG as iv -Tu.il «ne.twbe.*'.
The PRG wasted no time in introducing legislation in
of the revolutionfavour of the trade unions. Within three months/all of Gairy's 
anti-worker laws were repealed, and in May 1979 the Trade 
Unions (Recognition) Act was passed. Under this law the 
employer was compelled to recognise the trade union, once 
over 50 per cent of the workforce were union members. The 
Ministry of Labour was required to respond within seven days of 
the union's application for recognition, and then call a poll 
of workers. If the majority was shown to be members, then the
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union would automatically be certified as the bargaining agent 
14for the workers. This law effectively put an end to the
non-recognition of trade unions by employers, as had occurred 
at Barclays Bank, the Red Spot Soft Drink Factory and Bata 
Shoe shop.^fls a consequence of the trade union law and the 
recruitment drive mounted by union activists,unionization of 
the labour force grew from around 30 per cent under Gairy to 
between 70 and 80 per cent.
Under the PRG there were eight principal trade unions in 
Grenada, and the revolutionary government recognised their 
right to affiliate to the national trade union federation, the 
Grenada Trades Union Council (GTUC). During the revolution 
the GTUC joined the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
for the first time in its history, and became an active member 
of the regional trade union movement. Grenada's labour 
movement was given additional support by various other laws 
introduced by the PRG. People's Law No. 62, the Trade Union and 
Trade Disputes (Amendment) Law, 1979, permitted a registered 
trade union to purchase, sell, lease, exchange or mortgage 
land or any other property. This was a significant extension 
of trade union rights. An earlier law, People's Law No. 46, 
recognised and protected the right to strike. In this way 
the PRG showed a genuine commitment to the independence of 
the trade union movement. Moreover, the NJM actively 
encouraged trade unions to struggle for the best possible 
conditions for workers within the framework of free collective 
bargaining and a market economy. The party newspaper consistently 
lent its support to workers in struggle against private 
companies and landowners. However, in terms of maintaining a 
an industrial climate favourable to capital accumulation by 
both local and foreign interests, the Commissioner of Labour
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mas instructed to intervene in disputes that threatened to 
last a long time. He mas usually able to force a settlement 
because of the general support mhich the trade unions gave to 
the PRG .16
It seems that after the revolution the NJM took a 
conscious decision to send most of its cadres into the trade 
unions and other mass organisations and leave much of Gairy's 
state bureaucracy intact. This mas considered to be the most 
effective may of keeping the economy going, of preventing 
an inordinate gromth of the state apparatus and at the same 
time of protecting the interests of the people. Thus, many 
government officials, including the heads of a number of state 
enterprises mere unmoved by the revolutionary ideology of the 
PRG. Many of these officials mere unresponsive to the needs of 
the labour force and resisted government attempts to improve 
the efficiency of the state sector. By taking action against 
the obstructionist and unsympathetic behaviour of these 
individuals, the trade unions assisted the PRG and at the same 
time defended the interests of their membership.
The main goals mhich the NJM-led unions mere striving for 
in the industrial arena mere profit-sharing and morker 
participation. Profit-sharing mas accepted by many companies 
but morker participation did not extend beyond the state sector 
The goals of profit-sharing and morker participation are 
clearly mechanisms that tie the morking class to a particular 
private enterprise and cannot be considered conducive to the 
gromth of genuine proletarian class consciousness. Homever, 
since it mas accepted that the capitalist class mould continue 
to survive for a considerable period of time, such arrangements 
mere thought to be the most suitable in terms of raising 
morker productivity. Information on the profit-sharing
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agreements reached between the trade unions and various 
private employers was provided by Franklin Philbert, the 
Commissioner of Labour. Most companies that entered into 
profit-sharing agreements undertook to give between 12i to 
15 per cent of their net trading profit to the workforce. These 
included Bata shoe shop, Caribbean Agro-Industries Ltd, the 
Tobacco company, Caribana store, Grand Baza store, Bargain 
House, Distributors Ltd, Seachain Bookshop and L.L. Ramdhanny 
and Sons Ltd. Other companies agreed to give a fixed quantum 
of earnings for profit-sharing. For example, Hubbards gave 
its workers five months wages and Huggins paid its labour
force six weeks wages. Similar agreements were worked out
17between trade unions and state sector enterprises.
While the PRG encouraged the expansion and consolidation 
of the trade union movement in Grenada it also placed great . 
emphasis on democratic forms of organization. As Bishop 
explained at the regional trade union conference held in 
Grenada in November 1981: 'Along with /Fhe7" sudden explosion 
in the membership of our unions is the emphasis the new 
leadership is putting on their démocratisation. This is very 
much allied to the general thrust in democracy right through 
our society since the Revolution, in all structures of 
mass organisations, community groups and the other organs of
our people's power. ... before the Revolution there was a
18tradition in some unions of few or no General Meetings.' 
Although concerted efforts were made to introduce democratic 
procedures in the Grenadian labour movement, the agrarian 
character of the society and absence of a strong collective 
identity amongst workers militated against trade union members 
taking an active part in the running of their unions. And
«
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notwithstanding the 'democratic' intentions of the trade union 
leadership, they had no difficulty in getting the membership to 
agree to any policies or recommendations they put forward 
without a serious debate. For example, the Twenty-fifth 
Annual General Meeting of the Grenada Technical and Allied 
Workers Union (GTAWU), which I attended in February 1983, 
was a particularly undemocratic affair. GTAWU was the largest 
trade union in Grenada during the revolution and was led by a 
prominent NJM trade unionist, Jim Wardally, so its organizational 
practices provide a good illustration of the operations of 
the trade union movement as a whole. The meeting was held on 
a Saturday and was very poorly attended because on this day ^ 
have farm work to attend to. Even though the meeting was well 
advertised in advance and the union provided free transport 
and refreshments for workers, only a handful of the union's 
membership showed up. The main report to the meeting was 
given by the President, Jim Wardally. GTAWU had intended to 
circulate copies of Wardally's report before the meeting, but 
the texts were not printed in time. Wardally reported on the 
union's activities over the past year and devoted particular 
attention to GTAWU's efforts to obtain compensation for a 
number of workers made redundant by private and public sector 
companies. After his speech, Wardally invited contributions 
from the membership. About three or four people asked for 
clarification about certain points which were raised but 
nobody expressed disagreement with the views that were put 
forward. The leadership of the union seemed pressed for time 
as the meeting had started late, so they made no serious 
attempt to encourage discussion but quickly moved a motion that 
the President's report be accepted. A somewhat ritualistic
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showing of hands 4o*»K pti\.cc_- o*£ v*\ -{aiooiAr, There were
none against and no objections. The platform then proceeded 
to put forward a slate of candidates for election to the union's 
executive. Once again, the membership was called upon to 
rubber stamp the leadership's recommendations. It seemed as 
though the main purpose of the meeting was to educate GTAUJU 
members on the social and economic policies of the PRG and the 
role of the working class in the revolutionary process. In a 
speech given before Idardally's report, Chester Humphrey, the 
First Vice-President of the union, made a number of remarks 
about the progress of the revolution that were identical to 
those made by Coard in an address given two days before. The 
key-note speech of the meeting was given by Bishop. He 
presented an outline of the PRG's policies in the period ahead 
and praised GTAUU for the work it had done over the past 
year and the 'discipline, unity and democratic participation 
of its membership'.
The GTAWU general meeting shows the difficulties that were
inv olved in put t ing into pract ice the loft y ideals of trade
uni on democracy which the PRG adv oca • i 19 ted .
As already ment ione d abov e , in 1983 the PRG called for
the introduction of worker education c lasses in private and
pub lie sector enter prises . I n the state seet or the trade unions
did not encount er any seri ous diff icuIt ies in setting up
c lasses on a we ek i y basis, a Ithoug h many senior government
off icials did not S ee the re levance of t he programme and did
n ot bother to sh ow up . In the privât e sect or there was
res istance in certain quar ter s, but the most enlightened
section of the business class saw that the classes did not
pose a direct threat to their intere st s . For although the
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classes endeavoured to teach workers elementary facts about 
class struggle and the history of the Grenadian and international, 
labour movement, they also sought to imbue workers with the 
notion of a 'patriotic national bourgeoisie' and pointed to 
the need for a harmonious relationship between workers and 
management. Some businessmen went as far as attending the 
worker education classes, and for this they received the 
acclamation of the trade unions. For example, liiorker' s Voicg, 
the newspaper of the GTUC, commented: 'What is noticeble ... 
is that some privately owned factories like Hadeed's Factory 
and Tempe Soap Factory are also having classes. These owners
are able to see the improved labour discipline and output as
15,0 20a result of the workers^Education classes.' In nearly all 
cases the classes were well attended^ and vibrant and 
stimulating dicussions took place. This had a good deal to do 
with the fact that they took place during working hours and 
workers used the opportunity to relax and let off steam 
about working conditions. The worker education classes had a 
major impact on the political consciousness of Grenadian 
workers and enabled many to understand for the first time 
the utility of trade unions.
While the PRG respected the independence of the trade 
union movement in Grenada^ it did not refrain from using 
coercive measures in those instances where unions held out for 
terms that the revolutionary government was not prepared to 
concede. A good example of this was the way in which the PRG 
handled the public workers' dispute which took place in early
1981. The dispute began in December 1980 when the Public 
Workers Union (PWU) , formerly called the Civil Service 
Association, made a demand for a 9 per cent 'weighted average' 
increase in salaries over two years. The PRG's first offer
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was for a 5 per cent increase in 1981, and a 7i per cent 
increase in 1983. Several compromise offers were made by both 
sides without acceptance and, when a final deadlock was 
reached, the PUU along with the Grenada Union of Teachers (GUT) 
and GTAlilU called a 'sick-out' on 3 March, just before the 
second anniversary celebrations of the revolution were due to 
commence. In response to the union action, the NJM mobilised 
hundreds of its supporters to march in protest, carrying 
placards which read: 'Sick-out can't stop we festival' and 
'If you sick-out, stay out forever'. On 6 March several 
leading members of the unions received warning letters from 
the PRG , ten PWU members were suspended on half pay, one 
was dismissed and another one, the PUU President, Robert 
Robinson, was transferred from his post of Labour Commissioner 
to that of a road supervisor in a remote parish. The PRG 
viewed the 'sick-out' action as a move to discredit the 
government and destabilise the revolution, and defended its 
actions as follows: '/_The PRG_Y recognizes the rights of all 
workers to take legitimate and reasonable industrial action', 
/but7 it felt that these rights carried an equal obligation 
to protect the country's interests. /The sick-out is_7 'part 
of a plan by certain unpatriotic and counter-revolutionary 
elements to disrupt the second anniversary celebrations of 
our glorious March 13 Revolution and embarass the PRG and the 
Grenadian people in face of our numerous friends anda*
well-wishers.' In response to the PRG's tough stance the unions 
wrote a letter offering to resume negotiations if the letters 
of suspension were withdrawn, and, on 9 March, having received 
a reply that the offer was being considered by Cabinet, the 
'sick-out' was called off that day. Negotiations were resumed 
and final agreement was reached on 22 May. Under the
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agreement, the PRG agreed to withdraw the letters of warning,
supension and transfer and a three year contract was signed
with salary increases of 17.3 per cent, 10 per cent and
12.5 per cent in 1981, 1982 and 1983 respectively.
The public workers dispute illustrates several points
about the PRG's attitude towards independent action by the
u a .S
trade union movement. First of all, a dangerous proclivity toA
label genuine working class opposition 'counter-revolutionary1 
or CIA-inspired. In order to suppress the workers' revolt^ 
the PRG resorted to some of the same anti-worker practices 
of Gairy: intimidation, suspension and transfer. At the same 
time, by organizing its most committed supporters in support 
of the government's stance the PRG sought to demonstrate that 
the majority of people in the country were opposed to the 
union action. This was another example of the PRG mobilising
the masses in support of what can only be described as an
22authoritarian and undemocratic political position. Nevertheless,
because of the general sympathy which the trade unions had
for the revolution they were prepared to back-down and enter
into negotiations with the revolutionary government. So in
spite of its authoritarian tendencies^the PRG refrained from
23the use of force or prohibition.
Turning to the other 'mass organisations', the PFU, the 
NUO, the NYO and the NSSC, the PRG evinced a similar 
paternalistic and manipulative disposition. The PFU was 
created in October 1980 in order to provide an organization 
for poor and middle peasants^ who were suspicious of peasant 
associations because of their past experience of corrupt and 
bureaucratic leadership. Initially^ only thirty-six peasants 
joined the PFU. However, by 1983 this figure rose to 1,300.
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Membership of the union was open to all peasants who owned and
worked lands between i acre to 100 acres.^ The PFU gave
an independent voice to poor and middle peasants for the
first time in their lives, and played a crucial role in the
25agrarian programme of the PRG.
The NWO had its origins in the women's organisation
affiliated to the NJM before the revolution, whose work was
geared towards the mobilisation of women against the Gairy
regime. Three months after 13 March a National Women's
Conference was organized to initiate discussions about the
future role of women in Grenada. Under the impetus of the
women associated with the NJM, the PRG took a number of early
initiatives to improve the position of women in society. On
20 March 1979, the PRG proclaimed the abolition of the sexual
exploitation of women,and this decree was strictly enforced.
Several months later, the revolutionary government established a
Women's Desk in the Ministry of Education, Youth and Social
Affairs for the purpose of advising the PRG on women's issues,
co-ordinating the national programmes for women and dealing
with the area of discrimination against women. In 1982 the
Women's Desk was converted into a Ministry of Women's Affairs.
Another early measure introduced by the PRG was a policy
in the state sector.declaration providing for 'equal pay for equal work'/ The 
actual implementation of this policy was a long drawn out 
process as the PRG was reluctant to carry out enforcement in 
those sectors, particularly agriculture and road work, where 
there was resistance. In 1980 the Maternity Leave Law was 
introduced which gave every working woman the right to two 
months paid maternity leave during the period of birth of any
r  ;
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child. In December 1980 the first general meeting of the NWO
iiias organized, and by this time the membership of the
organization had grown to 1,500 operating in some 47 groups.
It was decided at the meeting that membership of the NWO should
be open to all women on the island, making it a truly national
body. Following this decision the NWO experienced a mercurial
growth and at one time boasted a membership of 6,500 (28 per
cent of the adult female population), organised in 155 local
groups in all parishes including the island parishes of
Carriacou and Petit Martinique. From the documents of the NJM
which became available following the US invasion, it appears
that these claims were greatly exaggerated and in any event by
1983 the membership of the NUJ0 had fallen off markedly and the
organisation was in a state of disarray. Nevertheless, it was
the most vibrant women's organisation to be set up in the
English-speaking Caribbean and ensured that women played an
active part in the revolutionary process. But it did not go
beyond the parameters that were laid down for it by the NJM,
and did not take up explicitly feminist issues such as
abortion. It did, however, ensure that women were given prominent
positions within the governmental structures of the revolution.
About twenty women held high level positions. Dessima Williams
served as Ambassador to the 0AS; Jaqueline Creft was
appointed Minister of Education, Youth and Social Affairs;
Phyllis Coard, the President of the NWO, was the Vice-Minister
of Women's Affairs; and Claudette Pitt served as Vice-Minister
for Community Development. In addition, there were five
Permanent Secretaries who were women and ten heads of national
programmes. The Grenadian revolution had taken some important
2 6first steps to improve the position of women in society.
i
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Before the revolution the NYO was the youth arm of the 
NJM, operating underground with about forty members. Grenadian 
youth participated massively in the events of 13 March 1979 and 
were the driving force behind the intelligentsia which led 
the revolution. Underlying the militancy of the youth during 
the Gairy years was their direct confrontation with the most 
oppressive features of the 'constitutional dictatorship': 
massive unemployment, poor educational facilities, and police 
brutality. After the NJM took power, the problem faced by the 
party was how to maintain the intense commitment and militancy 
of the youth in a situation where the revolution was unable to 
provide an immediate solution to all the social problems 
faced by young people. Many youth who helped to overthrow 
expected the PRG to find an instant cure for unemployment, and 
the Rastafarian section of the youth thought that marijuana- 
smoking would be legalised and that the PRG would legitimise 
other aspects of Rastafarian culture. The revolutionary government 
faced an uphill battle in winning young people to its official 
communist ideology and maintaining their active participation 
in the programmes of the revolution.
In June 1980 the MYO was opened to mass membership. By 
the end of 1981 it claimed over 7,000 members. Like the trade 
unions and the NWO , the NYO encouraged its members to become 
involved in the main programmes of the revolution. In particular, 
NYO members were urged to join the People's Militia and 
recruit school students to the militia. While the NYO achieved 
some important successes , its work was impaired by a number of 
major weaknesses. These were outlined in a 1983 edition of the 
NYO's newspaper, Fight: 'The year 1982 was a fairly successful 
year for the National Youth Organisation ... However, there is
r  •
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absolutely no doubt that during the past year we have failed
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miserably to meet the demands of the youth, students and 
children's population.
Several glaring weaknesses affected our work in 1982. ...
□ne of the major weaknesses in 1982 was the inadequate, 
exciting, stimulating and well organized activities to galvanise 
the youth and keep them vibrant and active. Our programme must 
certainly be much more attractive and exciting. In this way 
we would be able to attract much more young people in 1983.
Hence the reason for the main focus of the NYO in 1983 will be 
on consistent organisation of sporting, cultural and recreational 
activities. ...
Another major weakness of our work in 1982 was the poor
quality of leadership on the Base Group Level. The recent
intensive leadership training course has had noticeable
improvement on the quality of leadership. We have however, an
C r . O
extremely long road ahead of us to totally illiminate thisA
2 7problem.'
The NSSC worked closely alongside the NYO and experienced 
many of the same problems. In addition to organizing school 
students to participate in the main programmes of the revolution, 
the NSSC organized a national study drive. This was the 
issue discussed at the Council's first general meeting held 
in February 1981. In his report to the meeting, Tarli Francis, 
the President, said that the NSSC went through some trying
times because it was beset by 'inexperience and a low level of
2 8organizational ability'. Following the meeting the organization 
introduced various measures to improve its functioning and 
was highly successful in fund-raising and establishing links 
with regional and international youth organizations.
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The Parish and Zonal Council Meetings
In 1978 the NJM managed to set up a network of party 
support groups in each parish, and after the revolution these 
'Parish Councils' continued as a forum for dialogue between 
the leadership and the people. With the influx of participants 
that these bodies increasingly began to attract, a decision was 
taken to break down each parish into several zones, and a new 
structure came into being: the Zonal Council meeting. The 
entire country was divided into thirty-six zones of roughly 
equal population size (equal to three to four geographic 
villages per zone). This ensured that virtually every adult 
in a particular zone could fit into the nearby primary or 
secondary school assembly. Alongside the Zonal Councils, the 
NJM set up parallel structures for workers, farmers, women 
and youth respectively. Issues of specific concern to these 
sectors were discussed at monthly Workers' Parish Council 
meetings, Farmers' Parish Council meetings, and parish meetings 
of the NWO and IMYO. The principal aim of all these structures 
was to provide a direct line of communication between the 
people and the PRG. The process was based on the principle of 
accountability: the political leadership and the officials in 
charge of government programmes were required to face the 
people on a regular basis to account for their performance in 
running the country. A member of the PRG Cabinet was usually 
present at a meeting, and a meeting was allowed to request in 
advance the presence of any government official whom they 
wished to question.
In addition to the accountability procedure, the meetings 
served as consultative organs that fed ideas and proposals 
into the legislative process. All major pieces of legislation
passed after 13 March 1979 were only effected after the most 
elaborate process of consultation and discussion with the 
mass organizations, trade unions and representative bodies.
In 1982 the democratization process w as taken a step further 
with the presentation of the national financial budget to the 
people for criticism, suggestions, and recommendations. The 
process was again repeated in 1983. The budget formulation 
process was regarded by the Bishop regime as one of its most 
pioneering innovations and in reference to the 1982 exercise 
a publication that largely reflected the views of the PRG 
boasted: '... for the first time in the history of the
Commonwealth, the people were directly involved in the
2 9preparation of the Budget-Plan of their country.'
In essence the budget exercise involved the following 
procedures. First of all, expenditure requests from all 
government departments were studied by the Ministry of Finance. 
A preliminary draft budget was then submitted to the PRG 
Cabinet for discussion. This was followed by a period during 
which officials from the Ministry of Finance went before the 
trade unions, mass organizations and zonal and parish councils 
to discuss the draft. The high point of the exercise was the 
national conference on the economy, which was attended by 
delegates from all the mass organizations. Breaking up into 
workshops devoted to specific areas of the economy, the 
delegates made detailed comments and criticisms on the 
draft proposals. The budget then went back to the Ministry of 
Finance for final revisions and the the PRG Cabinet for 
approval. Finally, a detailed report was made to the people by 
the Ministry and an explanation was given of which delegates' 
were accepted, which rejected and why . ^
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The Parish Council system was a form of revolutionary 
direct democracy. This particular pattern of popular consultatio 
was practical because of the miniscule size of the island, 
which meant that it was physically possible for the population 
to have a close dialogue with their leaders and scrutinize 
major pieces of government legislation. In a society which 
provided no real avenue for democratic debate one can readily 
appreciate the interest that was aroused by the system.^ In 
the first few years of the revolution the Zonal and Parish 
Councils were well attended, although by 1983 there was an 
appreciable waning of support. As an authentic system of 
socialist democracy, however, the Parish Council system was 
still embryonic and did not allow for real power to be wielded 
by the masses. First of all, the executive committees of the 
Parish and Zonal Council meetings were appointed by the l\IJ(yl. 
Although interesting and heated debates took place at the 
meetings they did not result in binding results and the 
election of delegates to ensure that the wishes of the meeting 
were carried out. At most there was an expression of wishes, 
which the leadership of the Council may or may not have taken 
into account. Furthermore, it was the Central Committee of the 
NJW which decided the main issues that were to be put on the 
agenda of the meetings, and this enabled the party to 
orchestrate and manipulate the discussions which took place.
The workshop format which the meetings followed points to 
the fact that the Councils were conceived of as forums in 
which the PRG could 'educate' the masses about its policies, 
and not autonomous bodies that could challenge or overturn 
these policies if it was so decided. The guidelines issued by 
the NJM for the holding of Parish and Zonal Council meetings
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to discuss the 1983 budget shows quite clearly the educational 
role that was assigned to the Councils, and that as 'organs of 
people's power' they did not have any real power. The preamble 
to the guidelines were divided into two sections: section A 
and Section B. Section A, entitled 'The Process' explained to 
workshop leaders what their objectives should be in guiding 
discussion on the budget: 'All workshop leaders and technicians 
should appreciate that the holding of these workshops is both 
an exercise in the democratization of the decion-making process 
as well as part of the structured adult education process.
We are going to educate by giving information on the 
national planning and budgeting system and by promoting the 
absorption (sic) of this information through participation in 
dicussions out of which will come expressions of concern, 
opinions and suggestions for improving the system.
We should try to make participants aware that better 
participation on their part can only come about with more 
information and education.
It is therefore most important that workshop time be
managed effectively so that the information imparted is
structured and rounded and times given to this and to discussion
32are properly balanced.' Section B, entitled 'The Content',
set out how the Parish or Zonal Council meeting should be 
structured: (i) Opening Plenary - A presentation will be made 
which highlights major achievements and shortcomings of 1982 
and will outline the objectives and reasons for these objectives 
for 1983; (ii) Individual Workshops - These will focus on an 
examination of the 1982 performance of seven areas of the 
state sector and discuss their 1983 proposals; (iii) Closing
Plenary - Reports from the individual workshops will be
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presented. This should be followed by a brief wrapping up which 
draws together the common threads of the workshop reports and 
which summarizes on the theme that improvement of political 
and academic education leads to better participation in 
decision-making, increased production and productivity and a 
higher standard of living and a more rounded human being.
It is evident from the guidelines for holding meetings on the 
1983 budget that the revolutionary democracy in Grenada was 
very much a 'guided democracy', find the actual discussion's 
which took place in the Parish and Zonal Council meetings 
brought out both the strengths and weaknesses of this system.
The Report on the Economy prepared by the PRG was a massive 
document and was handed out at the meetings when the discussions 
on the budget were scheduled to take place. At several of the 
meetings which I attended, people were very pleased with the 
simple way in which information on the economy was presented 
and took great satisfaction out of the fact that they were 
being directly informed about the budget and could understand 
what it was all about. However, many people were highly 
critical of the fact that they had not received the report in 
advance, and could not, therefore, prepare themselves 
adequately for the discussions. So each meeting took the form 
of a seminar in which the workshop leaders outlined the main 
points in the report, and the participants could do no more 
than ask for clarification and come up with a few suggestions 
and criticisms from the top of their heads. By the time of 
the national conference on the economy, participants had had 
about a week or two to read the report. Although designated 
the 'National Conference of Delegates of Mass Organisations on 
the Economy', all of the participants were nominated by their 
respective mass organisation and took part in discussions as
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individuals rather than as representatives of an organisation. 
The same workshop format was adopted. As in the case of the 
Parish and Zonal Council meetings, the conference broke up 
into a number of workshops, each of wjiich focussed on one of 
seven areas of the state sector of the economy. The seven 
areas were: (i) finance and commerce; (ii) education, health 
and public administration; (iii) agriculture; (iv) construction 
(v) tourism; (vi) industry; and (vii) public utilities. 
Participants could choose to attend any one of the workshops. 
Discussions in the workshops were more informed than those 
which took place in the Parish and Zonal Council meetings, and 
after making their presentations workshop leaders invited 
participants to make suggestions and recommendations. Some of 
the issues raised by the workshop leaders were highly 
technical so that most participants were unable to make 
meaningful contributions. Nevertheless, lively discussions took 
place and some credible suggestions were put forward. At the 
end of the workshop discussions, each workshop leader was given 
around seven minutes to give a report to the plenary session 
held toward the end of the conference. This was followed by 
closing remarks by Selwyn Strachan and Bishop, who both 
commented that they were greatly 'impressed' by the quality of 
this year's reports. Strachan said that the recommendations 
would be analyzed by the appropriate state body and taken into 
account in the formulation of the budget. He called on 
delegates to assist in the further discussions on the budget
that were scheduled to take place in Zonal Councils in the 
34next few weeks.
Around three weeks later, on 17 March 1983, the National 
Budget and Plan Presentation took place. The main speech was 
given by Coard, who did not actually present the budget but
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went over views and recommendations expressed during the 
budget exercise, and reassured his audience that the 
recommendations of the Zonal Councils 'will be studied ... 
with a view to seeing how many can be implemented.'"^ Coard 
further stated that the PRG would publish all of the 
suggestions, criticisms and proposals and a response would be 
made to each one of them. 'This', he declared, 'is what
■z cpeople's democracy is all about.' fls it turned out, the PRG 
did not in fact publish the recommendations made during the 
1983 budget exercise, and pursued the policies outlined in 
the 1983 Report on the Economy.
The Parish and Zonal Councils and the national conference 
on the economy had no legal status. However, in Way and June 
1983 appointments were made to a Constitutional Commission^ and 
it was announced that the time had come to 'take the process of 
the formal institutionalization of the Revolution a stage
further and commence work on the preparation of the proposed 
37new constitution.' The Commission was mandated to present 
the first draft of the constitution within two years. In 
addition to getting 'information on alternative forms of 
political constitution' and receiving the views and proposals of 
all classes, strata and interests of the Grenadian people', 
the Commission's terms of reference included participation in 
public and other discussions on the draft constitution prior 
to preparing a final draft constitution for approval in a 
referendum. In preparing the draft, the Commissioners were 
given certain guiding principles upon which the Grenadian 
revolution was based. These included 'the building of a new 
and just society, people's participation in grassroots 
democracy, national unity' and 'the widest possible participation 
by the people in the country's decision-making process and
Thethe day-to-day administration of affairs of state'. 
Constitutional Commission was headed by West Indian legal 
figures sympathetic to the PRG, such as Alan Alexander, from 
Trinidad and Tobago, and Richard Hart, the Jamaican lawyer who 
was appointed as Acting Attorney General to the PRG in 1981.
In setting up the Constitutional Commission, the PRG was 
fulfilling the promise which it made in the Declaration of the 
Grenada Revolution, and the constitutional exercise was 
clearly designed to gain credibility for the revolution in 
the eyes of CARICOM and Western public opinion. In laying down 
'guiding principles' upon which the revolution was based, 
the PRG sought to ensure that the existing Parish Council 
system was institutionalized. Hence, the system of government 
which the Constitutional Commission was working on was a 
one-party state with mass organizations and Parish and Zonal 
Councils centrally controlled by the NJM. This was a significant 
departure from the Jamesian conception of popular democracy 
espoused in the party's manifesto. Moreover, the NJM was 
ambiguous about how to apply its official communist ideas of 
one-party rule. And it was disagreements related to this issue 
which led to the disastrous events of October 1983.
~Z Q
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Chapter Four
The Economic Strategy: An Overview
In accordance with its interpretation of the official 
communist theory of socialist orientation, the PRG evolved 
a radical economic strategy based upon a progressive expansion 
and rationalization of the activities of the state, government 
incentives to the tourist and industrial components of the 
bourgeoisie, and the mobilisation of international sources of 
finance from both East and West. The most comprehensive and 
detailed statement on the economic strategy is contained in 
the report presented by the PRG to the Fifth Meeting of the 
Caribbean Group for Co-operation in Economic Development 
held in Washington in June 1982^ After highlighting certain 
structural features of the Grenadian economy, the report 
identified five basic tasks faced by the revolutionary 
government:
1. To try to ameliorate somewhat the straightjacket and
and stifling strictures of the gold exchange 
2standard in all its several aspects and manifestations, 
and the massive economic ills of the economic 
behavioural patterns that the system had generated, 
i,e., automaticity between domestic income and growth 
or contraction; an extremely high import content of
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consumption; the inability to apply a discretionary 
monetary policy to influence the level, flou and 
destination of domestic savings and to control or even 
mnimally influence the financial sector of the economy; 
and the incapability of the system, when manifested 
fiscally, to balance the budget.
2. To set the basis for structural adjustment of the 
economy, economic diversification, sustained growth, 
self-sufficiency and fuller employment through a 
massive rehabilitation of run-down but still usable 
capital stock, including capital stock in the 
agricultural sector, and through a forceful, concerted 
programme to rehabilitate existing and construct new 
physical infrastructure in the form of roads, airport 
and public utility services on the basis of careful 
and meticulous evaluation of the economic and financial 
feasibility of the overall infrastructural programme
as a whole, and of each of its constituent parts.
3. To take immediate measures to establish backward and 
forward linkages between major sectors of the economy; 
to demonstrate to the private sec-t*>r the existence of 
myriad opportunities for profitable investment in the 
productive sectors and to put idle resources - both 
material resources like wasted fruit and agricultural 
by-products, and wasted human talent - to productive 
work by establishing, on the basis of strict regard to 
cost effectiveness, and on the criterion of self­
liquidation and financial viability, a number of public 
sector enterprises in productive sectors and
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agricultural distribution.
4. To bring order to public accounts, to cut out corruption, 
waste and speculation, to increase the revenue base,
to cut current expenditure to the bone consistent with 
the efficient functioning of government and adequate 
maintenance of infrastructure and capital stock.
5. In full realization that the economy, for several years 
to come, will have to depend strongly on agriculture 
and tourism - both as major foreign exchange earners 
and as sources of employment - to take an interlocking 
series of specific steps to promote the growth and 
vibrancy of both sectors.^
The report then went on to explain, that because of the 
considerable dearth of domestic finance available for develop­
ment, the PRG had sought and would continue to seek, inter­
national economic assistance, provided that any such 
assistance did not violate the integrity and sovereignty of 
Grenada as an independent nation— state . Notwithstanding the 
fact that the report was addressed to Western governments 
and multilateral lending agencies, it was a true statement of 
of the PRG's commitment to a process of economic transformation 
that involved the active participation of Grenada's business 
class. State intervention was conceived as providing the 
infrastructural and technical basis for increased private 
sector initiative in productive activities. In this respect, 
the PRG's economic strategy was a programme of state capitalist 
development similar to that pursued in a number of the more 
developed countries of the English-speaking Caribbean. The 
distinctive feature of Grenada's economic strategy was that
I
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state capitalism was conceived as a component of the 
'pre-socialist stage' that would ultimately be superseded by 
a socialist transition, so that from the very beginning the 
state assumed more wide-ranging powers to intervene in the 
economy than in any other country in the Anglophone region. 
Thus, in general terms the PRG's economic strategy may be 
described as a synthesis between official communist ideas 
about transition in the periphery and Caribbean-derived theorie 
of industrialisation in small states, of which UJ. A. Lewis 
was the chief advocate/
This chapter examines a number of central features of the 
economic strategy. More detailed treatment is given to some 
of the most important initiatives and programmes of the PRG 
in chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8.
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The Expansion and Rationalisation of the State Sector
Under the Bishop regime there was a significant expansion 
in the activities of the state with the establishment or 
re-organisation of state enterprises in agriculture, agro- 
industry, fishing, tourism and banking. (See table 13). In 
addition, the PRG took measures to improve the efficiency of, 
and ensure greater local control over, public utitilities. 
Nevertheless, the Central Government, comprising the government 
ministries, the administrative and judicial organs of the 
state and a number of ancillary departments, remained the 
most important component of the state sector accounting for 
over BD per cent of financial operations in 1981. In the same 
year the Central Government's total expenditure amounted to 
EC5143 million, 59 per cent of GDP.
Various methods were used by the PRG to modernize and 
rationalize the operations of the state sector. The revolutionär 
government was particularly concerned about controlling 
public spending, and introduced a number of expenditure 
controls. In 1977 the Gairy government established a monthly 
revenue and expenditure reporting system to identify and 
control overspending on a vote-by-vote basis. The Ministry of 
Finance was authorized to suspend payments against votes once 
the annual allocation was exhausted unless special notice was 
obtained from Cabinet. Later on in the same year the system 
was strengthened further by controlling monthly, rather than 
annual allocations. However, since these controls were 
effected in respect of payments rather than accruals, while 
having some success in limiting expenditures, they contributed 
to the problem of increasing arrears. In early 1978 monotoring 
procedures for current expenditures were drawn up and restraint
TABLE 13
STATE AML PALA-STATAL ENTERPRISES IN 
GRENADA IN 1983
NAME OF Ei'lTERPRISE 
AGRICULTURE
National Co-Operative Development Agency-
Cocoa Rehabilitation Project Management Board
Forestry Development Corporation
Grenada Farms Corporation
Grenada Sugar Corporation (joint Venture)
Grenada Cocoa Association
Grenada Co-Operative Nutmeg Association
Grenada Banana Co-Operative Society
BANKING
Grenada Development Bank 
National Commercial Bank 
Grenada Bank of Commerce
EDUCATION
Grencraft
HOUSING
National Housing Authority 
INDUSTRY
Quality Control Laboratory 
Grenada Agro-Industries Limited 
National Fisheries 
Coffee Plant 
Spice Processing Plant
Livestock Production and Genetic Centre
PUBLIC UTILITIES 
Central Water Commission 
Grenada Electricity Services 
Grenada Telephone Company 
National Transport Service
TRADE
Marketing and National Importing Board 
Crucial Factor Restaurant
TOURISM
Grenada Resorts Corporation 
Grenada Beach Hotel
PORTS
Grenada Ports Authority
MEDIA
Free West Indian 
Television Free Grenada 
Radio Free Grenada
Source: Economic Memorandum Presented by the Government of
Grenada. Appendix 1; World Bank, Economic Memorandum 
on Grenada. 1982, p. 128
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was observed in non-personal emolument items, but wage 
increases and the employer of last resort approach to 
employment mitigated against overall expenditure control. By 
the end of the year monthly budget monotoring, the basis for 
expenditure controls, had ceased to operate effectively.
Shortly after the revolution, the PRG began to work out a 
more effective solution to this problem. In August 1979 the 
revolutionary government established monthly expenditure 
limits for each Ministry, and the accounting officer in each 
spending unit was required to review and submit a daily 
summary of expenditure to the Ministry of Finance for scrutiny. 
The scheme was tightened further in January 1980, and no 
Ministry was allowed to exceed its allocated monthly limit 
except by special approval of the Cabinet. However, due to 
the preparation of the Festival of the Revolution in March 
1980 and the damage caused by Hurricane Allen in August, 
expenditure controls became difficult to implement in some 
areas.^
In 1982 the PRG launched a major initiative to improve 
the efficiency of the state sector. In his opening address to 
the Conference on the Economy For Managers and Heads of 
State Enterprises, Bishop announced the PRG's intention to 
introduce a series of measures that would increase the 
profitability of state and parastatal enterprises and thereby 
maximise the utility of public spending: ' ... traditionally 
when governments have got involved in economic enterprises 
many of the workers in those enterprises continue to approach 
their job with a very civil service-type mentality, viewing 
their work in terms of drawing a monthly salary as usual, 
having the Government always as a back-up system, as a buffer,
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and therefore in the final analysis continuing to shift the 
responsibility for efficiency and productivity onto the backs 
of already over-burdened taxpayers.
That psychology it seems is very., very deep in comrades 
who are involved in state and para-statal enterprises. And 
that psychology is one of the things that in 1982 we must crush 
completely.
Comrades are going to have to develop a new approach, a 
new attitude to running these enterprises that lays predominant 
emphasis on the fact that these are independent economic 
enterprises that must stand on their own feet, that must 
survive as a result of production going up, of worker 
productivity increasing, of efficiencies being introduced, of 
proper management, of serious planning.
... We also have to develop a state of mind that says that 
the benefits and the services which we have traditionally 
provided over these past three years for our people have been 
provided largely on the basis of taxation, and of course 
through assistance in different forms. But not very much of 
this was achieved on the basis of production and there again 
we have to achieve a major shift in that area. We have to move 
away from a psychology which says that in order to provide
0services for our people that the taxes alone will do that.'
On 8 April that year the Cabinet approved a policy directive 
to all state and parastatal enterprises setting out 
standardized accounting and financial proceedings and laying 
down a strict time-table for the presentation of financial 
accounts by the enterprises. In addition, the borrowing 
activity of each state enterprise was subjected to the approval
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of both the Cabinet and the Board of Directors of the 
enterprise in question. The directive stated that no new state 
enterprise was to be established nor could any existing 
enterprise be expanded without the submission of detailed 
feasibility studies to the Ministry of Planning. Such studies 
were to be analysed and vetted by the Ministry of Planning - 
with assistance and support from funding agencies such as 
the CDB, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), 
and the European Investment Bank (EIB) - and due consideration 
would be paid to the availability of sources of finance on 
terms and conditions that would allow the enterprise concerned 
to achieve a sufficient surplus to cover the resultant debt 
burden. It was also stressed that all state enterprises were 
to pay all forms of duties and taxes as applied to private 
companies, unless a specific exemption was granted by the 
Cabinet. The Cabinet directive also called upon the Board 
of Directors of each enterprise to work out a system of 
penalties for late submission or non-submission of all the 
data required. One penalty suggested was that the manager of 
each enterprise be put on half salary for the period of 
non-submission of data or non-fulfilment of tasks. Full
salary, including backpayment could be restored once the
7manager completed his or her alloted tasks.
Another set of guidelines in the Cabinet directive 
dealt with productivity and provided for workers' participation 
in the running of state and parastatal enterprises. They 
called for full discussions between workers, their union 
representatives and the management of each workplace, 
following which, it was stated, a committee or serveral 
committees should be established to examine three specific
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issues: production and productivity; emulation; and workers’ 
grievances and discipline. Concerning production and productivit' 
the directive highlighted the importance of raising the skill 
and academic levels of workers through means such as on-the- 
job training; pointed to the need to improve work methods and 
the organisation of work in order to increase the individual 
and collective productivity of workers, emphasizing that as 
a means of achieving this piece-work should be introduced 
whenever feasible; called for the evaluation and elimination
gof all cases of ’disguised unemployment’ following frank
discussions between the management, workers and their union
representatives; and finally, proposed that consultations
should take place with the workforce to assess the progress
made in the fulfillment of production plans and drawing up
targets each year. As regards emulation, the directive gave an
instruction that suitable criteria should be established to
recognise and reward on a monthly basis outstanding work
performed by different categories of workers; and it was
stated that agreement should be reached on appropriate moral
and material incentives that could be awarded to exemplary
workers. Each enterprise was called upon to set aside a fund
gas part of its existing budget to pay for emulation awards. 
Lastly, with respect to workers’ grievances and discipline, 
two recommendations were made. Firstly, that regular monthly 
meetings with workers should take place to discuss their 
grievances. Secondly, that a code of discipline should be 
drawn up that is agreed upon by management, workers and their 
union representatives.
The directive also announced that the Cabinet Secretary 
would be sending a draft proposal on profit-sharing to each 
enterprise for discussion with a view towards implementing
1 6 2
profit-sharing and/or production bonuses for the year 1982.
In addition, there was an instruction that there should be 
at least one workers' representative elected by all workers 
on the Board of Management of each enterprise. Summarising 
the objectives to be attained by the various measures just 
discussed, the directive declared: 'Prof it/Surplus/Capita1 
accumulation is critical to economic development. All State 
enterprises must therefore consciously strive to achieve the 
maximum surplus possible within over-all policy guidelines 
set by the Government.
Good organisation of production and sound management, 
combined with full worker participation are precisive (sic) 
elements in reaching a surplus.
The implementation of the above fundamental principles by 
Board, management and workers will guarantee success for the 
enterprise and the nation. They must form the principal 
objectives guiding the performance of all state and parastatal 
enterprises. ^
In another series of measures designed to place state
enterprises on a sound commercial basis, the PRG moved
aggressively to reduce the operating deficits of the island's
two main public utilities, the Central Water Commission (CWC)
and the Grenada Electricity Services (Grenelec). Under the
Gairy regime the CWC had not been able to generate sufficient
revenue to cover its expenditures, partly because of low
tariffs and payment arrears. Government subventions were used
to offset its operating deficits while its capital expenditures
were traditionally financed by external sources such as the 
11CIDA and the CDB. In 1980 the PRG introduced a set of measures
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to improve the financial position of the Commission. In the
past the CWC did not prepare a budget; in 1980 a system of
semi-annual budgets was introduced. In addition, the bill
collection and record-keeping activities, which had been
shared between the Ministry of finance and the Commission,
were centralized in the latter's hands. In this respect a
survey was launched to update the records of users living
outside of St. George's. The Commission also raised water
rates effective 1 October 1980 from ECSl to ECSlO per 1,000
gallons for metered customers, and from ECS2.5 to ECHO per
12long ton for ships. Thus, in 1981 the operating deficit of 
the Commission was virtually eliminated. Further increases 
in water rates in 1982 allowed the Commission to increase 
its revenue by 20 per cent over the 1981 figure. ^
The actions taken by the PRG to ensure the viability of 
Grenelec were a good deal more controversial. Prior to the 
revolution the electricity company was a joint venture 
between the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) and 
the Government of Grenada. From 1960 onwards the CDC held
192,000 shares representing 59.3 per cent of the company's 
suscribed capital. Following the revolution relations between 
the PRG and the CDC deteriorated rapidly and became overly 
strained in August 1980 when the CDC-appointed Chairman of 
Grenelec, John Taylor, applied for an increase in the 
government-controlled rates for the sale of electricity. 
Taylor claimed that the increase was necessary to raise money 
to carry out essential maintenance work. However, the PRG 
was extremely suspicious of the CDC's intentions. The 
revolutionary government was dissatified with Grenelec's 
supply of electricity to the island and harboured fears that
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the Brit1sh-based multinational corporation was trying to 
destabilize the revolution. The PRG refused to grant the 
increase and appointed a Commission of Inquiry to investigate 
the operations of the company. The Commission reported in 
early 1981 and proposed that the 'considerable debt' owed to 
Grenelec by the CWC and the Central Government should be paid 
off. It also proposed 'the negotiated transfer by CDC of a
block of shares to the Government acting on behalf of 
14consumers.' Subsequently, the confrontation between the 
PRG and CDC took a new turn when, at a rally held on 23 nay to 
commemorate African Liberation Day, Bishop announced that he 
had uncovered a 'plot' against the revolution by CDC, Esso 
Standard Oil Company and Barclays Bank International. 'It was 
a very simple and basic plot ... and it had three or four 
sides', Bishop alleged. He said that one side was to allow the 
generating equipment of Grenelec to run down and not bring in 
any spares. Another was to fail to collect bills from customers: 
so that there would be no cash to pay for the fuel supplied 
by Esso. In an obvious reference to Barbados, Bishop asserted 
that the plot had originated in an island 'not far from'
Grenada, 'an island that has been involved in other respects 
against our revolution' and where a number of regional 
companies have their headquarters. On 21 May, Bishop went on, 
a series of 'coincidences' took place in which the plot 
matured, and it was now possible to understand their full 
significance. The first co-incidence was that Grenelec's Board 
of Directors decided to hold one of their infrequent meetings 
on the very same day that Esso wrote them a letter demanding 
the outstanding payment of over E C U  million for fuel and 
threatened to cut off the fuel supply if payment was not
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forthcoming. Esso further stated that if an immediate payment 
was not made, then, whenever the account was paid off in full 
further supplies of fuel would be provided on a basis of 
payment before delivery. Due to the fact that Grenelec's fuel 
stocks had been allowed to run down, the demand for prompt 
payment was particularly ominous. Moreover, John Taylor told 
the PRG that Grenada was unable to raise the necessary money 
from Barclays Bank International, the company's bankers, and 
asked for government assistance to get a loan from the 
state-owned National Commercial Bank. The request was turned 
down, Bishop told his audience. The PRG, he added, had watched 
the unfolding of the plot and was not surprised that another 
part of it was being implemented, with fuel supplies running 
out, with Esso demanding immediate payment before fresh 
supplies were provided and with Barclays refusing to make 
finance available. 'We are not surprised about any of this 
because we knew of a plan coming up, but we have the 
responsibility of running this country and, because we 
recognise that it is a national crisis you are trying to 
create, and because the laws of Grenada provide for people 
who conspire to try to sabotage electricity, if any of you 
try to get involved in this "sagadan"^ you are working out, 
then Richmond Hill will have to do the talking. Finally, 
the Grenadian Prime Minister told his listeners that the 
struggle with Esso and Barclays would continue and that these 
companies would 'have to remember that, if in a time of 
crisis like this they don't want to put their best foot 
forward, then, afterwards, they might not have any foot at
all to put forward. ,16
The next day the PRG passed a law which transferred
|
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32,000 shares in Grenelec to the government making the PRG 
the majority shareholder in the company. Winston Bullen, a 
ardent supporter of the Bishop regime, was made the Chairman 
of the company. Following Bishop's speech it appears that 
discussions took place between the PRG on the one hand, and 
Barclays and Esso on the other hand. Barclays agreed to supply 
the finance to pay the debt to Esso and Esso said that they 
would give Grenelec credit on a month to month basis. 
Addressing workers at Grenelec's power station on 25 Way, 
Bishop accused the CDC of incompetence: 'If every week you 
want to make the taxpayers of this country, the consumers of 
electricity, keep paying for your negligence and recklessness 
and irresponsibility, and if you are getting money for 
management but you don't want to manage, and if you feel that 
it is only CDC you are concerned about and not the local 
company, then, we will take over the right to manage for you 
and we will start to run this company to make sure that, in
the future, the possibilities of this kind of sabotage and
17blackmail are greatly reduced.'
Under the management of the PRG Grenelec greatly 
expanded its production and sales of electricity, enabling the 
company to make a net profit of EC$283,250 in 1982. However, 
due to problems with the generators at the plant the country 
continued to experience frequent black-outs.
Along with efforts to control public spending, increase 
the profitability of state enterprises and eliminate the 
operating deficits of public utitlities, the PRG sought to 
streamline the operations of the state sector by introducing 
a new energy policy. Grenada is totally dependent on imported 
petroleum for energy consumption. Electricity is generated
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exclusively by Grenelec, and consumption of oil (gasolene, 
kerosene and diesel) is on average 130,000 barrels a year.
In terms of fuel consumption per capita, Grenada ranks low 
in the world, with roughly half the average of developing 
countries. Imports of petroleum and petroleum products was 
estimated at US$4.4 million in 1980; this represented some 
8 per cent of merchandise imports in that year. The PRG ’ s 
plans for the development of agro-industry and the expansion 
of tourism would have significantly increased the requirement 
for energy consumption in Grenada in a relatively short space 
of time. In anticipation of this and the balance of payments 
pressures that the high cost of imported petroleum would have 
caused, in 1980 the PRG implemented a number of conservation 
measures, including the creation of an Interministerial 
Energy Committee which monitored the use of energy in the 
public sector. The revolutionary government also explored 
two alternative sources of energy; offshore oil and hydro­
electric power. Located near the continental shelf of Venezuela, 
Grenada was hopeful that the exploration of offshore oil 
would turn out positive results in a few years, and a 
preliminary geological survey for oil exploration was started 
with the assistance of the Caribbean Fund for Technical 
Co-operation. In addition, the seismic tapes made during 
exploration under the Gairy regime were reprocessed. These 
preliminary tests were to be finished in time to enable 
international petroleum companies to bid for drilling 
concessions. Owing to a dispute over territorial waters 
between Grenada and neighbouring territories, however, drilling 
activity was delayed. The PRG was also optimistic about 
the prospects for hydro-electric power because Grenadian 
topography is suitable for the construction of small-scale
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hydro-electric dams. Finally, the revolutionary government 
also sought to reduce the cost of petroleum supplies by 
making government-to-governmnent arrangements with Trinidad
and Tobago and Venezuela, the two countries that provide most 
18of Grenada's oil.
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The Introduction of Planning and Training
As part of its drive to modernize and refashion the state 
apparatus to enable it to play a catalytic and directional 
role in the process of social transformation, the PRG 
introduced a number of changes in the Ministry of Planning and 
devoted consierable attention to upgrading the skills of state 
employees. From the early days of the revolution the PRG 
recognised the importance of planning for the success of the 
economic strategy as a uihole. Nevertheless, it was sober and 
quite candid in its assessment of what could be achieved in 
this direction. Speaking in an interview published in The 
Courier, Coard explained: 'You can call anything a plan. You 
can all (sic) it a 5-year or 10-year or 15-year plan, but 
those are games for schoolchildren. You are really fooling 
yourself if you believe that that is planning, unless you have 
control over all the variables, or most of the variables. In 
an open, dependent economy, on which fluctuations in the world 
economy have a devastating effect to a degree that you cannot 
fully predict and cannot control; and when you don't even 
have reliable data upon which to base anything, talk about 
planning is merely to impress people.
Maybe you can fool them, but you are not fooling yourself. 
We don't believe in indulging in that kind of game, of saying 
that we are into 5- and 10- and 15-year plans, when it is not 
physically possible. If at some stage we can diversify our 
economy so as to prevent some of tha shocks by putting our eggs 
in more baskets, both in production, through agro-industry 
and manufacturing, and in exports and imports, then we will 
begin to create part of the basis for planning. If also we 
are able to have a greater degreee of predictability over the
\i '
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variables which operate within our particular economy and if, 
in addition to that, we develop the kind of information systems 
which serve our purposes, then we can begin to talk seriously 
of a 5-year plan. Even so it will have to be flexible. It will 
have to be within a framework which has some relationship to 
reality, rather than something which is fixed in an artificial
way and which in reality doesn't work out the way one says
19it will on paper.' In 1981 the PRG restructured the
Ministry of Planning so that it could function as a genuine 
planning institution. The Ministry was organized into a 
Macro-Planning Unit, a Project Unit, an Economic and Technical 
Co-operation Unit and an Administration Unit; and there was 
a significant increase in the number of professional staff 
appointed, some of whom were experts funded by organisations 
such as the Organisation of American States (OAS), the European 
Development Fund (EDF) and the United Nations Development 
Progaramme (UNDP). With the assistance of the OAS, the 
revolutionary government set up a computer centre and began 
to computerize all the data sources of the state. Under Gairy, 
the only kind of planning which took place was project 
planning; this covers the whole process from the identification 
of a project to its formulation, pre-feasibility studies, 
feasibility studies, obtaining the necessary funding and 
ensuring the successful implementation of the project by 
whichever Ministry or government department is responsible.
The changes brought about by the PRG greatly increased its 
capacity to carry out this kind of planning. At the same time, 
steps were taken to make macro-economic planning possible.
In his 1902 Report on the Economy, Coard declared the PRG's 
intention to prepare a Three-Year Plan for the period 1983 
to 1985. He also stated that an attempt would be made to plan
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certain areas of activity in 1982. A methodology had been
prepared by the Ministry of Planning, Coard said, which was
discussed by the NJM and the PRG and brought to the attention
of all state institutions in seminars held in December 1981.
As a result of this exercise, the PRG had decided to focus
on the country's material requirements and three areas were
selected for special consideration in the 1982 Plan. The first
area that the 1982 Plan would seek to cover would be the
labour force. After evaluating the number of employees and the
categories of labour that would be required by state bodies,
the Ministry of Planning would consider means of obtaining
payment for those employed. Coard said that the second area
of attention in the 1982 Plan would be investment. The Ministry
of Planning intended to collect, co-ordinate and assess the
investment plans of state bodies in order to ensure that they
were in keeping with the PRG's policy goals. Finally, the
1982 Plan was to focus on the main technical and material
supplies of state institutions. Each government ministry and
- f h  svV, rv*»”"t"
state enterprise would be asked^to the Ministry of Planning 
their requests for supplies. Once the total requirements of 
the state sector were calculated, the Ministry of Trade would 
attempt to get the goods at a cheaper price by buying in bulk 
from the least expensive source. In drawing to a close the 
item on planning in his report, Coard called for the active 
participation of the masses in the planning process: 'UJe have 
to remember, that any planning process at all must be linked 
with the real world.
Any planning process cannot be meaningful if it is done 
in the confines of an office. Furthermore, planning is not 
and cannot be a bureaucratic exercise. Planning must always
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be the means of ordering the socio-economic process occurring 
in the country. Then what is absolutely necessary is for 
planning to be linked directly and concretely with increasing 
the living standards of the people. U/e must always remember 
that planning cannot solve all our problems. A plan does not 
run an economy or a factory, or a farm. People do. People 
make the plans, (sic) and people implement the plans. So that, 
the people must be involved at all stages of the Plan - the 
preparatory stage - right through to the implementation stage, 
the masses of the country must be involved. All sections of the 
society must become part of the process. Our private sector, 
our co-operatives and our mass organisations have a vital 
role to play . '
The following year in his 1983 Report on the Economy,
Coard explained that due to the inadequacy of the data 
available and a lack of trained personnel in many government 
institutions, the Ministry of Planning was unable to prepare 
the Three-Year Plan for 1983-1985. Nevertheless, he went on, 
the attempt to draw up the Three-Year Plan had been an 
extremely valuable educational experience for all managers 
and technicians; and many of them had now become 'enthusiastic' 
about the planning process. Moreover, Coard announced, the 
Ministry of Planning had produced a broad perspective Plan 
encompassing the PRG's goals for the period 1983-1985; and 
detailed state sector plans for the year 1983 had also been 
worked out for each state institution. The state sector plans 
were presented along with the recommendations of the Ministry 
of Planning in the brochure containing Hoard's report, and 
Coard called on his audience to ppt forward their views and
O I Further on in his report, Coard
/!
suggestions on each plan.
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divulged that the first stage of the project to plan the 
technical and material supplies of the state sector had been 
completed. In all, a total of ninety-nine products had been 
considered and concrete steps mere to be taken to import in 
bulk at least some of the main items. Coard did not provide 
any information in his report on how successful the PRG had
been in trying to plan the investment and labour force
2 2requirements of government bodies in 1982.
Additional information on the PRG's attempts to introduce 
planning was provided by Clairmont Kirton, the Guyanese-born 
Head of the Macro-Planning Unit. Kirton stated that the PRG 
intended to stick to One-Year Plans up until 1986, when the 
first Five-Year Plan would be introduced. He, Kirton, was 
primarily responsible for preparing a draft of the Plan. When 
asked how the PRG's planning efforts fitted in with the regime's 
notion of socialist orientation, Kirton said that the PRG was 
being extremely tactical in its presentation of its economic 
strategy. Economic data using Marxist categories were being 
tabulated but not made public because of the PRG's relationship 
with Western governments and financial institutions. The 
information was being sent to Cuba and other socialist countries 
in order to' enable them to play a greater role in the economic 
affairs of the island. Acknowledging that the private sector 
continued to dominate economic activity in the country, Kirton 
promised that the merchant class would be 'dealt with' in 
due course.^
In making an assessment of the PRG's attempt to introduce 
planning in Grenada, one can say that the revolutionary 
government gave a considerable amount of thought to the subject, 
made strenuous efforts and attempted to involve the masses 
in the planning process. The main objectives of planning were
A
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to rationalize the operations of the state sector, increase 
the PRG's ability to intervene in the economy and progressively 
orientate the economy towards the Soviet bloc. However, the 
revolutionary government's efforts to introduce planning 
were severely handicapped by institutional, data, technical 
and personnel constraints. The PRG's predicament was best 
summed up by Robert E. Cole in a paper presented to the 
Conference on Science and Technology held at the Dome in 
August 1980: 'The situation we face is a vicious circle. Past 
underdevelopment has left us without the resources and 
institutions necessary for planning. In turn, the absence of 
operational planning helps perpetuate our underdevelopment. The 
logical place to break the circle is by bringing planning 
on-stream. This however, is not a simple process; it requires 
thought, work and resources. On the other hand, failure to 
move in this direction is far more costly, since that failure 
condemns us to making poor use of what we have for the 
indefinite future. '^
The PRG experienced a similar situation in its attempt to 
introduce training in Grenada. For many years prior to March 
1979 little had been done by way of organising training in 
the state sector; the programmes organised by the Gairy 
regime were ad hoc, unco-ordinated and unintegrated. The last 
serious training efforts to be carried out at senior levels 
were in 1976 and 1977. The PRG was greatly alarmed at this 
state of affairs. Recognising the need for basic management 
skills and training at all levels in the ministries, state 
and parastatal enterprises in May 1980 the revolutionary 
government established an In-Service Training Unit. Headed by 
a Director of Training, the Unit supervised training
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activities for government employees. The motto of the Unit was 
to bring about 'Change Through Training' and as a first step 
the Unit sought to assess the training needs of the state 
sector. In terms of facilities, three conference rooms at the 
Extra Mural Department of the University of the UJest Indies 
in St. George's were available for training. Movie and 
overhead projectors were also at hand, though there was no 
VTR equipment. Library resources and other training materials 
were also lacking. In terms of resource personnel, there were
a number of trained people who could be utilized in training 
25programmes. The PRG also made maximum use of the training 
programmes and institutions established by CARICOM. The most 
important regional programme, which played an important role 
in providing support for the Inservice Training Unit, was the 
Centre for Development Administration (CARICAD). Created in 
1979, CARICAD was a regional organization responsible for 
improving the management capability of the Caribbean public 
sector to assist in sustaining the socio-economic development 
in the region, and aimed at erasing deficiencies in public 
sector management through a comprehensive approach in training, 
research, information, consultancy and advice and strengthening 
training divisions by providing training material, technique 
and personnel. Another programme which the PRG availed itself 
of was the Caribbean Regional Training Programme (CRTP). 
Launched by CARICOM on 27 July 1979 the CRTP was a four-year 
project financed by the US Agency for International Aid (USAID) 
to develop and train manpower to improve productivity in both 
the public and private sectors. The CRTP sought to upgrade the 
managerial and technical skills of government employees and 
small businessmen in the CARICOM member states. The executing 
agencies for the CRTP were the Eastern Caribbean Common
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Market (ECCM) Secretariat and the CARICOM Secretariat. The 
CRTP had two components: individual training grants and 
special focus seminars. The grants were geared toward enabling 
officials to receive short-term specialized training in the 
region to improve certain functional skills. Finally, owing to 
the importance of development projects in the economic 
strategy of the PRG, the revolutionary government required 
senior level officials to attend the training programmes of 
the Project Administration Training Unit (PATU). This 
organization was set up in September 1980 by the CDB in response 
to the findings of the Eaton Report, which drew attention to
n Rthe need for more staff trained in project work in the LDCs.
The CDB also considered that too much of its time was spent on
project preparation, which is a task that, ideally, the
27borrowing country should undertake. The PATU programmes 
comprised high-level training courses lasting ten weeks, for 
about twenty-five participants per course. The courses were 
organized on a regional basis and were open to senior- and 
upper middle-level managerial and technical personnel in the 
public sector of CDB member countries, particularly the LDCs. 
They covered all aspects of the project cycle - identification, 
preparation, appraisal, implementation and evaluation. To 
achieve this, PATU organized a number of training programmes, 
specialized seminars and workshops for personnel involved in 
the preparation and management of development projects in the 
region .
Along with providing increased training opportunities in 
Grenada and the region, the PRG sought a number of other 
methods of developing a corps of technocrats and highly 
skilled professionals for the island. These methods were 
spelt out by Coard in his interview published in The Courier:
»
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'Now we are seeking to do this /deuelop a corps of technocrats 
and professionals7 both by trying to harness and utilize more 
efficiently Grenadians who already hav/e ability and who were 
already living in Grenada at the time of the revolution; and 
secondly by harnessing Grenadians living abroad who are 
helping many other countries to build their own processes. I 
am talking about advanced countries now; that is, North 
America and Britain and some of the larger Caribbean 
territories. These people are highly skilled and highly 
experienced; having them back home would make an enormous 
difference in pushing the process forward.
/Thirdly^ ••• by getting outstanding Caribbean professional 
who have a great range of skills and experience and are 
willing to come here and work in Grenada and help to build the 
country for us.
/Fourthly/ ... by sending out some of our brightest
young people on scholarships in several different countries
outside so that as quickly as possible, four, five or six
years from now, they will begin to return home with the
necessary skills in chemical engineering, civil engineering,
mechanical engineering, veterinary science, different branches
of agricultural science, management studies, economics and so
on, all the different areas which are vitally necessary for
2 8us to push the economy and society forward.'
While the PRG's state sector training drive had a marked 
impact in improving the knowledge, skills and attitudes of 
government employees many problems remained. In his 1983 Report 
on the Economy, Coard reproved certain managers for refusing 
to attend the management training courses which the PRG had
been providing. He also deprecated some Permanent Secretaries
for preventing workers in their ministries from attending
middle-managernent, supervisory and secretarial courses
provided for them. Coard apportioned the blame for this
resistance to a lack of political consciousness on the part of
the government officials involved and went on to imply that
this was one of the reasons why the PRG had designated 1983
the 'Year of Political and Academic Education' . He called for
a heightening of the campaign to raise the educational level
29and political consciousness of the Grenadian people. In 
putting forward this view, Coard was demonstrating the 
importance which the PRG attached to political and academic 
education as means of increasing the number of trained 
personnel in the country. This abjective was spelt out by 
Coard in the item in his report on planning: 'Let us not forget, 
too, that political and academic education from literacy up 
to primary and secondary levels, will provide the basis for 
many of today's workers to become the managers of tommorrow's 
state companies. The 'Year of Political and Academic Education' 
has thrown up hundreds of workers who have the ability to 
become the skilled technicians, professionals, managers and 
planners for the Grenada of the future.'
In addition to political motivation, a number of 
structural factors also served to obstruct the PRG's efforts 
in training. The state sector continued to experience 
considerable difficulties in. retaining trained staff. Mot only 
were there losses of capable personnel to the private sector 
with its higher salaries and more lucrative benefits, but 
the management system as a whole was also being depleted by 
emigration and the loss of staff to regional and international 
agencies. There were also a number of 'defections' caused by
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the PRG's ideological and organizational offensive in the 
state sector, although, for obvious reasons, it would be 
difficult to identify specific instances of this.
1 8 0
Taxation and Social Reform
The economic strategy pursued by the Bishop regime was to 
a large extent shaped by the decision taken by the revolutionary 
government to stay within the East Caribbean Currency 
Authority (ECCA). Established in 1965, ECCA originally 
comprised six member states of the Eastern Caribbean - Antigua, 
Dominica, Monserrat, St. Kitts, Nevis, St. Lucia and St.
Vincent and the Grenadines. In 1968 Grenada joined the 
Authority. After December 1973 ECCA members shared a common 
currency, the East Caribbean dollar, which was initially 
pegged to the pound sterling at a rate of ECSA.80 per pound.
In July 1976 it was repegged to the US dollar at a rate of
ECS2.70 per US dollar. During the period of the revolution 
ECCA did not have the powers of a central bank;^ it had no
authority to regulate credit policies, to fix interest rates
or establish the reserve requirements of the commercial banks. 
Thus, the PRG1s membership of ECCA limited its ability to 
use monetary and exchange rate policies in response to 
balance of payments difficulties. Moreover, Grenada had no 
central financial institution of its own and the government's 
holdings of foreign assets were very small and kept as 
sinking funds against external debt. Consequently, the only 
buffer the country had to the automatic adjustment of imports 
to a drop in foreign exchange earnings - as occurred in 1980 - 
were the willingness of the private sector (mainly the 
commercial banks) to increase its net foreign exchange 
liabilities, and the government's limited capacity to borrow 
abroad. Owing to the restrictions on ECCA's powers, Grenada 
along with other member governments had little influence over 
the lending policies of the commercial banks; there was no
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means of channelling the funds of the banks into productive 
activities. In 1982, for example, the commercial banks in the 
region lent only EC5J37.8 million for agriculture and 
ECS67.6 million for manufacturing. Thie corresponding figures 
for the distributive trades and personal loans were
32ECI144.6 million and ECS245.3 million respectively.
Notwithstanding these limitations, however, the PRG also 
derived certain economic and political advantages from its 
membership of ECCA. In the first place, Grenada did not have 
the means to establish a central bank and issue currency of 
its own; and if the PRG were to have done so it would have 
rendered the island's economy open to financial conspiracies 
hatched in Washington. Thus, Grenada's membership of ECCA 
allowed the country to forgo the expense involved in 
setting up a central bank, and, at the same time, provided a 
measure of protection from economic destabilization. In addition 
the PRG was able to make use of the technical expertise and 
economic data possessed by ECCA, and in times of balance of 
payments difficulties - such as 1980 - draw upon the financial 
resources of the Authority. ^
On account of the PRG's inability to use monetary 
mechanisms and the restraint which it exercised in transforming 
property relations, taxation was the principal lever used by 
the revolutionary government to effect economic and social 
policies. In 1980, the first year in which the PRG presented 
a budget, a package of measures were introduced which 
reduced personal income tax by 21 per cent, costing the 
revolutionary government EC31.7 million. Personal allowance on 
taxable income was raised from EC$1,200 to ECSl,500 per
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year. A husband and wife were given the entitlement to file 
seperate income tax claims, thus broadening the scope of the 
increase in personal allowance. Previous allowances for a 
husband or wife (ECI600), maintenance.or alimony (EC$960), 
a housekeeper (ECS120) and a dependent relative (EC3120) 
remained the same. The allowance for children was raised from 
ECJ&350 per child to ECS650 for the first two children and 
remained at EC$350 for each additional child; and an entirely 
new educational allowance of ECS700 was introduced to help 
offset the costs incurred to the parents of children studying 
abroad. The education allowance applied whether or not the 
children involved were on scholarship as long as parents 
supplied documentary evidence confirming that they gave 
financial support to the children being claimed for. In 
addition, if after taking all allowances into account chargeable 
income came to EC310D or less then there was an exemption 
from inoome tax altogether. Persons previously in this 
category would have had to pay ECS50 per annum. Finally, there 
were significant reductions in the rate of taxation for low 
and middle income wage earners. According to the PRG, this 
package of tax measures exempted over 30 per cent of Grenadian 
workers from paying income tax, and some two-thirds of the 
benefits went to the lowest paid categories of workers whose 
taxable income was EC$5,000 and under.^
In order to pay for the wide-ranging reductions in income 
tax, the PRG levied increased charges on large- and medium­
sized companies, closed off a number of tax loopholes to the 
private sector and raised taxes on certain goods and services. 
New licences were introduced for companies involved in trading 
in dry goods, hardware, groceries and non-essential items.
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Previously, such businesses had not been liable to pay licences. 
Small traders were not required to pay the licence fee. The 
most important new charge levied on the private sector u/as 
the 'Withholding Tax'. This tax became payable on all monies 
sent abroad by the subsidiaries of foreign companies 
operating in Grenada (including commercial banks) and monies 
sent out of the country to individual non-residents as rentals 
or dividends. The tax on such companies, in addition to 
regular company tax and tax on interest, amounted to 25 per 
cent of any profits sent abroad. Also, ticket tax, a tax on 
tickets to destinations outside the CARICOM area, was changed 
to 5 per cent of the cost of the ticket instead of the flat 
rate of ECS5.35
After 1980 taxation was used by the PRG primarily as a 
means of raising revenues for the revolutionary government's 
development programmes. The Bishop regime was of the view that 
state revenues should mainly be used to generate employment in 
productive activities and not to provide social benefits.
Other means were employed to finance the other social reforms 
that were introduced. In 1981, 1982 and 1983 there were 
substantial increases in two taxes in particular: stamp duty 
and consumption duty. Both of these were taxes levied on 
imports. Thus, in 1981 there were modest increases in stamp 
duty and consumption duty. The following year increases in 
stamp duty and consumption duty were accompanied by a series 
of new taxes on services, products and companies. Information 
about these was disclosed by Coard in his presentation of the 
1982 budget. Consumption duty was raised by between 10 and 
25 per cent on imported items produced outside of CARICOM. The 
list included luxury consumer goods as well as items produced 
in Grenada such as beverages, garments and tinned fruit.
t
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Coard also announced the imposition of an International Airport 
Levy of 2 per cent on all imports coming into the island. The 
revenue generated by this levy was to be used for work at the 
new international airport under construction at Point Salines. 
And in another measure designed to generate additional finance 
for the project, the PRG passed the International Airport 
(insurance Comapnies) Investment Law 1982, which required all 
insurance companies operating on the island to buy International 
Airport Bonds with 10 per cent of their total premium income.
The commercial bank? were also summoned to make a greater 
contribution to the development drive. The Special Deposits 
Levy, which the commercial banks customarily deposit with 
the Treasury, was increased from 10 per cent to 20 per cent.
The final measure announced by Coard was an increase in 
company tax from 50 per cent to 55 per cent. However, in order 
to encourage greater private sector investment in the economy, 
rebates were to be given to companies that re-invested their 
profits in Grenada. For companies that expanded their operations 
in productive spheres such as hotel construction and 
manufacturing, a rebate of 15 per cent would be given. Companies 
that established new activities in other 'non-productive' 
areas would receive a 10 per cent rebate. Summarising what 
he loosely referred to as a 'carrot and stick device' , Coard 
stated: 'In other words, for those who sit on their behinds 
and do nothing about reinvestment, the tax has gone up by 5 
per cent. But for those who are interested in getting into 
investments either in their existing undertakings or in some
find themselves paying in reality either only 45 per cent 
Company Tax instead of the old time 50 per cent or 40 per cent 
instead of the old time 50 per cent and the present time
new undertakingsf then they will
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3 655 per cent.' Towards the end of 1982 and in early 1983
the PRG introduced further increases in stamp duty and
consumption duty leading the business community to request
3 7'an urgent meeting' with Coard. (Seg table 14).
Alongside the substantial increases in taxation the PRG 
raised income for state expenditure by borrowing money from 
the commercial banks and the agricultural marketing associations. 
These funds were used for development projects and to finance 
a number of social programmes. In each year of the revolution 
the PRG passed one or two Finance Borrowing Authorisation 
Laws empowering the Minister of Finance to borrow money from 
any of the commercial banks operating in the island. In 1979 
the Minister was authorised to raise up to ECS2 million and 
by 1981 this figure was raised to EC$3 million. In 1979 also 
the Agro-Industries Finance Borrowing Law was passed authorising 
the Minister of Finance to borrow EC$650,000 from the commercial 
banks 'to promote, finance and develop agro-industries', and 
subsequently three other laws were introduced enabling the
GCNA , the GCA and the GBCS 'to provide loans to meet the partial
3 flcost of establishing and developing approved agro-industries.' 
Also in the first year of the revolution, the PRG introduced 
the Loan (Low Cost Housing Loan) Law, 1979 which authorised the 
Minister of Finance to raise ECS3,750,000 from the commercial 
banks for low cost housing. Additional funds were obtained 
from the insurance companies and other sources so that by 
December 1979 the PRG could announce an EC5S7.5 million housing 
programme. The need for such a programme was spelt out in an 
official government document in these terms: 'As in most other 
developing countries, housing is a critical problem in
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TABLE 14
CHANGES IN SELECTED TAX AMD OTHEK REVENUE-GENERATING 
MEASURES INTRODUCED BY THE PEOPLE'S KEYOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT
1979 C/
1983f
Stamp Duty 7.5 20.0
(a)Consumption Dutyv y 7.5 15.0
Foreign Exchange Tax 5.0 5.0
Company Tax 50.0 55.0
Withholding Tax n.e« 25.0
Special Deposits (Banks) Levy 10.0 20.0
International Airport (insurance 
Companies) Investment Levy n.e. 10.0
International Airport Levy n.e. 5.0
(a) Refers to the average rate of Consumption Duty, 
n.e. Non-existent
Source: Grenada: The People's Laws 1980;
Grenada: The People's Laws 1981:
Grenada: The People's Laws 1982;
Grenada Government Gazette. 1 Jan. - 3 June 1983.
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Grenada. In 1970 (the most recent census available), 46$ of 
the population lived in overcrowded conditions, 56$ of household: 
lacked electricity, 64$ lacked running water, and 77$ lacked 
indoor toilets. Population has increased since 1970 while no
significant new housing has been constructed. Thus present
39conditions, although unquantified, must be worse.' The 
housing programme included a low-cost housing scheme and 
soft loans for house repair. Some 300 houses were to be built 
on government lands. The scheme was started in Grand Anse,
St. George's and Telescope in St. Andrews and by November 1981 
a total of thirty-two houses had been constructed. The houses 
were rented to government employees and other middle income 
workers and once the tenants had paid enough rent to cover the 
cost of the houses they would have become the owners paying no 
more rent. Under the housing repair programme community 
organisations identified the homes which were most in need of 
repair, and offered their labour on week-ends to help offset 
the cost. The loans came in the form of the materials needed 
to repair the home, and after the repairs were made the 
beneficiaries were given up to ten years to repay the loan.
The loans were of two types. The first type was given to 
people who earned less than ECS150 per month; and the second 
type to people who earned more than ECS150, but less than 
ECS250 per month. People in the first category were given 
up to ECStl.OOO in materials and were only required to pay 
two-thirds of this amount, the rest being a grant from the 
PRG. Repayment was at a rate of ECS5 per month for ten years. 
People in the second category were also given up to E C U , 000 
in materials. However, they were required to repay the whole 
amount at a rate of EC&17 per month and within a period of
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five years. In his 1982 Report on the Economy, Coard disclosed 
that in 1980 593 loans mere given for house repair totalling 
EC$532,288, and in 1981 these figures rose to 973 and 
EC$781,682 respectively.^
In addition to the housing programme the PRG introduced 
a number of other social programmes. These included: free 
secondary education and the provision of free uniforms and 
school books for the lowest income families; free milk and 
school lunches; the improvement of health facilities and the 
introduction of free physical and mental health care.
In evaluating as a whole the public spending programme of 
the PRG several points should be made. First of all, while the 
radical taxation policies arid other revenue-generating 
measures of the revolutionary government led to a substantial 
increase in the revenues of the state, thereby contributing 
to the PRG's development programme, it also produced a number 
of social effects that militated against the socialist goals 
of the revolution. The tax concessions made in favour of the 
working class in 1980 were undoubtedly generous, but they were 
not of sufficient magnitude to appreciably affect the level of 
income inequality in the country. (See table 15). It is true 
that the overall growth brought about in the economy led to 
an improvement in the living standards of certain sections of 
the poor; however, because the bourgeoisie continued to 
dominate economic activity and retained its priveleges in 
income, housing and education, it was an even greater 
beneficiary of the modernization drive. For, as Griffin has 
pointed out, poverty is a relative phenomenon. In spite of 
improvements in their own living standards, the poor will
40
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TABLE 15
III COME DIFFERENTIALS II: GRENADA IH 1985
OCCUPATION 
Bank Manager
MONTHLY INCOME 
ËCÜ ~  
5,000
Director of a Large Company 5,000
Government Minister 2,000
Insurance Company Agent 1,500 - 3,000
Qualified Teacher 800 - 1,000
Unqualified Teacher 300 - 400
Road Worker 250
Estate Worker 175
Note: In 1983 the Ministry of Labour had no up-to-date 
labour statistics. These figures were provided by 
Franklyn Fhilbert, the Commissioner of Labour.
Source: Ministry of Labour, St. George's, 1983.
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continue to consider themselves poor if the rich are seen to
42be getting even richer. And in a society that remained 
open to the 'demonstation effects' of Western tourism and 
Grenadian migrants returning from the, metropole, this factor 
took on an added dimension. This would, indeed, help to 
explain why many of the 'less politicised' poor people in 
Grenada during the revolution genuinely believed that the 
PRG was acting on behalf of the rich. Another problem with 
the PRG's taxation policy was its deleterious effect on the 
real income of wage earners. In his Reports on the Economy for 
1982 and 1983, Coard presented figures which, he argued, showed 
that in 1981 and 1982 wage increases had kept ahead of 
increases in prices. Without even questioning the accuracy of 
Coard's figures, there were a number of factors which he 
omitted to mention which would lead one to arrive at a different 
conclusion to the one presented by the deputy Prime Minister. 
Given the highly skewed nature of income distribution in 
Grenada the average figure for wage increases could only serve 
to obscure the wide discrepancies that existed in the wage 
and salary rises obtained by individuals employed in different 
occupations. Moreover, Coard's figures on wage rises in 1981 
indicated that low paid workers received the smallest rises 
in pay. Working in areas such agriculture, construction and 
the services sector, these workers constitute the overwhelming 
majority of the island's wage earners. Furthermore, when one 
considers that most of the growth in employment took place 
in government-sponsored construction activities and that the 
PRG tended to hire labour on very low pay, then it becomes 
evident that the income of the majority of wage earners did 
not keep pace with inflation. Indeed, many workers complained
about the revolution having brought about a sharp increase in 
the cost of living. Government officials, however, were usually 
quite inventive in their response to criticism of this 
character. They said that people had .'forgotten' what things 
were like under Gairy, and, as if to solicit support for 
their argument, the masses would be constantly reminded of 
just how bad things had been under the mystic. Coard's reports 
were also silent about the reduction in real income brought
about by the fall in prices of Grenada's main agricultural 
4 3exports. In chapter one we saw that many individuals 
employed in a wide range of occupations in Grenada derive a 
significant portion of their income working part-time in 
agriculture. There was also a certain lack of realism in 
Caord's reports. In 1983, for example, he said that since the 
PRG had imposed the highest taxes on luxury goods and other 
items imported from abroad, it was 'mainly those families who 
were not willing to eat local and buy local, only those who 
wanted to use things from abroad /who7 had to pay more.'^ In 
a society which has historically imported the main bulk of its 
food, medicines and consumer goods these were pretty harsh 
words. There was also a class contradiction involved here.
For it was only the upper middle class, the rich and tourists 
who could have afforded to pay the mark ups caused by government 
taxation as an increasing number of goods traditionally used 
by Grenadians were put beyond the reach of poor people. It was 
as if the PRG was saying to the poor, if you cannot affort 
something it is because it is imported or a luxury item and 
you have no business buying such things in any way. Let the 
rich people and the tourists have them, they do not understand 
the socialist goal of the revolution to 'eat local and buy
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local' . There is no need to expand on how much of an irony 
this represented for a regime which considered itself to be 
a 'worker's government'. This is not to suggest, however, that 
there was any easy solution to this problem. Finally, in his 
reports, Coard tended to overstate the contribution made by 
the 'social wage' to improving living standards. From most of 
the evidence available it would seem that the social benefits 
provided were not extensive enough to alleviate some of the 
hardships that were being caused. Thus, on balance, one can 
say that while the taxation policy of the PRG made an 
important contribution to the modernization drive of the 
regime, its effects on income inequality and the real income 
of the poor were less impressive.
193
Chapter Five
The Search For A 'Patriotic National Bourgeoisie'
In spite of the fact that during its four-and-a-half years 
in office the Bishop regime called for the active participation 
of Grenada's business class in its economic programme and 
introduced a number of measures to assist the private sector, 
the relationship between the PRG and the bourgeoisie 
remained tense and dissonant. To a certain extent, the 
revolutionary government's difficulties with Grenada's 
capitalist class were analagous to those faced by a number of 
radical Third World regimes. Michael Manley, who experienced 
a vicious private sector backlash against the reformist 
policies of his PNP administration in Jamaica, has summarised 
the problem quite well: 'It is this /the conflict in society 
brought about by a challenge to the international syst em~J 
which makes a mixed economy, with social and political aims of 
a socialist nature, so difficult to manage. Central to the 
mixed economy is the understanding that both private and 
public sectors will co-operate to promote economic development. 
When the private sector feels there is no threat to its class 
interests and that the public sector is merely engaged in 
productive capitalist activity for the state, all is well.
But where the development of a public sector is part of an 
overall strategy to change the balance of relations between
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classes in the society, the private sector reacts differently. 
True, some elements co-operate once they feel assured that this 
mixed economy really has a place for private business. Indeed, 
they may feel more secure in a society u/hich they see 
tackling injustice.
But other parts of the private sector do not co-operate, 
doubtless feeling that their class interests are threatened.
Some mark time, do not reinvest profits. Others actively seek 
ways to sabotage the economy, running down their businesses, 
exporting their capital illegally. Still others simply depart, 
complete with wordly goods, often to set up points of overseas 
resistance to the government which tried to disturb their 
power.1'*' As we know, Manley was unable to resolve this 
contradiction and it was this, in large measure, which led to 
his defeat in the October 1980 elections. Indeed, Manley's 
predicament was particularly untenable on account of the 
preponderant role played by North American capital in the 
Jamaican economy, the organic connection that exists between 
this capital and the local bourgeoisie and the presence in 
Jamaica of a totally unscrupulous and rabidly anticommunist 
political party, the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), which continued 
to enjoy mass support. In this sense, the circumstances which 
confronted the PRG were somewhat more favourable. Most of the 
island's economy was in the hands of Grenadian and Caribbean 
companies, the industrial base of the society was extremely 
slender and therefore, the impact which an investment strike 
could have was limited, and, finally, all organized political 
opposition had been silenced. Nevertheless, the tension which 
existed between the revolutionary government and the island's 
business class was ominous and did place a question mark over 
the long term viability of the PRG's economic strategy.
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The Question of Expropriation
Two months after the revolution, Bernard Coard spoke at 
the Annual General Meeting of the Chamber of Commerce. Seeking 
to allay any fears that businessmen may have held over the 
revolutionary ideology of the NJM, he called on his audience to 
keep an open mind on the sjbject: 'We have always insisted that 
we want to be judged by results, not rumours, not gossip, not 
propaganda, not malicious old talk. We are only asking you to 
judge us by results.'  ^ He then went on to give a categorical 
pledge that, unlike the Gairy regime, the PRG would respect 
private property: '... with the revolution has come an end to 
the forceable seizure of people's property without 
compensation.'^ The Chamber of Commerce took Coard's statement 
at face value and in its 1979 Annual Report commented 
favourably on the PRG's policy towards the private sector:
'The Council of Management continued to give serious 
consideration to the growing threats to private enterprise 
with particular reference to the indiscriminate acquisition of 
agricultural land and was therefore pleased to note the new 
government's pledge to respect the rights of ownership of 
property. This was reaffirmed by the Minister of Finance, Trade 
and Industry at the meeting with the Chamber's delegation ...
The Minister further stated that Government participation in 
productive enterprises was contemplated but that this would 
be mainly in joint ventures in industrial promotion. Government 
had in mind a mixed economy and intended to adopt a flexible
5position as it was proposed to proceed on democratic lines.' 
Going on to outline the views of the Chamber on the 'advantages' 
of private enterprise, the Report continued: 'If the system 
of private enterprise is to be preserved its benefits must
I
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continue to outweigh its disadvantages and it must maintain 
its superiority over public enterprise. It must also play its 
part in the economic development of the State, especially in 
promoting full employment and greater equity in income 
distribution. Public enterprise can encourage waste, inefficiency 
and corruption. On the other hand the profit motive and 
competition in private enterprise tend to keep wastage at a 
minimum and provide a stimulus to greater efficiency. But the 
unscrupulous businessman smears the image of private 
enterprise. The business community must therefore maintain a 
high standard of ethics and police itself in order to win the 
respect and confidence of consumers and the co-operation and 
loyalty of employees. Private enterprise will thus avoid being 
hedged around with restrictions, licences and other controls 
which are often disincentives to new private investment and can
gimpede economic growth.'
In an interview published in The Courier in 1980, Coard 
re-stated the PRG's commitment to uphold capitalist property 
relations, but this time entertained the idea of 'compulsory 
acquisition'; this was in fact an allusion to certain 
expropriatory measures which the revolutionary government had 
already taken and its oontemplation of the use of this 
formula to legitimize further acts of expropriation: 'We see 
it ^nationalizatiorV7 as an extreme measure to be used in a 
special case. I don't know whether one could even call it 
nationalization. I am talking about, for example, things that 
happen in other islands, and I think in Britain, it's called 
compulsory acquisition. In the case of America its called 
imminent domain or something like that.
In other words, if, for example, the only place in the
whole country where you can build an airport happens to be in
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a particular spot, in our case Point Salines - and all the 
experts over 25 years have told us that there is only one 
place in Grenada where you can build an international airport, 
where there is enough flat land, enopgh space, the right 
clcud cover, the absence of cross-wind problems etc. - and the 
people there don't want to sell the land, obviously the 
government will have to compulsorily acquire that land. The 
owners will be fully compensated but it will have to be 
compulsorily acquired, otherwise the country cannot have an 
international airport. If that's what you mean by nationaliza­
tion, yes, you will have situations like that.
But, in other words, if you mean confiscation of people's 
property, that is out. Our position on that is quite clear.
We are not in favour of compulsorily acquiring people's 
property.
But where the national interest is involved, we will have 
to do it, like every other country does, but with full
compensation. Seizing property without compensation is not part
7of our policy.' It was in fact at the airport site, Point 
Salines estate, that the PRG made its first 'compulsory 
acquisition' shortly after the revolution. Although the 
revolutionary government promised to make a prompt payment to 
the owners of the estate, the Julien family, in 1983 no 
settlement had been reached. The compulsory acquisition of 
property in Grenada is provided for under powers contained in 
a statute existing from colonial times, the Land Acquisition 
Ordinance 1958. This statute, which authorises acquisition for 
any public purpose, provides for payment of market value 
compensation. In 1981 the PRG introduced the Land Development 
and Utilization Law, which, making use of the powers contained i
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the Land Acquisition Ordinance, empowered the Minister of 
Agriculture to compulsorily lease for ten years the idle 
portions of any estate ov/er 100 acres. In early 1983 this law 
was used by the PRG to take over a number of estates, although 
in carrying out the take-overs the revolutionary government 
did not stick to the letter of the law. Some of the estates
acquired could in no way have been described as 'idle land' and
8in certain instances compensation was not paid.
In addition to the semi-legal expropriations carried out
in the countryside, the PRG also confiscated property without
compensation in the case of two particular individuals. People's
Laws Nos. 95 and 96 of 1979 provided for the expropriation
without compensation of the properties acquired during their
terms of office by Gairy and his deputy Derek Knight. These
actions were justified by the PRG on the grounds that all the
assets owned by these two individuals were 'acquired by means
of corruption and the blatant abuse and misuse of the powers 
gof ... office.' It should be pointed out that these measures 
were in violation of clause six of the suspended constitution 
which states that: 'No property of any description shall be 
compulsorily taken possession of, and no interest in or right 
over property of any description shall be compulsorily acquired, 
except where provision is made by a law applicable to that 
taking of possession or acquisition for the prompt payment 
of full compensation.'^ and 'No person entitled to compensation 
... shall be prevented from remitting, within a reasonable 
time after he has received any amount of that compensation, the 
whole of that amount (free from any deduction, charge or tax 
made or levied in respect of its remission) to any country of 
his choice outside Grenada. '^
#
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Along with the measures already discussed, the PRG held 
open the option of a direct intervention in the economy in 
cases where there was suspicion of economic destabilization or 
if it was considered that an industrial dispute was causing 
serious damage to the economy. Mention has already been made
of the steps taken by the PRG to put an end to what it considered
12to be economic sabotage on the part of the CDC. The dispute 
which took place at the Grenada Bottling Plant Ltd in Tempe,
St. George's, provides an illustration of the PRG's use ofI
direct intervention in industrial relations. The Bottling 
Plant is a wholly-owned subsidiary of W.E. Julien and Company 
Ltd and provides all the island's Coca Cola. On 16 August 
1979 workers at the factory went on strike to protest against 
the unfair dismissal of two workers. After the dispute had 
dragged on for five weeks, with the management refusing to 
reinstate the workers, the PRG intervened, took over the 
running of the plant and gave the workers their jobs back. In an 
interview published three months after the incident, Selwyn 
Strachan, who was at the time the Minister of Labour, Works and 
Communication, explained the PRG's approach to the issue as 
follows: 'It was not a question of us taking full control of 
the factory. It was a question of trying to get a settlement 
and up to now, although the factory has been run by government, 
the ownership still remains in the hands of W.E. Julien and 
Company. All we are concerned about now is getting the 
industrial matter settled. Once that is settled, they can 
continue running the factory.
We have a number of things to do. We cannot take that on 
now. That is for another stage in the struggle . ' ^  An important 
factor influencing the PRG's decision to assume control of the 
factory was the obstinacy of the plant's management and the
i i *
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disrespect with which it treated government ministers. By its 
intervention the PRG was teaching the company a lesson and 
asserting the authority of the revolution; and in doing so 
it provided a demonstration of its commitment to the cause of 
the working class. The PRG ran the factory for two years 
during which time it appears to have encountered a number of 
technical difficulties. By March 1982 the PRG and the company 
had sorted out their differences and it was announced that 
Julien's had resumed management of the factory and all funds 
which the PRG had collected during the two years of its control 
would be handed over to Julien's.^
The events which occurred at the River Antoine estate in 
February 1980 provides another example of the PRG's pragmatic 
approach to the question of property relations. At that time 
the estate was taken over by its labour force, who protested 
about working conditions and rates of pay, and declared a 
People's Collective Farm. The take-over was organized by the 
'Budhlall Gang', led by brothers Kenneth and Kennedy Budhlall, 
and the PRG alleged that they were linked to a CIA plot to 
overthrow the revolution. It was further claimed that the 
Budhlall Gang wanted to use the estate for the mass cultivation 
of marijuana, since at a public demonstration they called for 
the legalization of the drug. The PRG condemned the occupation 
of the estate, and in response to the public demonstration 
organized a counter-demonstration in which it dubbed its 
opponents 'marijuana capitalists'. The leaders of the Budhlall 
Gang were arrested and River Antoine was returned to its 
owners, although the PRG conceded that the workers' complaints 
were legitimate and set up a Commission of Inquiry to examine 
conditions on the estate,^ In a public statement on the 
incident, the PRG affirmed that while it fully supported
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workers' rights to decent liv/ing and working conditions, it
'could not and would not support the seizure of people's
property as a means of resolving the conditions of hardship
16of the workers ...' The PRG's action was heartily applauded 
by the estate's owners, the de Gale family, and this was 
expressed by David de Gale in a letter sent to The Times:
'... it is relevant to record publicly that when, in February 
1S80, our family estate was peremptorily taken over by a 
village commune and renamed 'The People's Collective Farm' 
government support was immediately forthcoming for the 
manager's protection and the estate was returned (eventually) 
to normal working .
It is by judicious, well regulated behaviour that Mr
Bishop - like Mr Mugabe - hopes to transform his small nation
17into a homogenous structure of living communities.' As things 
turned out, however, the de Gale family was to radically 
modify its assessment of the Bishop regime. For River Antoine 
was one of the estates expropriated in early 1983, and up 
until the time of the US invasion the PRG and the de Gale 
family were at loggerheads over the manner of the take-over and 
the terms of compensation. It would seem, therefore, that the 
PRG's public stance on the 1980 take-over was determined by 
its desire to maintain the support of the planter class at 
that particular conjuncture, and not allow forces to its left 
to precipitate a premature confrontation. The revolutionary 
government was adamant that it alone would dictate the nature 
and pace of the tranformation process taking place in the 
country.
The PRG's approach to the question of expropriation, then, 
was very tactical and pragmatic. Given the widespread ownership 
of property in the island and the extreme shortage of
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trained personnel with a socialist conviction, the revolutionary 
government was obliged to refrain from a policy of wholesale 
nationalization. Moreover, in order to maintain the confidence 
of the bourgeoisie the PRG stated publicly that it was 
opposed to nationalization without compensation, and intervened 
physically to restore an estate to its owners after it had 
been forceably taken over without the sanction of the 
revolutionary government. But this public stance provided a 
camouflage for a policy of gradual expropriation, and the 
pre-existing laws in the country were used in a somewhat 
opportunistic fashion to legitimize this policy.
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Economie Incentives and the Bourgeoisie
Pursuant to its goal of promoting the growth of the
industrial and tourist components of the local business class,
the PRG introduced a wide-range of incentives to encourage
private sector investment. Mention has already been made of
the 1982 tax measures which provided rebates of up to 15 per
cent for local companies which re-invested their profits in 
18Grenada. Additional incentives were made available under the
Qualified Enterprise Act, the Hotel Aid Ordinance and the
Fiscal Incentive Act. In March 1983 the PRG published its
most comprehensive policy statement on its relations with the
19private sector, the Grenada Investment Code. This document 
identified areas of economic activity suitable for private 
sector involvement and outlined the basic principles governing 
joint venture operations between the PRG and private enterprises. 
In the preamble to the text, the revolutionary government 
vaunted the reputation it had acquired for sound management of 
the Grenadian economy. The PRG honoured its commitments and 
undertakings, it was claimed, and had a perfect record for the 
settlement of Grenada's financial obligations. The preamble 
also drew attention to the good industrial relations climate 
in Grenada resulting from the 'enlightened economic and 
labour policies' pursued by the PRG, and, asserted that 
negotiations with investors took place within the context of 
'honesty and non-corruption', In welcoming foreign investment 
in Grenada, the Investment Code pointed out that particular 
encouragement was being given to investments which served at 
least one of four specific objectives: (i) the creation of 
employments (ii) the expansion of production; (iii) the
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preservation of the quality of the environment; (iv) the 
generation of and/or the conservation of foreign exchange 
earnings. There mas also an insistence that foreign investment 
'should indeed mean that foreign funds will be invested in the 
economy' and there was a call for agreements to include 
provisions for the training of Grenadian nationals. Three 
specific categories of investment areas were identified. The 
first group was designated 'Areas of Investment Normally 
Reserved for the State and Para-statal Bodies', and a number of 
activities were listed in which, it was stated, the PRG 
reserved the right to preclude private sector ownership and 
control. If private investment was deemed necessary in these 
activities then it could only take place on the invitation of 
state and para-statal bodies. The list comprised the following 
enterprises and activities: public utilities, radio, television, 
infrastructural facilities including quarrying, the national 
airline, the telecommunications network and trading in certain 
strategic and basic commodities.
The heading of the second group was 'Areas of Restricted 
Further Growth For the Private Sector'. The PRG intended to 
prohibit the establishment of new private enterprises in the 
following areas: banking, insurance, importing and wholesaling, 
fishing (except artisanal fishing) and internal transportation. 
The third group was entitled 'Areas of Investment Normally 
Reserved for Nationals'. In this section the PRG stated its 
intention to prohibit any future investment by foreigners in 
certain activities in which it was considered there existed 
adequate capability and expertise amongst Grenadian nationals. 
Included in the list were the following areas: retail and 
distribution trading, taxi and self-drive services for the
tourist sector, cinemas, travel agencies, real estate agencies, 
automobile and other repair services, agriculture, civil 
engineering and contracting, restaurants, night clubs, 
hairdressing, and laundry and dry cleaning services.
In line with the economic and political strategy of the 
PRG as a whole, these three categories of investment areas 
were evidently designed to strengthen the state's control 
over strategic areas of the island's economy, prevent the 
further growth of the bourgeoisie in non-productive activities, 
and retain Grenadian ownership and control of a number of 
tertiary activities.
Another section of the Investment Code announced the PRG's 
intention to refrain from 'all acts of acquisition and/or 
expropriation of investments' within Grenada. It pointed out, 
however, that where such an undertaking was done for a public 
purpose it would be on the basis of fair and adequate 
compensation and in accordance with the existing legislation. 
Summing up the PRG's approach to this question the Investment 
Code affirmed: 'Where the Government embarks upon the 
acquisition or expropriation of an investment, it would seek to 
do so by first negotiating with the party or parties concerned 
to arrive at a just settlement.
It is the policy of Government at all times to maintain a
politically stable environment conducive to the planned
development and growth of the economy including the private 
2 0sector.' Finally, in the Investment Code Incentives Law, 1983, 
which formed an appendix to the Investment Code, a number of 
incentives were offered to potential investors. These were: 
tax concessions for approved enterprises; the exemption from 
payment of withholding tax by an approved enterprise; the
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exemption from payment of transfer tax by investors in an 
approved enterprise; the inclusion of hotels, condominiums, 
and guest houses in the list of qualifying businesses on which 
income tax capital allowances are granted; and accelerated 
depreciation allowances.
In addition to providing incentives for investment in 
productive activities, the PRG sought to stimulate private 
sector activity through state intervention in banking. After 
the revolution the PRG set about re-organising the GAIDC, which, 
as has been documented in chapter one, was plagued by 
corruption and maladministration under the Gairy regime. A 
banking specialist from the CDB made a number of proposals to 
the PRG about the organization of the GAIDC, and in response 
to these proposals the PRG appointed a new manager to run the 
Corporation, established a new administrative structure and 
assumed liability for the debts owed by the GAIDC to the 
local commercial banks. Satisfied with these changes, the CDB 
began to release funds to the GAIDC which had been temporarily 
held up. In 1980 the Corporation was re-named the Grenada 
Development Bank (GDB).
In making funds available to the GDB, the CDB restricted 
the maximum size of loan the GDB was able to make to a 
private borrower to the equivalent of US$100,000. In addition, 
the GDB was prevented from making loans available to the 
state sector. Considering itself hamstrung by these restrictions 
the PRG submitted a proposal to the CDB calling on the bank to 
increase the maximum loan size to US$200,DD0 and requested a 
change in policy that would enable the GDB to make loans 
available to the state sector. In 1982 the CDB sent Conrad 
Griffiths, an industrial development specialist, on a two year
- 
]
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assignment to Grenada. Griffiths was asked to perform four 
major functions: (i) provide assistance to the GDB in the 
approval and supervision of loans for industrial projects;
(ii) provide small businessmen with technical and management 
expertise; (iii) assist in the training of a local industrial 
officer to assume Griffiths' functions after the two year 
assignment had elapsed; (iv) liaise with the Chamber of 
Commerce and individual entrepreneurs, and submit their
2proposals for loans of over US$100,000 to the CDB for approval.
As a result of the work of Griffiths and the re-organisation
of the GDB, there was a sharp increase in the amount of loan
approvals made by the bank to entrepreneurs operating in the
manufacturing sector of the economy. (See table 16).
Most of the loans disbursed by the GDB to the manufacturing
sector went to provide assistance to businessmen producing
22garments, furniture and spaghetti. Due to the fact that
most of these enterprises were export-orientated, the increased
manufacturing activity brought about by GDB loans and other
incentives contributed significantly to the revolutionary
government's export drive; and as most of these exports were
destined for the regional market, trade relations with CARIC0CI
23became of greater importance to the Grenadian economy.
Shortly after the revolution, the Canadian Imperial 
Bank of Commerce announced its intention to cease operations 
on the island for financial reasons and the PRG used the 
occasion to acquire ownership of the banks facilities and 
establish a state bank, the National Commercial Bank (NCB).
The NCB was registered as a limited liability company with the 
PRG as the sole shareholder, and a publicity campaign was 
launched to promote the new bank. By 1983 the NCB was the
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TABLE 16
LOAMS APPROVED BY TH5 GRENADA DEVELOPMENT BANK
(a.)TO INDUSTRY AMD TOURISM'* ^
YEAR AMOUNT 
EC 0
1980 5 0 0 ,0 0 0
1981 6 6 ,0 0 0
1982 8 7 8 ,0 0 0
(a) The overwhelming majority of loans were made 
available to industry as opposed to tourism. It 
was not possible to disaggregate the figures.
Source: Grenada Development Bank, St. George's,
1983
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second largest bank on the island after Barclays Bank 
International and had branches in St. George's, Grenville, 
Gouyaue and Carriacou. In three years it made net profits of 
ouer ECS900,000.
Prior to the revolution the current account of the state, 
called the Government Consolidated Revenue Fund, mas handled 
by all the four commercial banks through a system of quaterly 
rotation. The PRG continued this arrangement but reserved the 
most profitable areas of government business for the NCB.
In order to galvanise local savings for development 
purposes, the NCB offered an interest rate of per cent, 
which was 1 per cent higher than that of the foreign-owned 
commercial banks. Cheaper loans were also offered to 
borrowers. The NCB charged 12^ per cent interest on loans made 
to customers purchasing consumer durables but only 9 per cent 
on loans taken out for industrial purposes. The NCB was run 
along commercial lines and complemented the lending activities 
of the GOB. The NCB provided short term facilities to cover 
the operating expenses of entrepreneurs who had successfully 
negotiated long term loans from the GDB. There was also an 
arrangement between the NCB and the GDB to share the security 
for loans. This was something which the foreign-owned 
commercial banks had refused to do in the past.
In addition to its developmental objectives, the NCB 
contributed to a number of social programmes of the PRG and 
provided finance for private housing. Traditionally, most of 
the finance for house construction in Grenada came from the 
insurance companies. However, most of the insurance companies 
only provided long term mortgage finance once a house was 
actually built; this was in order to ensure that the house
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had no structural defects which might lead to a reduction in 
its sale value. A commercial bank would be called upon to 
make funds available to construct the house, after which the 
loan would be taken over by the insurance company in question 
over an extended period of time. The establishment of the 
NCB significantly increased the funds available for this sort 
of bridge financing in Grenada.
In early 1983 the PRG bought the head office of the Royal 
Bank of Canada as a going concern. This followed an announcement 
made by the Royal Bank that it would cease its operations in 
Grenada. The bank's head-office decided to close its Grenadian 
branch as part of a move to rationalise its activities in the 
Caribbean. The opportunity was used by the PRG to establish a 
second state bank in Grenada - the Grenada Bank of Commerce 
(GBC). The PRG was the sole shareholder of the GBC and the 
bank was accorded the same priorities as the NCB. It seems that 
the GBC was established to provide for an element of competition 
within state banking.
It took some two years for the PRG and the Grenadian 
private sector to reach agreement on the exact wording of the 
Investment Code. The primary factors responsible for this 
appear to have been the 'ideological' character of the 
original draft, certain differences of opinion between the 
revolutionary government and the bourgeoisie over economic 
policy and the lack of clarity on the part of the PRG itself 
about is long term economic goals. The publication of the 
Code in March 1983 suggests that, in spite of a number of 
unresolved differences between the two sides, some sort of 
modus vivendi had been reached. Nevertheless, there was a
varied response to the incentives provided in the Code, as
211
indeed there had been to the earlier economic initiatives 
taken by the PRG to assist the private sector. Because of the 
PRG's control of the media and the disinclination of the 
bourgeoisie to air its grievances in public it is difficult to 
assess the true feelings of businessmen about the economic 
policies of the revolutionary government. Nevertheless, a 
number of sources do provide suggestive information on this 
matter .
Shortly after the national budget presentation in March 
1982, David Minors, who was then the President of the Chamber 
of Commerce, sharply criticized the PRG over its economic 
policies. In an interview with the Caribbean News Agency 
(CANA) he complained that the revolutionary government was 
using the businessmen's association as 'window dressing'. 
Minors was critical of the new tax measures announced by the 
PRG, expressed apprehension about the prospects of Grenada 
benefiting from the Caribbean Basin Initiative launched by 
the Reagan administration and stated that he found it irksome 
that the Chamber was not allowed to publish its monthly 
bulletin because of the 1981 Newspaper Law. 'There have been 
many instances in which we could have embarrassed government 
and we have gone out of our way not to do so, but we can't 
say the same for government', Minors claimed. 'They have used 
all sorts of opportunities to tear into the private sector 
unfairly and in an unwarranted manner.' Minors argued that the 
new trading regulations introduced by the PRG meant that 
whatever was imported or exported from 'a pin to an elephant' 
would be subject to licence; and that was a disincentive to 
business. Turning to the rebates on company tax that the PRG 
was offering to companies which re-invested their profits in
Grenada, Minors recalled that Coard had described it as a 
'carrot-and-stick device'. 'My reaction to that description of 
the taxation' , stated Minors, 'is that the carrot is an 
anaemic variety grown on the arid dry lands of the island, while 
the stick is a wallaba pole.' Spelling out the argument, he 
continued: 'If you are facing a situation where 55 per cent of 
profits goes back to government in income tax, and 25 per cent 
goes to workers - which I do not object to - and inflation is 
running at 15 to 20 per cent annually, just to replace stocks 
and keep going will take up all that and still have you 
borrowing from the bank, far less to undertake expansion.'
In respect to Grenada's chances of benefiting from the Caribbean 
Basin Initiative, Minors said that it was his understanding 
that Grenada would be excluded from bilateral aid, but was not 
excluded from the trade and investment part of the plan. 'I thinl 
it would be an uphill job to benefit fully under investment 
because there are other countries around posturing correctly, 
and the mere fact that the government of the United States has 
said that Grenada has a totalitarian regime will keep North 
American investors away.' On the question of the Chamber's 
bulletin which reviewed business performance, Minors said that 
for the past six months they had received promises from various 
government officials that the Chamber would receive an 
exemption under the Newspaper Publications Law. Finally, Minors 
claimed that while the Chamber did have opportunities to hold 
discussions with the PRG, 'a lot of it is just talk and nothing 
happens . '
In January 1983 the Chamber of Commerce was given the 
go-ahead to publish a special newsletter, pending the 
resumption of the monthly news bulletin. Although the tone of 
the newsletter was certainly more conciliatory than the
interview given by Minors, it did allude to a lack of response 
on the part of the business community to the PRG's economic 
policies. The first item contained in the newsletter was the 
New Year's message of the new President of the Chamber, G.fl. 
Menezes. In it he called on the private sector to respond 
to the revolutionary government's development drive: 'Government 
is expending considerable sums with a view to upgrading and 
improving the country's infrastructure. Whatever our 
persuasion, we must recognise that "one hand cannot clap". The 
public and private sectors must co-operate if worthwhile 
economic growth is to be achieved. Neither can stand alone and 
hope for success.
It is therefore my wish that in 1983 we examine all 
possible ways of increasing productivity and trade through 
investment, and having set our minds on realistic objectives, 
pursue them relentlessly until success is achieved. As "faint
2 6heart never won fair lady" so stagnation profits us nothing.'
The newsletter also contained a report on the Extraordinary 
General Meeting of the Chamber held on 24 November 1982. The 
meeting was held to inform businessmen of certain initiatives 
taken by the Chamber's Council of Management, aimed at 
identifying and pursuing sources of capital for economic 
expansion by the private sector. G.A. Menezes gave the main 
report at the meeting. In his speech, reported in the newsletter 
he outlined the PRG's policy of promoting manufacturing 
activities: 'The time had come for the private sector to 
consider the transition from its traditional role of merchant 
trading and to become more production orientated and more 
export orientated.
The President considered the private sector to be at the
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crossroads where, by its own endeavours, or lack of them, it
27can either go forward or be overtaken by events.' Continuing
his report, Menezes stated that members of the Council of
Management had made approaches to government officials in
Canada, regarding economic assistance to Grenadian businessmen.
The Canadian officials had indicated their readiness to meet
with representatives of the Chamber to consider funding for
private sector projects in Grenada. In the first instance,
Canadian development agencies would be called upon to provide
assistance. Menezes said that the PRG had been made fully
aware of this initiative and had agreed that it should be 
28pursued. Finally, the newsletter reported on a second 
Extraordinary General Meeting of the Chamber held on 12 January 
1983. The main item on the agenda at this meeting was the 
new round of tax increases which came into force on 1 January. 
At the meeting businessmen discussed the effects the new 
tax measures would have on a wide range of consumer goods. 
Members of the Council of Management informed businessmen that 
they had written to Coard 'requesting as a matter of great 
urgency' a meeting with him to express the Chamber's views on 
government taxation policy. No response to the letter had been 
received. Nevertheless, the views and opinions of businessmen
were noted down at the meeting, so that they could be presented
29to Coard 'if and when he agrees to a meeting.'
The reports contained in the newsletter of the Chamber of 
Commerce, then, provide further evidence of the disquiet that 
prevailed in the business community over the economic policies 
of the PRG. Indeed, in spite of the incentives provided by the 
revolutionary government private sector investment in Grenada 
fell sharply during the course of the revolution. (See table
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17). This provides a good index of the loss in confidence among
businessmen brought about by the revolution. However, while
there was a decline in private investment under the PRG a
number of enterprises were able to increase their profit
margins because of the overall growth in the island's economy
brought about by the high inflows of aid to the state sector.
Paradoxically, it was the comprador bourgeoisie that benefited
most from the economic policies of the PRG even though the
revolutionary government itself sought to progressively
eliminate this section of the property- owning class. In
financial year 1982, Jonas Browne and Hubbard (Grenada) Ltd
recorded a pre-tax profit of ECSl.9 million - an increase of
37.2 per cent over the 1981 figure. It was also the largest
profit made in the company's history. Reviewing the performance
of the company in 1982, C.F. Toppin, the Chairman, gave the
following explanation for the good results: 'What has caused us
to have good results in a year when revenues from agriculture
and tourism are seriously reduced, and what of the future.
Undoubtedly the capital spending by the public sector has had
a marked impact on trade and has more than made up the shortfall
of spending money from our traditional industries. Hopefully,
an improvement in the world economy, coupled with the improvement
of infrastructure and the rehabilitation of agriculture from
now until 1985, should create an investment climate for
private sector investment which, together with increased
earnings from traditional industries would lead to continued
economic growth. We are watching the position carefully with
a view to expansion geared to take maximum advantage of this
30projected situation.'
In carrying out fieldwork in Grenada in early 1983, I 
conducted interviews with a number of Grenadian businessmen
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TABLE 17
PRIVATE INVEST M3HT ITI GIÆNADA -  1976-81
1976 1977 1978 1979 1 980 1981
Private Investment 
SC $ million 7.9 8.5 7.9 4.8 3.5 2.0
Private Investment as a 
Percentage of GDP 8.2 11.0 7.7 4.4 3.2 1.2
Source: Economic Memorandum on Grenada, pp. 114-115
and representatiues of regional development agencies. The 
comments made by these individuals provides additional 
information on the unease felt by the business community over 
the economic policies of the PRG. Among those interviewed 
were the managers of three privately-owned banks on the 
island. Acting as book-keepers for the capitalist class as a 
whole, bank managers have a close acquaintance with many 
individual businessmen and are acutely aware of developments 
in the private sector. Thus, the views expressed by the three 
bank managers may be considered representative of the business 
community as a whole. Of course, one should bear in mind that 
in view of the political climate in Grenada under the PRG 
few businessmen were prepared to be completely candid in their 
public statements.
Chester Hinkson, the Manager of the Bank of IMova Scotia, 
stated that the tax structure in the country was much too 
tight and many businessmen were complaining. He believed that 
taxation was causing inflation to move ahead of the cost of 
living; and in order to demonstrate that real wages had fallen 
under the PRG, he pointed out that in spite of the Grenadian 
custom of eating ham at Christmas, many stores still had 
large unsold stocks of the product. Hinkson was very sceptical 
of government figures on unemployment, arguing that the jobs 
created by the PRG could not have absorbed the number of 
jobless in the country. Turning to threat of competition from 
the NCB, Hinkson said that the Bank of Nova Scotia had no 
plans to close, since, on account of the bank's professionalism 
and international contacts, it could compete successfully with 
the NCB. Most of the large companies prefer to stay with the 
private banks, he added, because of their mistrust of the
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PRG. Finally, Hinkson reported that a lot of money was going
out of the country illegally; he had personally seen businessmer
stuffing money into suitcases, which were then put on boats
destined for a neighbouring island or tax havens such as the 
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Cayman Islands. The scale of this activity was, however,
questioned by Claremont Kirton, Head of the Macro-Planning Unit.
in the interview I conducted with him following my conversation
with Hinkson. Kirton acknowledged that money was probably
leaving through unofficial channels, but argued that if it were
taking place on a large-scale then evidence would have shown
up in the money supply figures. Kirton had served as an
economist under the Manley administration in Jamaica and had
acquired considerable experience of capital flight. He said
that if it were happening in Grenada, he would have been able 
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to detect it.
Geoffrey Commissiong, the manager of Barclays Bank 
International, expressed similar views to Hinkson with respect 
to the PRG's taxation policy. Going on to speak about the 
PRG's strategy of promoting investment in manufacturing, he 
stated that Barclays continued to invest most of its profits 
with the ECCA since there were no liquid investments on the 
island and providing funds to industrial enterprises was 
fraught with too many risks. 'West Indians are not factory 
oriented', he opined, and argued that the Caribbean was 
littered with failed manufacturing ventures. Commissiong then 
complained about the preferential treatment which the PRG 
was giving to the NCB. 'This should not happen in a free 
enterprise system', he asserted. Nevertheless, Commissiong did 
not believe that the PRG was 'going communist', and remained 
'cautiously optimistic' that it would not. He said there was
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nothing to nationalize in Grenada and if the PRG took over 
one business place then all businesses in the country would 
close d own.^
Gordon Steele, manager of the Grenada Co-operative Bank 
Ltd, was critical of several areas of the PRG's economic 
policy. The Co-operative Bank traditionally catered for 
small savers who loaned money from the bank to purchase land, 
fertilizer and consumer goods, so Steele was more concerned with 
the effects of government policy on lower income groups. He 
said that the bad servicing of loans had risen significantly 
under the PRG and attributed this to the fall in prices of 
agricultural commodities and increased government taxation. 
Steele did not believe that real wages were keeping pace with 
inflation and described the successive increases in the rate 
of stamp duty as 'vicious'. He also expressed concern at the 
level of commercial borrowing the PRG had undertaken in 
connection with the international airport. 'How will the 
country service this debt?', he asked.^
The views expressed by the three bank managers were echoed 
by a number of officials of the CDB, who have expert knowledge 
of the Grenadian economy and close contact with the island's 
business class. Conrad Griffiths, the CDB industrial development 
specialist mentioned already, said that most businessmen still 
had a wait-and-see attitude towards the PRG's economic 
programme. While there had been a spurt of activity in certain 
manufacturing enterprises, the three largest companies on the 
island had not made any approach to him about investment 
opportunities. Griffiths surmised that the international 
airport would make a big difference to the tourist industry, 
which had a considerable amount of excess capacity, but said 
that the country's image was 'a big problem'
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Neville Grainger, to whom the CDB assigned the 
responsibility for the development banks in the Eastern 
Caribbean, praised the PRG for its sound management of the 
Grenadian economy. He was particularly impressed by the 
efforts made by the revolutionary government in training 
public sector employees. Nevertheless, Grainger identified 
two main difficulties with the PRG's industrial export drive: 
competition from the Far East and the problem of keeping 
foreign businesses in the country after the expiry of their tax
-7 CJholiday period.
Samuel Singh, the deputy Director of the Industry Division 
of the CDB, was far more critical in his assessment of the 
PRG's economic policies. Singh led the CDB mission which 
visited Grenada in 1982 and probably has a greater acquaintance 
with the Grenadian economy than any other CDB official. Singh 
argued that the PRG had stifled the development of the private 
sector. He acknowledged that there had been a pick-up in 
certain manufacturing activities, but attributed this to the 
work of Conrad Griffiths rather than any change in attitude on 
the part of the business community towards the PRG. Many 
businessmen had told Singh that the political situation in the 
country was getting worse as the PRG had now begun the process 
of 'indoctrination'. This was a reference to the worker 
education classes introduced in 1983 by the trade unions in a 
number of state and private establishments. Singh did not 
believe that the PRG's formula of promoting worker education 
classes to increase productivity could work. While certain 
businessmen made public statements in support of the PRG's 
initiative, privately they admitted that they felt threatened. 
Singh also reported that invoicing techniques were being used 
by businessmen to disguise the true extent of their profits
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and re-direct money away from Grenada to neighbouring islands 
and tax havens. Finally, in discussing the growth in the 
economy which took place under the PRG, Singh pointed out 
that a certain amount of caution should be exercised when 
examining official government figures. The PRG was recording 
many things in the national accounts data which were not
37recorded before, and this had inflated government figures.
Following the downfall of the Bishop regime and the US 
invasion of Grenada in late 1983, Grenadian businessmen felt 
that they could air their views in public once again. Of 
course, those dramatic events greatly influenced the public 
pronouncements that were made. Nevertheless, the interviews and 
statements from the business community published during this 
period do provide an important insight into the relationship 
between the PRG and the private sector, fit a special meeting 
held on 1 November 1983, the Chamber of Commerce issued a 
statement in support of the US invasion of Grenada and spelling 
out their disagreements with the PRG: 'From the beginning of 
the revolution on March 13, 1979, our Chamber has repeatedly 
expressed its grave concern over the infringement of the basic 
rights and freedoms to which the people of Grenada are 
entitled. UJe have protested the expropriation and closure of 
the public media, and unlawful detention without trial or due 
legal process of our citizens. We have sought continuously to 
have the People's Revolutionary Government redress its wrongs 
and proceed to the holding of free and fair elections as was 
promised on the morning of the revolution and on many occasions 
thereafter. U/e have brought to the attention of the People's 
Revolutionary government the economic hardships placed upon 
the people of Grenada by their oppressive policies whose net
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effect mas to worsen the living standards of Grenadians and 
u/hich conspired against the development of the country's .
economy. We have worked actively to influence the People's 
Revolutionary government to adopt more reasonable positions 
internally, and externally, albeit with very little success.
We have observed with alarm the increasing and unnecessary
militarization of our country and the patent efforts to
restructure the economy of Grenada in a fashion that is alien
to our people's aspirations. Our concerns found tragic
expression on Wednesday, October 19, 1983, when scores of
Grenadian men, women and children were wilfully murdered in
peaceful demonstration by units of the People's Revolutionary
Army at Fort Rupert. Our country has never experienced
3 8savagery of this nature.'
To conclude this chapter on the relationship between the 
PRG and the private sector in terms of the NJM's search for 
a 'patriotic national bourgeoisie' the following points can be 
made. Because of the predominantly comprador and petty bourgeois 
configuration of the island's class structure and the extreme 
shortage of trained personnel with a socialist conviction, the 
PRG adopted a highly pragmatic and tactical policy of 
gradual expropriation. However, this programme was mainly 
confined to the agricultural sector. The PRG devised a number 
of schemes and incentives to promote the growth of the 
manufacturing and tourist components of the capitalist class 
at the expense of the comprador bourgeoisie. However, because 
of the lack of response to the PRG's measures the desired 
transformation in the physiognomy of the bourgeoisie was not 
taking place. The comprador bourgoisie was able to increase its 
profit margin while enterprises in tourism and manufacturing
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did not perform as well as was anticipated; and the outlook for 
foreign investment in these areas was uncertain. Furthermore, 
a question mark lay over the actual viability of the 
industrialisation programme. It is not at all clear whether 
Grenada would have been able to find a reliable and expanding 
market for the manufactured goods projected because of the 
competition it faced from the Far East and the growth of 
protectionism in CARICOM. Again, although the PRG continually 
stressed the importance which it attached to the private sector, 
it was not prepared to make concessions to the bourgeoisie 
over such issues as freedom of the press, political detainees 
and foreign policy. Yet these were some of the main issues 
which invoked the hostility of the business community and 
lead to a loss in confidence and a steep decline in private 
sector investment. It was these issues also which jeapordized 
the PRG's prospects of receiving aid and investment from the 
West. In spite of these problems, however, the PRG did succeed 
in bringing about growth in the island's economy. The state 
sector investment programme was of sufficient magnitude to 
offset the drying up of private investment. Equally, although 
certain businessmen did resort to economic sabotage, the 
impact of this was not too debilitating. However, it is highly 
unlikely that this state of affairs could have continued for 
an extended period of time. The PRG's investment programme 
had placed a severe strain on the financial and technical 
resources of the island, and the country's debt to the West 
seemed likely to rise considerably in the years ahead. These 
developments would have exacerbated the tension which existed 
between the PRG and the bourgeoisie. Thus, while the Bishop 
regime fared better than the Manley government in attempting to 
manage a 'mixed economy', the Grenadian revolution evinced in
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Chapter Six 
The 'Aid Boom*
While the PRG actively encouraged private investment in 
Grenada it attached far greater importance to the mobilisation 
of economic assistance on concessional terms from foreign 
governments and financial institutions. Thus, overseas aid 
became the principal catalytic agent in the transformation of 
the Grenadian economy. Aid enabled the PRG to expand and 
modernise the state sector so that it could play a directional 
role in economic affairs. Aid was also responsible for the 
growth that took place in the economy, provided most of the 
jobs and greatly improved the island's infrastructure. This 
'aid boom' was a very distinctive feature of the Grenadian 
revolution and was facilitated by the miniscule size of the 
island in which relatively small aid inflows can have a 
substantial effect on economic activity.
Long before the revolution the NTM recognised the 
possibilities that existed of obtaining international financial 
assistance, and following 13 March 1979 strenuous efforts 
were made to use up the 'slack' debt capacity which was the 
legacy of the incompetence, mismanagement and corruption of 
the Gairy regime. At the same time, the PRG explored a number 
of new sources of aid. In all, one can identify four main 
categories of aid donors to Grenada: (i) Western governments and 
financial institutions; (ii) the socialist countries; (iii) the
2 26
oil-exporting countries; (iv) non-governmental organisations 
(See table 18). On account of the preponderant role that was 
played by aid and the diversity of the donors involved, the 
Grenadian revolution provides an exceptionally good testing 
ground on which to examine the effectiveness of aid in 
alleviating poverty in the Third World; and it also affords 
a comparison of the relative strengths and weaknesses of a 
host of important aid donors.
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oil-exporting countries; (iv) non-governmenta 1 organisations 
(See table 18). On account of the preponderant role that was 
played by aid and the diversity of the donors involved, the 
Grenadian revolution provides an exceptionally good testing 
ground on which to examine the effectiveness of aid in 
alleviating poverty in the Third World; and it also affords 
a comparison of the relative strengths and weaknesses of a 
host of important aid donors.
TABLE 18
GRENADA -  CAPITAL GIANTS. 1977-82 
(ECg Million)
1977 1978 1979 1980 Preliminary
1981
Projected
1982
UK Development Aid. 0.3 0.1 - 0.6 - 0.3
CIDA 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.9 - -
EDF - 0.7 0.7 0.5 4.0 3.0
cdb/usaid - - - 1.1 0.3 2.6
QAS - - 0.7 0.4 - -
UNDP - - 0.1 0.3 0.1 -
unicep/f a o - - 0.1 0.2 0.1 -
CUBA _ 27.0 12.2 24.1 28.2
(of which airport related) - - (27.0) (11.3) (23.0) (20.0)
Algiers - - - - 0.9 -
Syria - - - 2.2 3.2 -
Lybia - - - - 0.8 -
Other Arab Countries - - 5.4 8.6 - -
USSR - - - - 3.0 -
German Democratic Republic - - - - - 3.0
Other - - - 0.3 0.2 0.2
Total Grants 1.5 1.6 34.4 27.3 36.7 37.3
Source: Economic Memorandum on Grenada, p. 125
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Western Governments and Financial Institutions 
The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank
One central feature of the PRG's economic policy that owed 
a great deal to Bernard Board's familiarity with international 
finance was Grenada's strict observance of the external 
requirements for the repayment of the national debt. As a 
result, US efforts to use the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank to destabilize the revolution were only 
partially successful. Although the US is the single most 
important power in the IMF, controlling 20 per cent of votes 
and well able to organise loan vetoes and other financial 
conspiracies against the wishes of a majority of member states, 
it was not able to block all funds to Grenada nor impose 
regulations on government spending.
In March 1981 the PRG applied to the IMF for an SDR 
6.3 million (equivalent to about ECS21 million) extended fund 
facility (EFF). This funding had been agreed to by IMF officials 
and the PRG after an IMF visit to Grenada, and was destined for 
capital projects in agriculture, agro-industry, tourism and 
housing. Howver, the US director on the Board of the IMF 
opposed Grenada's application on the grounds that Grenada did 
not have a balance of payments problem to justify the loan - 
although the 1980 trade deficit totalled US$33.4 million.
Under IMF rules, an EFF is intended to aid a two-year or 
three-year programme aimed at correcting the structural causes 
of a payments imbalance. Giving in to US pressure, the IMF 
only gave a US$4 million standby credit, to be used for 
short-term financial stabilization but not the basic capital
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improv/ements Grenada needed. At around the same time, the US 
used its influence inside the World Bank to withhold the Bank's 
endorsement of the island's public investment programme, thus 
blocking Grenada's access to some US|3 million in concessional 
funds from the Bank's soft loan arm, the International 
Development Agency. The lack of endorsement also made it 
difficult for Grenada to raise funds from other international 
banks and lending agencies. In response to these acts of 
economic aggression, the PRG threatened to withdraw from the 
IMF and the World Bank within two weeks if both institutions 
did not stop interfering in the internal affairs of Grenada. 
Speaking at the Second Congress of the Association of Third 
World Economists, Kenrick Radix accused the US of vulgarity, 
and of attempting to manipulate Grenada's political course, 
using the IMF and the World Bank as its surrogates. If concrete 
measures were not taken within two weeks, he warned, Grenada 
would withdraw from both organisations 'and let them return 
the deposits they have in our name, for we believe that we 
might be able to make better use of them than they.
If they do not approve, we will launch a worldwide campaign 
to expose them, to make our country's experience a worldwide 
experience.1'*' Subsequently, at a joint meeting of the IMF and 
the World Bank held in Gabon, the PRG lobbied support for its 
position. Although the PRG did not in fact withdraw from these 
institutions, by making the maximum publicity over the issue 
and mobilising support within the IMF and the World Bank, it 
exposed the role of the US and reduced Washington's ability to 
use these bodies against the revolution. By scrupulously 
meeting repayment schedules and utilizing assistance efficiently 
the PRG defied attempts by the international financial agencies
to deny it funds. However much the sympathies of those who 
controlled the IMF and the World Bank lay with the positions 
adopted by the US administration, and however political the 
effects of the terms under wich they make loans, these bodies 
ultimately found it exceedingly difficult to reject or ignore 
the accounts produced by the PRG. As a consequence, they were 
obliged to continue relations with an extremely well behaved 
client and even grudgingly offer their congratulations for 
the performance of the economy under the PRG's supervision.
In September 1983, Board announced that the IMF approved the 
payment of a loan of ECi40 million to Grenada. The only 
major condition laid down by the IMF was that the PRG could 
not borrow any addditional money from international commercial 
banks for a period of three years. However, this condition 
did not have any bearing on the projected EC$20 million which 
the PRG had already contracted to borrow from a number of 
different sources at commercial rates for investment purposes. 
Coard explained that there was no reason for the IMF to 
impose any stringent conditions on loans to Grenada because the 
country had had good economic performances in recent years.
He added: 'We are in a very strong bargaining position with the 
IMF. They can't tell us cut back on Government expenditure on 
the recurrent account because of a massive gap, because we 
have no massive gap.
We have a surplus and the surplus is growing every year. 
They can't say cut back on Government's social programmes such 
as health and education. They can't tell us to do that 
because we have a surplus.'^
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The Caribbean Development Bank
Article 1 of the CDB's charter declares that the purpose of 
the Bank is to 'contribute to the harmonious economic growth 
and development of the member countries in the Caribbean and 
to promote economic co-operation and integration among them, 
having special and urgent regard to the needs of the less 
developed members of the region.'^ According to the Bank's 
President, William G. Demas, CDB has a niche in the region 
and is advantageous to donors and beneficiaries for a number 
of reasons. First of all, CDB aid delivery is administered at 
less cost per dollar of aid delivered than for almost all other 
aid donors, particularly those whose activities are small and 
diverse. In fact, this has been recognised by the major 
international development banks who, concerned over 
cost-effective aid delivery, use CDB's services to channel 
funds, particularly to the LDCs. Secondly, with the expertise 
of its Caribbean staff, CDB has an intimate knowledge of, 
sensitivity to and empathy with, regional problems. Other 
factors isolated by Demas include the fact that CDB offers to 
aid donors the advantage of aid co-ordination and that the
support of the CDB is seen by many contributors as a tangible
4contribution to regional integration and co-operation. Most 
of the members of CDB are Commonwealth Caribbean countries, 
however, the Bank also includes Britain, Venezuela, Mexico, 
Canada, and Colombia. At a special meeting of the Bank's Board 
of Governors held in 1971, the Board decided that Commonwealth 
Caribbean members should always have a majority of the voting 
power in the Bank and a majority of the number of directors. 
According to Demas, this creates a sense of identity and dignity 
for the major beneficiary countries, and ensures that the
I
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countries of the Commonwealth Caribbean receive inflows of 
external resources in the context of economic self-reliance 
and are therefore not placed in a position of total dependency.“* 
On account of the voting power arrangement of CDB and article 
35 of the Bank's charter, which emphasizes the international 
character of CDB and imposes on the Bank an obligation neither 
to interfere in the political affairs of any member nor to be 
influenced in their decisions by the political character of 
the member concerned, the US government was unable to prevent 
any of the funds it donated to the Bank through the US Agency 
for International Aid (USAID) from reaching Grenada. However, 
in June 1981 the US made a direct challenge to the CDB's 
charter by offering a US$4 million grant to the Bank on condition 
that none of the money go to Grenada. The grant was earmarked 
for programmes addressing 'basic human needs'. In response to 
this provocative offer from the US administration, the 
CDB's Board of Directors took a firm decision to uphold the 
Bank's charter and voted unanimously to refuse the grant.
In addition, a number of Caribbean states openly denounced this 
victimization of Grenada by the US, thus blocking Washington's
gbid to isolate the PRG in the region.
The financial operations of the CDB are of two kinds: 
ordinary operations and special operations. Ordinary operations 
are financed from the Bank's share capital and the proceeds 
of loans raised in capital markets or borrowed or otherwise 
acquired by the Bank for inclusion in its ordinary capital 
resources. In the ordinary operations of the Bank, loans may 
be spent on goods produced in and services supplied from 
member countries only or other countries which in the opinion 
of the Board of Directors have contributed substantially to
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the resources of the Bank. The Bank's terms for lending vary 
from time to time in accordance with decisions taken by the 
Board of Directors. At the time of the revolution the rate of 
interest on loans financed from its ordinary capital resources 
was 12 per cent. Depending on the project being financed, an 
appropriate period of grace is given and usually the loan is 
thereafter repayable over a period of 10 to 15 years.
The special operations of the CDB are financed from the 
Special Development Fund and other Special Funds. Contributions 
or loans to the Special Development Fund are made available 
to the Bank on particularly favourable terms, for on-lending 
to projects at lou rates of interest and extended maturities, 
taking into account the economic circumstances of the country 
in which the project is located as well as the requirements of 
the project. The Bank also accepts contributions or loans 
for other special funds which it may administer on terms agreed 
with the contributors so long as the purposes are consistent 
with its objectives and functions. In its special operations, 
the proceeds of loans may be used for the procurement of goods 
and services only in those countries specified as eligible 
countries in the agreement which makes the funds available to 
the Bank. At the time of the revolution the rate of interest 
on loans financed from the special funds resources was A per 
cent per annum. The grace period is usually up to five years, 
and in most cases the loan is thereafter repayable over a 
period of 15 to 20 years. The US is the biggest single 
contributor to the special funds resources of the CDB. In 
December 1982 US loans made up USI 21 , B99,000 out of a total 
figure of USS139,147,000 in the Special Development Fund, 
and US8100,800,000 out of USS187,015,000 in the Special
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Funds. The other main contributors to the special funds 
resources of the COB are Canada, Britain, Venezuela and West 
Germany . ^
The main bulk of Grenada's loans from the CDB came from 
the special funds resources of the Bank. This meant that 
although funds were obtained on highly concessional terms, they 
were subject to the performance criteria and conditionality 
of the international aid organisations. For example, USAID 
programmes stipulate that the proceeds of its loans may only 
be used for the procurement of goods and services in the US 
and certain Latin American countries which are dominated by 
American multinational companies, and require the goods
gpurchased to be carried in ships flying the US flag. Thus, 
assistance from the CDB served to reinforce Grenada's dependence 
on the West, even though the long term goal of the PRG was 
to reduce this dependence.
Because of the economic reforms introduced by the PRG, 
the revolutionary government was able to obtain a significant 
increase in funds from the CDB. Among the projects funded by 
the CDB were the Feeder Road Programme, the Carriacou Sheep 
Production Scheme, resurfacing the Western Main Road, the 
Mamma Cannes Water project, port development at St. George's, 
the repair and construction of bridges and primary schools, 
and the rehabilitation of agricultural estates. Mention has 
already been made of the technical expertise made available by 
the CDB to the GDB and the facilities it provided for training 
public sector employees.
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The European Economic Community
The main bulk of the overseas aid provided by the EEC 
goes to the sixty-three African, Caribbean and Pacific 
countries that are associated to the EEC under the terms of 
the Lome Convention, which uas first signed in 1975 and 
renewed in 1979. The Lomé Convention is a treaty of co-operation 
between supposedly equal partners which includes trade access 
provisions, aid, agreements on investment guarantees and 
undertakings on political co-operation and consultation. The 
contractual nature of Lomé has given rise to elaborate joint 
consultation procedures and the ACP states have a formal 
negotiating status with the Community - not only with respect 
to implementing, renewing or renegotiating their Convention 
but also with respect to certain matters of EEC external 
economic policy affecting ACP states. This is a distinctive 
feature of the EEC aid programme and has no international 
parallels. EEC aid is also distinctive in several other respects 
First of all, aid from the Coomunity has a particularly high 
grant element. Nearly 80 per cent of the aid disbursed by the 
European Development Fund (EOF), the EEC's principal development 
agency, is provided as grants and the remainder attracts only 
a maximum of 1 per cent interest with repayment being phased 
over forty years with a ten year grace period. However, much 
more onerous terms are attached to loans from the European 
Investment Bank (EIB), which functions as a normal bank and is 
the sister organisation to the EDF. EEC aid is also relatively 
less tied than that of many donor organisations. This is 
because works and supplies contracts for EDF projects are 
made through open international tender within the ACP-EEC
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region. Recipients can therefore shop around in a much larger 
and competitive market than is the case in many bilateral 
aid programmes. Nevertheless, the tying of EEC aid to procurement 
in the ACP-EEC region does have its drawbacks like any other 
tied aid. In the case of Grenada and the other ACP states in 
the Caribbean, it would be easier to obtain supplies from 
North America. It is not simply the extra cost which procurement 
in Europe implies to the region, but also the ordering and
shipping delays, and the complications of dealing with
gunfamiliar firms and supplies.
An additional feature of the Lome Convention is that it 
confers upon the ACP states the power of project determination 
and intervention in the deliberation of the EOF. These powers 
are unmatched by those of previous conventions, or by any 
other bilateral or multilaterl donor. Furthermore, because 
EEC aid is 'programmed* over five years it allows the ACP 
states to plan development spending with reasonable certainty 
that funds already earmarked will be made available. This 
'indicative' aid programme allows the government to arrange 
with the donor the total amount of EEC government finance 
available for commitment over the five year period - few other 
donors are as forthcoming as this. Any other aid mechanisms 
included under Lome arrangements (such as 'regional' aid for 
more than one country and emergency assistance) are additional 
to the programmable part and are thus regarded by the recipient 
as a bonus. Nevertheless, a number of problems have arisen 
with regard to these features. One overriding criticism made 
of EEC aid is that implementation procedures are inordinately 
drawn out. While the Community tends to argue that the major 
cause for this rests with the inefficiency of the ACP states,
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there are, as Rajana points out, more serious reasons which 
emanate from the EEC itself.*"^ * Bureaucratic disputes in the 
EDF and other factors result in considerable delays in the 
implementation of Community aid. One .consequence of this is 
that since EEC aid is not indexed against inflation, its worth 
in real terms decreases proportionately with the delay in 
commitment and disbursement.
Finally, it is necessary to debunk EEC claims that the 
ACPs and the EEC are equal partners in the administration 
of EEC development assistance. The partnership principle has 
not been extended to joint decision-making. Only one of the 
EEC's aid bodies having an executive function, the Committee 
for Industrial Development, is jointly managed with the ACP 
states - and this is an area which has been starved of funds.
The ACPs have been denied effective representation on the 
crucial decision-making body, the EDF Committee. It is the 
EDF Committee which submits recommendations over the 
funding of projects to the EEC Commission which makes the 
final decision on the matter. It is true that the ACP state does 
have the right to argue its case with the EDF Committee and to 
request that the EEC Commission forwards its project to the 
ultimate Community authority, the EEC Coucll of Ministers.'*’''
But these lobbying mechanisms cannot be regarded as 
co-management. Overall, developing countries are no more 
partners under the EEC's aid programme as they are under 
bilateral aid. The interests of the Community come first. To
quote Rene Dumont: 'La Communauté economique européene et un
12club de pays riches, unis pour le devenir encore plus.'
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The PRG quickly recognised the possibilities that existed 
of securing an increased amount of development assistance from 
the EEC. In 1980, at great cost to such a tiny country, Grenada 
established an embassy in Brussels in order to strengthen 
its links with the Community. The fact that the PRG had 
successfully projected the revolution as innovatory, 
non-aligned and respectful towards capitalist property relations, 
struck a chord with Claude Cheysson, who was at the time the 
Commissioner of the EEC. And following a visit by an EEC aid 
programming mission, Grenada was granted a special allocation 
by the EDF of ECI12.5 million. In an interview published in 
The Courier, the official journal of the EEC, Bishop spelt out 
the PRG's attitude towards economic assistance from the 
Community: 'EEC co-operation is extremely important to us. We 
see the EEC countries as being the third major block in the 
world today. We believe the Community is in a key area of the 
world and it is very important for us to maintain very close 
links with it. We see the EEC as having tremendous possibilities 
for assisting the development of many Third World countries, 
including, of course, countries from this region and including 
Grenada. Our position is that we need to strengthen and deepen 
our ties with the EEC countries.'^
The aid programme drawn up by the EEC and the PRG 
prioritised transport and communication which were alloted 
48 per cent of the total assistance package. Most of this 
money was earmarked for the resurfacing of the Eastern Main 
Road, which links the eastern and western coasts of the 
island. A brief discussion of the performance of this project 
will be made further on. The rest of the aid programme was 
assigned to EDF support for government efforts in education 
and training, the improvement of cultural and social activities
1 «
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in community centres, assitance towards the establishment of 
curatiue and preventive medicine, the provision of technical 
training for Grenadian fishermen and the provision of experts 
for projects and defined priorities of the PRG. Under a 
seperate arrangement, the EEC also provided milk and food aid 
to the island and assistance for hurricane damage
In March 1981 the US waged a concerted campaign to 
pursuade EEC members not to help finance the international 
airport project launched by the PRG. The main focus of the 
campaign was the airport financing meeting scheduled to be 
held under EEC auspices in Brussels the following month. The 
U/orld Bank also took part in the campaign by secretly 
circulating documents to participants at the Brussels meeting, 
claiming that the airport project was not feasible. Bowing to 
the pressure, give EEC members (Belgium, France, West Germany, 
Italy and the Netherlands - Britain had not been invited) 
declined to attend, arguing that they would be represented by 
the EEC Commission. However, Claude Cheysson described 
Grenada's reguest for assistance as 'entirely normal' under 
the terms of the Lomé Convention, and added: 'The only abnormal 
thing is the American interest. What America thinks is of no 
importance. Let us forget about the Americans. This is a 
decision for the EEC and Grenada.'^
In the event, the conference, which was held on 14-15 
April and attended by Algeria, Cuba, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, 
Sweden, Syria and Venezuela, as well as OPEC and other 
international agencies, issued a communique supporting the 
airport project. Coard, who headed the Grenadian delegation, 
said the West Europeans were 'upset and annoyed at the bully-boy 
tactics of the United States', and that their decision to be
represented by the EEC Commission by no means amounted to a 
boycott, since they were among the countries holding bilateral 
talks with the PRG over funding for the project. He also 
decribed as 'exceptionally powerful' the resolution of support 
for Grenada passed unanimously by the ministerial council of 
the ACP states on 7 April, condemning the US for interference 
in Grenada's internal affairs.
A significant feature of EEC aid, which has not yet been
discussed and is of particular relevance to Grenada, is its
new emphasis on microprojects. These are tripartite ventures
which involve local communities as well as the EEC and the
recipient government. The PRG made maximum use of the EEC's
microproject programme, and undertook the construction of
a number of community centres some of which had been conceived
or initiated under the Gairy regime. In his interview published
in The Cour ier, Bishop made special reference to EEC assistance
in this area: 'Many of the community centres were built with
the assistance of the European Economic Community, and in all
cases the Community (sic) input has been very strong. In
St. Patrick's, where one new community centre is being built,
the extent of community mobilization and involvement has
really been quite extraordinary. People are putting in their
own voluntary labour and are able to get something concrete
out of it, which clearly will be socially and economically
16relevant to the building of the economy.'
The Eastern Main Road Project, which was financed entirely 
by the EEC, was the second largest infrastructural project 
undertaken by the PRG after the international airport. In 
carrying out work on the project, the PRG took advantage of 
all the provisions which exist under the Lomé Convention for
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ACP countries to manage development projects themselves. Houiever
the revolutionary government ran into a number of difficulties
stemming from its own technical and administrative limitations
and certain problems caused by the EEC's method of disbursing
aid. The financing for the project had been agreed upon
under the Gairy regime, but it was the PRG that brought it to
fruition and in 1980 work began. In order to maximise the
employment generating potential of the project, the PRG
elected to supply all the labour rather than use private
contractors that could have been provided by the EEC. This
meant that Grenada had to find its own engineers, and since
there were no road engineers available on the island the PRG
asked the Cuban government to send four engineers to work on
the Eastern Plain Road. Cuba was already providing most of
the materials and labour at the international airport site,
and the PRG also decided to ask the Cubans to supply cement
mix from Point Salines to the Eastern Main Road project. On
both accounts the Cubans were found to be lacking. Only one
engineer showed up and he did not stay for very long. According
to Alberto Ferrari, the EEC technical advisor to Grenada,
the Cubans claimed that they did not have any engineers who
17spoke English. Ferrari found this hard to believe, although 
it should be borne in mind that Cuba earns a good deal of its 
foreign exchange exporting engineers and technicians to some 
of the richer Third World countries so one can well appreciate 
the constraints on the Cuban government in sending engineers to 
Grenada. The Cubans also proved unable to supply the cement 
mix in sufficient guantities, even though they were under 
contract from the EEC to do so.
Another factor holding up the project was that Michael 
Prime, the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Construction
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and had the overall responsibility for infrastructural projects, 
was greatly overworked. He was a lieutenant in the PRA before 
he became Permanent Secretary and still held important 
military responsibilities. Furthermore, he was not suitably 
qualified to do the job which had been assigned to him. Again, 
the project was beset by problems caused by the PRG's 
inability to find the necessary counterpart funds to meet 
EEC contributions. The net result of all these technical 
hiccups, financial constraints and administrative incompetence 
was that the project made very slow progress. And on account 
of inflation this led to a considerable escalation of costs.
In addition, the PRG's inability to find ready cash meant that 
workers were continually being taken on and laid off the whole 
time. Thus, whereas some 175 workers had been employed on 
the project when it began, by April 1983 this figure was 
down to 107. And Patrick Noel, the Project Manager of the 
Eastern Nain Road, expressed the view that the number employed 
could fall to as low as 60 if government funds were not 
forthcoming in the near future. Both Noel and Ferrari believed 
that the PRG had taken on too many projects for the amount of 
technical personnel that was available in the country. Noel 
said that he had raised this point with the PRG, but was 
ignored. He further added that there was no atmosphere of free 
debate about these issues, and if one were too critical of
government policies there was a strong likelihood of being
18called a 'counter' (i.e., counter-revolutionary).
Finally, Ferrari also reported on the shift in the EEC's 
towards Grenada which had taken place in the last year or so.
He said that the Community was concerned about the strengthening 
of political ties between Grenada on the one hand, and Cuba 
and the Soviet Union on the other hand. Relations between the
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EEC and Grenada were a good deal cooler than they had been
• • 19in the first year of the revolution.
Canada
The Canadian overseas aid organisation, the Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA), mas established in 
1968 and represented a move by Canada, in line with other 
Western capitalist powers, to greatly expand its foreign aid 
programme. According to CIDA the primary objective of the 
Canadian aid programme is to 'support the efforts of 
developing countries in fostering their economic growth and 
the evolution of their social systems in a way that will 
produce a wide distribution of the benefits of development 
among the populations of these countries, enhance the quality 
of life and improve the capacity in all sectors of their
2 0populations to participate in national development efforts'.
In reality, however, national self-interest rather than 
philanthropy is the basis for Ottawa's development assistance 
programmes.
About three-quarters of the aid disbursed by CIDA is 
bilateral, and about 20 per cent of this bilateral budget is 
devoted to food aid. Less than 10 per cent is spent on 
technical assistance, which covers the costs of sending 
Canadian advisors overseas or of training programmes for Third 
World students. The remaining 70 per cent of bilateral aid 
is extended in grants and loans for various kinds of economic 
assistance. By the middle seventies, the proportion of grants 
to loans was 63 per cent to 37 per cent. Some 90 per cent of 
loans are disbursed according to the 0/10/50 formula - 0 per 
cent interest, 10 years grace for repayment of principal, and
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50 years to maturity. Other loans are offered according to a 
concessional 3/7/30 formula.
CIDA requires that 80 per cent of all bilateral aid be 
spent on the purchase of goods and services in Canada, and 
tuo-thirds of the value of this merchandise must actually be 
added in Canada. Multilateral aid provided by CIDA, however, 
is not tied to procurement in Canada, but most multilateral 
aid is generally spent on goods and services available only 
in the advanced capitalist countries. The added costs which 
tied aid bestows upon the recipient country has been 
acknowledged by CIDA itself. In 1979 Maurice Strong, the first 
President of CIDA, estimated that the direct cost of tying 
CIDA's aid exceeded 25 per cent of the competitive international 
prices for goods and services. Costs are inflated in two ways. 
First of all, because aid-receiving countries are obliged to 
spend their funds in Canada suppliers are able to charge 
monopoly prices for goods provided under the aid programme.
A second way in which costs are added to the recipient 
country is due to the fact that goods poduced in the donor 
country are more expensive than those from other countries.
An additional dimension to the problem of tied aid is to 
be found in CIDA's technical assistance programme. The Agency 
spends over USI50 million annually to send Canadian technical 
advisors and teachers overseas and to train Third World 
students in Canada. Canadian experts working on development 
projects in aid-receiving countries may be considered an 
indirect means of peddling Canadian exports since they are 
likely to recommend the purchase of Canadian products or brands 
with which they are familiar. Moreover, a tied technical 
assistance grant obliges recipient countries to pay Canadian
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advisors and teachers at Canadian rates. This gives rise to 
a wide disparity between the income and lifestyle of Canadian 
experts and their local colleagues. Although Canadian 
advisors cost less than experts from multilateral institutions 
like the World Bank, they are more expensive than many other 
donor organisations. With salaries, living expenses, trips 
home and other perks, it costs CIDA up to US|90,0D0 per annum 
to keep a consultant in the field. In contrast, volunteers 
with the Canadian University Service Overseas (CUSO) cost 
about USU15,000 annually. Consequently, developing countries 
receive only one Canadian expert for the price of two from 
Europe or three from another part of the Third World. Moreover, 
aid-receiving countries have claimed that less than 50 per 
cent of the aid-financed experts, advisors, consultants and 
teachers they receive will 'produce' more than their local 
costs (housing, support staff, travel, etc.).
As is the case with most bilateral development agencies, 
development projects submitted by Third World countries to 
CIDA must conform to the Agency's policies and standards.
Thus, developing countries shape their funding requests in a 
way that is acceptable to CIDA, and alternative project 
designs that might be more in tune with the development needs 
of the country are discarded from the outset. Moreover, because 
CIDA has a greater administrative capacity, technological 
expertise and access to the files of multilateral institutions 
on the requesting country it is in a strong position to 
dictate almost every detail of the development projects which 
it funds.
□n account of its substantial interests in banking and 
bauxite in the Commonwealth Caribbean, Canada has long held a 
pre-occupation with the political stability of the region.
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A confidential document of the Canadian Cabinet issued in the 
mid-1970s stated unequivocally that the Canadian aid programme 
'may be seen as a useful support for peace and stability
within the region and hence an effective support for all
21Canadian interests.' It is this consideration which has 
made Canada an active supporter of the Caribbean regional 
integration movement and led to the English-speaking Caribbean 
becoming the highest per capita recipient of Canadian bilateral 
aid.
During an official visit to Jamaica in January 1981,
Mark MacGuigan, the Canadian External Affairs Minister, promised 
to double bilateral flows to the region within three to four 
years and subsequently committed CIDA to tripling annual 
disbursements from US$31 million in 1979-80 to as much as 
US$90 million by 1986-87. Both political and commercial 
considerations lay behind the Minister's announcement. Canada's 
share of the Commonwealth Caribbean market has declined 
markedly over the years from 17 per cent in 1950 to a mere 
5 per cent in 1978. Boosting aid to the region is viewed by 
Ottawa as the best strategy for promoting Canadian exports 
and re-asserting Canada's commercial status. The aid drive 
also forms part of Canada's response to the new strategic 
importance which the US attaches to the Caribbean Basin in the 
wake of radical political developments in Jamaica, Nicaragua,
El Salvador and Grenada. MacGuigan accepts the US contention 
that the economic and political crisis in the Caribbean and 
Central America could jeapordize Western interests in the 
region, and suggests that Canada can play a distinctive role. 
Canada considers that it is in a good position to represent 
the West because of Britain's withdrawal from the region and
the suspicion and hostility that exists towards the US in 
various quarters. At the same time, Canada is seeking to 
demonstrate a degree of political independence from US policy 
in the region.
Many of PlacGuigan's sentiments were again expressed by the 
Canadian Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau, at the two-day 
summit conference held in Castries, St. Lucia in February 1983 
to discuss Canada-CARICDM relations. It was the first such 
meeting since the 1966 Canada-West Indies Conference held in 
Ottawa and Trudeau used the occasion to announce the establish­
ment of an annual small projects fund for the Caricom Secretariat 
commencing with some US|405,000 for 1984-84. The assistance 
package is being administered by the Canadian High Commission 
in Georgetown. Trudeau also gave details of a new project for 
training young Commonwealth Caribbean diplomats and other 
initiatives. Finally, in his opening address to the conference, 
Trudeau outlined Canada's policy towards socialist regimes 
in the region: 'When a country chooses a socialist or even a 
Marxist path, it does not necessarily buy a package which 
automatically injects it into the Soviet orbit.
The internal systems adopted by countries of Latin America
and the Caribbean, whatever these systems may be, do not in
22themselves pose a security threat to this hemisphere ...'
He further added, that it was only when countries adopted 
systems which deliberately linked themselves to outside forces 
or sought to destabilize their neighbours that a threat was 
posed, and, if countries kept their social and humanitarian 
obligations to their people in the forefront of their actions 
they would always have Canada's help. In enunciating this 
position, Trudeau was in fact providing a rationale for 
Canada's decision to resist US pressure to limit aid to
2 4 8
Grenada and Nicaragua. This was also in keeping with Ottawa's 
policy in the past, when, for instance, it continued to 
provide aid to Cuba and the Manley government in Jamaica in 
spite of pressure from Washington.
As a traditional donor of aid to Grenada, after the 
revolution Canada was approached by the PRG for development 
assistance in a number of areas. CIDA was already involved in 
one important project in Grenada during the time of Gairy .
This was the Grenada Cocoa Scheme which was started in 1975 
and provided fertilizer to cocoa growers. In 1979 CIDA agreed 
to incorporate this scheme into a much larger programme, 
the Cocoa Rehabilitation Project, whose goal was to replace 
a large proportion of Grenada's aged stock of cocoa trees.
The Cocoa Rehabilitation Project also incorporated the Central 
Garage Unit Project, which provided the systems, technicians 
and equipment for central maintenance of the government 
vehicles participating in the Rehabilitation Project. CIDA 
also provided assistance for the improvement of port facilities 
in St. George's and at the Harvey Male Jetty, and a smaller 
amount of funding was provided for education. Assistance was 
also made available through Mission Administered Funds 
disbursed by the Canadian High Commission in Barbados.
The conditions attached by CIDA to the Grenada Cocoa 
Scheme and the Cocoa Rehabilitation Project provide good 
examples of the encumbrances placed on Canadian aid. The Cocoa 
Scheme was initially financed by a loan to the Gairy government 
of Can. $850,000 for the purchase of Canadian fertilizer. 
Formula 0/10/50 applied to the loan and repayment was to be 
made from a Cocoa Rehabilitation Account at the GOB. The
fertilizer was sold to growers by the GCA and the proceeds 
from sales were placed in a revolving fund, some of which was 
used for annual purchases of fertilizer from Canada. With the 
coming on stream of the Coca Rehabilitation Project, it was 
decided that the net proceeds of the revolving fund should 
be made available to the Cocoa Project Management Board, the 
executing agency of the Rehabilitation Project. According to 
the Plan of Operation For the Cocoa Rehabilitation Project, the 
proceeds derived from the sale of Canadian procured fertilizer 
should have amounted to approximately Can. $1 million at 
current dollar value over four years. Thus, from an initial 
grant of Can. $850,000 in 1975, CIDA expected to generate 
sales of Canadian fertilizer to the tune of Can. $1 million 
in the first four years of operation of the Rehabilitation 
Project. Moreover, under the terms of the Grenada Cocoa Scheme
the Grenadian government was obliged to purchase all of its
25requirements of fertilizer from Canada.
According to Terry Ross, a Canadian political scientist 
who conducted a study of CIDA programmes in Grenada in early 
1983, most growers on the island were indisposed to the use 
of Canadian fertilizer. They considered it to be of inferior 
quality to the Dutch fertilizer to which they had become
accustomed. Because the Canadian fertilizer was subsidized,
2 6however, they used it grudgingly.
The Cocoa Rehabilitation Project itself was scheduled to 
last until 1990 and conformed to CIDA's standard tying 
arrangements. The total cost of Canadian aid to the project 
was to have amounted to Can. $7.3 million of which only 
Can. $2.0 million would have been untied. And of the untied 
proportion of the aid, a mere Can. $345,000 was to have been
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spent locally in Grenada. The total cost of Grenadian inputs 
including allowances for contingencies and inflation was 
estimated at EC36.8 million (Can. 32.85 million) over and 
above current ongoing expenditures. Of this amount, ECS3.3 
million was to be provided by Canada through counterpart funds 
generated by the sale of fertilizer (mentioned already) and 
a working grant. The balance of ECS3.5 million (Can. $1.5
million) was to be funded by Grenada primarily in the last
2 7four years of the project.
Thus, as with the Cocoa Scheme, the Rehabilitation Project 
constitued an effective subsidy for Canadian manufacturers of 
agricultural products and farming equipment and would have 
generated repeat business for these firms for a considerable 
time to come. Of course, the Project would also have been 
highly beneficial to the PRG and cocoa growers in Grenada in 
that it would have increased farm income substantially and 
made a major contribution to foreign exchange earnings. Whether 
these new cash inflows would have been sufficient to meet the 
escalating costs of Canadian spare parts, repairs, fertilizer, 
insecticides and expertise is, however, another matter 
altogether .
FRANCE
The coming to power of Francois Mitterand in France 
brought about a substantive shift in French foreign policy. 
France has a foreign policy tradition underscoring its 
independence vis-a-vis the two super powers, and in its bid to 
resuscitate French capitalism and re-assert the sovereignty 
of France, the Nitterand government has publicly criticised 
US foreign policy on a number of important issues. Of all the
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major Western powers, France has the least to fear from a
cooling in relations with Washington. The French economy is
less intertwined with America's than that of most advanced
capitalist countries, and its own nuclear 'force de frappe'♦
makes it less dependent on US military protection.
The Caribbean Basin has been assigned an important role 
in the Mitterand regime's plan to redeploy French capitalism 
in association with the EEC. During the current period of 
retrenchment in certain markets and stagnation in international 
trade, the semi-industrialisation which is taking place in 
countries such as Mexico, Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Jamaica, Puerto Rico and Brazil has given them a new importance 
in the world economy and they now offer a potential that is not 
negligible for the export of French and European capital goods. 
It is the aim of the Mitterand administration to use the 
French colonies of Martinique, Guadeloupe and Guyane as 
logistical supports for its policy of implanting French 
capitalism in the Caribbean Basin and Latin America. This is 
why in spite of the Third Worldist colouration of the 
Mitterand regime, the French Antilles have been more tightly 
integrated into the web of metropolitan control. Revolutionary 
developments in other territories in the region have presented 
Mitterand with a welcome opportunity to enhance the 'socialist' 
dimension of French Third World policy and distance Paris 
from the belligerancy of US policy the Caribbean and Central 
America. In opposition to the 'Cold War' policies of the 
Reagan administration, France has put forward a comprehensive 
political solution to the crisis in the Caribbean basin. The 
French strategy has been expressed though the provision of 
increased economic aid to the region, the supply of arms to- 
Nicaragua, the improvement of relations with Cuba and support
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for the campaign to establish a New International Economic
n . 28 Order.
Hawing already established close relations with Claude 
Cheysson while he was the EEC Commissioner for developing 
countries, the PRG wasted no time in making overtures to the 
newly-elected government of Mitterand of which Cheysson was 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Bishop was the first 
CARICOM head of state to be invited to Paris by Mitterand.
The visit took place in September 1982 and was described by 
Bishop as being of 'historic significance to Grenada in its 
thrust to develop closer relations with France and to widen 
its international links.' The most important outcome of the 
visit was the decision made by the French government to 
provide economic and technical assistance to Grenada and the 
other member states of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean 
States (OECS). The assistance package was extended through 
the Fund for Action and Co-operation (FAC), which prior to 
Bishop's visit had only disbursed aid to former French colonies 
and a few Portugues-speaking African countries. In disclosing 
details about the French aid programme, Bishop commented that 
for the first time France would be giving grants to small
Caribbean island states, as Canada and the EEC had been doing
- . . 30for some time.
Following Bishop's visit to France, a high-level 
technical mission was sent to Grenada to work out the details 
of French assistance to programmes in health, education and 
agriculture. In early 1983 the first French technicians 
arrived on the island. The short duration of economic aid from 
Paris makes it difficult to evaluate the impact of French
assistance
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Britain
For Britain, trade with the Caribbean represents only a 
tiny proportion of the country's totaj. trade, but for the 
Caribbean, Britain is still the main market for its major 
export crops, taking the bulk of the region's sugar exports, 
almost the entire banana crop and most of the citrus. None of 
these products are very competitive on the world market, and 
in the past they have relied heavily on the help of Britain 
in providing guaranteed markets. With Britain's entrance into 
the EEC, London progressively reduced its economic and political 
commitments to the region. Britain's growing indifference to 
the Caribbean has led it to follow the lead of US policy 
towards the region. The 'special relationship' between
Britain and the US, which was born of Second World War 
collaboration and whose remnants include complementary 
intelligence gathering, has continued to exert an oblique 
pressure on British foreign policy. The main benefit to Britain 
in the 'special relationship' is its ability to influence 
US foreign policy, however, there is an ever-growing set of 
arenas where British and US interests collide, so that the 
points of harmony acquire greater importance. The absence of 
many potential causes of friction between the two sides over 
policy towards the Caribbean makes it a useful issue for the 
British to embellish their 'special relationship' with the 
US.31
The Labour government of James Callaghan initially 
followed a non-interventionist policy towards the Grenadian 
revolution. Gairy had become particularly unpopular with the 
British Labour Party after he had signed a military alliance
with the Pinochet regime in Chile, so the overthrow of his 
government did not cause a great deal of consternation in 
Whitehall. Although Britain did not take long to recognise 
the PRG, the Labour government demonstrated its distance 
from the revolution by turning down the PRG's request for 
military assistance. Subsequently, Callaghan, an avowed 
atlanticist who had worked hard both as Foreign Secretary and 
Prime Minister to to rekindle the Angol-American 'special 
relationship', deferred to American apprehensions about the 
security threat posed by the Grenadian revolution and took the 
initiative in persuading neighbouring states to set up a 
mobile regional defence force with the capability to intervene 
in any of the participant islands.
The Thatcher government which came to office in mid-1979 
was prepared to go much further in supporting the Caribbean 
policy of its North American ally. Of all the major Western 
powers, the Conservative government has been the most responsive 
to Washington's requests for support in bringing economic and 
political sanctions to bear on Grenada. While Thatcher 
continued to meet existing aid obligations to the island 
administered through the British Development Division (BDD) 
based in Barbados, the Conservative government consistently 
refused to begin informal negotiations to draw up a new 
bilateral aid agreement. Grenada was also excluded from aid 
extended to other Windward Islands to rehabilitate the 
banana industry following the damage caused by Hurricane Allen. 
The Tory government justified its aid embargo on Grenada by 
arguing that receipts from the EEC and other sources reduced 
the necessity for a direct British contribution, but such 
considerations did not prevent the Foreign Office from 
extending an aid programme in 1980 of £27 million to other
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Caribbean islands, who also benefited from EEC assistance.
The political basis for the British censure of Grenada was, 
however, disclosed by Nicholas Ridley, the Foreign Minister of 
State at the Foreign Office, who was^ quoted as saying: 'Grenada 
is in the process of establishing a kind of society of which
the British government disapproves, irrespective of whether
32the people of Grenada want it or not.' More detailed 
information on British aid policy towards Grenada was provided 
by John Kelly, the representative of the British High 
Commissioner resident in Grenada. Kelly explained that in 
Britain's view the PRG was a 'socialist' government but contains 
communist members. Britain wished to maintain friendly 
relations with Grenada and would seriously consider giving aid 
to the country if the PRG would improve its performance in 
three areas: (i) show a greater respect for human rights;
(ii) return to constitutional rule; (iii) call general elections 
Kelly stated that the Thatcher government was not pushing for 
a Westminster model of parliamentary democracy as it was 
recognised that this system of government was not necessarily 
suited to many Third World countries. The Commonwealth 
included a great number of regimes that did not conform to the 
British notion of parliamentary democracy, but this did not 
adversely affect their relations with Britain. If the PRG 
wished to institute some form of one-party state Britain would 
have no objection to this. However, it was imperative that 
Grenada institutionalised its system of government and called 
elections. Kelly also commented on the official government 
reaction to the report on the Caribbean produced by the House 
of Commons Select Committee for Foreign Affairs. The Committee 
heard evidence from many expert witnesses in the Caribbean
and elsewhere during the course of 1981 and 1982 and produced 
a document highly critical of the Thatcher government. Putting 
forward the position that Britain had perhaps withdrawn too 
abruptly from its long-standing commitment to the area, it 
argued that in the present circumstances there was a good 
deal of justification for Britan to make an active contribution 
to the achievement of stability, security and development in 
the Caribbean. It further isolated economic problems as the 
key to the instability of the region and criticised the 
Foreign Office for generally taking an unjustifiably optimistic 
view of the economic prospects of the region. In this regard, 
it acknowledged the achievements made by the PRG in its social 
and economic policies and noted, by contrast, the poor 
performance of the other small territories of the Eastern 
Caribbean. The Thatcher government responded to these 
criticisms by asserting that it did have a commitment to the 
long-term development of the area, and that political criteria 
should be taken into account in disbursing aid. Kelly 
reported that Grenada's growing ties with the Soviet bloc was 
viewed with great apprehension by the Foreign Office, and this 
was one of the main reasons why the Thatcher government could 
not accept the Select Committee's view of Grenada. In this 
connection, the PRG's decision in early February 1983 to 
replace reports from the BBC World Service with news items 
taken from TASS, was seen in London as further evidence of 
Grenada moving into the Soviet camp.^
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The Socialist Countries
Given the fact that Grenada under the PRG mas officially 
recognised by the Soviet Union and its East European allies 
as a 'state of socialist orientation' one would have expected 
these countries to have provided a large amount of economic 
assistance to the Bishop regime. What for these countries 
would have constituted a relatively small amount of overseas 
aid could have made a big impact in transforming the Grenadian 
economy. As it was, however, while assistance from the 
socialist countries was significant, it was by no means 
preponderant and certainly not on the scale that might be 
expected given the political complexion of the Bishop regime. 
Several factors would seem to be responsible for this. First 
of all, there appears to have been an overriding political 
consideration. As part of its strategy of building the broadest 
base of support for the revolution at home and abroad, and 
counter US accusations that Grenada was a client state of 
Moscow, the PRG consciously chose not to become overwhelmingly 
reliant upon East European assistance. It seems that the Cubans 
also gave counsel along these lines in the light of their own 
experience of aid from the countries of the Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). Recalling the Soviet decision 
in 1969 to suspend oil supplies to Cuba, the Castro regime 
has striven to diversify its trading relations and reduce the 
country's dependence for strategic supplies on the Eastern 
bloc. Undoubtedly, the Cuban leadership informed the IMJM about 
the problems they had had with East European aid. The 
socialist orientation strategy also laid great emphasis on the 
need to make the maximum use of economic assistance from the 
Uest. In addition to these factors, one can explain the
258
parsimony of the socialist countries towards Grenada in terms 
of fundamental constraints in the East European economies.
The economic arrangement that exists between the Soviet Union 
and Cuba has no other parallel in Soviet relations with 
Third World states. Halliday and Molyneux have identified six 
factors which have placed limits on Soviet development aid to 
governments in the capitalist periphery: (i) the lack of hard 
currency foreign exchange; (ii) the overall constraints on 
Soviet action arising from the shortage of funds within 
the Soviet economy; (iii) Soviet weakness in key areas of 
development technology, especially those related to agriculture; 
(iv) the unpopularity of foreign aid with a Soviet population 
itself exposed to consumer shortages; (v) a political refusal 
to take responsibility for what are seen as the consequences
of capitalist imperialism; (vi) a distrust of the Third World
34regimes in question. It is factors such as these which have 
restricted the amount of assistance given by the Soviet bloc 
to revolutionary states like Angola, Mozambique, and Vietnam 
and led them to turn to the West for economic aid. Grenada was 
only one of a number of radical Third World regimes that have 
been obliged to supplement East European aid with assistance 
from other sources.
From Grenada's point of view, the fact that Western 
donor organisations such as the CDB, EDF and CIDA had 
considerable knowledge and expertise relevant to the English- 
speaking Caribbean made their assistance particularly welcome 
in the immediate aftermath of the revolution. In terms of the 
NJM's stated goals of a progressive disengagement from 
imperialism and an evolutionary transition towards socialism, 
it seems that Western sources were going to be relied upon for
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a certain period of time, after which assistance from the 
socialist countries would have come to play a more preponderant 
role. From the point of view of the Souiet bloc, a time-span 
of several years was probably deemed fit to test the 
revolutionary (i.e., pro-Soviet) credentials of the PRG, and 
its ability to administer East European aid. During this 
period a Grenadian technical and political cadre conversant 
with the workings of the CMEA countries could have been 
trained .
Cuba
The coming to power of the Manley regime in Jamaica in 
1972 opened up a new period in Cuba's relations with the 
Commonwealth Caribbean. Manley worked closely along with 
Forbes Burnham of Guyana in calling for the English-speaking 
Caribbean to establish economic and political relations with 
the Castro regime, which up until that period had been kept 
at arms length by the Anglophone states because of their 
support for the US policy of isolating Cuba. In the same year 
as Manley's victory at the polls, the Seventh Conference of 
the Heads of Government of the Commonwealth Caribbean jointly 
agreed to the early establishment of relations with Cuba 
'be they economic, political or both.'^
In 1973 both Manley and Burnham took up Fidel Castro's 
invitation to travel with him to the Non-Aligned Summit 
Conference in Algiers, and both leaders subsequently paid 
highly publicised visits to Cuba where they were awarded the 
Jose Marti National Order. In addition to these connections, 
bilateral relations were established between Havana and each
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of the two CommonweaIth Caribbean states. Cuba provided 
technical assistance and other forms of economic aid, and 
commercial agreements were entered into. Jamaica and Guyana 
also collaborated with Cuba over foreign policy matters, and 
political relations between Kingston and Havana became 
particularly close, and controversial, as the Manley regime 
became the target of US efforts at destabilization. Cuba 
supplemented its bilateral connections with Jamaica and 
Guyana with open support for CARICOM, and called for a closer 
integration between all Latin American and Caribbean states 
irrespective of the internal political systems of such 
states. In its public pronouncements, the Cuban leadership 
stated that it wished to have cordial relations with all 
Caribbean governments, and that Cuba never publicly criticised 
or disagreed with Caribbean governments even when they 
attacked Cuba because Cuba took the view that these countries 
behaved in this manner because of US pressure.
The revolutions in Grenada and Nicaragua in 1979 
re-asserted armed struggle as a credible path of attaining 
state power and beginning the process of social transformation, 
and provided Cuba with more dependable allies in the region. 
However, Havana's adoption of the official communist policy 
of revolutionary change in the Third World and its own 
experience of trying to build socialism led it to exercise 
great caution in the development ,of its relations with the 
two fledgling revolutionary states. Cuba showed a great deal 
of respect for the integrity and independence of the Grenadian 
and Nicaraguan leaderships, and allowed them to chart their 
own course of revolutionary transformation. At the same time, 
there were severe constraints on the amount and quality of the
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assistance which Cuba could extend to these nascent revolutions
Cuba, along with Jamaica and Guyana, responded favourably
to the PRG's request for military assistance made within
hours of the seizure of power. Exactly one month after the
♦
revolution, a Cuban freighter with 1,000 tons of cement for 
Grenada docked in St. George's and also unloaded a number of 
wooden cases containing arms. Shortly afterwards, Cuba 
opened an embassy in the capital, the first full permanent 
diplomatic mission to be established in Grenada. Thereafter, 
the immediate assistance provided by Cuba centred on health 
and education. From June 1979 a medical team of twelve Cuban 
doctors was operating in the island, and provided the basis 
for the system of free medical health care introduced by the 
PRG. In his address to the Sixth Summit Conference of the 
Non-Aligned Movement in Havana in September 1979, Bishop 
referred to the role being played by the Cuban doctors to 
demonstrate how relatively small amounts of assistance can 
have a big impact in a small country: '... we must point out 
that even what might appear to be relatively minor assistance 
for a larger Third World country can have a tremendous impact 
in a smaller and poorer society. For example, when we requested 
assistance from the Revolutionary Government of Cuba and they 
sent us 12 doctors, this very generous assistance immediately 
had an overwhelming impact on our country. I am sure you will 
understand the extent of the impact that 12 additional doctors 
spread throughout an island as small as Grenada would have.
I do not want to be misunderstood. Obviously, the loan 
of even one doctor is an extremely valuable contribution even 
if made to a fairly developed country. But the point is that 
the impact that 12 doctors can make in a small state, as
I
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contrasted to their impact in, say, a vast country as Ethiopia
where almost literally they could be swallowed up, bears no
reasonable comparison. For a small state ... relatively minor
assistance of all kinds can make an enormous difference and
*
3 6have an enormous impact.' Soon after the arrival of the 
Cuban doctors, 38 scholarships for higher education in Cuba 
were offered to Grenada. This programme expanded quickly and 
greatly increased the opportunities for higher education 
available to Grenadians. Traditionally Grenada sends around 
30-40 students a year to the University of the West Indies 
based in Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados and Jamaica. Most of 
these students come from upper class families. In the last 
year of the Gairy regime, Grenada provided only three 
scholarships for study at the University of the West Indies and 
two of these were taken by Gairy's daughters. With the assistanc 
of the Cuban programme the PRG was able to provide so many 
scholarships that there were not enough qualified students to 
fill them all. According to George Brizan, who served as a 
consultant to the Ministry of Education, at the end of May 
1982 there were 224 Grenadians studying abroad, and of this 
number 157 were in Cuba. The overwhelming majority of those 
who were not studying in Cuba were undergoing training at 
universities in Eastern Europe. The PRG's scholarship programme 
gave rise to a class division amongst those who took up 
opportunities for higher education. The bourgeoisie was not 
keen for their offspring to pursue studies in 'communist 
countries' and continued to sent their children to the Universit 
of the West Indies, so that most of those who went to the 
socialist countries came from poor families. Of all the subjects 
taken by the students on scholarships, there were three main
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areas of specialisation: economic planning, engineering and 
medicine. Brizan estimated that the main impact of the
overseas scholarship programme would be felt in 1985 when the
3 7first wave of graduates would be returning to the island.
In June 1980 a 63-point scientific, economic and
technical co-operation agreement was signed between Grenada and
Cuba and a Cuba-Grenada Joint Commission established to
monitor progress. In September the following year a second
agreement was signed in Havana which involved more substantial
levels of aid in a number of areas, particularly road repair,
education and educational equipment, prefabricated housing
and agriculture and agro-industries. Commenting on the
agreement, Coard revealed that Grenadian business places were
already importing thirty-six items from Cuban commercial
houses as a result of the accords signed in Havana. He also
stated that the Ministry of Trade and Industry which was
already importing sugar, rice and cement from Cuba would be
seeking to increase the number of items and arrange a line of
3 8credit with the Central Bank of Cuba. A further agreement 
followed in December 1982 and a memorandum of understanding in 
the following June, outlining proposals for twenty-eight 
areas of bilateral co-operation in 1984, an increase of four 
over those of 1983. Highlights were a convention centre and a 
marine aquarium. This growing co-operation between Cuba 
and Grenada demanded better communication. In January 1981 
Cubana Airlines inaugurated a direct weekly passenger service 
between Cuba and Grenada, and at the same time visa requirements 
for nationals travelling between the two countries were 
removed. The weekly flights facilitated economic co-operation 
and provided a boost to the tourist industry since visitors
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from Miami, Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver could now fly to
„ . 39Grenada via Havana.
Because of the technical and financial constraints on 
Cuba, which are the product of structural features of the
Cuban economy and its continued vulnerability to the
. . . 40vicissitudes of the capitalist world market, many of the project:
which Cuba supported in Grenada were also funded by Western
donor organisations. We have already seen the problems which
arose in the co-ordination of Cuban and EEC assistance to
the Eastern Main Road project. Difficulties of a similar
nature also developed at the international airport project,
the largest infrastructural project undertaken by the PRG.
The idea of building an airport at Point Salines, a sparsely
populated area of saltponds and bush, was first conceived in
1926. However, the physical problems involved in its constructior
led the British to construct an airstrip at Pearls, on the
north-east coast, which opened in January 1943. The airport
at Pearls could not be expanded further because of the
surrounding topography on three sides and the sea on the fourth.
These physical features of the airport site made night flights
impossible and forced pilots to use a visual, rather than an
instrument, approach when landing at Pearls. The prevailing
winds further made the construction of a 'crosswind' runway
impossible, although flat land was available. Thus Pearls
could only accomodate Avro 748 turbo-prop aircraft carrying up
to forty-eight passengers. As a result of these difficulties,
tourists wanting to visit Grenada were obliged to trans-ship
in neighbouring Caribbean territories, such as Barbados and
Trinidad and Tobago, and this deterred many potential tourists
from visiting the island. Moreover, even on landing at Pearls,
which is situated some 16 miles from the capital and 20 miles
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from the Grand Anse tourist area, access to the touin and beach 
involved driving across a 2,000 foot mountain with innumerable 
hairpin bends. The absence of a direct flight from Europe 
and North America meant that after the revolution the government; 
of Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago could exert political 
pressure on the PRG. Thus, for both economic and strategic 
reasons it was imperative that Grenada had a new international 
airport .
In September 1979 the PRG approached the US, European,
Arab and Caribbean countries for assistance to start work 
on the airport project. Cuba, in a gesture of friendship and 
solidarity, made an immediate response to the PRG's request 
for assistance and agreed to supply US$40 million worth of 
labour and machinery. However, as the total project was 
costed at US$71 million and Cuba was unable to commit foreign 
exchange or provide specialist expertise, the PRG had to 
seek additional assistance elsewhere. By 1982 the revolutionary 
government had succefully negotiated grants from the EEC,
Algiers, Syria, Venezuela and Libya, and commercial loans 
were obtained from private companies in Finland, Britain and 
the United States. Table 19 provides a breakdown of the main 
sources of funding for the airport project. While economic 
factors were central, political considerations were also 
involved in the PRG's efforts to secure funding from Western 
and Arab sources. In order to counter US allegations that 
Grenada was building a Soviet military base at Point Salines, 
the PRG sought to demonstrate the falsehood of American 
propaganda by pointing to the range of governments and 
companies providing assistance to the airport project. At the 
same time, the PRG insisted upon its right to receive economic
Source: Economic Memorandum Presented dy the Government of Grenada. 1982, Statistical Appendix, Table 8.
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assistance from Cuba, and highlighted the fact that the Cuban 
aid was an outright gift with no commercial strings attached.
The construction team at the airport consisted of 300 Cubans 
and 250 Grenadians, working and living together in wooden 
dormitories. Dubbed 'internationalist workers', the Cubans 
were applauded for their discipline, hard work and simple 
life-styles, and Grenadian workers were encouraged to emulate 
the work ethic of their comrades from socialist Cuba. The Cuban 
work brigade also provided a pool of highly motivated technician 
and lorry drivers who could be deployed for maintenance and 
relief work at state and para-statal enterprises.
Notwithstanding the important contribution that was made, 
Cuba's inability to provide more of the foreign exchange and 
specialist expertise for the airport project placed a great 
strain on Grenada's financial resources. Less money than had 
been hoped for was obtained from the EEC as a consequence of 
US and British opposition. And some of the money promised by 
Libya and Iraq did not materialise. France, Mexico and Canada 
decided not to supply aid directly for the airport, but did 
continue to include Grenada in their development programmes, 
thereby releasing other capital funds within the state sector 
for expenditure on the airport. Even so, the PRG was left to 
find a lot of money from its own resources and this created 
pressing cash-flow problems which led to the imposition of 
progressively stricter expenditure controls. Because of the 
attention it would arose in Washington, the PRG was anxious 
not to seek Soviet aid for Point Salines. However, the 
critical financial situation which the revolutionary government 
faced did lead eventually to the making of a request for 
ECS15 million, which was still under consideration in Moscow
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in October 1983. Thus, in spite of the economic and strategic 
importance of the international airport its sheer scale in 
comparison with Grenada's own economic resources, combined with 
the hostile attention it generated, made it an extremely heavy 
burden for the revolution to carry in its formativ/e period.
The attempt to supplement Cuban aid with economic assistance 
from the West proved to be far more difficult to implement in 
practice than was originally conceived, and left the PRG in 
a sort of no man's land in which socialist aid was insufficient 
to complete the project and yet it was this aid which prevented 
the PRG from obtaining more funding from the West.
The projects undertaken by the PRG at Point Salines and 
on the Eastern Main Road provide examples of the problems that 
were involved in blending Cuban aid with assistance from the 
West. At the same time, many difficulties were encountered 
on projects that were wholly funded by Cuba. Of all the 
Cuban-sponsored projects in Grenada, the National Fisheries 
Corporation (NFC) established in 1981, was probably the most 
disappointing of all. In spite of the fact that fish is the 
biggest single source of protein in Grenada, before the 
revolution fishing was a small-scale enterprise done mainly 
by aging fishermen in small boats. Cuba donated seven 
65-foot ferro-cement fishing trawlers which provided the basis 
for the NFC fishing fleet. From the very beginning the Cuban 
boats began to give trouble. Two of the boats broke their 
moorings and went out to sea, and it took a good while for 
the PRG to recover them. The engines on most of the boats were 
defective so that as late as 1983 the fishing fleet was not 
fully operational. Tony Moody, an agricultrual specialist at 
the Commonwealth Secretariat who served as an adviser to the
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PRG, was highly critical of the quality and condition of the 
boats supplied by Cuba. He said that the boats were too small 
and what Grenada needed was good quality fibre glass boats 
and not the ferro-cement type of trawlers donated by Cuba.^
Finally, Cuba supplied a considerable amount of military 
assistance to Grenada. The full extent of this was revealed 
at the time of the US invasion when the CIA obtained the 
secret protocols to the PRG's treaties with Cuba, the Soviet 
Union and North Korea. The equipment supplied by these three 
countries included thousands of rifles, machine-guns and small 
arms, mines, armoured cars, coastguard boats, trucks, 
anti-aircraft guns, searchlights, anti-tank weapons, tons of 
ammunition, wireless equipment, tents and uniforms. Cuba 
pledged twenty-seven permanent and twelve to thirteen temporary 
military advisors and, with the Soviet Union, agreed to train 
PRA members in their respective countries. Included in the 
treaties with all three suppliers was the clause that both 
parties 'will take all measures ... to assure the secrecy of 
the military assistance' ; that with Cuba additionally stressed 
the need to keep secret 'the permanency of the military 
personnel in both states and the character of /their_7 
activities
The Soviet Union
Because of the political repercussions that it might have 
caused in Washington, in the first few years of the revolution 
the PRG consciously refrained from making public the nature of 
its political relations with the Soviet Union. No doubt the 
political discussions which took place between the Grenadian 
and Soviet leaderships during this period were often mediated
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by Cuba. Nevertheless, in spite of the surreptitious nature of
political relations between the two states, in 1980 the
Soviet Union began to provide modest amounts of economic aid
to Grenada. It is difficult to determine the exact amount of
Soviet aid in the early period because for political reasons
it was decided that some of the aid should be provided
indirectly through Cuba. In July 1980 Coard made a trip to
Eastern Europe, and on his arrival in Grenada he announced
that the Soviet Union had promised to give Grenada agricultural
machinery worth EC$3 million, plus two years' supply of spare
parts. Hungary undertook to lend EC|2 million for the purchase
of generic medicines, Czechoslovakia promised to conduct
feasibility studies into a hydro-electric scheme, East Germany
pledged EC$800,000 worth of medical and sporting equipment,
and Bulgaria offered to supply two ice generating plants^
In July 1982 Bishop paid a state visit to the Soviet Union
and an agreement for technical and economic co-operation was
signed. Moscow agreed to assist Grenada in a number of areas,
including, the setting up of a satellite earth station, the
development of a seaport on the east coast, the improvement of
the water distribution system and in the area of education.^
The Soviet Union also undertook to purchase significant
45quantities of Grenadian cocoa and nutmeg. Later on in the 
year a Soviet embassy was established on the island and this 
facilitated closer collaboration between Grenada and the 
Soviet Union. In October 1983 only a few of the Soviet 
projects had begun.
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East Germany
At around the same time as his visit to the Soviet Union, 
Bishop also made a state visit to East Germany inhere another 
economic and technical co-operation agreement mas signed.
East Germany extended an ECÌ516 million line of credit to 
finance modernisation of the telephone system, the provision of 
tractors to the state farming sector, the purchase of 
telecommunication equipment and the setting up of a 
cocoa processing plant. As regards the latter, uihen a team of 
East German technicians arrived in Grenada to begin work on 
the project they found that their cocoa plant was far too 
big for Grenada's needs. Consequently, the PRG was forced to 
look elswhere and eventually came across an appropriate plant 
in Spain which the PRG made plans to purchase in 1983.
North Korea
In April 1983 Bishop made an official visit to North 
Korea where he obtained a long term grant of ECJ25 million.
The main features of the aid agreement were: assistance in 
agricultural technology to irrigate some 1,000 acres of land 
to increase food production in twenty food crop zones; the 
provision of agricultural machinery and equipment, including 
thirty tractors; the establishment of a new agro-industrial 
plant to supplement the one in operation at True Blue;^^ the 
construction on the island of two diesel-engine fishing boats, 
built from local woods, and the training of Grenadians in 
boat building and fishing; and the building of a modern
A  Osports stadium to seat at least 15,000.
»
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The O i 1-exporting Countries
Notwithstanding its official communist ideology, the NJW 
considered Grenada to be part of the Third World and believed 
that economic and political collaboration with other developing 
countries was an important task in the struggle for a New 
International Economic Order. In pursuit of this goal the 
PRG developed strong links with a number of Third World 
countries, and was able to obtain substantial amounts of 
economic assistance from some of the wealthier Third World 
states, most notably the oil exporting countries.
The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
The industrialised countries have greatly exaggerated the 
amount of additional revenue obtained by the member countries 
of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
following the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973, and the 
effect that this had on other developing countries. This forms 
part of the ideological and political campaign that has been 
waged to mystify the real causes of the capitalist world 
recession of 1974-75, whose origins lay in the inherent 
contradictions of the capitalist mode of production. Undoubtedly, 
the oil explosion of 1973 and subsequent increases in the 
price of oil did aggravate the already chronic balance of 
payments deficits of developing countries and led them to 
halt or even abandon important development projects. But the 
overall position of Third World countries was dealt an even 
greater blow by three other factors: (i) sharp increases in 
the price of foodstuffs and fertilizer which they had to
A
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import from the industrialised countries; (ii) the price
collapse of a whole series of raui materials which developing
countries produce; (iii) a reduction in the volume of their
industrial exports as a consequence o^f the international
recession. These factors had a more devastating effect on
Third World economies than the dramatic increase in the
price of oil. Moreover, most of the petrodollar surpluses of
the OPEC countries were subsequently spent in the West in the
form of long term and short term investments, deposits in
international organisations and purchases of capital goods for
the grandiose development plans which many of the states
embarked upon. Consequently, the amount of resources at the
disposal of the OPEC states are far less than those presented
49by the industrialised countries.
Disregarding these factors, Western commentators have 
made strident appeals to the OPEC countries to inprove their 
performance as aid-givers in order to compensate developing 
countries for the increases in oil prices. OPEC's rejoinder 
to criticism of this character is to assert that it sees no 
obligation to compensate consumers for oil price rises. 
Producers of no other commodity compensate their customers for 
price increases, and the OPEC states are themselves developing 
countries with development needs of their own. Nevertheless, 
several OPEC countries and the cartel as a whole have become 
substantial aid donors. In fact, collectively OPEC's 
performance in terms of aid disbursed as a percentage of GNP 
surpasses that of the West. Aid disbursements by OPEC states 
reached a peak of 2.71 per cent of GNP in 1975 against the 
UN's target of 0.7 per cent. For the OECD countries the 
proportion has hovered round the 0.34 per cent mark for the
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past decade. Not only have the OPEC states made some big
contributions to existing multilateral organisations, but they
have also set up new multilateral and bilateral aid funds of
their own. Between 1973 and 1979 net disbursements of aid by♦
OPEC states totalled US|30 billion, and OPEC has co-financed 
many valuable projects in developing countries with Western 
aid donors, including schemes that might never have got off 
the drawing board. And OPEC aid has not been tied to the 
purchase of OPEC states' manufactured goods nor to the 
employment of their technicians.^
The principal lending agency of OPEC is the Fund for 
International Development (FID), created in January 1976 to 
provide economic assistance to other developing countries on 
highly concessional terms. OPEC considers FID to be a vehicle 
for developing solidarity between OPEC and other Third World 
countries and promoting financial co-operation between them.
The Fund gives priority to balance of payments support.
On account of the PRG's strong commitment to the 
Palestinian cause at the United Nations, the Arab countries in 
OPEC looked favourably on Grenada's requests for economic 
assistance. In July 1981 FID agreed a loan of USJ2 million to 
the PRG for the importation of capital goods, spare parts, 
foodstuffs and other essential consumer items. Repayment of the 
loan was to be effected in fourteen semi-annual instalments 
commencing on 15 October 1984 after a grace period running up 
to that date. Grenada was required to pay interest at the rate 
of one per cent per annum and service charges at the rate of 
i per cent per annum on the principal amount of the loan 
actually withdrawn and outstanding. ^  In July 1983 FID 
extended another loan to Grenada of USSl million for similar
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purposes. The grace period on this second loan extended to 15
July 1986, after which repayment was to be made in eight
semi-annual instalments. This time Grenada was required to
pay interest at the rate of 3 per cent per annum and service
52charges at the rate of 1 per cent per annum.
In addition to these loans for balance of payments 
support, OPEC provided assistance for road construction, the 
international airport and the expansion of the Grenada Sugar 
Corporation. Individual member states of OPEC - notably 
Libya, Algeria, Syria, Iraq and Venezuela - also supported a 
number of government projects through their bilateral aid 
pr ogrammes.
Venezuela
Venezuela has used its oil revenues to build up the 
manufacturing sector of the economy and has looked upon the 
Caribbean basin as a potential market for exports. Venezuela 
has also sought to win support among Commonwealth Caribbean 
countries for its territorial dispute with Guyana, and these 
two factors has led Caracas to become a significant aid donor 
to the region. In 1980 Venezuela earmarked USS5.9 million in 
aid to Caribbean countries. Of this amount, USS5700 million 
was alloted to an oil facility it is financing with Mexico.
The scheme provides nine Caribbean and Central American 
states with 160,000 barrels of crude a day on generous credit 
terms with an incentive to develop their own energy resources.^
Shortly after the revolution, the PRG developed close
relations with Venezuela and a Venezuelan embassy was 
established on the island. The government of President Luis
I
Herrera Campins provided substantial assistance to the PRG 
through the Fundo Inuesiones de Venezuela (FIV). Some US$1.3 
million was made available for the construction of 100 houses; 
another US$1 million for the improvement of housing; and 
US$750,000 for the fishing industry. The Venezuelan government 
helped to finance the expansion of the runway and the 
construction of a terminal building at the airport in Carriacou, 
and paid for the construction of three playgrounds as well as 
the fence which encloses Pearls airport. It has also furnished 
athletic supplies to the tune of US$30,000 and hospital 
equipment valued at US$200,000. In 1982 Venezuela made a gift 
of 10,000 barrels of gas-oil to the island, and in the same 
year it provided 8,000 posters praising Grenada as a tourist 
paradise. A former supermarket at Grand Anse was transformed 
by the Venezuelans into the Venezuela-Grenada Co-operation 
Centre where various lectures, cultural events and Spanish 
language classes were held. In 1983 Venezuela agreed to send 
to Grenada for the duration of three months an instructor in 
international cuisine. In that year also, ten Grenadian 
students were attending Venezuelan institutions of higher 
education on scholarships.^
Trinidad and Tobago
The oil price explosion of 1973 led to a dramatic 
increase in the revenues of Trinidad and Tobago, and this oil 
bonanza enabled the twin-island state to offer economic 
assistance to other Commonwealth Caribbean countries. During 
the period 1974-1976 the twin island state disbursed loans 
totalling TT$340.B million to three CARIC0M states for
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balance of payments support. In 1978 an aid mechanism was set 
up under the stewardship of the Caribbean Aid Council. Loan 
approvals and disbursements under this facility were modest, 
however, primarily due to constraints caused by the project 
nature of lending. With the new round of substantial price 
increases for petroleum products in 1979 the balance of payments 
problems of many states supplied with oil by Trinidad and 
Tobago intensified, and this led Port of Spain to re-examine 
the scope for increasing its aid to the region. Pursuant to 
this review, in January 1980 a facility was established for 
financing oil, fertilizer and asphalt purchases by CARICON 
states. The facility was structured to provide for the 
financing of the incremental costs of products, and was only 
applicable where the products were supplied from Trinidad and 
Tobago. With respect to the CARICON LDCs, the facility 
provided for a maturity of fifteen years, icluding three years 
grace, at an annual interest rate of 2 per cent. Borrowers 
were permitted to service debt by the supply of commodities 
to Trinidad and Tobago, with the value of such payments 
estimated at the prevailing market price.
From the early days of the revolution, the PRG attached 
great importance to the establishment of close relations with 
Trinidad and Tobago, because of that country's aid programme 
and the economic and cultural links that exists between the 
two states. Furthermore, as the biggest market in CARICOM 
Trinidad and Tobago loomed large in the PRG's plans for 
export led growth geared towards the region. Nevertheless, 
repeated Grenadian efforts to open a dialogue with the 
government of Eric Williams were coldly rebuffed. Personal 
letters from Bishop to Williams went unacknowledged and
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unanswered, as did other correspondence from PRG ministers to 
their Trinidadian counterparts. Williams agreed to the 
establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the 
two states but insisted that no more substantive co-operation 
could be discussed until elections were held in Grenada.
Following Williams' death in March 1981 the new Trinidadian 
Prime Minister, George Chambers, re-opened contacts with 
Grenada. Chambers adopted a tolerant attitude towards the 
Grenadian revolution, and in June 1981 the PRG was allowed to 
raise a loan of EC2512 million under the terms of the 
Trinidad and Tobago oil facility.During talks between 
Bishop and Chambers, the Grenadian Prime Minister gave an 
undertaking to hold elections, although not necessarily of 
a Westminster type. And on the basis of this assurance,
Chambers spoke on Grenada's behalf at the CARICOM Heads of 
Government Conference held at Ocho Rios in Jamaica in November 
1982, where an attempt was made to expel Grenada from the 
Community by changing the CARICOM Treaty so as to commit its 
members to the maintenance of parliamentary democracy and the 
defence of human rights. In July the following year at the 
next full summit CARICOM conference, Chambers and Bishop held 
several private meetings. Bishop, still anxious to improve 
relations with Trinidad, strongly backed Chambers at the 
conference in his successful bid for Trinidad to be recognised 
as the oil supplier of 'first resort' for those CARICOM 
territories without refineries and the source of any oil 
needed by territories with these installations. The two 
leaders also discussed once more the question of elections in 
Grenada and agreed finally that the point had been reached 
when proper diplomatic representation between their countries

The IMon-g ouer nment a 1 Organisations
The effectiueness of private voluntary organisations in 
alleviating poverty in local communities of developing 
countries has been recognised in many quarters. These 
n on-g ov er nmenat 1 organisations, or IMGOs, collaborate in field 
activities with a variety of UN and other international 
development agencies. Groups such as trade unions and religious 
organisations, and charities like Oxfam and Save the Children 
Fund, have amassed valuable and successful experience. Staffed 
by an international network of volunteer or paid workers who 
are highly motivated, they lobby, disseminate information and 
collect funds for a variety of development projects, and play 
a key role in alerting public opinion in the industrialised 
countries about the plight of Third World peoples. The Brandt 
Report is most complimentary about the activities of these 
organisations: 'In meeting the needs of the poor at local 
level, in encouraging self-help and participation, in 
appreciating the social and cultural sensibilities of all the 
people involved, in circumventing bureaucratic red-tape and
C  Cgetting things done, they have a truly remarkable record.'
NGO aid places no restrictions on the procurement of goods and 
services, and considerations of a political and commercial 
character do not generally affect disbursements.
Cognizant of the possibilities of mobilizing assistance 
from NGOs, in August 1981 the PRG set up the Agency for Rural 
Transformation (ART) to co-ordinate aid inflows from these 
agencies. Headed by the industrious Trinidadian, Regina 
Taylor, ART assisted the mass organisations and other independen 
bodies in Grenada to draw up programmes and projects eligible
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for outside funding. Under Gairy only a handful of IMGOs
provided assistance to the island. These included Oxfam, the
Caribbean Council of Churches (CCC) and Canada Save the
Children Fund (CANSAVE). Following the revolution and the
♦
establishment of ART a host of other agencies became involved, 
particularly the more progressive ones. The PRG also availed 
itself of the NGO facilities provided by the EOF and CIDA.
The IMGOs were attracted to Grenada because of the PRG's 
emphasis on community involvement and the integrated character 
of the island's development programme, in which the policies 
of the government and those of the mass organisations 
coincided. According to Regina Taylor, some 50 per cent of 
the regional budget of most of the IMGOs operating in the 
Caribbean was alloted to Grenada. The concentration of 
assistance on Grenada was partially due to the fall of the 
Hanley government in Jamaica in 1980. Unenthusiastic about the 
policies of the newly-elected government of Edward Seaga, a 
number of agencies reduced their operations in Jamaica and 
devoted more of their resources and energy to Grenada. Because 
ART encouraged its IMGO aid donors to go to Grenada to visit 
projects, and supplied them with regular progress reports, 
many donors became highly committed to the island.
ART began its work with an initial grant of ECS132.000 
from the Dutch charity, HIVOS. The Agency had a board of 
directors composed of representatives from the mass 
organisations, government ministries, the PCBs and the private 
sector. Because many leaders of the mass organisations were 
young and relatively inexperienced, a great deal of ART's 
time was devoted to helping them to draw up proposals for 
programmes and projects, and arranging technical assistance.
In order to forestall any attempt by external forces to use an
282
NGO for destabilization purposes, careful screening was 
carried out of the agencies that expressed an interest in 
providing assistance to Grenada. Taylor worked in Switzerland 
with the World Council of Churches, and in Barbados with 
Christian Action for Development in the Caribbean (CADEC) 
before going to Grenada, and had thereby developed an 
international network of contacts which enabled her to 
scrutinise the credentials of dubious NGOs. Because of the 
concern over security, ART consciously refrained from 
making links with American agencies. At the end of May 1983, 
however, Taylor was scheduled to go to the US to investigate 
the possibilities of obtaining funding from American NGOs.
After it received the initial grant from HIVOS, ART
added to its finances by taking a percentage of the funds
obtained for each project to cover administration expenses.
HIVCIS had asked the Agency to set up business enterprises so
as to generate enough funds to make the organisation self-
sufficient and no longer dependent upon HIVOS funding. In
fact, most of the NGOs assisting projects provided finance for
a specific period of time, usually two years, and recommended
that the projects found ways of securing independent means of
finance once the period of funding had elapsed. Taylor saw
her job as helping each project to stand on its own two feet,
and hoped that the projects that were already receiving
assistance would begin to disappear from her books, so that
58new projects could be taken on board.
The major drawback of NGO aid is that the private 
agencies do not have a great amount of resources at their 
disposal, and are therefore only able to fund small projects 
which do not have an impact on the situation in society as a
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whole. In the context of a country the size of Grenada, however,
NGO assistance was able to play a major role in the development
process. One of the most important programmes of the revolution,
the CPE, was entirely funded by NGOs. Few countries in the
world would have been able to set up a national adult education
programme with the funds that are at the disposal of
private voluntary organisations. In the two years of its
existence, ART was able to obtain over ECU3 million for local
projects which had a significant impact on the island's 
59economy.
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Achievements and Contradictions of the 'Aid Boom'
By adopting a radical but highly pragmatic foreign policy
and projecting the revolution as 'peaceful', innovatory and
non-aligned, the PRG was able to mobilize considerable amounts
of overseas aid which financed most of the social and economic
programmes of the revolution. The Grenadian experience shows
how an astute, energetic and committed Third World state
can make maximum use of the concessional financial resources
at the disposal of the international community. Because of the
growing volume of aid inflows, the PRG was able to increase
capital spending from ECS8 million under Gairy in 1978, to
ECS16 million in 1979, ECS39.9 million in 1980, EC379.2 million
r nin 1981 and EC3101.5 million in 1982. In spite of the
magnitude of overseas financial assistance, because a great
proportion of government expenditure was obtained through
soft loans, grants and outright gifts and donations, the debt
servicing burden of the island remained light. The 1982 World
Bank Report gave a figure of less than 4 per cent of export
earnings. In his 1983 Report on the Economy, Coard provided
information on the amount of concessionary aid made available
to the PRG. Thus, in 1981 soft loans accounted for EC358.2
million out of the total figure for capital expenditure of
EC379.2 million, and in 1982 the corresponding figures were
6 1EC367.4 million and ECI101.5 million. The significant increase 
in the amount of government borrowing on commercial terms 
that occurred between 1981 and 1982 was caused by the sizable 
loans taken out for activities linked to the airport project.
It was the 'aid boom' which enabled the PRG to considerably 
expand the activities of the by providing the finance for the
establishment of state enterprises. Aid also made a major
contribution to government revenues in the manner described by
Payer: 'Aid ... supports the domestic budget of the
borrowing government, since private importers have to pay
the government in local currency for the privelege of selling
aid-financed goods. In this respect aid has the same effect as
a tax programme which brings in the same amount of money, but
permits the government to avoid making enemies through new
taxes. The aid thus finances government expenditures by
providing additional goods to sop up excess currency in the
country and channelling the proceeds to the government which
is thus allowed to spend more than it collects in taxes.
Without the aid, government expenditures would have to be cut
by the amount of aid or there would be an inflationary increase
Rin the money supply.' Again, overseas aid was primarily
responsible for the growth which took place in Grenada's
economy in each year of the revolution. According to government
figures the rate of growth of GDP was 2.1 per cent in 1979,
3.0 per cent in 1980, 3.0 per cent in 1981 and 5.5 per cent 
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in 1982. This growth in turn brought about a reduction in
the level of unemployment from around 50 per cent in 1979 to
14 per cent in 1982. Apart from the unemployed, various other
classes in society derived benefits from the 'aid boom'.
Mention has already been made of the increased earnings of the
64
comprador bourgeoisie. The petty bourgeois landlord class 
also managed to increase its income. The great influx of 
highly paid technicians, economists and other experts funded by 
the Western development agencies inflated the demarid for high- 
class rented accomodation, so the petty bourgeois landlord 
class substantially increased its income from this source.
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In addition to providing increased benefits for various 
social classes in the island, overseas aid enabled the PRG 
to undertake major initiatives without undermining the 
livelihood of key interest groups. For example, the setting 
up of the National Transport Service (NTS) with funds donated 
by Libya, allowed the revolutionary government to establish 
a state transport system without interfering with the operations 
of the private minibus drivers. Admittedly, the NTS did 
exert a downward and stabilising influence on bus fares in 
the private sector, but the private minibus drivers were still 
able to make a profit. A similar situation obtained with 
respect to the social programmes of the PRG funded by 
external assistance. While the Cuban doctors provided a free 
medical service to the island, private doctors continued to 
operate as before. Thus, overseas aid was a primary instrument 
in the PRG's strategy of building a broad interclass 
alliance for its political project of socio-economic 
tranformation.
One final achievement of the aid-sponsored development 
programme carried out by the PRG was that there was no 
evidence of the sort of corruption that has taken place in 
other Third World countries. Whatever the criticisms that the 
various donors of aid to Grenada may have made about the PRG's 
ability to utilize the resources they made available, nobody 
ever suggested that corruption was to blame for the problems 
that arose at particular projects. In view of the record of 
many Caribbean countries, this was no mean achievement.
Turning to the contradictions engendered by the 'aid 
boom', one should first of all point out that the PRG itself 
was very much aware of the problems that are involved in
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utilizing development aid from the West in particular.
Speaking at the Sixth Summit Conference of the Mon-aligned 
Movement in Havana in September 1979, Bishop made a direct 
reference to the obtacles that lie in the path of small states 
in their dealings with Western development agencies: 'Our 
problems are compounded by the inadequacy and inappropriateness 
of the criteria that are used to determine whether loans 
can be made, or aid, or other forms of co-operation or 
assistance can be given. The balance of payments test is unfair 
for these small states. Many do not have their own central 
banks, so what passes as a balance of payments deficit is 
more often than not really a budgetary deficit. The per capita 
test is also greatly unfair. When you see that test you are 
taking into account the earnings of the millionaires and 
other bigshots so that when you come to divide your GDP by the 
total population, the majority of whom live in conditions of 
abject poverty, you can get a very accurate picture of the 
true earnings of the average citizen.
Likewise, the requirement of pre-financing costs which
requires that the local government purchases out of its own
resources the required materials for the particular project,
to be reimbursed thereafter, also works very unfairly because
65very often the initial money cannot be found.' In spite of 
it appreciation of, and opposition to, the encumbrances of 
Western aid organizations, the PRG was, nevertheless, a victim 
of these encumbrances. The revolutionary government was 
clearly overambitious in its attempt to use Western aid to 
improve the island's infrastructure and provide jobs. Unable 
to find sufficient counterpart funds and beset by difficulties 
in recruiting qualified technicians - the principal stumbling
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block here being the desperately low salaries the regime uias
able to offer - the PRG's performance in implementing projects
was desultory. Terrence Moore, the Director of Planning,
conceded that the number of projects taken on board had placed
*
a severe strain on the financial and technical resources of
the island. He stated that in the financial year 1983-84 the
R RPRG would be more prudent in its infrastructural programme.
While the 'aid boom' was successful in bringing about a 
dramatic reduction in the level of unemployment in the island, 
because of the problems experienced in carrying out projects, 
the labour force was sujected to extreme fluctuations in the 
availability and duration of employment. Moreover, due to the 
inefficiency of the administrative arms of the state, workers 
often had to put up with considerable delays in obtaining 
wages and salaries. Added together, these factors had a negative 
impact on workers' morale.
There were several other contradictions caused by the
'aid boom'. The tying restrictions of the Western aid agencies
effectively took the decision-making power over economic
out of the hands of the PRG. As Terrence Moore stated bluntly,
the tying restrictions of Western donors 'makes economic
. 67planning impossible'. The big influx of aid-funded 
technicians and experts also gave rise to a number of anomalies. 
Because of the extremely low salaries paid by the Grenadian 
government, a gross discrepancy arose between the salaries 
earned by officials and technocrats paid by the PRG and the 
salaries of those who were paid by the development agencies. 
Given that most of the experts were foreigners, this led, quite 
naturally, to a certain disquiet amongst Grenadian officials.
It also represented a serious contradiction in terms of the
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socialist and egalitarian goals of the revolution. Pointing 
out that the PRG was aware of, and concerned about, this 
problem, Terrence Moore explained that the differences in 
salary would be removed by progressively training Grenadians
6 8to occupy the posts that were currently filled by foreigners.
The experience of other Third World countries shows, however,
that it is in practice a particularly difficult task to
train local people to manage and service Western aid projects.
To quote Carty and Smith: '... knowledge has a built in
obselescence . Development fashions change fast, technology
faster, and foreign experts, with their international
experience and First World citizenship, are hard to replace
unless a Third World government is deeply committed to 
69self-reliance.' Undoubtedly, the PRG was such a government. 
Whether it would have been able to break out of this crucial 
area of Western domination is, however, an open question. 
Finally, there was one other problem caused by the arrival of 
the foreign experts. Because of the popularity and international 
prestige of the revolution, Grenada managed to attract a 
good number of socialists from abroad who worked in areas such 
as education, health care, finance and planning. Coming 
principally from the US, Canada, Britain, West Germany and 
other Caribbean islands, these 'internationalist workers' 
were employed at local rates of pay and in most cases made a 
personal sacrifice in going to Grenada. Unfortunately, the 
Grenadian people, themselves accustomed to travelling abroad 
in search of higher incomes and having heard 'talk' about the 
inflated salaries of the foreign experts, treated the 
internationalist workers with suspicion. As for the petty
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bourgeois landlord class, it sought to cash in on these
radical migrants; particularly in the case of the white-skinned
supporters of the regime. Perturbed by these happenings
and somewhat envious of the recognition that the PRG had♦
accorded to Cuban workers in comparison to the neglect which 
they had experienced, in March 1983 a number of socialists 
from abroad formed an Association of Internationalist Workers. 
Led by Regina Fuchs, a West German medical practictioner, and 
Delia Smith, an English school teacher, one of the principal 
aims of the association was to counter the negative attitudes 
that many Grenadians held about foreign workers.
While aid from the socialist countries was provided on 
more favourable terms and allowed the PRG a great deal more 
room for manouvre, problems of a different order arose. First 
of all, the lack of familiarity with the Grenadian economy on 
the part of the Cuban and East European technicians limited 
their ability to provide meaningful assistance. And some of 
the equipment and goods that these countries made available 
were unreliable and of poor quality. Similarly, the advent of 
aid from the socialist countries and the oil-exporting states 
greatly extended the number and range of donor organizations 
supporting Grenada, and this severely taxed the resources and 
capabilities of the government administrative apparatus. Finally, 
the experience of socialist aid to Grenada raises questions 
about the viability of the socialist orientation strategy of 
the NJM. For while the Grenadian revolution demonstrates the 
scope that exists for a radical Third World state to mobilise 
economic assistance from the West, it also shows the 
contradictions and limits of this path of development. For it 
was Grenada's economic and political relatiionship with the
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socialist countries that invoked the hostility of the US
government which in turn used its influence to reduce the
amount of aid provided by Western governments and financial
institutions. It is true that the pragmatism and adroitness of*
the PRG1s foreign policy enabled it to counter some of 
Washington’s moves, but the effects of US economic destab li zatior 
were felt, Moreover, in following the guidelines of socialist 
orientation the PRG was reluctant to make the sort of political 
concessions that would have eased the suspicions of Western 
donors, so that they would have been more willing to assist 
the PRG. And socialist aid was insufficent and inadequate to 
have a major impact on the economy. Hence the PRG found itself 
in a situation where its political ideology stood in opposition 
to the requirements of the Grenadian economy.
2 9 2
Chapter Seven 
Tourism and Revolution
The pride of place accorded to tourism in the economic 
strategy of the Bishop regime gave the revolution a distinctively 
congenial ambience, following Cuba, Grenada under the PRG was 
the second country in the world to promote a. tourist industry 
during the course of‘a revolutionary process. This was 
facilitated by the ease with which state power was taken, the 
absence of any significant economic or social dislocation 
caused and the generally favourable image which the revolution 
attracted in the international community in the first few 
months after the overthrow of Gairy. The pursuit of tourism 
as a locomotive of economic growth was also an illustration 
of the pragmatism of the PRG in economic affairs. Recognising 
the poor natural resource endowment of the island and the 
importance of foreign exchange earnings to the success of the 
economic strategy as a whole'i the revolutionary government 
expended considerable energy in promoting tourism in spite of 
the many criticisms it had of the tourist industry in the 
Caribbean. Undoubtedly, there was a very strong economic 
rationale behind the PRG's efforts in tourism. Jean Holder, 
Secretary General of the Caribbean Tourism Research and 
Development Centre (CTRC), has over the years consistently 
championed the cause of tourism in the Caribbean. Without 
necessarily going along with all of her views, what she has to
V i
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say is certainly worth considering: 'The oil crisis of 1973/74 
followed by spiralling inflation, high interest rates, and a 
deep worldwide recession led to a return to reality. This 
reality in 1983 is illustrated by the fact that Barbados 
recognizes that the performance of its tourism is inextricably 
bound up with the survival of its existing standard of 
living, that tourism has become the number one industry in 
Jamaica, that oil-rich Trinidad and Tobago has finally 
discovered the tourism sector that the Bahamas, the Cayman 
Islands and Bermuda countries with nothing but tourism and 
banking have the highest per capita incomes in this region. 
There are other worldwide tourism realities, 279,900,000 
million persons travelled internationally in 1982 and spent
99.925.000 U.S. (almost 100 billion dollars). Tourism has 
therefore once more proved its vitality and its resistance to 
inflationary pressures, political instability, widespread 
unemployment and dwindling discretionary dollars in tourist 
generating countries. In 1982 about 7.2 million visitors came 
to the Caribbean and spent 3.5 billion U.S. dollars, roughly 
the same as 1981. Tourism directly, indirectly, and through 
tourism induced activity such as construction, employed some
270.000 persons in this region. The good news therefore is
2
that the travel habit dies hard.' Elsewhere Holder opines:
'We can no more abandon tourism than the Arabs can oil. But
we must use our tourism revenue to achieve the greatest
3
possible balanced growth that we can.' No doubt, the PRG, in
drawing up grandiose plans for the expansion of Grenada's
tourist industry, was motivated by the sort of views
4
expressed by Holder. At the same time, the Bishop regime had 
to take political factors into account. Given the economic
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TABLE 20
International Tourist Arrivals
1950 25 millions
I960 71
1970 168 " +9#
1971 182 " +8#
1972 198 " +&/0
1973 215 " +9$
1974 209 " -3#
1975 213 " +2#
1976 218 " +4#
1977 242 " +11#
1978 260 " +7#
1979 270 " +4#
1980 278 " +3#
1981(a) 290 " +4#
a) Preliminary estimate
S o u r c e :  C a r i b b e a n  T o u r i s m  S t a t i s t i c a l  R e p o r t  1 9 8 2 . p . 6
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TABLE 21
Tourist Arrivals in the Caribbean (a)
%  Change
1970 4.26 million
1971 4.62 +8.4$
1972 5.05 " +9.3$
1973 5.41 +7.1 $
1974 5.65 +4.4$
1975 5.48 -3.0$
1976 5.77 +5.3$
1977 6.22 " +7.8$
1978(b) 6.94 +11.5$
1979 7.59 +9.5$
1980 7.61 +0.2$
1981 7.24 -4.8$
a) Caribbean defined as all CTRC member countries, 
with the addition of Bermuda, Suriname, and 
Trinidad and Tobago.
b) Revised series since 1978.
S o u r c e :  C a r i b b e a n  T o u r i s m  S t a t i s t i c a l  R e p o r t  1 9 8 2 . p . 7
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leverage wielded by the United States over the Caribbean 
tourist industry, how could the PRG expand its tourist 
industry and still maintain an anti-imperialist stance? In 
this respect the experience of tourism in two other radical 
Caribbean states, namely the Castro regime in Cuba and the 
Manley administration in Jamaica, were highly pertinent.
The Experience of Tourism in Cuba and Jamaica
In the early days of the Cuban revolution the Castro
leadership believed that it would be possible to attract
American tourists to the island, and the early projects of
the Cuban National Tourist Agency, INIT, were geared towards
the US market. 'The programs of ...INIT were begun in a
period when the revolution still had, in part, a middle-class
aspect, when the full implications of the struggle with
American imperialism had not yet become clear to everyone. They
reflected the general revolutionary sweep, the rush to get on
5with the many things that were necessary for Cuba.' As it was, 
with the US imposition of a ban on travel to Cuba in 1963, the 
flow of American visitors stopped. The American hotels 
expropriated by the Castro regime lay empty and the ambitious 
construction programme launched by INIT lost much of its 
economic rationale. In response to this turn of events, the 
Castro regime put poor people to live in the empty hotels and 
redirected its tourist industry to the needs of the Cuban 
people. This bold and egalitarian move on the part of the 
Cuban revolutionaries was one of the many measures which won 
it the admiration of socialists throughout the world. It also
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strengthened support for the revolution at home, and, by 
assisting in reducing foreign exchange expenditure on luxury 
goods and eliminating at a stroke the prime source of Western 
capitalist values, had a positive economic effect and 
facilitated the growth of socialist class consciousness. It 
was not until March 1977, when the Carter administration lifted 
the travel ban on its citizens, that the Castro regime could 
again contemplate the development of a tourist industry geared 
towards the US market. Now, in a more stable economic and 
political environment, the Cuban leaders were able to ruminate 
upon their country's experience of Western tourism and 
elaborate a concept a concept of tourism in conformity with 
the socialist goals of the revolution. Nevertheless, the 
Castro regime still evinced a certain ambivalence when it 
projected the ideal of un turismo sano, or, a healthy tourism. 
For, in order to capture even a fraction of the Caribbean 
business Cuba must compete fiercely with Puerto Rico, the 
Virgin Islands, Jamaica, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and the 
Bahamas - islands which offer some of the world's finest and 
most sophisticated hotels and have gained reputations for the 
very things that the Cuban revolution eliminated - gambling,
hot night life, prostitution and subservient attentiveness to 
0the tourist. In spite of this, a number of factors would tend 
to suggest that Cuba is in a good position to stick to its 
objective of un turismo sano. First of all, Cuba is a big 
island and tourism is not one of its major industries. Secondly, 
due to the existence of a substantial domestic market for 
tourism the industry is not entirely dependent on the whims 
of foreigners. Finally, because of the excesses of Cuban
tourism before the revolution the Castro leadership is
7determined to maintain strict control over it today.
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□n May 15 1982 the Reagan administration imposed new 
restrictions on travel to Cuba almost identical to those in 
effect up until 1977. The new ban formed part of the Reagan 
administration’s attempt to limit thq flow of dollars to the 
island. John Walker the US assistant Treasury secretary 
justified the action in the following terms: 'Cuba will not be 
allowed to earn hard currency from tourist and business travel 
when it is sponsoring armed violence against our friends and
gallies.' The Cubans hope to counter this new challenge to 
its tourist industry by attracting more visitors from Canada, 
Europe and Mexico.
Although the measures taken by the US to damage tourism 
under the Manley government in Jamaica were not as draconian 
as those directed against Cuba, they did, nevertheless, cause 
much greater damage to the Jamaican economy. In 1974 the Manley 
regime imposed a levy on the North American companies which 
control the island's bauxite-alumina industry, and went on to 
develop close relations with Cuba and take anti-US positions 
in foreign policy. In response, the US government took steps 
to destabilize the Jamaican economy, and tourism was selected 
as a prime candidate for attack. An anti-communist campaign 
of vituperation and slander was launched in the North American 
media, which was was echoed in the pages of the Daily Gleaner, 
Jamaica's leading capitalist newspaper. The campaign to 
prevent North American tourists from from visiting the island 
was also taken up by the opposition party, the Jamaica Labour 
Party, whose members and supporters in New York organized 
demonstrations alleging that Manley was a communist and calling 
for a boycott of Jamaica. As a result, the number of visitors 
from the US, a figure which had been rising steadily since the
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1960s, declined by 13 per cent between 1974 and 1975, and
gdropped by more than 10 per cent in 1976. Coinciding with a 
reduction in the country's production of bauxite, an investment 
strike and a flight of capital abroad, the fall in earnings 
from tourism formed part of a general economic crisis. However, 
Norman Girvan, who served as an economic advisor under the 
Manley administration, argues that the overall crisis was 
precipitated by the shortfall in tourism earnings.^ The 
economic malaise which afflicted Jamaica under Manley was one 
of the main factors which led to defeat of the PNP in the 
October 1900 elections.'*''*'
In the light of the experience of tourism in Cuba and 
Jamaica, what, then, was the thinking of the Bishop regime 
on how it could expand its tourist industry in the face of 
US hostility? Was the promotion of tourism congruent with the 
socialist goals of the revolution? UJhat obstacles did tourism 
place in the path of the PRG's attempt to develop socialist 
class consciousness? Before proceeding to answer these 
questions, it is first of all necessary to provide some 
more data on the Grenadian tourist industry.
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Peculiarities of Grenada's Tourist Industry
As a tourist resort, Grenada possesses all that is typical 
of a small Caribbean island, and, in addition, has a beauty in 
its beaches, mountains, streams and towns which surpasses 
that of all its neighbours. Grenada provided the setting for 
the film Island in the Sun, starring Harry Belafonte, and is 
widely regarded as the most beautiful island in the Caribbean. 
Wore specifically, Grenada has certain outstanding attractions 
that have enticed visitors from all over the world. The 
scenic reputation of St. George's has already been mentioned 
in chapter one. Four miles to the south of St. George's lies 
the famous Grand Anse beach - one of the finest in the 
Caribbean. On the southern coast of Grenada, the coolest part 
of the island, is UJesterhall Point residential area. This 
picturesque and salubrious district, with its two peninsulas, 
three superb sheltered bays and white sand beaches, has been 
widely acclaimed by international travel writers. Grenada is 
also renowned for its yachting. Lying just south of the 
hurricane belt, Grenada and the other islands in the state 
have been described as a yachtsman's paradise. Offering a 
wealth of natural harbours and anchorages, a perfect climate, 
peace, beauty, in addition to an abundance of sea, Grenada 
has attracted some of the world's leading yachtsmen. The 
Easter Regatta, organized by the Grenada Yacht Club for over 
twenty-four years, is one of the most popular sea events in 
the Caribbean. Finally, the variety of tree crops grown has 
given the countryside a distinctive scenic appeal and the 
abundance of spice trees has led to the island being called 
'The Spice Isle'. Of never failing interest to visitors is
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a trip to either of the Nutmeg processing stations - popularly 
referred to as 'Spice Factories' - located in Gouyave and 
Grenv i1le . ^
It was Grenada's outstanding natural attributes as well 
as Gairy's susceptibility to bribes which in 1977 led to the 
establishment on the island of the St. George's University 
School of Medicine. It was a bright idea. Founded by Charles 
Modica, the son of a US Republican from Lomj Island, the 
school catered for American students who were unable to obtain 
places' in a medical school in the US. Staffed by retired 
professors and charging exorbitant fees, the medical school 
earned its income from wealthy American families determined to 
obtain a career in medicine for their offspring. Grenada's 
slow pace and congenial environment are ideal for academic 
study, and this was the main attraction of the school. The 
school provided places for around 600 students who rented 
and leased some of the best accomodation on the island. (See 
table 22). St. George's University School of Medicine was 
a major component of Grenada's tourist industry and accounted 
for some 20 per cent of the country's foreign exchange 
earnings. Many American tourists who visited Grenada were 
either personal acquaintances of, or had been recommended to 
Grenada by, medical school students.
On the opposite side of the coin, medical school students 
tended to 'crowd out' Grenadians in the best night clubs 
and drinking places on the island and effected a strong 
upward pressure on the price of rented accomodation; effectively 
placing a significant proportion of rented accomodation 
outside the reach of ordinary Grenadians. And like a good 
number of Western visitors to the Caribbean, many medical
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TABLE 22
HOTELS. GUEST HOUSES. COTTAGES AMD APARTMENTS 
IN  G RENAD A(a) UNDER 
THE P E O PLE 'S  REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT
A . HOTELS
Name o f  H o t e l O wner N a t i o n a l i t y
A p p le  In n G ren a d a  R e s o r t s  C o r p o r a t io n -
B lu e  H o r iz o n s  C o t t a g e  H o t e l A r n o ld  D . H o p k in s G re n a d ia n
Th e C a la b a s h C h a r le s  d e  G a le G re n a d ia n
Camp C a r r ia c o u G ren a d a  R e s o r t s  C o r p o r a t io n -
C innam on H i l l  and  B ea ch  C lu b R ic h a r d  G ra y B r i t i s h
C r e s c e n t  In n W. B . J a c o b s G re n a d ia n
H a m ilto n  In n V e r o n ic a  Adams G re n a d ia n
H ib is c u s  In n G ren a d a  R e s o r t s  C o r p o r a t io n -
H o l id a y  In n G ren a d a  R e s o r t s  C o r p o r a t io n -
H o rs e  S h oe  B ay  H o t e l G ren a d a  R e s o r t s  C o r p o r a t io n -
M erm aid  B ea ch  H o t e l G le n n a  B u l l e n G re n a d ia n
R i v i e r a  C o t t a g e  H o t e l M s. N y a c k G re n a d ia n
R oss  P o in t  In n C u r t i s  H o p k in G re n a d ia n
S a m 's  In n E l l e n  Sam G re n a d ia n
S e c r e t  H a rb o u r  H o t e l G o d f r e y  V e n to u r G re n a d ia n
S ea  S c a p e  In n G ren a d a  R e s o r t s  C o r p o r a t io n -
S i l v e r  B each  H o l id a y  C o t t a g e  R e s o r t M r. B u l l e n G re n a d ia n
S i l v e r  San ds  H o t e l  an d  B ea ch  R e s o r t E a r l  G i t t e n s G re n a d ia n
S t .  Jam es H o t e l L o c a l  com pany G re n a d ia n
S p ic e  I s l a n d  In n Desm ond C a m p b e ll G re n a d ia n
T ru e  B lu e  M o te l On l o n g  te rm  l e a s e  t o  th e  
S t .  G e o r g e 's  U n i v e r s i t y  
S c h o o l  o f  M e d ic in e
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B . GUEST HOUSES
Name o f  G u es t H ou se O w n er N a t i o n a l i t y
Adams G u es t H ou se V e r o n i c a  Adams G re n a d ia n
P e t e r ' s  P a la c e P e t e r  P l e n t y G re n a d ia n
M i t c h e l l ' s  G u e s t  H ouse S id n e y  M i t c h e l l G re n a d ia n
S t .  A n n 's  G u e s t H ouse E . C .  P r a n k ly n G re n a d ia n
S k y l in e  G u es t H ou se Ms. Emm anuel G re n a d ia n
T i t a ' s  G u es t H ou se A g a t h a  P h i l l i p G re n a d ia n
W indw ard  San ds  In n On l o n g  te rm  l e a s e -
W in t e r  R e s t  G u e s t  H ouse On l o n g  te rm  l e a s e
C. COTTAGES
Name o f  C o t t a g e O w n er N a t i o n a l i t y
C a r i f t a  C o t t a g e s G re n a d a  R e s o r t s  C o r p o r a t io n
C o r a l  C ove C o t t a g e s J i l l  E van s G re n a d ia n
C ro to n  V i l l a N .A . -
L 'a n s e  Aux E p in e s  C o t ta g e s J i l l  E van3 G re n a d ia n
S o u th  W in ds H o l id a y  C o t ta g e s
and A p a r tm e n ts C h a s l e y  D a v id G re n a d ia n
Th e F lam b o yan t J im  Needham A m e r ic a n /
G r e n a d ia n 13
3D4
D . APARTMENTS
B e v e r l e y  F l a t s On l o n g  t e r m  l e a s e -
O tw a y 's  P a lm  B ea ch  A p a r tm e n ts On lo n g  te rm  l e a s e  t o  th e  
S t .  G e o r g e 's  U n i v e r s i t y  
S c h o o l  o f  M e d ic in e
F a lm  C o u rt M a is o n e t t e s On lo n g  te rm  l e a s e  t o  th e  
S t .  G e o r g e 's  U n i v e r s i t y  
S c h o o l  o f  M e d ic in e
T w e lv e  D e g r e e s  N o r th J o s e p h  G a y lo r d A m e r ic a n
V e r o n i c a 's  B ea ch  A p a r tm e n t V e r o n ic a  Adams G r e n a d ia n
W a ve  C r e s t  A p a r tm e n ts On lo n g  te rm  l e a s e  t o  th e  
S t .  G e o r g e 's  U n i v e r s i t y  
S c h o o l  o f  M e d ic in e
a .  In c lu d e s  C a r r ia c o u .
b .  A c c o r d in g  t o  a  s o u r c e  i n  t h e  G ren a d a  T o u r i s t  B o a rd , J im  N eedham  i s  
A m e r ic a n  b y  o r i g i n  b u t h a s  ta k e n  o u t  G r e n a d ia n  n a t i o n a l i t y .
N .A .  N o t  a v a i l a b l e .
Source: Grenada Tourist Board, St. George's, 1983
HPUhto.
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school students helf contemptuous and even racist attitudes 
attitudes towards the indigenous population. In an interview 
conducted after the US inusion of Grenada, a friend of a 
medical school student told the American weekly, \l_i_ll_a2_e^
Voice: 'Half the med students didn't like the Grenadians. 
Students called them FIGs, "fucking ignorant Grenadians".'^
Concerned about the negative socio-cultural impact of 
the medical school and suspicious of the relationship between 
it and the Gairy regime, before the revolution the NJCO 
pledged to take over the school when they came to power. ^
The NJM's failure to implement this promise after the revolution 
seems to have been due to its recognition of the economic 
importance of the medical school. The Bishop regime also 
sought to use the school as a propaganda weapon, holding it 
up as an example to show to the US public that the PRG was 
not against Americans per se, but against the policies of the 
Reagan administration.
In spite of Grenada's resplendent virtues as a tourist
resort, confirmed by studies conducted by a number of
international travel organisations,^ tourism has never
really flourished in Grenada. Above all else, this has been
16due to air inaccessibility and the inadequacy of water and 
sewerage supplies. BiBhop himself drew attention to the 
problem of tourist infrasturcture in an interview conducted 
seven months after the revolution: 'You charge the tourist a 
hundred US dollars a day or a hundred and twenty US a day and 
he pulls the chain and no water comes. He's not likely to 
come back.' As a result of these drawbacks, there has not 
been any substantive addition to the tourist facilities - 
restaurants, hotels, guest houses ... - established in the
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1960s. Indeed, as already mentioned in chapter one, the
Grenadian tourist industry has evinced a good deal of excess
capacity. As is the case in a number of islands in the
Eastern Caribbean, most of the tourist accomodation in Grenada
consists of small and very intimate establishments owned by
local people. (See table 22). At a maximum the country has a
total of 765 rooms available to tourists,. Out of this figure,
451 are in hotels, 35 in apartments, 208 in cottages and 71 in 
18guest houses. The largest hotel in the country, Holiday Inn, 
at one time accounted for 184 of the hotel rooms, most of the 
remaining twenty-odd hotels having less than thirty rooms 
each. Holiday Inn also accounted for 50 per cent of the first
class hotel rooms in Grenada and contributed over half the
19foreign exchange earned from visitors each year. As with 
the majority of hotels, most of the apartments, cottages and 
guest houses also have less than thirty rooms.
In 1980 a fire broke out at the Holiday Inn causing 
severe damage to much of the hotel complex. Grenada was 
thereby deprived of a large percentage and most valuable 
component of its tourist accomodation. After lengthy 
negotiations between the PRG and the owners of Holiday Inn, 
Commonwealth Holiday Inns of Canada Ltd, the PRG purchased the 
hotel and in mid-1983 opened the East Wing - the section of 
the hotel that was not damaged in the fire. The newly 
acquired state hotel was renamed Grenada Beach Hotel.
The existence in Grenada of only one hotel with a 
significant number of rooms has itself presented an obstacle 
to the expansion of the tourist industry. Big tour operators 
are reluctant to use a large number of small hotels, since 
this involves placing their groups in different accomodation 
and making special arrangements for transport. This in turn
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TABLE 23
ROOM CAPACITY IN THE CARIBBEAN - 
SELECTED COUNTRIES
Country Year Rooms
Anguilla 1980 150
Antigua 1980 1 ,350
Dominica 1980 157
Grenada 1979 765
Monserrat 1979 131
St. Kitts/Nevis 1979 584
St. Lucia 1980 1 ,245
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 1979 510
Barbados 1 980 6,680
Jamaica 1980 9,500
Trinidad and Tobago 1979 2,141
Bahamas 1979 11,441
Source: Caribbean Tourism Statistical Report 1981. p.32
leads to higher administration expenses and breaks up the 
20trauel party. Hence, Grenadian tourism has traditionally 
catered for small groups, many of whom have displayed a strong 
loyalty to the island. Before the revolution, repeat business
in tourism stood on average at around 30 per cent -
. . . 21 high figure.
a very
'New T o u r i s m '
A significant number of the infrastructural projects 
introduced by the PRG were specifically aimed at improving 
the island's attraction as a tourist resort. The new 
international airport at Point Salines, which took the lion's 
share of the PRG's capital expenditure, was to have paid for 
itself through the substantial increase in the number of 
tourist arrivals it was disigned to facilitate. This attention 
to tourist infrastructure was an illustration of the 
coherent and well-considered ideas that the PRG had about the 
type of tourist industry it wished to promote. These ideas 
were enunciated by government spokesmen on numerous occasions. 
The PRG propounded the concept of 'New Tourism'. This 
tourism was to differ from that in existence in the other 
territories of the Caribbean in several important ways. First 
of all, in anticipation of US hostility and as part of the 
politico-economic strategy of progressive disengagement from 
imperialism, the PRG sought to diversify Grenada's tourist 
industry. Considerable attention was devoted to attracting 
tourists from the Caribbean, Latin America, Europe and 
Canada. Diversification was also seen as a means of breaking 
the relationship between tourism, class and colour and the 
revolutionary government specifically encouraged non-white 
visitors. In the Caribbean a significant amount of importance 
was attached to the Trinidad and Tobago market, on account of 
the affluence of the twin-island state and the historical and 
cultural links that it has with Grenada. A tourist office was 
scheduled to be opened there in the later part of 1983. At a 
later stage the PRG planned to establish an office in Venezuela
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to service South America. In Canada and Europe the PRG 
established tourist offices at an earlier date and stepped up 
its promotional work. In a further bid to make the Grenadian 
tourist industry less vulnerable to the US, the PRG sought to 
encourage more Grenadians resident abroad to take regular 
holidays on the 'Spice Isle'. In his 1983 report on the 
economy, Coard pointed to the importance of Israelis resident 
abroad to the tourist industry of Israel, and suggested that 
if a significant proportion of overseas Grenadians returned 
to the country on a regular basis this would be sufficient to 
make the island's tourist industry 'take off'. In fact, in 
anticipation of strong support from Grenadian nationals 
abroad, in 1983 the Ministry of Tourism began, for the first 
time, to keep a seperate record of the number of nationals
taking a vacation in Grenada and add this figure to the total
23number of tourist arrivals.
While the revolutionary government took into account the 
possibility of a decline in American arrivals, it remained 
most sanguine with regard to its prospects in the US tourism 
market. The Ministry of Tourism projected a steep and 
continuous increase in the number of US arrivals, beginning in 
1983. (See table 24). Several factors were involved in this 
optimism which the PRG displayed over its ability to attract 
American tourists in spite of the State Department inspired 
propaganda campaign. In the first place, as an industry 
tourism thrives on confidence and stability, and a good deal 
of the enthusiasm expressed was no doubt part of a conscious 
effort to project an image of a vibrant tourist industry 
with good potential. Secondly, the PRG was astute enough to 
discern certain advantages in Washington's programme of
disinformation directed against Grenada. Prior to the
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TABLE 24
PROJECTED STAY-OVER VISITOR AhRTVALS 1983-86
1983 1984 1985 1 986
Grenada 8,000 9,600 13,440 18,200
U.S.A. 5,500 6,600 9,900 14,850
Canada 2,200 2,600 5,200 7,800
U.K. 2,750 3,300 4,400 5,280
Europe 6,600 8,000 10,000 12,000
Caribbean and others 10,230 12,300 17,700 23,870
TOTAL 27,280 32,800 47,200 63,800
(a) Grenadian nationals resident abroad.
Source: Ministry of Tourism, St. George's, 1983.
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revolution, most Americans had never even heard of Grenada; 
suddenly this tiny Caribbean island had become 'a threat to 
the national security of the United States'. In an interview 
broadcast over Radio Free Grenada in early 1983, Lyden 
Ramdhanny, the recently appointed Minister of Tourism, 
highlighted this positive aspect of Grenada's new-found 
publicity: 'In a way ... President Reagan has helped us by 
advertising Grenada for us, because quite a number of 
people didn't even know where Grenada w a s . T h e  PRG 
skillfully exploited the heightened interest over Grenada in 
the US and elsewhere to draw attention to the island's 
exceptional qualities as a tourist resort. One of the main
25slogans of the revolution was, 'Come and see for yourselves', 
and many speeches given by PRG leaders were consciously 
aimed at a travelling audience as well as a political audience. 
In March 1983, when Ronald Reagan made his most extravagant 
claims of all about the intentions of Cuba and the 
Soviet Union at the international airport, the PRG invited 
US journalists and politicians to visit Grenada; and while 
demonstrating the falsehood of Reagan's allegations pointed 
to the island's natural beauty and the tranquillity of Grenadian 
society. Similarly, during his trip to the US three months 
later Bishop vaunted Grenada's scenic attractions.
After diversification, a second goal which the PRG 
projected in its concept of 'New Tourism' was that of a 
greater linkage between the tourist sector and the economy 
as a whole. The revolutionary government sought to reduce 
the amount of visitor expenditure on imports by producing in 
Grenada a number of the items bought by tourists. Hotels
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and guest houses mere encouraged to use local supplies of 
fruit, vegetables and fish, and, in order to promote Grenada's 
handicraft industry, shortly after the revolution the PRG 
established the Grenada National Institute of Handicraft 
(GNIH). Adopting the motto 'Helping the hand to build the 
land', the GNIH was set up as a parastatal body with special 
responsibilities for research, training, production, 
marketing and promotion. In September 1981 a marketing outlet 
for the Institute was established called Grenada Craft 
Market (Grencraf t)
A third factor isolated by the PRG in its tourism 
programme was that of tourism education. Concerned about the 
disturbing experiences of other Caribbean islands, the 
revolutionary government was of the view that some of the 
negative socio-cu11ura 1 influences of tourism could be 
alleviated in Grenada by educating the masses about the 
importance of tourism to the country's economy. An exercise 
in one of the textbooks used in the CPE programme provides 
an indication of the sort of ideas about tourism which the 
PRG attempted to inculcate in society at large: 'Another 
aspect of "New Tourism" promotes that all our activities 
and attitudes towards guests should be positive and helpful, 
because our visitors must feel welcome and be treated well.
All Grenadians must behave as true ambassadors of our 
country in this field. We should be tourist guides rather than 
tourist plagues. We must display a certain amount of 
responsibility, self dignity and self respect when dealing 
with visitors. Remember that they don't want to be 
pestered. They want to feel free to move around our beautiful 
country.
3 1 4
Grenada will not only benefit from the exchange of ideas 
and experience with visitors, but will also improve 
economically from the expanded tourism. When inviting visitors 
to share in the many attractions of our culture and country,
all efforts should be made to ensure that local foods and
2 7products feature predominantly.' In his interview broadcast
over Radio Free Grenada Lyden Ramdhanny announced that the
PRG would be launching a 'tourism awareness programme' to
bring tourism to the people. Representatives were to be sent
from the Ministry of Tourism to 'discuss with people the
whole question of tourism, how it relates to the economy,
the importance of tourism and what kind of package we can 
2 8put together.' The PRG also introduced annual seminars in 
tourism awareness for taxi drivers and beach vendors.
Tourism education also formed part of the political role 
that 'New Tourism' was to play. As Bishop stated in his 
address on tourism given in December 1979: '... we see
tourism not merely as a business but as an instrument of 
world peace and understanding where peoples from all over 
the world can meet in an atmosphere of mutual respect and
2 9develop closer understanding of their different cultures.'
In June 1981 the Grenada Committe for Friendship with the 
Peoples (GCFP) was set up in the Ministry of Mobilisation 
with three main objectives: to foster co-operation, understanding 
and friendship among all people; to promote social and 
cultural exchanges with all people; to express solidarity with 
all oppressed peoples of the world. The GCFP was geared 
towards radicals from leftwing parties and organisations 
around the world who had rallied to the cause of the Grenadian 
revolution, and it sought to attract these 'working class
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tourists' during the period June to December, the low season 
in tourism. Hence, the dates of commemoration for the 
Grenadian and international labour movements were publicized 
as the most suitable occasions for radicals to Visit the 
country. The official leaflet of the GCFP summoned visitors 
thus: 'The GCFP wants you to know and understand our pople.
To achieve this we are organizing programs on community 
exchange, lectures, entertainment and tours for you and 
sympathizers with the GRENADIAN REVOLUTION.
We therefore invite you to 'Come and See for Yourself' .
We offer some of our official dates in the Grenada 
Calendar when members of your society and others can come to 
Grenada and integrate yourself (sic) with our people.'^
The activities of the GCFP were complemented by the PRG's 
tourism agency - the Grenada Resorts Corporation (GRC). The 
GRC was established shortly after the revolution when the 
hotels and guest houses personally owned by Gairy were 
expropriated. Together with the Carifta Cottages, built under 
the GULP regime, Gairy's former possessions provided the 
revolutionary government with a state sector in tourism.
(See table 22). The GRC made special arrangements for 
'working class tourists' and the hotels and guest houses run 
by the Corporation were featured prominently in the tourist 
brochures put out by the PRG. Because of this solicitous 
approach and the international stature of the revolution, 
Grenada rapidly became a venue for Caribbean and North 
American radicals and a conference centre for regional and 
international debate on Third World issues. Nevertheless, 
'working class tourism' was not given a central place in the 
plans of the PRG. The revolutionary government had a 
preference for 'upper income tourism' because it brought
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more foreign exchange into the country and created more jobs.
It was also believed that some of the negative socio-cultural 
influences of tourism could be alleviated by staying 
'up market ' . ^  t
In seeking to draw up guidelines that would concretise 
its concept of 'New Tourism', the PRG put forward a number 
of proposals and set itself certain well-defined targets.
First of all, in order to avoid a 'concrete jungle' on the 
beaches, the PRG stated its intention to carefully plan 
Grenada's tourism development. In late 1982 a Physical 
Planning Unit was set up in the Ministry of Planning. The Unit 
was assigned the responsibility for environmental management 
and alloted the task of preparing a Physical Plan for the 
country. In order to prevent tourism from spoiling the
natural beauty of the country, particular regions were reserved
32for specific purposes. A target of a maximum of 100,000 
stay-over visitors a year was declared, and in order to 
accomodate them the revolutionary government anticipated the 
construction of between 1,500 and 2,000 hotel rooms. It was 
envisaged that local and foreign capital would establish most 
of the hotel infrastructure, and generous incentives were 
provided in the investment code for companies wishing to 
invest in hotels and other tourism facilities.^ The PRG did 
not want hotels to exceed 150 rooms nor be above two stories 
high. This was in order to obviate the need for elevators. The 
revolutionary government required hotels to make use of 
natural ventilation rather than air conditioning, a measure
which, like the discouragement of the use of elevators,
34would have saved on electricity. As regards the development 
of the state sector in tourism, mention has already been made
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of the PRG's acquisition of the Holiday Inn hotel in 1983. 
Negotiations mere also under way with certain financial 
institutions for funding to construct two 150-room hotels. 
These were to be built by the PRG, after which an agreement 
was to be made with an international hotel chain to 
provide management. Stipulated in the agreement would be 
a provision to train Grenadians in order to prepare the 
way for ultimate PRG administration of the hotels. ^  Such 
an arrangement had already been worked out at the Grenada 
Beach Hotel. Thus, with its carefully worked out strategy 
and the opening of the new international airport scheduled 
for mid-1984, the Bishop regime confidently predicted that 
tourism would rapidly absorb the country's unemployed and by 
1985 Grenada would be facing a labour shortage.
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Tourism and Rev/olution
The actual experience of Grenada's tourist industry 
under the PRG could not, in and of itself, be used to make a 
judicious appraisal of the revolutionary government's views 
about tourism. History did not allow the PRG sufficient time 
to complete the international airport nor remain in power 
until 1985. Indeed, the PRG worked under the assumption that 
tourism could only 'take off' once the Point Salines project 
was completed. Nevertheless, the poor performance of tourism 
between 1979 and 1983 does raise a number of questions about 
the viability of the PRG's concept of 'New Tourism'.
The first point to be made is that the US propaganda
campaign achieved its main objective - there was a sharp
decline in the number of visitors in each year of the
revolution. (See tables 25 and 26). While the revolution
coincided with the international recession, and, as a
consequence, there was a downturn in tourism throughout the
Caribbean, Grenada witnessed the steepest and most sustained
decline of any other country in the region. The sharpest fall
of all was in the number of US stay-over visitors, which
plummeted from 9,191 in 1978 to 5,124 in 1981. While the
shortfall registered in the number of stay-over visitors from
other countries was not as dramatic, it was pronounced, and
there was no evidence to suggest that the loss of US visitors
was being offset by arrivals from elsewhere. (See table 25).
The diversification programme had not yet begun to bear fruit.
furthermore, repeat business fell from 30 per cent to less 
*&6than 12 per cent. While these facts alone do not prove that
the PRG's bid to develop a tourist industry less dependent
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TABLE 25
STAY-OVER VISITOR ARRIVALS 1 978-1 982
fa)Country of Origin' ' 1978 1979 1980 1 981 1982
U.S. 9,191 9,081 6,767 5,124 N.A.
Canada 2,977 2,926 1 ,991 1 ,910 N.A.
Europe/U.K. 6,998 11,371 6,774b 5,618 N.A.
Venezuela 498 287 472 438 N.A.
Caribbean 8,773 7,981 7,655 8,509 N.A.
Rest of World 3,899 657 5,813 3,473 N.A.
TOTAL 32,336 32,303 29,418 25,072 22,788
(a) By country of nationality.
(b) U.K. and Germany only.
N.A. Not available
Source: Caribbean Tourism Statistical Report 1982. p. 66; 
Statistical News. 20 April 1983.
320
TABLE 26
CKUI3! PASSENGER ARRIVALS 1078-1982
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
116,331 138,654 145,594 77,596 62,119
Source: Caribbean Tourism Statistical Report 1982. p. 67; 
Statistical News. 20 April 1983.
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upon the US was untenable, other factors do in fact suggest that 
this may have been the case. In the first place, the,US is 
the Caribbean's most important tourism market, accounting 
for some 63 per cent of stay-over visitor arrivals in the 
region. The corresponding figures for Canada and Europe are 
7 per cent and 12 per cent. Secondly, while the Canadian 
and European markets experienced serious problems during 
the recession, the US market continued on an upward trend and 
exhibited an underlying strength of demand. Caribbean 
tourism also increased during this period, but it does not 
have the same economic importance as North American and 
European tourism. To quote the CTRC: 'Although /the7 strength 
in the Caribbean market is encouraging, it represents a 
general upward trend for more travel by those resident in the 
region, with gains being, in foreign exchange terms, balanced 
by losses. Regional tourism cannot have the same economic 
impact as spending from outside the region.' As regards the 
prospects for increased travel by Grenadians resident abroad, 
the very least one can say is that Coard's comparison with 
Israel was hardly relevant. Finally, in spite of much 
discussion about the potential of the South American market 
for the Caribbean, it has failed to materialise except to 
those destinations offering exceptional opportunities for 
shopping or other such diversions. It is difficult for the 
Caribbean to compete with the many attractions - shopping, 
financial services and so forth - of Miami, and most South 
American countries have good holiday resorts of their own.
Apart from the question of market strength, American 
tourists spend far more money than visitors from any other 
destination. In the case of Grenada, this was confirmed by
a detailed survey carried out by the CRTC in early 1982. It 
showed that as an average per party per trip, American visitors 
spent around 4 per cent more than European visitors, around 
10 per cent more than Canadian visitors and over 65 per cent 
more than Caribbean visitors. (See table 27). Part of the 
reason for the particularly low expenditure of Caribbean 
visitors was the fact that less than 50 per cent of arrivals 
from the Caribbean were in Grenada specifically for vacation
purposes, whereas over 83 per cent were from the US, Canada
. 40and Europe.
The CTRC survey also provides data on a number of other 
aspects of Grenada's tourist industry under the PRG. First of 
all, it showed that Grenada's main attractions to the visitors 
interviewed were the country's warm climate, beaches and 
relaxed atmosphere. (See tables 28 and 29). Most other 
Caribbean tourist resorts are equally we 11-renowned for these 
features and this factor would seem to indicate that Grenada's 
special attraction - namely its scenery - would not, in and 
of itself, have been sufficient to attract the sort of 
numbers projected by the PRG. The revolutionary government 
would have faced intense competition from its Caribbean rivals. 
Secondly, the survey confirmed with respect to Grenada a 
pattern that has been observed in other tourist resorts, 
namely the heavy reliance of tourists upon friends and relatives 
for information concerning a tourist resort. (See table 30). 
'What seems to occur is that a person's interest is aroused 
through many alternative means - a film on TV, a tourist board 
advertisement, a book, a newspaper article, a tour 
operator advertisement - and this initial interest is followed 
up by a consultation with some friend or relative who has
TABLE 27
TOURIST EXPENDITURE
US Canada Europe 
US 3
Caribbean
Average per party per trip 855 724 818 295
Average per person per trip 481 398 482 223
Average per person per night 57 36 48 69
Note: The average length of stay of Caribbean residents was 3.6 
nights, compared with typically around 9 nights for those 
outside the region. In addition, the number of people per 
expenditure party was typically 1.7-1 .8 for those from 
outside the region, compared with 1.32 for Caribbean 
residents. Both these factors tended to push up the 
expenditure per person per day for Caribbean residents.
Caribbean Tourism Research and Development Centre, Grenada 
Visitor Survey 1982: Vol. 1 Summary and Methodology, Barbados,
1982,  p .  8 .
Source:
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TABLE 28
REASONS GIVEN BY TOURISTS FOR THEIR V IS IT
US Canada Europe
Warm Climate 119 93 120
Restful Atmosphere 71 48 82
Scenery 56 40 72
Beaches 76 43 85
Inexpensive in General 4 7 2
Friendly People 50 35 76
Near Family/Friends 46 17 21
Yachting/Sailing 12 15 13
Other 50 24 41
Note: Respondents were asked to cite three reasons 
for their visit to Grenada.
Source: Grenada Visitor Survey 1982: Vol. T Summary 
and Methodology, p. 4.
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TABLE 29
ASSESSMENT OF GRENADA HADE BY TOURISTS
Very Satisfied^ US Canada Europe Caribbean
Ease of Entry 48.2 62.1 42.7 67.1
Immigration Personnel 51.2 56.5 44.7 68.4
Customs Personnel 50.0 54.4 45.6 61.0
Beaches 89.4 82.0 74.4 65.7
Accommodation 56.2 62.1 45.1 55.7
Restaurants 40.6 37.7 23.2 23.7
Sports Facilities 30.6 26.2 13.4 21.1
Night Life 19.5 27.0 17.8 14.3
Local Transport 36.2 34.3 25.0 25.0
Excursions 46.5 49.2 28.2 23.5
Friendliness 71.4 75.4 66.7 75.0
Overall Cost of Visit 40.1 48.5 24.6 60.3
(a) Respondents were asked to score aspects of tourism in Grenada 
on a range of 1 (very dissatisfied) to 5 (very satisfied).
The proportion of 'very satisfied' forms a useful index of 
relative strength.
Source : Grenada V is i t o r  Su rvey 1982: V o l.  I  Summary and M ethodology, 
p. 7.
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TABLE 30
SOURCES OF INFO RM ATIOH USED BY TOURISTS
Information Source US Canada Europe
Friends/Relations 54.1 64.7 46.4
Travel Agent Brochure 8.2 8.4 15.3
Airline Brochure 11.2 6.7 6.6
Travel Books 10.6 3.4 13.8
Newspaper, Magazine - 0.8 -
Tourist Board 0.6 0.8 4.1
Note: Respondents were asked for their main information source.
Source: Grenada V i s i t o r  Survey 1982: V o l.  T Summary and 
M ethodology, p. 4 .
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personal experience.1^  This is an illustration of the deep 
conseruatism of tourism and the reluctance of most tourists 
to venture into 'unchartered waters'. Another area on which 
the survey contains information is that of accomadation . The 
most important factor to isolate here is the strong tendency 
of Caribbean visitors to stay with friends and relatives,
which confirms the information already presented concerning the 
expenditure pattern of visitors from the region. (See table 
31). Finally, the survey contains a number of comments made 
by visitors about their appreciation of holidaying in 'Free 
Grenada'. Reactions to the revolution were mixed: 'As a 
socialist and member of the New Democratic Party in Canada,
I was inspired by Revolutionary Grenada, and will encourage 
everyone to come and see for themselves', stated one satisfied 
customer of the PRG. Another supporter was somewhat more 
reticent: 'Long live the revolution', was his or her response. 
Other respondents were not so impressed by the revolution:
'The people were friendly and helpful. Our only recommendation 
would be to use another word for revolution, because revolution 
has a negative connotation to tourists'; 'Too much militaries'; 
'UJe disliked soldiers coming into the restaurants with large 
guns hanging over their shoulders'. And one final criticism of 
the revolution was: 'Disliked all the bad talk about the US 
on the radio and in the press which makes the US visitors 
uncomfortable'. Many visitors were also apprehensive about the 
planned growth of Grenada's tourist industry, thus revealing 
a marked reverence amongst tourists for the island's 
underdevelopment. Typical comments were: 'We liked the fact 
that the island is not too developed'; 'Tourism is important 
to the economy, but I am afraid that if Grenada had a lot of
TABLE 31
ACCOMMODATION USED BY TOURISTS
Accommodation US Canada Europe
%
Caribbean
Hotel 48.2 18.8 44.4 42.4
Guesthouse 6.6 6.0 13.9 10.9
Rented Apartment 7.2 27.4 21 .4 4.3
Friend a/Relat ive s 30.1 35.0 13.4 40.2
Bareboat 2.4 3.4 1 .6 -
Crewed Yacht 3.0 5.1 2.7 -
Other 2.4 4.3 2.7 2.2
Source: Grenada V i s i t o r  Survey 1982: V o l.  T Summary and 
M ethodo logy , p. 6.
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tourism it would change the friendliness and mentality of the 
people* ; 'I have an anxiety that development of the country 
could lead to over-deuelopment which has happened in Japan 
and the US i.e., spoiling the natural beauty and the wild 
life for development'.^ These statements reveal a great deal 
about the tensions which existed in Grenada's tourist industry 
under the Bishop regime.
Taken together then, the actual performance of tourism 
under the PRG, and the nature of, and trends inherent in, the 
international tourism market would tend to suggest that 
diversification could not have given rise to the growth in 
tourism envisaged. The ability of the US to substantially 
reduce the flow of visitors to Grenada was a major headache 
for the Bishop regime.
The central place which the PRG accorded to the private 
sector in its tourism programme also posed a number of problems 
First of all, given the unreliability of local supplies most 
private hoteliers continued to purchase imported food and drink 
Secondly, private sector investment in tourism remained 
depressed throughout the four years of the r e v o l u t i o n P a r t  
of the reason for this was, undoubtedly, the international 
recession. The fact that the Point Salines project had not yet 
been completed, was another. In his Radio Free Grenada 
interview Ramdhanny reported that he had been told by hoteliers 
and other private investors that they were not prepared to 
'pour one bucket of concrete in terms of hotel construction 
until they have that international airport'. These factors 
alone, however, are not sufficient to explain the poor 
investment climate in tourism. For, in spite of the recession, 
a number of other Caribbean islands managed to attract
substantial new investments in tourism during this period. 45
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Why did this not occur in Grenada which had such tourism 
potential? Evidently, there was a lack of confidence on the 
part of investors in the PRG's ability to complete the Point 
Salines project, and apprehension existed with respect to 
the long term prospects for tourism in a revolutionary state. 
The Canadian company, Carinex, which expressed great interest 
in developing a hotel complex in Grenada, had in April 1983 
still not made a final commitment. According to Nicholas 
Thomas, Tourism Development Officer of the CTRC, hoteliers in 
Grenada were highly suspicious of government intentions 
following the PRG's cancellation of an agreement with an 
international company. Thomas had been told by Royston Hopkins, 
President of the Grenada Hotel Association (GHA), that he, 
Hopkins, was hesitant about investing because of his fears 
over the PRG's policies.^®
The poor investment climate in tourism also indicates 
that the projected number of tourist arrivals was unrealistic. 
Since the construction of new hotels was not taking place 
there simply would not have been the space to accomodate the 
numbers planned. And this, in turn, suggests that government 
revenues from tourism would not have been adequate to repay 
the debts incurred at Point Salines. A debt crisis loomed 
on the horizon. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that employment 
would have been found for all those whose labour would have
become superfluous with the completion of the international 
47airport.
While the problems associated with private sector tourism 
development were formidable, it should be pointed out that 
the PRG's experience of state intervention in this area was 
not too encouraging. The commitment to private sector tourism
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was, to a large extent, based on the inability of the state 
to operate efficiently in the tourist industry. Although 
Grencraft turned out to be one of the biggest success stories 
of the revolution, achieving a rapid^growth in sales and 
stimulating a local demand that it was unable to fully satisfy, 
the GRC's performance was little short of a disaster. Four of 
the managers appointed to run the Corporation had to be sacked 
for a number of reasons, such as 'sexploitation', corruption 
and poor management. In 1982 the GRC lost ECS230.000. While 
the slump in tourism was partly responsible, the loss in 
earnings was primarily due to overstaffing, pilferage of food 
and drink, waste, and the failure of government ministries 
to pay bills. Most workers in the hotels had no experience of 
hotel work, and this was another contributory factor to the 
poor performance. Originally, the PRG believed that the GRC 
could be used to provide more jobs for the unemployed, and, 
in 1982 the Corporation's workforce was increased to 116 
employees from 90 the previous year. This meant that in
comparison with the private hotels the GRC had twice as many
4 9workers to each hotel room. In order to reduce the staffing
ratio and cut its losses, in early 1983 the GRC fired
about half its labour force without any form of compensation.
Finally, the Crucial Factor restaurant, owned by the PRG,
was somewhat more successful. In 1983 it made a profit of
EC$5,800, though this was quite a modest sum for such an 
50enterprlse.
The limited scale of government intervention in Grenada's 
tourist industry placed restrictions on the PRG's ability to 
use tourism as an instrument of 'socialist orientation' .
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Given that the tourist industry remained largely in the hands 
of the private sector most of the benefits still accrued to 
a minority of the population; and since private sector 
participation in tourism was scheduled to increase this 
situation would have been exacerbated. Unlike Cuba, tourism 
is one of Grenada's leading industries and therefore its 
ownership structure is of capital importance to the island's 
political economy as a whole. Notwithstanding the plans of 
the PRG, the prioritisation of tourism in the econimic 
strategy of the revolutionary government thus constituted a 
major contradiction in the attempt to construct a socialist 
society. To quote Emmanuel de Kadt: 'Planners of tourism can 
do little to promote greater equality in the distribution of 
the benefits of that industry, if the forces making for 
inequality are left a free rein in their society and if policies 
aimed at the eradication of poverty are not vigourously 
pursued. It is a nation's overall political economy that will, 
in effect, largely determine the eventual social outcome, 
if not the initial economic shape, of projects. "Planning" 
can do little to alter this, fundamantal fact . '^  And this, in 
turn, relates to the PRG's tourism awareness programme. The 
underlying concept of this campaign was the idea that the 
animosity displayed by the indigenous population towards 
tourists is based on ignorance and a lack of appreciation of 
the economic importance of tourism. Such an idea; however, 
rests on a misunderstanding of the effects of tourism in a 
society with a highly skewed distribution of income. To quote 
Emmanuel de Kadt once again: ' klhen tourism development is 
grafted onto a society whose poverty is still widespread and 
where many inhabitants do not share in the benefits of
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tourism, negative attitudes tomard the tourists and
resentment of their wealth should cause no surprise. 1 
In spite of its innovative features, the tourism awareness 
programme of the PRG suffered from thj.s fundamental 
misconception which has nullified tourism education campaigns 
in a number of Caribbean states. Moreover, the PRG does not 
appear to have had any concrete plans to counter the class 
barriers erected by tourism by making the island's tourism 
facilities more accessible to working people. When asked if 
the PRG had any scheme of rewarding workers with a holiday in 
a government-owned hotel, Jane Belfon, the director of tourism, 
commented flatly: 'If they can afford to stay in hotels, they 
stay.'^ Again, the private sector bias in the PRG's 
tourism programme restricted its ability to alleviate the 
negative soci-cultural influences of tourism. While Grenada 
by no means reached the level of Barbados, the evils of 
tourism were in evidence in Bishop's Grenada. Most important 
of all was the beach boy phenomenon. In fact, it appears that 
the popularity of the revolution amongst young radicals in 
Europe and Worth America made Grenada a chosen destination 
for white women seeking a physical encounter with black 
and Rastafarian males. As in a number of other Caribbean 
islands, Scandinavian and West German women were the most 
enthusiasitc supporters of this black eroticism of the 
revolution. The avenues that existed for young, enterprising 
and virile young males to earn a living providing sexual, 
narcotic and other services for tourists was a major 
weakness of the Bishop regime. It militated against the 
socialist and egalitarian ethos of the revolution, reinforced 
racial and cultural stereotypes, fostered disdain and
52
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resentment for work in agriculture and was the main factor 
underlying the 'visa mentality', i.e., the urge to migrate, of 
sections of the youth. While Radio Free Grenada extolled 
with great solemnity the superiority of the socialist camp 
over the Western countries, Grenadian teenagers could make 
a concrete assessment for themselves by going to the beaches 
of Grand Anse and dome Rouge and examining the attire and 
affluence of Western tourists and Cuban construction workers 
respectively. Of course, this would not have been a 'scientific' 
way to evaluate the relative merits of capitalism and 
socialism, but unemployed young people in Grenada would 
probably not have been thinking 'scientifically'.
The beach boys also caused great offence to a number of 
socialist feminists who worked in Grenada under the PRG. 
Intimidated by the advances of the beach boys, they stayed
away from the major beaches and did not dare to venture out
54alone in tourist areas. In addition to beach boys, there 
was also begging and female prostitution, but these activities 
were not widespread. No doubt the recession facing Grenada's 
tourist industry made the PRG hesitant about stamping out 
these practices. The tourists would simply have gone to a 
neighbouring island. When asked about these problems, Jane 
Belfon was attentive but not overly concerned. She said that 
the PRG was aware of these happenings, and although no 
concrete measures had yet been drawn up to resolve the 
'Scandinavian problem' it was their intention to stop the 
'trade in body'. Strategies were being developed, she said, 
to end prostitution and drug peddling, and booths were to 
be built for vendors to stop them 'hassling' tourists.^
To sum up then, one can say that tourism was a major
contradiction of the Grenadian revolution in that it
saddled the PRG with a number of social and political problems
while its economic benefits were of declining value and the
long term prospects of the industry were uncertain. It also
made the revolution particularly vulnerable to US imperialism.
The crippling effects of the state department propaganda
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offensive have been documented. What also has to be mentioned 
is that tourism was a colossal security problem for the 
revolution. Unable to impose visa restrictions and security 
checks on visitors, owing to the competition it faced from 
neighbouring states, Bishop’s Grenada must have been a 
paradise for CIA operatives. The efficiency and speed with 
which the US invasion was carried out in October 1983 was, 
in part, an illustration of the CIA's success in intelligence 
gathering. In that sense, tourism may also be considered to 
have been one of the gravediggers of the revolution.
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Chapter Eight
Developments in the Countryside
Since Grenada is predominantly a rural society, it is 
not surprising that some of the boldest measures introduced 
by the Bishop regime took place in the countryside. Undoubtedly, 
the PRG devoted more attention to agriculture than any other 
state in the history of the English-speaking Caribbean.
Pursuing an integrated strategy, which involved mass 
mobilisation, incentives to the peasantry, the improvement of 
feeder roads and land reform, the revolutionary government 
had no intention of neglecting the rural areas in its 
modernization drive. The PRG consistently lauded the virtues 
of farming in order to root out the disdain for this activity 
which centuries of slavery and colonialism have implanted in 
the psyche of the Grenadian people. However, the problems 
which the revolutionary government inherited in this area 
were formidable and may factors served to obstruct its
intiatives.
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The Agrarian Programme
On assuming power in 1979 the PRG did not u/aste any time 
in attempting to find a solution to the deep malaise which 
afflicted Grenada's agricultural industry. Intially, the 
revolutionary government centred its attention on the twenty- 
six state farms it inherited from the Gairy regime. A detailed 
inventory of the assets of each of the estates was made and 
new management teams were brought in. Managers were asked to 
make proposals for the 'urgent rehabilitation' of the estates 
so that each farm could become self-sufficient by the end of 
a five-year period. In December 1980 the Grenada Farms 
Corportation (GFC) was launched and assigned the following 
responsibilities: to maintain, manage and control all the farms 
to develop the farms on a commercial basis consistent with 
the agricultural policies and programmes of the PRG; to 
stimulate and undertake agricultural development on the farms 
and participate in agricultural development pojects 
approved by the minister responsible for agriculture; to 
stimulate development among small landholders in close 
proximity to the farms and be a source of supply of inputs 
critical to small farm development; to perform any other 
function consistent with agricultural development as the 
minister responsible for agriculture may from time to time 
direct.“' Subsequent cost-benefit analysis indicated that six 
of the farms were inherently unviable and later on they were 
disbanded as seperate units or taken out of GFC control.
A policy paper put out by the ministry of agriculture
announced that the state sector would take 'the leading role
2in transforming agriculture', and this was given greater 
effect by the introduction in August 1981 of the Land
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Development and Utilization Law. Under this law, the minister 
of agriculture was empowered to compulsorily lease for ten 
years any estate over 100 acres considered to be idle. The 
Land Law was carefully worded to give^the Land Development 
and Utilization Commission, a body of government appointees, a 
great deal of scope to implement the law's requirements. In 
the first place, the Land Commission was authorized to 
designate an area of land as 'agricultural', thus making the 
law applicable to any piece of land chosen by the Commission: 
'The Commission with the approval of the minister may from 
time to time by order designate as agricultural land any land 
which, having regard to its situation, character and other 
relevant circumstances, the Commission considers ought to be 
brought into use for agriculture, so, however, that no order 
shall be made ... in relation to land the use of which for 
some development purpose other than agriculture has been 
approved by Government.'^ The original draft of the law 
allowed thirty days between the declaration, made in the 
Grenada Government Gazette, of an agricultural unit as idle 
and the coming into force of the law. Owners were given 
twenty-one days in which to make an appeal against the 
Commission's ruling. In December 1982 the PRG introduced an 
amendment to the law which speeded up the acquisition 
procedure. It stated that where 'the Minister in his 
discretion considers that for any of the purposes of increasing 
production providing employment or otherwise serving the 
national interest the Crown should obtain a lease of
/an agricultural uni^7 without delay the Minister may make an
' 4. 'Immediate Leasing Order' in respect of such land.
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The immediate leasing order allowed only seven days for appeal
by landouiners, following which the minister of agriculture
would either allow the appeal and revoke the order, or dismiss
the appeal and confirm the order. The original draft of the*
law had also provided for owners to submit a development plan 
in respect of their farming intentions as a means of 
avoiding government acquisition of their property; but the 
immediate leasing order dispensed with this provision. During 
the period of lease the Land Law made the rtiinister of 
agriculture responsible for all taxes payable by the owner. 
However, the amount of compensation to which the owner was 
entitled was extremely modest: an annual rent 'equivalent to 
one per centum of the unimproved value of the land as 
agricultural land at the time of commencement of the lease or 
any renewal thereof, as the case may be. In addition to 
the clause enabling it to designate an area as 'agricultural 
land', the Land Commission was given a wide range of powers 
to solicit information from owners about their estates and 
carry out inspections and surveys of its own of agricultural 
units.
The Land Law was introduced during the enumeration 
process of the 1981 agricultural census, which provided a 
great deal of information about the state of agr icGi lture, and 
focussed the attention of the revolutionary government on this 
issue. In the following year the PRG carried out an aerial 
survey of the island which produced photographic and 
cartographic information about the situation in the countryside. 
It seems that the PRG was carefully analysing all of this 
information before making full use of the powers it had 
assigned to itself under the Land Law. For in spite of the
■■■■■few.
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abundance of idle land in the country, no acquisitions took 
place for ouer eighteen months. Another factor which might have 
contributed to the delay was the shortage of trained personnel 
in agriculture. In any event, when the PRG did begin to take 
over estates in April 1983 it was greatly assisted by several 
Grenadians who had recently graduated at the School of 
Agriculture at the University of the West Indies in Trinidad 
and Tobago. An indication that the April take-overs were 
scheduled way in advance is provided in the revised Land Law.
It gave absentee landowners until 31 March 1983 to provide
the minister of agriculture with an address in Grenada that
0could be used for the purposes of the law. Clearly, the link 
between this date and the subsequent take-overs was no pure 
c oinc i dene e.
The PRG adopted a flexible and pragmatic approach in 
acquiring estates. Beginning around November 1982, a number of 
farms were declared idle. This process continued through to 
the early months of 1983. During this period the PRG entered 
into negotiations with landowners, and, in anticipation of 
government acqusition some of them offered their estates for
sale at knockdown prices. Such planters were paid in cash and 
7government bonds. In several other cases an appeal was made 
against the idle land order. Of those that appealed, the 
majority did not bother to submit a development plan. There is 
only one case documented of the PRG having accepted the 
development proposal made by a landowner. It was at the 
Chambord estate in St. Patrick's which was owned in three 
parts by Harold George Gentle and others, Ian Turbott and 
Kent Estates Ltd. The Land Commission agreed that forty acres 
of the 317-acre estate should 'remain in the possession of 
the Owners subject to it being used for the purpose stated
when representation was made to the Lands Officer.' In mid- 
April, when the main bulk of the acquisitions took place, the 
PRG resorted to the immediate leasing order provision to gain 
rapid control of estates, many of which had already been 
declared idle. Details of the various take-overs were made 
available in the Grenada Government Gazette only; the Free 
West Indian did not report them. The revolutionary government 
wanted as little publicity as possible in order to prevent 
an over-reaction on the part of the planter class and its 
capitalist associates. The landowners, for their part, did not 
agitate publicly about the fate that had befallen them. In the 
main, they entered into negotiations with the PRG in an 
attempt to get more acceptable terms either for the lease or 
an outright government purchase. With its intimate knowledge 
of each of the planters and their political and family 
backgrounds, the PRG treated each case seperately. It used 
various means to head off the demands of landowners while 
proceeding to take over the management of the estate in 
question. In this way it avoided a direct confrontation. The 
PRG's acqusition programme was facilitated by the generalized 
insolvency of the planter class. It was widely said that only 
three estates in the country were making any profit, and many 
were in debt to the commercial banks and the CDB. In fact, in 
at least two cases the PRG was obliged to enter into long
drawn out discussions with the Bank of Nova Scotia before
gassuming farm control. Several planters were quite happy to 
let the PRG take control of their estates and made informal 
arrangements with the revolutionary government either before 
or after the issue of an immediate leasing order. ^
0
Thus, the
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PRG was able to increase state intervention in agriculture 
with little appreciable opposition. In all, some eighteen 
estates were taken over, expanding GFC control to some twenty- 
five per cent of the cultivable land .in Grenada. (See table 
32). The estates that were left untouched belonged to local 
planters who were active supporters of the revolution and had 
well-thought out ideas about farming. In this way the PRG had 
seperated the 'patriotic national bourgeoisie' from the 
'unpatriotic national bourgeoisie' in agriculture.
In reinforcing the state sector in the countryside, the 
PRG devoted considerable attention to the living conditions 
and educational level of the agro-proletariat. A document 
issued by the GFC in 1983 provides an illustration of the 
revolutionary government's thinking on this matter: 'One of the 
fundamental reasons responsible for the backwardness of 
agriculture and the low level of production is undoubtedly the 
low productivity and cultural level of agricultural workers.
The cultural level of the vast majority of agricultural 
workers varies within illiterate and semi-i11iterate. When one 
considers the critical importance of agriculture to our 
economy it is ironical that such a vital area is clothed with 
the most backward elements.'^  In order to ameliorate this 
situation the PRG introduced a number of measures and 
incentives. First of all, government ministers paid regular 
visits to estates and castigated the old attitudes towards 
farm work. It was impressed upon the rural labour force that 
agriculture was of vital importance to the economy, and the 
'creative' and 'exciting' aspects of farm work were highlighted.
TABLE 32
ESTATES MANAGED BY THE GRENADA FARMS CORPORATION - 1983
Area in Acres Previous Owner
KEGION 1 - T. A. MAKRYSHOW
Carrière 78 Government of Grenada
Chambord 317 (Harold George Kent Gentle 
(ian Turbott 
(Kent Estates Ltd.
Lèvera 120 Government of Grenada
Meadow 122 Aero Club Company Ltd.
Mt. Reuil 250 Government of Grenada
Pointzfield 40 Government of Grenada
River Antoine 400 De Gale Family
REGION 2 - T. URIAH BUTLER
Belle Vue (St. Andrew) 226 Government of Grenada
Grand Bras/Cadrona 195 Government of Grenada
Mt. Horne 75 Government of Grenada
Paradise 198 Government of Grenada
Springs 226 Government of Grenada
REGION 3 - JULIEN FEPON
Belvidere 800 (Esmond Ronald Campbell 
(Malcolm Percival Campbell 
(Agnes Louise McMillan
La Force/Pechier N.A. N.A.
St. Omer N.A. N.A.
Windsor N.A. N.A.
REGION 4 - DEMO GRANT
Black Bay 90 Government of Grenada
Bocage/Diamond 380 Government of Grenada
Lorretto 110 Government of Grenada
Palmiste N.A. N.A.
Samaritan 43 Government of Grenada
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REGION 3 - HAROLD STKACHAN 
Beausejour 600 N.A.
Perseverance 260 Government of Grenada
Grenville Vale 300 (Herbert Heckles
Woodford 330
(Grenville Vale Estates Ltd. 
(Woodford Estates Ltd.
REGION 6 - RUPERT BISHOP 
Bailes Bacolet 398
(George Elliot Dunbar Clyne 
(Government of Grenada
Campbell's Estates Ltd.
Calivigny 110 Government of Grenada
Laura
(a)La Sagesse' ' 
La Sagesse
114 Government of Grenada
110 Government of Grenada
104 La Chausseur Beachettes
Minorca 68
Ltd.
Wilbert Douglas
REGION 7 - EDITH McBAIN 
Grand Bacolet 
Maremount^ 
Marcmount^b^
N.A. N.A.
148 Government of Grenada
176 (John Byron Renwick
Requin N.A.
(Charles Grainger 
N.A.
N.A. - Not available.
(a) - This refers to the Belle Vue estate in the parish of St. Andrew.
There is another estate called Belle Vue in the parish of St. George's.
Source: Grenada Farms Corporation, St. George's, 1 9 8 3 ; Grenada Government 
Gazette. Jan. 1 - June 3 1983 .
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In February 1981 the AGldU concluded a twenty-eight-point 
agreement with the PRG which greatly improved the wages and 
working conditions of workers on state farms. Contents of the 
agreement were disclosed at a general meeting of the union 
held at Seamoon, Grenville, on Thursday 19 February. In 
outlining the agreement, Fitzroy Bain declared that the days 
were done when agricultural workers were treated like animals,
and pledged that the flGWU would be standing up for their
12
rights in the times ahead. He announced that under the 
agreement daily-paid workers would receive pay increases from 
ECS6.80 to ECS8.50 for men, and from ECS5.80 to ECS7.5Q for 
women. These increases also applied to road workers who were 
represented by the union alongside estate workers. Clerical 
workers on estates, who were paid fortnightly, would receive 
an increase of ECU23.80 per fortnight. Profit-sharing was 
also to be introduced. Estates would be required to present 
a certified statement of accounts to the union, after which 
one-third of the profits would go to the employer, one-third 
towards the improvement of the estate and the remaining third 
to be distributed amongst the workforce. On profit-sharing 
Bain stated: '... this will be the basis for changing the 
economic situation of the agricultural and road workers', 
since it would ensure that they got a share of the profits 
created by their work.^ Bain reported on the other requirements 
contained in the agreement. The seniority and experience of 
workers were to be taken into consideration in their treatment 
by the the employer. Every worker would be entitled to sick 
leave benefits, whether sick on the job or at home. And 
workers were to receive pay for public holidays, as long as 
they worked the day before or the day after the holiday.
Proper health and safety conditions were 'guaranteed' to 
all workers on state farms, and the PRG agreed to have an 
insurance plan worked out in the not-to-distant future.
The PRG also undertook to institute a pension scheme for 
agricultural workers, and started t o pay ECI20 a fortnight 
to pensioners until the plan was implemented. Seperate toilet 
facilities were to be provided for men and women, so that 
workers would no longer need to 'hide behind the bushes'.
In order to put an end to the practice of workers drinking 
from streams, pipe-borne water and adequate drinking facilities 
would be installed; and workers were to be provided with a 
common room for eating. Estates were mandated to make cutlasses 
and files available to the workforce. In the event of 
redundancy, the estate owner was now obliged to inform the 
union and the workers at least forty-five days in advance, 
and severance pay was 'guaranteed' to any worker made 
redundant. Workers were called upon to participate in the 
running of estates, and managers were required to hold 
monthly meetings with their workforce to review the financial 
position of the estate and decide on ways of increasing 
production. Finally, workers on government estates would now 
be allowed to take time off during working hours to attend 
union meetings, seminars and other union activities, and 
full pay would be paid for the period of absence. In bringing 
his address to a close, Bain said that the union realised 
that more benefits were needed, but, he argued, workers 
should appreciate that they did not get 'one cent' last year 
and that there was a need for unity in the times ahead to
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get more benefits. He called on union members to wage a 
struggle to get the entire agreement implemented on state 
farms, and said that privately-owned estates should also 
be involved so that 'the agreement between the union and 
government can be instuted throughout the country.1^
In 1983, as part of its programme of promoting workers' 
education classes in public and private sector enterprises, 
the PRG introduced a new set of measures aimed toward the 
estate worker. These measures were designed to raise the 
'cultural level' of the agricultural labour force. In the 
first place, weekly workers' education classes were instituted. 
The classes lasted one hour and had three main objectives: to 
make workers aware that the farms were social property and hence 
that their development would enhance the development of Grenada; 
to ensure that workers participated actively in the process of 
managing the farms and in drawing up and executing all farm 
plans; to educate workers on production and productivity. 
Secondly, the PRG took steps to ensure that estate workers 
made maximum use of the CPE. Estate managers were instructed 
to keep a register of workers attending CPE classes and make 
arrangements for successful CPE students to get further training 
in agriculture. As an inducement to attend CPE classes, a 
CPE certificate was to be used as one of the main criteria 
for promotion. Finally, a procedure was worked out for the 
application of emulation to the state farming sector. Monthly 
emulation committees were set up comprising estate workers, 
management and union representatives. The emulation committees
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selected workers for emulation on an individual and group
basis. Emulation was based on labour discipline and
participation (see table 33), and a variety of awards were
given to successful workers, including: cash, travel to»
socialist countries, coupons for travel on state buses, tools,
clothes, increased loans for house repair, special invitations
15to state events and public recognition.
Turning to the development of the estates, on 15 December 
1982 the CDB approved a loan of US|2 million for the improvement 
of the estates managed by the GFC before the 1983 take-overs.
The agreement became effective on 1 January 1983, and included 
among the project's objectives were: the establishment, 
rehabilitation and maintenance of crops and livestock enterprise: 
on the farms; the cultivation of twenty-two acres of avacados 
and cloves, and thirty acres of vegetables; the establishment 
of a sheep enterprise on 114 acres of land under coconuts, 
fifteen acres of which were to be irrigated; the upgrading of 
the existing stock of equipment and machinery, and infrastructure 
such as roads and bridges; the provision of a radio network 
to facilitate contact between estates as well as between the 
GFC headquarters and individual estates; the improvement of 
management capability through the selection and training of 
key personnel at appropriate institutions. Crops produced 
under the scheme were to be sold primarily to Trinidad arid Tobag 
and Britain through the Marketing and National Import Board 
(MNIB), the state trading company established by the PRG.^
The PRG was required to contribute ECil.6 million to the 
oveall project to pay for certain local costs. As a rule, the 
CDB only makes payments to its recipients after they have 
already spent a sum of money, so the CDB loan gave rise to a
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TABLE 33
EMULATION OR IT BKIA USED BY TJK GRENADA FARMS CORPORATION
1. LABOUR DISCIPLINE . POINTS
Attendance and puncuality 1 0
Fulfilment of tasks in terms of both quality and quantity 40
Care of equipment and property 10
Initiative and creativity 5
Co—operativeness/comradeliness 2
TOTAL 67
2. PARTICIPATION
Punctuality and participation in Socialism classes 1 0
Attendance and punctuality in Adult Education classes 1 0
Attendance and punctuality in Trade Union activities 5
Attendance and punctuality in Militia activities 2
Attendance and punctuality in Voluntary Work in State/
Community enterprises 4
Attendance and punctuality in Workers Parish Council 2
TOTAL 33
Note: Out of 100 points 67 points were assigned to Labour Discipline
and 33 points to Participation. Each was subdivided in turn 
as shown. Points were awarded for labour discipline on a 
group basis. Workers were divided into teams and each team 
given a specific target to meet. It is not clear whether 
points were awarded for participation on a group or individual 
basis.
Source: Grenada Farms Corporation. St. George's, 1983, 
the Trade Union in 1983'.
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considerable increase in the financial requirements of the 
PRG. Moreover, since the loan did not cover the estates taken 
over in 1983, more government finance uas needed to develop 
them.^^
After the reinforcement of the state farm sector, the 
co-operative movement launched by the PRG, the National 
Co-operative Development Agency (NACDA), uas the second most 
important initiative undertaken by the revolutionary government 
in agriculture. Before the revolution there uas a very ueak 
co-operative movement in Grenada. Co-operative laus were based 
on the British model, uhile the co-operative credit unions 
that existed under these laus were strongly influenced by the 
American co-operative movement. In establishing NACDA the PRG 
uas assisted by T.D.L. Peiris , uhose technical expertise uas 
made available by the Commonuealth Fund for Technical 
Co-operation (CFTC). The Agency uas set up in April 1980 as 
a statutory body in the ministry of agriculture, and its 
objectives uere listed as follous: to co-ordinate the 
activities of the various departments of government and other 
institutions engaged in the establishment and development of 
co-operative societies in Grenada; to provide services necessary 
to facilitate the establishment and development of co-operative 
societies, and in particular, to create and manage a fund for 
granting loans and other financial assistance to registered 
co-operative societies; to advise the minister responsible for 
agricultural co-operatives in matters pertaining to the
1 flestablishment and development of co-operative societies.
In pursuit of these objectives, NACDA performed a variety of 
functions, including registration, preparation of feasibility 
studies, bye-laus and accounting systems, provision of
training and management advice, and overall monotoring and 
supervision. The Agency started out with a EC$1 million loan 
from the IMCB to use as a revolving loan fund for starting 
co-operatives. Subsequently, both the Agency itself and a 
number of individual co-ops received assistance from NGOs.
The actual process of forming co-ops began with a series 
of panel discussions held around the country. The panellists 
were all members of the PRG and included Bishop. Held under 
the slogan 'Idle Lands Plus Idle Hands = An End to Unemployment' 
the purpose of the discussions was to inform the masses about 
the PRG's concern over the high rate of unemployment and the 
vast tracts of land that were lying idle or underutilized. By 
the end of the discusssions a Land Reform Commission mas 
appointed, and between May to July 1980 it held sittings in 
all the parishes including the sister islands of Carriacou 
and Petite Martinique. At the sittings the masses were called 
upon to identify areas of idle land in each parish, and those 
willing to form co-ops were asked to come forward. In all, 
over 4,000 acres of idle land were identified, and many of the 
individuals (mainly youth and women) who gave evidence before 
the Commission later went on to form co-ops. Along with 
agriculture, co-ops were formed in fishing, handicrafts, boat 
construction, baking and garment manufacture. Most co-ops 
employed seven people. The average loan for an agricultural 
co-op was ECS25.000, which covered inputs such as seeds, 
fertilizer, tools, storage and transportation. Wages for 
co-operators in agriculture were set at ECS8.50 a day, the rate 
of pay prevailing on the state farms. It was, however, left 
to the co-operators to decide whether or not they wished to
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draw wages. With guidance from NACDA, the co-ops marketed 
their own produce and repayed loans on a monthly basis with 
eight per cent interest per annum. Each co-op was also 
required to place twenty-five per cent of its earnings into 
a 'reserve fund'. The first venture of every co-op was 
underwritten by NACDA, which absorbed the loss if the co-op 
failed; but if the co-op succeeded in its first year and 
failed in the second, the goup would have to use its reserve 
fund to absorb the loss. After nine months of successful
operation, a co-op could obtain a second NACDA loan in order
19to diversify or expand.
Initially, the co-operative programme was slowed down 
by the difficulties experienced in obtaining land. In the first 
year the acquisition of land depended on the availability and 
goodwill of landowners, who in many cases lived abroad and oftei 
did not negotiate in good faith. With the introduction of the 
Land Law in summer 1981, landowners showed greater interest in 
selling or leasing their idle lands because of apprehension 
about compulsory take-over. In spite of this greater 
receptivity towards NACDA, however, the Agency was still 
obliged to enter into lengthy negotiations with landowners, 
many of whom wanted unrealistic sums for their property.
NACDA had to wage a concerted battle to get landowners to 
accept what the Agency was able to pay. Nevertheless, some 
sixty per cent of the lands obtained by NACDA came from 
private landowners. The PRG could only provide a limited 
amount of land for co-ops since most government-owned property 
was earmarked for various projects. However, those lands that 
were made available were provided on very soft terms; state 
lands were leased at around EC8100 per acre per annum, while
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the corresponding figure for privately-owned lands was 
ECS50Q.20
In addition to the steps taken to expand the state and 
co-operatiue sectors in agriculture, ^ the PRG sought to 
strengthen the agricultural base of the economy by prov/iding 
greater assistance to the peasantry. The ministry of agriculture 
was re-organised to increase the availability of technical 
advice, subsidies and training to peasants. In 1981 the PRG 
raised ECSB million through the CDB to repair fifteen miles of 
feeder roads around the country. In the same year the 
revolutionary government extended an ECS4.7 million assistance 
package to repair an additional fifty-two miles of feeder 
roads, provide low interest loans through the CDB for crop 
diversification, set up a farm shop for the sale of
21agricultural inputs and establish a fertiliser programme.
A good deal of attention was also devoted to the marketing of 
peasants crops. The MIMIB provided a guaranteed market for 
fruits and vegetables and found new marketing outlets in 
England and Trinidad and Tobago. This assisted in the diversifi­
cation of Grenada's exports away from its heavy dependence 
on c ocoa, nutmegs and bananas.
Another major initiative of the PRG, which also formed 
part of its marketing strategy, was the creation of a number 
of agro-industrial enterprises. Grenada has an abundance of 
fruits and vegetables which previously were lost through 
spoilage because of the very short harvesting period for 
these perishable products. In December 1980 the PRG established 
the Grenada Agro-industries factory at True Blue which provided 
a ready market for fruits and vegetables to be processed 
into sauces, jellies and nectars under the brand name 'Spice
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Isle'. The factory was central to the PRG's goal of linking 
agriculture to industry, with the MNIB forming the third 
link in the chain. Grenada flgro-industries processed products 
which were then chanelled through the MNIB for local and 
international distribution. The factory provided an incentive
for peasants to produce more because of the ready market it
2 2afforded for their products. A second agro-industrial 
project set up by the PRG was the Coffee Plant, which started 
processing operations in June 1980. By offering an attractive 
price for coffee, the plant sought to stimulate local production 
of the crop which had been declining over the years. In 1982 
a Spice Processing Plant was set up. The plant bought raw 
materials from peasants and the marketing associations, and 
centred its activity on the processing into powder of nutmeg, 
ginger and tumeric. In his address at the First International 
Conference in Solidarity with Grenada held in St. George's in 
November 1981, Kenrick Radix reported on the PRG's plans to 
carry out more advanced processing of cocoa and nutmegs: 'Our 
cocoa and nutmegs historically have been exported to developed 
capitalist economies. I have myself travelled to New York 
where I was able to see an enormously large nutmeg processing 
factory, a factory which employed over 3,000 people. Never 
in our history has any attempt whatsoever been made to establish 
a processing facility to process the bulk of our export 
products. A few months ago we invited an international 
organization to come to Grenada to conduct a feasibility study 
in the processing of our cocoa. Grenadian cocoa is sold at 
a premium price, as it has a 44? fat content and is used for 
blending with inferior cocoa from some other countries. What 
we are seeking to do now is to in fact enter the manufacturing
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game where we will extract the cocoa butter, etc. So, we are 
now awaiting the report of this team, as we have made some 
approaches to our friends in a fraternal country, for the 
equipment necessary for us to become economically independent, 
by an introduction of cocoa processing.
This aim is the same in the area of nutmeg. At the present
time there is an application before a regional institution
for funding for the making of nutmeg oil in Grenada. This same
history is true of cocoa as it is with nutmeg. In fact the
scandal is well known that we export our cocoa for over just
11 (U.S.) a pound, that is 16 ounces making the pound and
when we re-import the processed product, it seems as if 14
ounces make their pound and it is over 85 (U.S.) for their
14 ounce pound. So we're going to learn how to trade and we
will be trading with the imperialist at 14 ounces equal to 
, »23one pound.'
By purchasing and aquiring assets in the Grenada Sugar 
Corporation, the country's sugar mill, the PRG placed itself 
in a much stronger position to increase the Corporation's 
output of brown sugar. At the time of the revolution the 
Corporation produced only 16 per cent of the domestic consumption 
requirement. By simultaneously expanding the acreage devoted 
to sugar cane from 1,100 acres to 2,000 acres and increasing 
the capacity of the Corporation, the PRG planned to achieve 
self-sufficiency in sugar within five y e a r s . T h e  revolutionary 
government also took steps to increase the Corporation's 
production of rum and methylated spirits both for domestic 
consumption and export. Shortly after the revolution the 
PRG set up a Livestock Production and Genetic Centre at Mount. 
Hartman to make local meat available and thereby reduce meat
I
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imports. In 1982 the plant began to install facilities to
enable it to accomodate 1,000 pigs, 500 goats, 1,000 ducks,
1,500 rabbits and 500 turkeys. A biogas plant was also under
construction to convert the animal waste into a useful source♦
of energy for the plant. Plans were also laid for the 
establishment of a cattle farm in the vicinity. In another 
programme designed to emphasize the linkages between agriculture 
and industry, the PRG sought to ensure that local raw materials 
would be available to serve the construction and furniture- 
making industries. In August 1979 a Forestry Development 
Corporation was formed to oversee the development of the 
country's timber resources on a commerical basis. The Corporatior 
was assigned the responsibility for the establishment of a 
Forest Registry that would keep an up-to-date record of the 
industry's potential. A number of the Corporation's employees 
underwent training in anticipation of its acguisition of 
modern processing equipment to speed-up production and 
reduce costs. Because of the deficiencies of the rural road 
systems and other transportation facilities in the countryside, 
however, the Corporation could only get access to a limited 
proportion of the country's tree resources.
Returning to the PRG's policies towards the peasantry,
the revolutionary government believed that one of the solutions
to the problems of Grenada's agriculture was to promote
co-operation amongst this class. Between October 1982 and
February 1983, an intensive debate took place in the Central
Committee of the IMJM on the best way to collectivise
agriculture and build 'a firm alliance between the working
2 6class and the peasantry'. The main conclusion that was 
reached was that 'the development and modernisation of
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Agriculture holds the key to winning the peasantry to
Socialism and the transformation of the countryside along 
27socialist lines.' It was during these discussions that the
decision was taken to expand the state farming sector and
make the GFC the 'leading vehicle for the socialist transforma-
2 8tion of agriculture.' It was also decided that the
peasantry was to be 'won gradually to socialism' by tax and
other incentives, investment in rural infrastructure, the
strengthening of existing machinery pools and other services,
the expansion of co-operatives and other forms of co-operation
and, above all, through reinforcing the role of the PFU 'to
further build the mass organisation of the farmers as the
organ for carrying out the tasks of the Party among the 
2 9peasantry.' The resolution on agriculture passed by the 
Central Committee was marked 'confidential', because although 
the measures proposed in it were quite moderate and in no 
way threatened the peasantry with forced collectivisation 
and other draconian measures, it was an extremely sensitive 
issue given the close relationship with the land of a broad 
cross-section of Grenadian society.
Another facet of the revolutionary government's efforts 
to assist the peasantry was the re-introduction of agricultural 
training. Past neglect in this area was reflected in the low 
level of knowledge, skills and technology demonstrated by 
most peasants and the alarming shortage both in number and 
quality of personnel suitable to work as technicians in 
agriculture and related fields. As a step towards improving 
this situation, the PRG re-opened the Mirabeau Agricultural 
School which had been closed down under the Gairy regime.
The school provided places for fifty students a year to be
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trained in agricultural science, skills and techniques, 
equipping them to enter farming either on their own or in 
co-operatiues, Mirabeau was central to the PRG's campaign to 
reduce unemployment and attract young^people to agriculture.
A number of graduates from the school served as extension 
officers in the ministry of agriculture. The PRG also establishec 
training schools at Bocage, Boulogne, La Sagesse and Six 
Roads, Carriacou.^
While the PRG introduced measures to diversify Grenada's 
agricultural industry, the revolutionary government devised 
programmes to safeguard the peasantry's income from traditional 
crops. The first initiative taken by the PRG in this area 
was to change the personnel of each of the three statutory 
marketing associations, the GCNA, the GCA and the GBCS. In 
spite of pledges made before the revolution to restore to 
growers the right to elect members of the management boards, 
the PRG made use of the legislation introduced by Gairy to 
nominate members of its choosing. The pro-Gairy cabal of 
merchants and landowners was replaced by peasants, trade 
unionists and agronomists. Notwithstanding the economic 
rationale and goodsense that lay behind most of these 
appointments, however, the PRG's disinclination to re-introduce 
elections caused friction and alienated some important 
individuals in agriculture who would otherwise have supported 
government policy in this area. For example, F. J. Archibald, 
a planter and businessman by profession who was removed by 
Gairy from the post of Chairman of the GCNA, was summoned by 
the PRG to take up his old position. After working for the 
GCNA for a year, however, he resigned as a matter of principle 
because of the revolutionary government’s failure to call
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elections.^
Although the PRG failed to call elections, it did, 
nevertheless, provide for a greater active involvement of 
growers in the running of the agricultural marketing 
associations by re-introducing area meetings. These took 
place at least twice a year. As to the marketing policies of 
the associations and their day to day running, the revolutionary 
government refrained from making any significant changes. The
minister of agriculture held frequent meetings with the
• 32associations, but they were allowed to operate as before.
Shortly after the revolution the PRG established a Minor
Spices Co-operative to function along the same lines as the
cocoa, nutmeg and banana associations. The co-operative
bought and handled the export marketing of minor spices like
cloves, cinammon and pimento.
Along with the re-organisation of the marketing 
associations, the PRG took a number of initiatives to 
rehabilitate Grenada's traditional crops and obtain better 
prices for them abroad. The most important project initiated 
was the Cocoa Rehabilitation Project which started in 1982 
and was designed to replace the island's aged and low-yielding 
stock of cocoa trees. ^  Cocoa provides about 30 per cent of 
Grenada's foreign exchange earnings and is an important source 
of income and employment. Most of the country's cocoa growers 
are smallholders who own less than five acres of land. (See 
table 34). For the 12,000 acres of cocoa in production yields 
are low at around 400 pounds per acre. Over half the trees 
are aged or in poor condition and produce less than 200 pounds 
of cocoa per acre. Under the Cocoa Rehabilitation Project 
some 10,000 acres of trees were to be replanted over six years.
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TABLE 34
NUI-I3SK OF COCOA GRO'.fflhS BY FAKH SIZE: 1980
Size of Farms Number of Growers
Acres
less than 1 500
1 - 3 5,600
4 - 5 1 ,000
6 - 9 194
1 0 - 4 9 180
50+ 67
7,541
Source: Grenada Cocoa Association, St. George's, 1983
361
This was to have resulted in more than doubled average annual
production for a period of twenty-four years - the length of
peak production of the cocoa tree. Replanting is a big
investment for growers. Removal of even 1ow-yielding trees*
results in foregone revenues of around EC$400 per acre per 
year for a period of three years until new trees are 
producing. In addition, there are outlays for tree removal, 
drainage repair and planting as well as continuing the 
application of fertilizer and spraying. Revenue is not earned 
until the third year and payback does not really begin until 
the fifth year or later. Under the project growers received 
assistance, which, while not compensating for forgone 
production, did obviate most of their cash requirements needed 
to replant an acre for each of the three years it took to 
bring the new trees into production. Some 70 per cent of the 
incremental export revenue arising from the increased 
production was to have gone to growers. The GCA would have 
absorbed 13 per cent of the revenue from the cost of sales 
and other services to growers; and 17 per cent of the 
incremental proceeds would have gone to the PRG through taxes 
and other charges. The project covered state farms, private 
estates and lands owned by smallholders. In order to facilitate 
replanting the project provided for a number of supporting 
services such as: management and administration; the repair 
and upgrading of pre-existing propagating facilities; the 
addition of new propagating facilities including twenty acres 
of nursery and eleven propagating units and associated 
structures; the development and implementation of methods 
to control thrips and beetles; the establishment of an 
organizational structure and financial procedures for 
continuing tree replacement on a self-sustaining basis. ^
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Grenada's cocoa is of hight quality and fetches a 
premium over the London price for bulk cocoa. Because of this 
Grenada has no real difficulty in finding a markek for its 
cocoa crop. The problems which the ccyjntry does have, hoever , 
are those of production and price. As the lev/el of production 
has declined over the years there uias a steep fall in the 
world market price for cocoa. As part of a solution to this 
problem, in July 1982 the PRG entered into a protocol with 
the Soviet Union in which the latter agreed to buy 500 tonnes 
of cocoa from the GCA, about one-fifth of Grenada's annual 
production. The first consignment under the agreement was 
taken up in mid-1983 and the Soviet Union paid £115 a tonne 
above the prevailing world market price. Negotiations were 
also concluded with the USSR to buy 500 tonnes of cocoa in 
1904, and 1,000 tonnes in each of the years 1985, 1986 and
1987. It was anticipated that by 1985 the Cocoa Rehabilitation 
Project would be producing yields large enough to fill the 
Soviet quota.
Due to the prevalence of intercropping in Grenada, most 
cocoa growers also grow nutmegs. Thus, the number of nutmeg 
growers and the size of their landholdings are similar to 
those of cocoa. (See tables 34 and 35). The harvesting of 
nutmeg mainly involves collecting fallen nutmegs, but partially 
opened pods may also be picked off the tree. Unless the nutmeg 
is harvested within a certain period of it having fallen from 
the tree, the mace, which forms a skin around the nutmeg seed, 
may be spoilt by moisture and insects. Thus, in contrast to 
cocoa which is harvested directly from the tree and requires 
more careful husbandry, nutmeg cultivation is not labour 
intensive. The nutmeg tree also takes much longer to reach
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TABLE 35
NUMBER OF NUTMEG GROVfEKS BY FARM SIZE 
AND TOTAL DELIVERIES OF HUTHEG: 1970
Size of Number of Percentage of total Deliveries
Farms Growers Humber of growers
(pounds, equivalent 
cracked)
(Acres)
<  1 2,595 49 718,300
1 - 5 2,115 40 1 ,252,572
5 - 1 0 309 6 267,451
1 0 - 2 0 132 2 279,635
20 - 50 67 1 207,078
5 0 - 1 0 0 32 1 291 ,471
100+ 38 1 546,635
TOTAL 5.288(a) 100 3,563,142
(a) There are now about 7,000 producers of nutmeg in Grenada.
Source: Veronica Regis, An Economic Assessment of an Alternative 
Marketing Strategy for Grenada Nutmegs - Research Report 
on the Economics of Hutmeg Production Submitted to the 
Grenada Co-operative Nutmeg Association. Department of 
Agricultural Economics and Farm Management, University 
of the West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidads and Tobago,
p. 12.
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full maturity than the cocoa tree - about tuenty-fiue years 
in all. Hence, the nutmeg trees planted in the make of Hurricane 
Janet had just started their peak production at the time of 
the revolution. Consequently, the problems faced by the PRG in 
nutmeg were of a different order to those experienced in 
cocoa. The major obstacle to the development of Grenada's 
nutmeg industry was that of securing sales for the country's 
burgeoning crop.
Indonesia is the world's leading producer of nutmeg with
roughly two-thirds of the market, while Grenada controls
most of the remaining third. The world market price for nutmeg
is chiefly a reflection of variations in the level of production
in, and export from the two main producing countries. In the
1950s an upward pressure was exerted on prices by two major
events in Grenada: the 1951 general strike and Hurricane Janet
in 1955. During the period 1965 to 1967, prior to which prices
had been falling off, there was another major occurrence which
sent prices skyrocketing. This was the political crisis in
Indonesia. By the late 1960s, however, following the restoration
of order in Indonesia, prices tended to fall off and have
3 0maintained that trend ever since. Exports from Indonesia 
come from a multitude of private companies who compete against 
each other; there is no national marketing association. For 
many years Grenada tried to get Indonesia to form a marketing 
body so that the two countries could reach a common accord in 
price negotiations over nutmeg. In fact, on the actual day of 
the revolution Robert Renwick, the general manager of the 
GCNA, was in Indonesia holding talks about a joint marketing 
strategy. Little was achieved during the discusions. Because of 
Grenada's inability to influence Indonesia's marketing policy,
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the demand for Grenada's nutmeg fell sharply under the PRG. 
Indonesia unloaded stocks at some 30 per cent below the price 
of those from Grenada, leading many buyers to change their 
source of supply to the detriment of Grenada. The 1980 world 
recession also contributed to the weak demand for Grenada's 
nutmeg. Thus, the PRG faced a situation of increased production 
but falling export orders and low prices; the result, a massive 
increase in stocks of unsold nutmeg. As in the case of cocoa, 
the agreement signed with the Soviet Union in 1982 was part 
of an attempt to improve the marketing situation for the 
nutmeg industry. In the past the Soviet Union purchased its 
nutmeg requirements from dealers in Britain and the Netherlands. 
Annual purchases averaged about 500 tonnes, although by 1981 
this figure had fallen to 235 tonnes. Under the 1982 agreement 
the Soviet Union agreed to buy 300 tonnes of nutmeg direct 
from Grenada in the next crop year. The Soviet Union also 
undertook to purchase 500 tonnes per annum for a period of 
five years. The 1982 purchase was made at the prevailing 
world market price, but, according to Robert Renwick, the
Soviet negotiators attempted to get a lower price and 'drove 
3 7a hard bargain' . The price of nutmeg was not fixed in the 
five year agreement.
While the PRG managed to secure a significant and reliable 
market for its nutmeg in the Soviet Union, the revolutionary 
government was less fortunate with another East European 
country, Poland. Even before the revolution Poland bought its 
nutmeg direct from Grenada and the Polish market became of 
great significance to Grenada's nutmeg industry. In 1980 
Poland took 12 per cent of Grenada's nutmeg crop. However, the 
economic crisis which broke out in Poland the following year
led the East European country to cancel its order of Grenadian 
3 8nutmeg. Thus, with the loss of the Polish market and the 
difficulties being experienced with traditional sales, the 
agreement with the Soviet Union did not provide a durable 
solution to the problems in nutmeg. In recognition of this, 
the PRG sought to dissuade growers from increasing their 
production of the crop. Growers were advised to diversify into 
other spices, such as clove, cinammon and pimento, for which 
the market prices were higher and more stable. The Ministry of 
Agriculture started a propagation programme for these crops.
Grenada's third traditional crop, banana, has two important 
functions in the country's agriculture; it is a source of 
year-round income and provides shade for the nascent cocoa 
trees. Due to years of neglect and the low levels of application 
of essential inputs, production was well below its peak, yields 
were low and quality was poor. Also, the moko disease created 
serious problems for banana in many areas. The production and 
volume of exports of banana were on a declining trend after 
the peak reached in 1976. Floods in late 1979 and Hurricane 
Allen in August 1980 severely damaged the crop, and in 1980 
production and export volumes were approximately one-quafter 
below their levels in 1976.
Grenada's bananas are shipped to Britain by Geest 
Industries (W.I.) Ltd, a subsidiary of Geest Industries Ltd.
The price at which bananas are imported into Britain is 
determined through negotiations between the producers, 
represented by the Windward Islands Banana Association (WINBAN) 
and the shippers. WINBAN, of which Grenada is a member, is 
bound annually by contract to supply all exportable bananas to 
Geest, the latter also accepting and classifying the bananas
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into various grades at the dockside. Geest, then, are in a 
strong position to determine the price paid to the grower .
While the price to the producers is largely under Geest's 
control, the level of banana exports is protected by a 
preferential trading agreement in which Grenada, along with the 
other Windward Islands and Jamaica, have guaranteed access to 
the British market. Protection is afforded by the 'Dollar Area 
Quota', which ensures that bananas from the dollar area, that 
is the larger and more efficient low-cost producers of South 
and Central America, may enter the British market only under 
licence. The problems of Grenada's banana industry were 
compounded in mid-1981 when increased exports from other 
Windward Islands resulted in a glut on the London market and 
the subsequent imposition of quotas on shipment from each 
island. The glut was caused by the frantic recovery programme 
launched by the Windward Islands following the devastation 
caused by Hurricane Allen. Recovery from hurricane damage was 
so dramatic that the islands were producing tonnages far in 
excess of the amount that could be handled properly. With 
supplies nearly twice as much as normal, quality control 
standards fell sharply and Geest issued a warning that it was 
impossible for any marketing company to force its customers 
to accept fruit in such volumes and of such poor quality. It 
claimed that much of the fruit was found to be unsaleable on 
its arrival in Britain. This put Windward Islands bananas 
at a further disadvantage to the Latin American fruit which 
have always been superior in appearance/^ The principal 
initiative launched by the PRG to improve the fortunies of 
Grenada's banana industry was the Banana Rehabilitation 
Project, administered by the Ministry of Agriculture. This
programme was designed to eradicate the moko disease, improve 
the quality of bananas and expand the acreage under production.
The problems of disease were not restricted to the
banana crop. Pest and disease infestation plagued Grenada's
*•
agricultural industry as a whole, and was one of the main 
factors responsible for the low yields obtained from most 
crops. (See table 36). Under the Gairy regime the level of 
infestation threatened to become uncontrollable. This was due 
to the unco-ordinated approach taken towards pest and disease 
management, which was in turn the result of a shortage of 
trained personnel and the absence of supportive diagnostic 
facilities. In order to combat the pest and disease problem, 
the PRG made plans to revitalise the Plant Protection Unit 
within the Ministry of Agriculture. It was anticipated that 
the Unit would have a technical section comrpised of field 
technicians, and a supportive section consisting of an 
information unit and a diagnostic laboratory with field 
experimental staff. Plans were well afoot for the establishment 
of a central diagnostic laboratory which would have facilitated 
indentification, monotoring and control of pest and disease, 
infestation.^
The PRG also launched a major initiative to root out an 
occurrence which has probably had the most debilitating social 
effect on Grenada's agriculture: praedial larceny. The 
disincentive to farming caused by this phenomenon was highlighte 
by the 1981 Agricultural Census, in which landholders were 
asked to identify two of the most important problems they 
faced. Praedial larceny came out as the greatest single 
problem, reported by 24.5 per cent of landholders. (See table 
37). It was widespread and common to all regions. The Census
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TABLE 36
AVERAGE YIELD OF SELECTED CHOPS
CROP AVERAGE YIELD PER ACRE TOUT
Present Potential
Cocoa 400 800 Pounds
Banana 4 8 Tons
Sugar Cane 15 30 Tons
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Grenada: Overview 
of the Agricultural Sector. St. George's,
1982, p . 9.
TABLE 37
FREQUENCY OF PROBLEMS EXPERIENCED BY FARMERS
PROBLEMS PERCENTAGES ^ a ^
Praedial Larceny 24.5
Plant Material 11.4
Marketing 5.4
Extension Help 7.8
Labour 18.7
Water 6.6
Roads 11.2
Disease 12.3
Credit 2.0
(a) Figures do not add up to 10C$. No 
reason is given in the source.
Source: Final Report on Grenada Agricultural 
Census 1981. p. 37.
returns also showed that the big landholders were the most 
concerned. (See table 38). This was probabaly due to the fact 
that policing becomes increasingly difficult as farm size 
increases. In fact, the policing problem is further exacerbated 
if greater farm size is associated with a greater number of 
dispersed parcels - a common feature in Grenada. In attempting 
to stamp out praedial larceny landholders were in the past 
frustrated by the cumbersome and intricate legal procedures 
involved in obtaining convictions. Under the Gairy government 
no serious effort was made to resolve this problem. Shortly 
after the revolution the PRG expressed its concern over the 
issue of praedial larceny but was ambivalent and slow-moving 
in working out a strategy. No doubt the revolutionary government 
was under the impression that this problem would 'wither 
away' once it found jobs for the young unemployed: the main 
perpetrators of this offence. When, after a few years, it became 
clear that there was no easy cure to the problem of youth 
unemployment and evidence surfaced to show that the incidence 
of praedial larceny was growing, the PRG moved with greater 
alacrity and precision in finding a solution. Focussing its 
attention on the legal process, in mid-1983 the revolutionary 
government prepared a draft Praedial Larceny Law which was 
submitted to the Parish and Zonal Councils in September that 
year. Under the proposed law persons suspected of praedial 
larceny would be tried by tribunals comprising up to nine 
persons, including a President and Vice-President. The 
proposed law stipulated that the tribunals to be set up by 
the government would only be able to hear and investigate the 
guilt or innocence of persons charged with committing praedial 
larceny but not with handing out sentences to them. Whenever
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TABLE 38
PROBLEMS EXPERIENCED BY FAKHBKS BY FAKI-i SIZE
PROBLEMS PERCENTAGE OP FARMER RESPONSE
0-2 Acres 2-10 Acres Over 10 Acres
Praedial Larceny 23.23 26.0 30.22
Plant Material 13.31 8.67 4.99
Marketing 5.77 5.18 2.87
Extension Help 8.55 6.89 4.99
Labour 17.43 20.90 21.46
Water 7.71 5.26 1 .97
Roads 9.33 13.55 19.33
Disease 12.61 11.63 12.83
Credit 2.06 1 .92 1 .34
TOTAL 100 100 100
Source: Final Report on Grenada Agricultural Census 1981. p. 39
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a tribunal found an accused guilty, he or she would then be 
taken into the custody of the police for a period of five 
days, within which time the accused would be brought before 
the District Magistrate either in chamber or open court to be 
sentenced. For those found guilty of committing praedial 
larceny, the proposed law provided for sentences of imprisonment 
with or without hard labour for a term not exceeding two 
years and/or fines of up to EC$1,000. There was also a 
provision for convicted persons to be placed under special 
police supervision for a period not exceeding one year.^^
In another move designed to stamp out praedial larceny 
the PRG took steps to introduce greater surveillance 
over the sale of cocoa to the GCA . Each cocoa grower in 
Grenada has an identification card which specifies the 
maximum amount of cocoa the grower's farm is capable of 
producing. The identification card provides a simple method of 
preventing illegal sales of cocoa, and hence praedial larceny 
in cocoa, by ensuring that only recognised growers are able 
to sell cocoa to the GCA. If a grower attempted to supply 
more than his maximum quota then he or she would be suspected 
of obtaining cocoa illegally, and if found guilty would have 
his or her identification card withdrawn. However, because 
the identification cards did not carry a picture of the 
grower, this system was difficult to operate in practice.
Cocoa growers could, for example, lend their cards to 
friends who had obtained cocoa illegally. Moreover, many 
growers tended to sent their children with their cards to 
sell produce. As a means of tightening up the monitoring 
procedure the PRG established a cocoa police force which went 
to receiving stations looking out for persons selling 
stolen produce.^
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Assessment of the Agrarian Programme
Four-and-a-half years could hardly be considered a long
enough period of time to resolve the myriad problems which
»•
beset Grenada's agricultural industry. The PRG itself gave 
itself until 1986 to attain the same volume of traditional 
exports as were produced in the mid-1970s.44 An assessment of 
the PRG's agrarian programme must therefore remain tentative; 
it can only list successes and failures and identify overall 
trends but cannot attempt to draw any firm conclusions. The 
analysis made by the PRG of the problems it faced in agriculture 
provides a good starting point for such an assessment.
In his 1983 Report on the Economy, Bernard Coard 
identified 'worker productivity' as the chief impediment to 
progress in agriculture: 'Our progress in agriculture is 
being seriously hampered by a number of things.
Wages of agricultural workers are still among the lowest 
in the country. But the wage of the agricultural worker 
cannot rise because the productivity of the agricultural 
worker is extremely low. On the average, it is 2 to 3 times 
less than the wage. That is to say that a worker is paid 
18.50 a day, but he/she is producing less than 13.00 or
S4.00 a day in agricultural produce.'4  ^ Coard then went on 
to itemise a number of factors which in his view were responsible 
for the low productivity in agriculture. The first factor 
isolated was that of primitive technology: 'We are still 
scratching the soil with the cutlass and the fork as in the 
days of Job. This kind of technology is all well and good for 
our backyard gardening. It is all well and good for the Caribs 
and Arawaks, who knew no better than living from hand to
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mouth. But for large-scale agricultural production which aims 
at feeding a nation properly and making money to raise the 
general liv/ing standards of that nation, agriculture has to 
use modern technology. Agriculture has to be mechanized.1 
Secondly, Coard pointed to the health and age of agricultural 
workers: 'Most agricultural workers are older comrades. Many 
hav/e not had the best possible nutrition over the years. 
Machines would make the work easier for these comrades, and 
enable them to produce more.1^  Finally, Coard referred to 
the low educational level of the rural workforce: 'Many 
agricultural workers, foremen and managers are comrades who 
have not been able to gain much education. Long ago we used to 
think that you didn't need education if you were going to 
work with your hands. Why bother to keep a girl or boy in 
school so long when it is land they are going to work?
But today, we are trying to bring our country into the 
twentieth century, it is becoming clear to us that education 
is necessary not only for "office work" but for every kind of 
work. A worker can do better work if he/she is educated: 
better carpentry, better road-building, better cultivation. 
Modern methods of agriculture demand educated workers.
The low educational level of those involved in agriculture 
prevents them, for example, from understanding and adopting 
new methods regarding use of fertilizers, pesticides, and so 
on, which would improve our output; it means too, that many
foremen and farm managers do not know how to keep proper
4 8records, along modern lines.'
Coard's explanation of the problems facing Grenada's 
agricultural industry provides a good insight into the PRG's
376
approach to agriculture. While the views expressed by Coard
were clearly meant to serve a pedagogical function, they did,
nevertheless, demonstrate the PRG's overemphasis on the work
ethic and educational level of the agricultural worker. For in
his presentation Coard barely mentioned factors such as
falling prices for agricultural exports, bad weather, pest and
disease infestation and praedial larceny. There was a good
deal of voluntarism in the way he addressed the question. It
was as though all the problems of Grenada's agriculture could
be resolved if only the agricultural worker would work harder,
produce more, use modern farming instruments and technology
and educate him- or herself; and this sort of thinking informed
the PRG's whole approach to rural labour, the consequences of
which were often counter-productive. The revolutionary
government experienced qreat difficulty in its attempt to
raise productivity and attract labour to the state farming
sector. The profit-sharing plan, for instance, produced a
number of anomalies. Since many of the estates were not making
any profit most workers did not receive any bonus payments,
and given the depressed prices for Grenada's agricultural
exports there was little likelihood of any profits being made
for some time to come. The payment of bonuses on some state
farms and not others led a good number of workers to move to
the profit-making estates. Other workers left the state
farming sector altogether and went to one of the few private
estates that were at the time making money. This occurred at
the River Antoine estate before it was taken over in April 
A 91903. There was also resistance to the increased production 
levels required by the PRG. In this area the legacy of 
Gairyism was particularly stultifying. Because of the patronage
3 7 7
function served by the state farms under the despot, estate
workers were given very little work to do and were allowed to
pilfer produce and equipment from the farms. Given the
symbiosis which exists between estate work and own-account*
work in Grenada, this situation was most attractive to a 
number of estate workers in that they were given the time and 
resources to tend to their own plots of land. The PRG's 
insistence on higher levels of performance therefore 
constituted a major challenge to the work pattern and lifestyle 
to which many workers had become accustomed. Since the 
revolutionary government was not prepared to pay higher wages 
until productivity increased, there were a significant 
number of defections from the state farming sector. Some 
estate workers simply decided to devote more attention to 
their private plots of land. The Belle Vue estate in St.
Andrew, which I visited in January 1983, was a very good 
example of this. As to the actual performance of the state 
farms, the picture was not too impresive. In his 1983 Report 
on the Economy, Coard stated that in 1982 the GFC as a whole 
produced goods to the value of EC31,058,900, which was 37 per 
cent below their target for that year. He gave six reasons 
for this shortfall: poor organisation and management; the 
absence of a proper system of record-keeping and accounts; 
primitive methods of agriculture; low worker productivity; 
the failure to develop linkages with the MNIB and the 
Agro-industrial plant; and the practice of mixed farming used 
on most farms which did not allow for specialisation.^^
Turning to the PRG's co-operative programme, NACDA , the
performance here was somewhat desultory. For while many of 
the non-agricultural co-operatives did very well, the
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agricultural co-ops encountered similar problems to the GFC. 
Out of a total of thirty-seuen co-ops established up to May 
1983, ten had been disbanded and three mere experiencing 
great difficulties. (See table 39). Ajid of the twenty-four 
that were still functioning only one-quarter were performing 
well. Out of a total of some 500 persons trained in 
co-operative management, only 170 were employed in co-ops in 
May 1983. Agricultural co-ops did not go down well with the 
young people of Grenada. Francis Hosten, a NACDA officer, 
considered that there were four major factors impeding the 
development of co-ops in the country: personal conflicts 
between individuals in the co-ops; a lack of irrigation on 
some of the land used; problems involved in the transportation 
and marketing of goods; and low wages. He stated that the 
PRG intended to launch a another propaganda drive over the 
radio to get more people involved in forming co-ops.^
The state marketing board set up by the PRG, the MNIB, 
was a far more successful venture. There was a rapid growth 
in the amount of produce bought by the board from peasants. 
Thus, in 1982 the MNIB bought 1,315,601 pounds of agricultural 
produce, a 75 per cent increase over the 1981 total. In 
absolute terms, however, the MNIB still only accounted for 
a small proportion of the non-export agricultural produce of 
the country. (See table AO). The MNIB also performed well 
in expanding its sales and reducing the prices of several 
items through importing in bulk. In 1982 MNIB sales of agro­
industrial products and fish, both locally and overseas, 
amounted to EC3554.000. In the same year, powdered milk and 
fertilizer were imported in bulk. The milk was sold at 
ECS2.95 per pound; considerably cheaper than the powdered
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TABLE 39
CO-OPERATIVES ESTABLISHED BY THE NATIONAL 
CO-OPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT AGENCY
NAME AMD MEMBER OF CO-OPERATIVE
1. Grenada Co-operative Plumbing Society
2. Good Hope C A P S ^
3. Jams Craft Co-operative
4. Herbs and Greens CAPS
5. Togetherness (Pishing) Co-operative
6. Pontenoy Wishing Co-operative
7. Vegetables and Pood Crop Growers CAPS
8. Brizan CAPS
9. River Salle CAPS
10. Happy Hill CAPS
11. Evans Co-operative Bakery
12. Brizan Bakery Co-operative
13. Paradise CAPS
14. St. Patrick's Pishing Co-operative Service Society
15. Concord Youth CAPS
16. Redemption CAPS
17. United Workers CAPS
18. Coleen CAPS
19» Norman Antoine CAPS
20. We People CAPS
21. Grenada Publishing Society
22. People's Revolutionary Army Co-operative Credit Union
23. River Salle Construction Co-operative
24. St. George's Shipping Co-operative
25. Rose Hill Pood Processing Co-operative
26. Unity 5 CAPS
27. Awade Sandals Co-operative
28. Mount Pleasant Pishing Co-operative
29. Sand Pebbles Co-operative Society (1)
30. Sand Pebbles Co-operative Society (2)
STATUS
X
X
y
y
X
y
y
V
X
X
X
y
y
X
y
y
X
y
y
y
y
X
X
0
X
y
y
y
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31. Grenfruit Women's GAPS J
32. Broken Fingernails CAPS J
33. Grenada Union of Teachers Co-operative Credit Union J
34. Sauteurs Women's Sewing Co-operative Society. J
35. Butlers CAPS J
36. Chantimelle Furniture-making Co-operative J
37. Gouyave Fishing Co-operative -J
X
J
Q
Disbanded
Still functioning
Experiencing great difficulties
(a) Co-operative Agricultural Production Society
S o u r c e :  N a t i o n a l  C o - o p e r a t i v e  D e v e lo p m e n t  A g e n c y ,  S t .  G e o r g e 's ,  1983
3 8 1
TABLE 40
FREQUENCY OF MARKETING OUTLETS FOR 
HON-EXPORT AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE
*
Marketing and National Import Board 7.92
Hucksters 21.20
Central Markets 29.48
Village 41.25
Source: Final Report on Grenada Agricultural 
Census 1981. p. 36.
382
milk that uas being sold by private retailers at EC354.50 per
pound. Similarly, the importation of five million pounds of
fertilizer allowed the Board to knock EC36.00 off the price
of a 110 pound bag. The MIMIB also took important steps in♦
establishing a Shipping Division and making contact with 
Cuban, Soviet and East German shipping lines* However, because 
PINIB had not yet developed any shipping facilities of its 
own it was unable to ensure that its overseas orders could 
be met on time. The overall success of the Board was reflected 
in an increase in sales revenue from ECS6.5 million in 1981 
to ECS 12.2 million in 1982 - an increase of over 88 per cent.52
The agro-industrial programme of the PRG was, on balance, 
also a success story. Grenada Agro-Industries showed good 
progress in increasing its output and productivity. In 1981 
the factory produced goods to the value of EC$326,200, and 
the following year this figure grew more than twofold to 
ECS804,900. Equally, in 1981 a worker at the plant produced 
on average goods to the value of ECS22.10 per day, and in 
1982 this figure rose to ECS104.12 per day. These achievements 
were, nevertheless, somewhat short of the targets that the 
agro-industrial plant had set itself. In his 1983 Report on 
the Economy Coard isolated five difficulties which in his 
view prevented the plant from reaching its targets: insufficient 
space for storing raw materials; the irregularity of supplies 
from peasants; the high cost of the tins and bottles used to 
retail products; inexperienced management; and the problems 
involved in marketing the products abroad.55 Output and 
productivity also improved markedly at the Coffee Processing 
Plant. In 1982 the plant produced 20,515 pounds of coffee,
383
more than double the 1981 output. Over the same period
productivity rose by 34 per cent. At the same time, however,
full use had not been made of the plant's equipment. This was
due to problems in obtaining raw coffee from abroad. The plant♦
also experienced difficulties in marketing.5  ^ Another 
profitable venture was the Spice Processing Plant, which 
made a profit of EC315,700 in its first year of operation.
The performance of the Grenada Sugar Factory was somewhat 
mixed. While there was a steady increase in output, which 
amounted to EC32.8 million in 1982, productivity declined.
The downturn in productivity was caused by the incentives 
paid to cane growers to stimulate production and the low 
yield of sugar from the cane processed at the factory. Rum 
sales at the plant grew significantly, although here again 
there were problems in marketing. ^  The PRG was more satisfied 
with the progress made at the Livestock and Genetic Centre. 
Output increased from EC337,000 in 1981 to EC$181,000 in
1982. At the same time, the installation of new equipment and 
production facilities at the plant proceeded sat ifact orily .
The plant was, however, beset by a number of minor problems 
which slowed down developments somewhat. There were hold-ups 
caused by the difficulties involved in deciding which 
countries to buy stock from; other delays were caused by 
problems in obtaining finance to buy stock, so that in 1982, 
for example, breeder animals arrived five to six months later
than planned; and there were also problems involved in
5 6obtaining breeder animals which had been paid for. Finally, 
the Forestry Development Corporation struggled to increase 
its production from ECi80,000 in 1981 to EC|92,500 in 1982. 
Coard isolated four main factors which adversely affected 
the Corporation's performance: a lack of organization;
inadequate data concerning the country's forestry resources;
the unavailability of appropriate technology and equipment to
57fully exploit forestry resources; and problems in marketing.
♦
Mention has already been made of the general problems 
which the PRG experienced with the production and export of 
Grenada's traditional crops and the measures which it 
sought to introduce to resolve these problems. Here I shall 
some empirical data on the performance of each of the traditions 
crops, and examine the fortunes of the growers who were 
dependent upon these crops.
In the first year of the revolution cocoa exports 
amounted to 5,382,667 pounds, a significant increase over the 
1978 figure of 5,203,200 pounds. (See table 41). Thereafter 
cocoa exports declined in an irregular pattern in each of the 
remaining years of the revolution. The increase in income 
received by the GCA in 1979 was far more substantial than 
the growth in exports. In the following years, however, the 
income of the Association fell off in a simliar fashion to 
that of exports. The sharp rise in income received by the 
GCA in 1979 enabled it to markedly increase its payments to 
growers in that year. Payments were raised from ECSl.70 per 
pound in 1978 to ECS2.40 per pound in 1979. In 1980 growers 
received the same amount as the previous year. Thereafter 
there was a decline, but not of the same order as the fall in 
exports and receipts of the GCA. Thus, in order to make 
payments to growers the GCA had to take money from its reserves. 
In 1981 and 1982 the Association reduced its reserves by 
EC®5,350,736 - a substantial amount. Weighing up the 
situation the 1982 Annual Report of the GCA cautioned: 'The
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balance sheet does not give cause for alarm at this stage.
But like all responsible people we have to plan to avoid a 
future crisis. We are concerned that should this pattern of 
trading continue, by the year 1985 the Association would have 
to seek to borrow funds to sustain its operations without any 
guarantee that these funds will be forthcoming.'59 Over and 
above the fall in exports, the decline in earnings of the 
GCA was caused by two factors. First of all, the
price of cocoa on the world market. This fell from EC35.07 
per pound in 1979 to EC32.69 in 1982. The premium that the 
GCA obtained for its cocoa followed a similar pattern. Secondly, 
the exchange rate of the pound sterling, the currency in which 
cocoa is traded on the world market. In 1979 one pound was 
worth EC$5.81. By 1982 this figure had fallen to ECS4.66.
In 1982 the depreciation of the pound resulted in a loss of 
earnings to the GCA of ECS2,108,009.60
The 1982 Annual Report of the GCA also provides some 
information on the progress made by the PRG in its attempt to 
resuscitate the cocoa industry. Concerning the Cocoa 
Rehabilitation Project, the report noted: ’... we are heartened 
by the progress of the Cocoa Rehabilitation Programme and
especially by the farmers' willing participation which augurs
6 1well for the future of cocoa in Grenada.' This was quite 
an achievement. Given that the benefits of the project were 
long term and agriculture was going through a period of 
hardship, it was an uphill battle for the revolutionary 
government to get growers to participate in the scheme. 
Nevertheless, because of the PRG's policy of popular 
consultation it was possible to overcome the resistance. The 
report's assessment of the pest and disease control programme 
in cocoa was more mixed: 'Whilst being reasonably satisfied
387
about the noticeable success achieved in controlling thrips 
and beetles, the Association is very concerned about the
incident (sic) of witches broom and wood-eating termite for
R ?which no control programme has so far been introduced.'
»•
Finally, the report praised growers for the quality of the 
cocoa produced in 1982: 'The Association takes this opportunity 
to congratulate farmers on the quality of the cocoa that was 
produced during the 1981-1982 crop year. The dramatic 
improvement was evident by the decrease in defective cocoa 
received from farmers, from 60,652 pounds during 1980/81 to 
17,137 pounds this year.
Farmers will know that it costs as much to produce and
deliver defective cocoa as it costs for sound cocoa but with
6 3considerably less earnings.'
In contrast to cocoa, there was a progressive increase
in Grenada's production of nutmeg over the four years of the
revolution. (See table 42). Nutmeg production rose from
5,128,778 pounds in 1979 to 6,157,754 pounds in 1982. Production
of mace, however, declined from 625,467 pounds in 1979 to
502,905 pounds in 1982. While there was an increase in
production, nutmeg sales declined from 4,533,499 pounds in
1979 to 4,210,664 in 1982. (See table 43). Sales of mace, on
the other hand, rose from 576,350 pounds in 1979 to 695,345 
64pounds in 1982. On account of the decline in nutmeg production 
and the fall in nutmeg prices in the various international 
markets, the earnings of the GCNA plummeted from ECS 16,128,777 
in 1978 to ECS10,640,716 in 1982. As in the case of the GCA, 
the GCNA's loss of earnings forced the Association to dip 
into its reserves in order to make payments to growers. In the 
case of the GCNA, however, the decrease in the amount paid
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TABLE 42
NUTMEG fKODUCTION 1978-1982
Crop Year Nutmeg
lbs
Equivalent shelled
Mace
lbs
Equivalent cured
1978 4,454,405 568,497
1979 5,128,778 625,467
1980 5,486,294 647,672
1981 5,300,836 532,129
1982 6,157,754 502,905
Source: Grenada Co-operative Nutmeg Association, Financial 
Statement and Report of the Nutmeg Board for the Year Ended 30th June 1982. St. George’s, 1982, p.13.
TABLE 43
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to growers was more pronounced. In 1979 growers were paid 
EClil.58 per pound for nutmeg, and in 1982 this figure fell to 
ECS0.80. (See table 44).
In the banana industry there wer^ similar problems to 
those in cocoa and nutmeg. Declining exports, lower prices 
and increased costs of inputs adversely affected the finances 
of the GBCS. Owing to these difficulties, the Society was 
forced to lower the amount paid to growers from around 
ECS0.18 per pound in 1979 to ECI0.14 per pound in 1982.^^
In making an assessment of the PRG's agrarian programme 
as a whole, one can say that strenuous efforts were made, 
and a number of important initiatives were launched which 
could have laid the basis for a radical transformation of 
the Grenadian countryside and a dramatic improvement in 
the working conditions and living standards of the rural 
labour force. Unfortunately, the PRG was not allowed sufficient 
time to see the fruits of its labour, and during the actual 
period of the revolution numerous factors militated against 
the efforts of the revolutionary government so that on balance 
the net position of the rural masses probably deteriorated 
under the Bishop regime. The problems of low yields, pest 
and diseas infestation, falling prices for Grenada's 
agricultural exports, praedial larceny and tire legacy of 
Gairyism were deep-seated and intractable, and could not be 
overcome in the space of just four years. Probably the most 
salutary feature of the PRG's agrarian programme was the 
openess with which it conducted itself. There was no attempt 
to brush problems under the carpet. Grenada's agriculture 
was depressed for a variety of reasons and the revolutionary
TABLE 44
NUTMEG; PKICES PAID TO GROWEKS 1 178-1982
1978 1979
EC
1980 
3 per
1981
Lb
1982
Nutmegs COin• 1.58 1 .45 1 .28 0.80
No. 1 Mace 1.90 1.90 2.34 3.29 2.60
No. 2 Mace and Pickings 1.24 1.24 1 .04 1 .04 1 .05
Source: Financial Statement and Report of the Nutmeg Board for the Year Ended 50th June 1982. p. 17.
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government wanted the masses to know about it so that they, 
the masses, could do something about it. Nevertheless, the 
PRG evinced a good deal of impatience, insensitivity and 
voluntarism in its bid to transform Grenadian agriculture. 
Unable to provide the rural poor with any substantive material 
inducements, it wanted to give them ideology and rhetoric. 
There were, of course, positive aspects of this; a greater 
appreciation of the importance of agriculture to the economy 
was instilled in society and a healthier attitude towards 
farmwork was discernible. At the same time, however, the PRG 
expected far too much from ideology. It was as if it was 
trying to force-feed Marxism to people who were hungry, and 
this feature of the agrarian programme led to cynicism and 
disaffection with the revolution.
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Chapter Nine
The Unmaking of the Revolution
In providing a detailed assessment of the social and 
economic policies of the PRG, the preceding chapters of this 
book furnish abundant material about the state of the revolution 
in 1983. From what has been said in these chapters it is 
possible to understand the context in which the implosion of 
the Bishop regime took place which led directly to the US 
invasion of Grenada. It is this unmaking of the revolution 
which forms the subject of this chapter.
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The Confrontation With Washington
Taking into account the extremely limited resources at its
disposal, the NJM devoted more attention to the history and
*■
multiformity of US destabilization of Third World regimes 
than any other contemporary reuolutionary leadership. In fact, 
so confident mere the NJM of the effectiveness of the strategy 
and tactics they had devised for combating destabilization that 
they collaborated with Chris Searle, an English supporter of 
the revolution, in producing a book which presented Grenada 
as 'a casebook of destabilization and a manual for fighting it'. 
The NJM were immensely ambitious and were committed 
internationalists, and they believed that the Grenadian 
revolution provided an example that could be emulated by other 
revolutionary movements around the world. Michael Manley, who 
had not himself been particularly successful in countering 
the CIA subversion that was directed at him while he was in 
office, was greatly impressed by Grenada's formula and declared 
at the back of Chris Searle's book: 'When an internal process 
is united and has adequate mass foundation, you could bring all 
the CIA's in the world and they would not advance an inch 
because they would be rebuffed by the unity of the people 
themselves. And that is why I dare to predict with confidence 
that no such force will prevail against the Grenada Revolution.'' 
The fact that the book was released just days before the US 
invasion of Grenada was acutely embarrassing to its author. 
Nevertheless, in putting forward the NJM's views on how to 
deal with destabilization, Chris Searle's book shows the 
systematic way in which the NJM addressed itself to this questior 
One could not, therefore, attribute the implosion of the 
revolution and the subsequent US invasion to a lack of
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understanding on the part of the NJFI about the subleties of 
US destabilization techniques. Rather, one should examine 
the strategy employed by the NJFI to counter the US offensive 
in order to understand why such a well-informed leadership 
succumbed to the type of mistake which has given American 
imperialism one of its greatest propaganda victories over 
socialism in this decade. Before doing so, however, it is 
necessary to outline the precise nature of the confrontation 
between Washington and St. George's.
The US under the Carter administration initially adopted 
a wait-and-see attitude towards the PRG. The overthrow of 
Gairy was generally welcomed in the Caribbean and elsewhere and 
the State Department was unclear as to the direction which the 
revolutionary government would take. Furthermore, the 
revolution occurred at a time when the Carter administration 
was still floating the idea reconciliation with leftist regimes 
in the Third World. Although the National Security Council 
considered the idea of blockading the island, it was deemed an 
untenable option. Cautious recognition was granted to the 
PRG. Nevertheless, relations between St. George's and Washington 
soon deteriorated as the Bishop regime moved on to establish 
close relations with Cuba - a move the regime made despite a 
candid statement by the then US ambassador to the Eastern 
Caribbean, Frank Ortiz, that the US would 'view with displeasure 
any tendency on the part of Grenada to develop closer ties 
with Cuba'^ Taking exception to the Cuban connection, the US 
embarked upon a policy of economic and diplomatic harassment 
of the PRG. In response to the US attempt to dictate policy to 
Grenada, Bishop gave a defiant speech, in which he declared: 
'Grenada is a sovereign and independent country, although a 
tiny speck on the world map, and we expect all countries to
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strictly respect our independence just as we will respect 
theirs. No country has the right to tell us what to do or how 
to run our country or who to be friendly with. We certainly 
would not attempt to tell any other country what to do. We are 
not in anybody's backyard, and we are definitely not for 
sale . '^
From then on US hostility towards the PRG increased. A 
major development in US-Grenada relations took place when 
the Bishop regime backed the Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan in December 1979. According to a report in the 
Washington Post, this action led the Carter administration to 
first discuss the use of covert operations against the PRG. 
However, only propaganda measures were approved by Carter, and 
this led to a barrage of anti-Grenada articles appearing in 
North American newspapers and magazines.
With the inauguration of Ronald Reagan as US President, 
a qualitative shift in the US attitude towards Grenada took 
place. Along with Nicaragua and Cuba, Grenada was portrayed 
as a source of unrest in the region and an 'exporter of 
revolution'. The administration also alleged that the island 
constituted a military threat to the US. Having elevated the 
Caribbean basin into a foremost concern of US policy, the 
Reagan administration proceeded to intensify and systematise 
the economic and political offensive against Grenada launched 
by Carter. In addition, the Reagan administration took steps 
to improve its capacity to carry out direct military 
intervention in Grenada. In August 1981 the US led the 
largest naval exercises conducted by Western forces during 
peacetime since World War Two. Code-named 'Ocean Venture 81', 
this exercise deployed over 120,000 troops, 250 warships and
1,000 aircraft in a fictitious scenario that had NATO forces
battling Soviet ships in the South Atlantic, Caribbean and 
North Atlantic before finally vanquishing them in the Baltic.
A central component of the exercise was the invasion of a 
Caribbean island group known as 'Amber and the Amberines' ,
(The islands to the north of Grenada are known as the 
Grenadines; a locality near Point Salines is called Amber). 
Staged at the island of Vieques, off Puerto Rico, this phase 
of the manouvres had the 'hostile' forces of Amber (backed by 
'Red', presumably Cuba) seizing US hostages, refusing to 
negotiate, and compelling a US invasion. At the time the 
scarcely-veiled threat to Grenada was widely appreciated. 
Subsequent US naval exercises in November 1981 ('Red X 183') 
and March 1983 - when US craft came within six miles of Point 
Salines - gave the State Department additional military 
expertise for a direct invasion of Grenada. However, because 
such rehearsals were carried out.and detailed contingency 
plans made, one should not therefore conclude that the real 
invasion of October 1983 was inevitable. Such activities have 
been directed against Cuba for over 25 years and still no US 
invasion of that country has taken place. The military 
exercises were used by the Reagan administration to intimidate 
the PRG. Up until the dramatic turn of events in October 
1983, it is highly unlikely that even the Reagan administration 
would have risked the formidable diplomatic problems of 
launching a full-scale invasion of an independent and 
sovereign state. If any country was likely to fall victim to 
such a move, it was thought to be Nicaragua, which presented 
a much greater military challenge and had been the object of 
a prolonged propaganda campaign, a major CIA covert operation, 
and an extensive US military build-up on its borders. Grenada, 
by contrast, was in a far more secure position. In July 1981
the US Senate Intelligence Committee rejected outright plans
drawn up by the CIA for covert destabilization of Grenada. The
fact that Grenada is an island protected it against any
obvious incursions from neighbouring territories. And because
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of the highly pragmatic foreign policy pursued by the PRG, 
Washington reaped poor results from its attempt to impose a 
diplomatic and economic boycott of Grenada. In fact, so 
effective was the diplomatic and propaganda counter-offensive 
mounted by the PRG that in April 1983 the US was obliged to 
shift the focus of its attacks on Grenada. In his bid to 
obtain congressional approval for increased military assistance 
to El Salvador, in March 1983 Reagan again linked Grenada to 
Soviet- and Cuban-inspired subversion in the region. The 
island was deemed a threat to the 'national security' of the 
US, and in a television address to the nation delivered on 
23 March, Reagan presented a 'declassified aerial photograph' 
of the airport. This gave rise to an intense public interest 
in the Grenada issue in the US, and a number of journalists 
and Congressmen visited the island. The PRG handled the whole 
incident very skillfully and made considerable propaganda 
value out of the fact that American students from the 
St. George's School of Medicine frequently went jogging on 
the airport site. In response to the weight of evidence that 
surfaced which demonstrated conclusively the civilian nature of 
the airport, the State Department suddenly became reticent 
about the airport issue. In mid-April Ludlow Flower, the 
charge d'affaires at the US embassy in Barbados, stated that 
the US was prepared to normalize its relations with Grenada 
providing there was movement with respect to the human rights 
situation on the island and the PRG's anti-US foreign policy.
Although the PRG publicly denounced Washington's plea for 
an improvement in relations, privately the revolutionary 
government had now come to the view that some sort of 
rapprochement with the US was necessary. Towards the end of 
1982 Bishop and Whiteman had realised that the new airport 
could be economically viable only if the American tourist 
market was secured. And this could only happen if proper 
relations were established with Washington. Unless a bilateral 
aviation agreement was signed between Grenada and the US 
American jets would not be able to fly directly to Grenada 
so that US tourists would still be obliged to trans-ship in 
a neighbouring Caribbean territory. This would have significantl 
reduced the impact of the airport in terms of boosting the 
number of US visitors to Grenada. Given the strategic importance 
assigned to tourism in the economic strategy of the PRG the 
US tourist market was of considerable importance to the 
Grenadian economy. Hence, the PRG was somewhat optimistic 
when, at around the time of Flower's statment , it received 
the first official note from Washington since the warning 
issued in the first few days after the revolution against 
involvement with Cuba. Moreover, the official note was 
concilatory in tone. Despatched via the leader of the US 
black caucus in Congress, Mervyn Dymally, it indicated that 
all US embassy personnel in Barbados were to be accredited to 
Grenada except the ambassador, Milan Bish. Congressman 
Dymally also invited Bishop to visit Washington and the trip 
was also supported by Trans-Africa, the influential black 
American lobby group. In the period leading up to the 
visit the Central Committee of the NJM agreed with Bishop's 
suggestion that a moratorium should be placed on anti-US
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propaganda. The visit took place during the first week of 
June, and Bishop used the occasion to explain to the US public 
in extremely diplomatic language the nature of the Grenadian 
revolution and the PRG's position on sensitive issues such as 
human rights, elections, and the island's relations with 
the Soviet Union and Cuba. Rather than stay on the defensive, 
Bishop took the offensive and listed the gains made by the 
revolution in the areas of employment, health care, education, 
economic growth and mass participation in the political 
process. In his speech delivered at Trans-flfrica's annual 
dinner, he pointed out that the American Revolution gave 
itself thirteen years before holding its first elections, and 
also acknowledged that like all previous revolutions the 
Grenadian revolution had brought about some 'disruptions'.
On the question of the island's relations with the Soviet 
Union and Cuba, Bishop was somewhat more evasive, yet 
re-affirmed the PRG's commitment to non-alignment and support 
for Third World liberation struggles. He used the visit to 
forge links between the PRG and its supporters in the US and 
discussions were held with US Congressmen and Senators. An 
announcement was also made on the PRG's intention to take 
steps that would lead to elections.
Included in the PRG's delegation were Royston Hopkin, 
President of the Grenada Hotel Association, Richard Menezes, 
President of the Chamber of Commerce and Lyden Ramdhanny, and 
the trip was also used to promote Grenada as a tourist resort 
and invite American entrepreneurs to invest in the island. 
Throughout the visit, Bishop skilfully used the heightened 
interest in Grenada to draw attention to the island's 
exceptional qualities as a holiday centre. Bishop's speeches 
were aimed at both a political and a travelling audience.
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As regards the latter, some important successes seemed to 
have been achieved. A reception hosted by Lyden Ramdhanny drew 
some 450 travel agents, travel writers and tour operators, 
and at a press conference Senator Lowell Weicker announced 
his intention to visit Grenada with a team to study the 
potential for US investment in the island. Prior to the visit, 
Bishop had requested a meeting with Reagan or some other 
high-ranking US official. Reagan refused to meet with Bishop, 
but eventually agreed to a meeting with Judge William Clark, 
the chief of the National Security Council. Although no 
details of the meeting were disclosed, it is known that the 
US administration welcomed the formation of the constitutional 
commission and discussed the possibility of reducing the 
Cuban presence, resisting future moves against the private 
sector and arresting the deepening of relations with the
gSoviet Union and Cuba. Bishop appears to have been quite
satified with the talks and described them as representing
'a useful first step in renewing bilateral relations between
gour two governments.' On his return to Grenada, Bishop 
called for the moratorium on anti-American rhetoric to . 
continue and asked for permission to allow a US diplomatic 
mission to be established in St. George's and a Congressional 
delegation to visit Grenada the following autumn. The 
Central Committee reluctantly agreed to the moratorium and 
the Congressional delegation but was non-committal about the 
US diplomatic mission. Many people in the party leadership 
were apprehensive about Bishop's overtures towards the US and 
this was an important factor in the party crisis which developed 
in October 1983.
Prior to the event of October 1983, then, there was an 
easing of tension in the relations between St. George's and
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Washington. The Reagan administration continued to make 
wild accusations about the Grenadian revolution, but in 
discussions with Bishop spelt out its real apprehensions about 
the PRG. In the State Department’s view, Grenada was in the 
process of becoming a client state of the Soviet Union and 
Cuba and this represented a challenge to US hegemony in the 
Caribbean basin. Irrespective of the fact that the PRG had 
not taken any actions against US interests in Grenada - which 
were in any case negligible - and the possibility of the 
Grenadian revolution spreading to neighbouring Caribbean 
islands had been markedly reduced, the political allegiance of 
the NJM to the Soviet Union could not be tolerated in 
Washington. Because of the strategic importance of the Caribbean 
Basin to the economic and security interests of the US, the 
establishment of a Soviet bridge-head in Grenada constituted 
a major threat to the US. To be sure, the State Department was 
well aware that Grenada's international airport was not 
designed for military purposes. But by making exaggerated 
claims about the Soviet and Cuban involvement in the airport 
project, the Reagan administration was sending signals to both 
St. George's and Moscow that it would not accept the deployment 
of sophisticated Soviet weaponry in Grenada. In order for a 
normalization of relations between Grenada and the US to 
occur, the PRG had to demonstrate that it was moving out of 
the Soviet orbit by reducing the Cuban presence, severing its 
political links with the Soviet Union and allowing the US to 
set up a diplomatic mission in St. George's.
The l\IJM, for its part, was being extremely pragmatic and 
tactical in seeking a rapprochement with Washington. Bishop 
had no intention of renouncing the official communist ideology 
of the party and remained resolutely opposed to the
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domestic and international policies of the Reagan administration. 
But the isolation of the Grenadian revolution in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean and the economic difficulties which 
confronted the PRG, led Bishop to realise that some sort of 
modus v ivendi with Washington was imperative for the very 
survival of the revolution. The problem which he faced was 
how to assuage the State Department's ire without abandoning 
the tenets of socialist orientation. Bishop wanted to make 
concessions to the US, but recognised the dangers that were 
attendant.in embarking upon such a course of action. Nevertheless 
he believed that the strategy that the NJM had devised for 
countering destabilization would enable the party to 
withstand any subversive actions which the State Department 
might attempt to carry out. This anti-destabi1ization 
strategy was informed by the official communist ideology of 
the party, and was. enunciated by Bishop in very plain terms 
in the interview published in Searle's book.
The first factor isolated by Bishop in the 
anti-destabilization strategy, was the fact that there was 
was no US embassy in Grenada: 'In Grenada there is no US 
Embassy, and this has clearly placed a powerful brake upon 
their potential to destabilize the Revolution internally, not 
having the permanent base for their mischief which they had 
in /Guyana, Chile and JamaicaT”. The US imperialists and their 
CIA are thus forced to rely upon local agents which they 
first have to recruit internally then contact clandestinely 
from time to time, but in Grenada they do not have this fixed 
facility and infrastructure to operate, they do not have this 
ready-made system. The guise of normal diplomatic relations - 
which only hid on-the-spot organizational and recruitment 
centres - enabled them to reach their agents and gain
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information on a daily basis, as ujell as to provide guidance 
to those unpatriotic elements within the country who were 
prepared to carry out the dirty work of the CIA. This is a 
critical disadvantage for them in relation to Grenada.'10 
The imposition of a one-party state was also considered by 
Bishop to be an effective means of countering destabilization: 
'Then our dismantling of the Westminster parliamentary system 
is also important in this context. Along with that dismantling 
has come an end to the traditional tribalism which continues 
in other Caribbean countries. A part of that political tribalism 
as used by the CIA, has been to get some of the parliamentarians 
to use the medium of parliament in such a way as to destablilize 
the country. Masterminded by their American puppeteers, they 
raise bogus concerns about the economy, they spread vicious 
propaganda from outside the country and seek to make the 
people lose faith and confidence in their revolutionary 
government, raising a million and one other such provocative 
matters through the medium of parliament - and thus claim to 
do it in that sense with a certain measure of leg itimacy.'^^
The third factor highlighted by Bishop was the NJM's 
monopoly of the media: 'In relation to the media, we made it 
very clear at an early stage that we were not prepared to 
countenance counter-revolutionary literature in our country, 
or media that were being used for the purpose of inciting 
sections of the population to violence or disaffection. So 
within the first six months of the Revolution, one counter­
revolutionary newspaper, The Torchlight, was closed down, 
and that too has meant that a powerful arm of their 
destabilization machinery has been amputated in our situation.'^ 
Next Bishop referred to the armed forces: 'Then there is the 
question of the armed forces, which in the Chile and Jamaica
4 05
situations, for example, remained intact after progressive 
governments had taken power. For us it was very different. In 
the first hours of the Revolution the Green Beast army of 
Gairy was completely disbanded. That meant that thereafter a 
new army came into being, an army of patriotic youth, young 
farmers and sections of the unemployed. Right from the start 
it was possible to imbue this young army with a patriotic, 
ar> t i - im per i a 1 i st consciousness, and that has proved to be a 
decisive factor. The possibilities of infiltration or of 
coups d'etats are much more difficult in this army than in those 
countries where the armed forces of the previous regime 
remained intact. On top of that we have built a people's 
militia in addition to our regular armed forces, something that 
did not happen in the three countries that were mentioned 
before, where the progressive regimes did not move to arm 
the people in this way.'1"5 The fifth factor cited by Bishop 
was the economy: '... there has been a great deal more 
voluntary involvment in the building of the economy in our 
situation than perhaps there was in either Chile or Jamaica.
That too has been a major factor in terms of the room 
imperialism would have to manouevre in our situation.1'*'^
Finally, Bishop gave a resume of the main features of the 
anti-destabilization strategy: '... our first line of defence 
is complete openess and honesty: tell our people all the 
facts and call upon them for a response and involve them in 
what is happening. ... We believe that the Revolution can only 
develop around three pillars: first the people and their 
democratic organizations, secondly the building of a strong 
national economy, and thirdly the building of a national 
defence capacity. We try at all times to integrate these three
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pillars because we feel that if any one of the three is 
missing at any particular time, then the Revolution will be 
in danger and will be u/eakened.
But we can also speak of a fourth pillar, the pillar of 
international relations, and that too has been a major way 
fighting destabilization. Whenever there is any threat to 
our process we immediately appeal to all our friends around 
the world for their support.'15
The anti-destabilization strategy outlined by Bishop 
proved to be effective for four years. However, in 1983 
serious differences of opinion arose in the NJM, and this 
development showed up some of the inadequacies of the 
anti-destabilization strategy.
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The Crisis of the Party
Most accounts of the party crisis devote considerable 
attention to the personality clash between Bishop and Coard.
In so doing, they underestimate the broader political issues 
involved and do not draw the right conclusions about the 
collapse of the revolution. Undoubtedly, in a country the size 
of Grenada strong personalities have a marked influence on 
public affairs. But the personal characteristics of Bishop and 
Coard were less important in themselves than for what they 
represented. Maurice Bishop was always more than a figurehead. 
For most Grenadians he symbolised their revolution and was 
their trusted 'chief'. Good looking, of 'fair' complexion and 
tall for a Grenadian, Bishop had acquired much sympathy 
through the loss of his father, who had been a prominent 
figure, and was widely respected because he had remained in 
the country from 1973 onwards and dedicated much of his work 
as a lawyer to defending people of humble background. His 
sympathetic character made him a natural mediator and gave 
the PRG a flexible and accessible image that did much to 
commend it to those who harboured reservations about its 
policies. In this sense Bishop represented an individual 
bridge not just between the government and the mass of Grenadian 
but also between the IMJM and the PRG, which, it must be 
remembered, contained non-party members and did not work 
openly towards the full party programme but only those parts 
considered applicable to the strategy of socialist orientation. 
This bridge eventually collapsed because leading members of 
the party felt that Bishop did not have a thorough grasp of 
'Marxism-Leninism', provided indecisive leadership and was
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becoming conciliatory in his attitude towards the US.
Bernard Coard was in many respects the antithesis of 
Bishop. An unkempt, bespectacled and plump figure, Coard 
newer sought personal popularity. Grenadians respected his 
academic achieuements, but found him aloof and unattractive 
as an individual. The fact that his wife, Phyllis, was a 
Jamaican and not widely viewed as sympathetic also made him 
unpopular. Coard was austere, an exceptionally hard-worker 
and a dedicated ideologue. He was also a strict disciplinarian 
and a tough taskmaster. He relished the state sector 
rationalisation programme, and had, a saying: 'If you don't 
work, you don't eat.' It was well known that Coard was 
highly ambitious, and it was widely rumoured that his wife 
was dissatisfied with the fact that he was only the Deputy 
Prime Minister. In reply to a comment that Bernard was 
'number two in the country', Phyllis is alleged to have said: 
'My husband isn't second to anybody'. Throughout the four 
years of the revolution many false rumours were spread about 
conflict between Bishop and Coard, and this may have been 
one of them. However, while many of the stories about the 
relationship between Bishop and Coard were unfounded, it is 
known that Coard was insecure as an individual and had a 
personal complex about Bishop. But up until 1983 Board's 
feeling of unease did not adversely affect his political 
relationship with Bishop.
In October 1982 a dramatic development took place in 
the IMJM when Coard insisted on resigning from the Central 
Committee and its political bureau on the grounds that he 
was overworked and the party had become excessively reliant 
upon him. He said that other members of the party leadership 
always turned to him to answer questions about theory and
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political strategy, and this was an impediment to the 
collective development of the party. Bishop opposed Coard's 
resignation, and asked him to stay on the Central Committee 
and do educational work. But Coard won backing for his position 
from his supporters in OREL, who, it must be remembered, 
commanded a majority of the party's leadership. Thus, Coard 
was able to retire from the Central Committee. He remained 
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Planning and 
Trade, but his role in NJM affairs was that of an eminence 
qrise operating behind the scenes and only occasionally 
attending formal meetings to which he was specially invited. 
After Coard's resignation more OREL members were elected to 
the Central Committee, while the individuals closest to 
Bishop, namely Kenrick Radix and Vincent Noel, lost their 
positions. The newly-elected OREL members were extremely 
hard-working and deserved their positions, but the strengthening 
of the OREL faction at the expense of the Bishop faction 
took place in the context of a move to transform the NJM into 
a bona fida Marxist-Leninist party. In 1982 the NJM openly 
declared to the membership that it was a Marxist-Leninist 
party, and a rule was introduced to the effect that party 
members were not allowed to derive any portion of their income 
from the ownership of property. The consolidation of a 
genuine Marxist-Leninist vanguard party was one of the 
major injunctions of the socialist orientation strategy, 
and in 1982 Coard and other leading figures in the party 
judged that the time was right to refashion the NJM.
U/ith the benefit of hindsight one can interpret Coard's 
resignation as the first move in a deliberate plan to curb 
Bishop's authority by placing Coard outside of policy-making 
bodies of the party and therefore in a good position to
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re-enter the arena when matters went awry, as he warned they 
might .
By the summer of 1983 the IMJM was in a state of disarray. 
Its total membership was not more than 300 militants, many of 
whom were 'candidate members', still in the process of 
receiving political education and lacking full voting rights 
in accordance with the organisational traditions of official 
communist parties. Given the fact that the I\IJM was the ruling 
party, its low membership in a society of 110,000 people is 
remarkable. It shows that the party adhered rigidly to the 
concept of a 'vanguard party' and made party members undergo 
rigorous selection procedures. However, the membership was not 
just low but also declining. This was principally because of 
the enormous demands made of militants, whose party, community 
and governmental obligations as well as their ordinary work 
kept them tied to 14-hour days six days a week. The strains 
that this timetable imposed were evident in the high incidence 
of illness at all levels and the growing inefficiency of 
political and other work. It was noted in several meetings 
of the Central Committee that important members of the party 
were drifting away because their obligations had exhausted 
them beyond all endurance. As a result, the vigour and 
sensitivity of the IMJM's activity in the unions and mass 
organisations had fallen off to a critical degree. There was 
resistance to the popular education programme, a falling away 
of the membership and enthusiasm of the MliJO and NY0, an 
increasing incidence of tactical mistakes, and a 'general 
drift' in the IMJI¥l's work that substituted genuine political 
leadership with brow-beating obligation. However, while the 
difficulties faced by the party were serious they were not 
insurmountable, and the revolution was not in danger of
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an imminent collapse from within. Yet this was the line taken
by the OREL faction. In July 1983 the Central Committee
held an extraordinary session at which the progress of the NJI*!
and the revolution were assessed. This meeting led to
*■
extensive self-criticism and the implementation of a variety 
of administrative changes, but both were essentially superficial 
and conducted in a coded manner that suppressed real political 
differences. No major changes came about despite the formal 
candour of the admissions that the party was facing severe 
difficulties. The Central Committee's appraisal of the period 
since Coard's resignation was that it had made partial gains 
but that the structural problems remained.
These problems were again discussed at a further 
extraordinary meeting of the Central Committee held from 
14 to 16 September. This meeting had been convened to analyse 
the results of the decisions made at the July meeting.
However, by this time positions in the party had hardened.
No agenda was circulated prior to the September meeting - 
an unprecendented omission - and two days before it began, 
all those overseas were ordered home. The scene was set for 
a confrontation when the OREL members refused to accept 
Bishop's agenda. They proposed an alternative agenda which 
centred on an analysis of the state of the party and the 
revolution, the work of the Central Committee and the way 
forward. On the first day of the meeting, a debate took place 
on the problems facing the revolution. Set within the parameters 
of the socialist orientation strategy of the party, the debate 
was highly subjective and elitist in tone. The waning of support 
for the PRG that was discernible was attributed to the 
'weakness of leadership' provided by the party. There was no 
attempt to make a balanced assessment of the progress of the
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centred on an analysis of the state of the party and the 
revolution, the work of the Central Committee and the way 
forward. On the first day of the meeting, a debate took place 
on the problems facing the revolution. Set within the parameters 
of the socialist orientation strategy of the party, the debate 
was highly subjective and elitist in tone. The waning of support 
for the PRG that was discernible was attributed to the 
'weakness of leadership' provided by the party. There was no 
attempt to make a balanced assessment of the progress of the
revolution by examining the impact of the PRG's policies on
the various classes in society. While passing reference mas
made to the economic and social characteristics of Grenada
which presented a huge obstacle to revolutionary transformation
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it was assumed that all these difficulties would be overcome
once the IMJM transformed itself into a 'disciplined
Clarxist-Leninist party'. On the second day of the meeting,
Liam James, a devoted follower of Coard, argued that the 
main problem confronting the revolution was the 'quality of
the leadership of the Central Committee and the party
. 17provided by Comrade Maurice Bishop.' In this he was supported 
by Leon Cornwall, Ewart Layne and John Ventour, who were also 
dedicated supporters of Coard and members of OREL. James went 
on to call for the return of Coard to the Central Committee and 
proposed a model of joint leadership that would marry the 
strengths of Bishop and Coard. He suggested that Bishop should 
be assigned the responsibility for direct work among the 
masses, paying particular attention to the mass organisations 
and the organs of popular power, and regional and international 
work. Coard should be put in charge of the organisational 
development of the party, the formation of party cadres and 
overall strategy and tactics. Although James and the other 
supporters of OREL tried to present the joint leadership 
proposal as a mere administrative device that would allow for 
the smoother functioning of the party by supplementing Bishop's 
qualities with Coard's, in fact it amounted to a major shift 
in power. In the theory of socialist orientation the party is 
accorded a hegemonic place in the revolutionary process, 
over and above the organs of the state. So the proposal to 
put Coard in charge of the party was tantamount to making him 
the leader of the revolution. In putting forward the joint
4 1 4
leadership proposal, Coard and his followers in OREL were in 
fact saying that they did not believe that Bishop was competent 
enough to lead the revolution, but because of his popularity 
amongst the masses it was inappropriate to remove him from 
power completely. Joint leadership was a formula designed to 
enable Coard to take control of the real locus of power in 
the country and relegate Bishop to the position of a figure­
head of the revolution, find this is confirmed by the fact 
that the joint leadership proposal went hand-in-hand with 
a move to make Leon Cornwall the Commander of the PRA in place 
of Hudson Austin, who was considered close to Bishop. Moreover, 
the power sharing arrangement was put forward even after 
Bishop had made a personal self-criticism and himself put 
forward a comprehensive solution to the problems facing the 
revolution. Bishop had conceded that there was a state of 
deep crisis in the party and revolution, and put forward a 
five-point proposal to improve the situation. The five points 
were: (i) improve the individual and collective leadership 
of the Central Committee; (ii) develop a perspective based on 
Marxist-Leninist criteria to guide the work of the party;
(iii) find creative ways of reinforcing links and carrying 
out work among, the masses; (iv) establish meaningful channels 
of communication between the leadership and the membership 
and formally rationalize the work among party members, bearing 
in mind the ground swell of complaints over work and lack of 
inner party democracy; (v) develop structures for accountability 
of the Central Committee to the party. Bishop's proposals 
were apposite and show that he recognised that the NJM had 
lost touch with the masses and had not been effective enough 
in winning support for its ideals and policies. Thus, in 
putting forward the joint leadership proposal, the Coard
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faction rode roughshod over Bishop's plea for a turn towards 
the masses, and insisted on a bureaucratic solution to the 
problems facing the revolution. The fact that OREL had by now 
secured a majority on the Central Committee and had prepared 
its position well in advance of the meeting, ensured that 
the joint leadership proposal was accepted. Those members of 
OREL who spoke in favour of the proposal did so in a uniform 
and orchestrated fashion, showing quite clearly that they had 
caucused over the issue. Bishop was no fool, and appreciated 
the significance of joint leadership. But he had been 
outmanoeuvred. He was the undisputed leader of the Grenadian 
people, yet now found himself in a minority in his party 
and lacked the political tools with which to mount a challenge 
to the Coard faction. Bishop adhered to the concept of a 
monolithic party and a one-party state, and this ideological 
framework provided no avenues for legitimate dissent. So 
when confronted by a majority of members of the Central 
Committee in favour of him relinquishing power to Coard, he 
had to evaluate his position carefully. Bishop protested that 
the joint leadership proposal amounted to a vote of no 
confidence in him, and in the vote that was taken on the subject 
decided to abstain. The subsequent behaviour of the Grenadian 
leader was spasmodic,and indecisive. He declined to attend a 
Central Committee meeting called to hear his views on 
the power-sharing formula, and was eventually brought to a 
second meeting of the whole party by a five-person delegation 
sent to fetch him. At this meeting, held on 25 September,
Bishop made a complete volte-face on joint leadership. After 
the overwhelming majority of party members voted to implement 
joint leadership, Bishop made another self-criticism and 
pledged to carry out the wishes of the party. But he still had
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grave doubts about the new arrangement. As a committed party 
member he did not want to be seen going against the decision 
of the majority, but he recognised that a power struggle was 
taking place. Coard had won support by devoting himself to 
ideological matters and organizing his supporters in OREL to 
take the leading positions in the party. Bishop's main support 
lay with the masses and the PRG, and in carrying out his duties 
as Prime Minister he probably neglected work in the party.
Bishop was well aware of the ideological sway wielded by Coard 
and appreciated that some of Coard's supporters were dissatisfiei 
with the Prime Minister's style of leadership. But Bishop was 
an extremely generous and accomodating individual and trusted 
that the Coard faction recognised the popularity which he 
enjoyed in the country, and would not question his 
authority to lead the revolution. It was now evident, however, 
that these assumptions were unfounded. Yet, having lost a 
majority in the party, there was no other institution to which 
Bishop could turn to seek a mandate for his continued leadership 
of the country. His personal predicament epitomised the 
central contradiction of a one-party state; namely that it 
imposes conformity upon minorities and oppositionists since 
public dissent is prohibited. Within the framework of the 
concept of monolithism to which he subscribed, Bishop's only 
legitimate course of action would have been to make a concerted 
bid win back control of the party. But it was too late for 
that. Outnumbered and confused, Bishop hoped against hope that 
commonsense would prevail.
Following the general meeting of party members, Bishop 
left Grenada for a two week trip to Eastern Europe, During his 
absence from the country, the party crisis entered a new
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phase. The Coard faction feared that Bishop might use his 
support among the masses to challenge the party decision on 
joint leadership, and any sign of dissent on the part of 
individuals close to Bishop was construed as evidence that 
Bishop was preparing some form of counter-attack. The Central 
Committee of the party became particularly alarmed when Bishop 
and his touring party stopped off in Cuba on its may home.
There Bishop was met at the airport by Fidel Castro and Raul 
Castro and eight other members of the Central Committee of the 
Cuban Communist Party. This was an unusually high-powered 
group for such a short visit by a close and familiar ally; 
it aroused suspicion that Castro was not only signalling to 
St. George's that he supported Bishop, a personal friend, but 
that he was also advising him. The Grenadian party leadership 
immediately sent a message of protest, but both Bishop's 
supporters and Castro himself subsequently denied that any 
discussion of Grenadian internal affairs took place. All the 
same, by this time the Coard faction had become paranoid.
The outcome was that by the time the touring party returned 
to Grenada, the Central Committee had taken measures to 
disarm Bishop's supporters in the PRA and demobilize the 
militia .
When Bishop arrived at Pearls airport he was met only 
by Selwyn Strachan, a significant departure from protocol.
It is said that Bishop told Strachan that he wanted a review 
of the leadership question to be on the agenda of the Central 
Committee meeting scheduled to be held on 12 October. This 
seems to have been interpreted by Strachan as the prelude to 
outright rejection; it was reported back as a negative 
response and must have been construed as an effort to challenge 
and reverse official party policy. The Central Committee
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hardened its position.
Watters came to a head on Wednesday 12 October. On that
day, one of Bishop's bodyguards told the Central Committee
that Bishop had been spreading rumours that Bernard and Phyllis
*•
Coard planned to kill him. On the basis of this accusation 
the Central Committee called off the sentries at Bishop's 
house and placed them under its own authority. The accusation 
concerning the assasination rumour was then taken up by a 
meeting of the Central Committee. fit this meeting Bishop 
was asked to deny the rumours on RFG; he did this but his 
statement was only broadcast once, and the lack of clear news 
caused widespread confusion and concern.
On the afternoon of 13 October a meeting of the entire 
membership of the NJM was held. Coard's supporters turned the 
meeting into a kangaroo court and cowed the membership into 
supporting a motion to expell Bishop from the party and strip 
him of all his positions. In taking this decision, the NJM 
revealed the fundamentally undemocratic character of their 
conception of the party as the primary source and ultimate 
guarantor of revolutionary legitimacy. It was an unwritten 
law of the revolution that spreading false rumours was a 
punishable offence; and it was this 'law' which the Central 
Committee resorted to when they placed Bishop under house 
arrest. But Bishop was given no opportunity to defend himself 
in public, and the Central Committee did not appoint an 
independent body to investigate the matter. Though given that 
the law which Bishop is alleged to have trangressed was 
unwritten, it is difficult to see what terms of reference 
would have been given to an investigative body. Bishop was now 
a political detainee just like many others in Richmond Hill 
prison. The concept of 'revolutionary law' which he espoused
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had now been used to expell him from the party and strip him
of ail authority. But there was one important factor which
Coard's supporters overlooked. For four-and-a-ha If years the
NJM had educated the Grenadian people in the belief that the
PRG was their government and it was they who ultimately
decided the fate of the country. Whatever weaknesses the
Grenadian revolution had, it was eminently successful in
raising the level of political consciousness and
self-organisation of the masses and instilling in ordinary
Grenadians the idea that they exercised real political
power. It was inevitable that the house arrest of Bishop
would inflame the country. But Coard and his supporters were
so intoxicated with their official communist ideology that
they were prepared to go against the masses on this question.
When Coard was asked by George Louison how he would respond
when the masses reacted, he replied: 'Well, the people can
march, they can demonstrate, and we won't stop them. But they'll
get tired. Gairy let them march and demonstrate almost daily
for two months in 1973 and 1974. The same happened in
Trinidad in 1970. The masses will get tired, and life will
return to normal. And we will continue the revolutionary
18process on a more Marxist, more Leninist footing.' A more 
elitist and substitutionist attitude towards revolutionary 
change could not be expressed. In Coard's view, the revolution 
could proceed without the masses.
But Coard was wrong. On 19 October a crowd of around
20,000 people, one-fifth of the population of the country, 
marched to Bishop's house and released him. Bishop was elated 
by this action taken in support of him. But the period in 
detention had taken its toll. He was very weary and in a state 
of tension. Nevertheless, together with some of his closest
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supporters, Bishop decided to take action against the Central 
Committee and led the demonstration to the army barracks 
at Fort Rupert. After some brief scuffles with the sentries,
Fort Rupert fell into Bishop's hands. Guns were distributed to 
the croud and plans uere drawn up to obtain more ueapons.
At around 1pm, tuo hours after Fort Rupert had been captured, 
three armoured troop carriers of the PRA arrived. Without any 
warning the PRA began to fire at the croud. The firing lasted 
for some six minutes and over 100 people uere killed, some 
of them in attempting to escape by jumping over a nearby 
cliff. The overuhelming majority of those uho had rallied to 
Bishop's defence uere school students and other youths, and 
it is they uho bore the brunt of the casualties.
Having retaken the fort, the PRA ordered everybody to 
file out at gunpoint. All uere allowed to go free except for 
Bishop and his five most prominent supporters - Unison 
Whiteman, Vincent Noel, Jaqueline Creft, Norris Bain and 
Fitzroy Bain - uho uere taken back inside. At approximately 
1.40pm, another burst of gunfire uas heard. Bishop and his 
follouers uere executed in cold blood.
The killings of 19 October sent a shock uave through the 
country, and the feeling of terror uas heightened over the 
next three days as the security forces detained over 150 people. 
On Friday 21 October a Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) uas 
set up, headed by Hudson Austin, uho nou served as the front 
man for the Coard faction. The RMC comprised fifteen members. 
Nearly all of them uere leading figures of the PRA and 
members of OREL. Although Coard did not join the neu military 
authority, he uas in direct control of its activities. The 
RMC assumed absolute control of the island and ruled by decree.
In carrying out its putsch against Bishop, the Coard
«
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faction considered how the US might respond to the split in 
the leadership of the NJM. Their evaluation, informed by 
the socialist orientation paradigm, was incredibly naive and 
adventurous. In reply to questioning by George Louison, they 
replied: '... even if it takes 10 years, the masses have to 
understand. Their analysis was that imperialism was too weak 
to attack them. There was Lebanon, which had reached a flash 
point. There were a number of other things, and imperialism 
could not attack them at that time. They felt that after a 
while the socialist countries would understand and come to 
their defense.' But imperialism was not 'too weak'; and in 
carrying out their massacre of Bishop and his supporters they 
gave Reagan the perfect opportunity to launch the invasion 
which he had been planning for four years, but up until that 
point was unable to put into operation. Thus, on 26 October 
troops from the US and several Caribbean states landed in 
Grenada, and what remained of the revolution was obliterated 
for ever. The anti-destabilizat ion strategy enunciated by 
Bishop made no provision for pluralism in the party, the state 
or the media because the IMJM believed that the most effective 
way of countering CIA subversion was to suppress all potential 
sources of opposition. Yet it was the authoritarian and 
bureaucratic way in which the Coard faction sought to resolve 
its differences with Bishop that facilitated the US 
invasion. The seeds of the downfall of the revolution lay in 
the pitfalls of the anti-destabilization strategy adopted 
by the IMJM.
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Chapter Ten 
Conelusion
The Grenadian revolution u/as the boldest experiment in 
revolutionary transformation ever attempted in the English- 
speaking Caribbean. It exploded the myth that Caribbean people 
are subservient and 'happy go lucky' , and demonstrated how an 
oppressed, nation in the West Indies could overthrow a 
tyrannical regime and begin the task of revolutionary 
transformation. In spite of its enormity, the tragedy that 
occurred in October 1983 cannot erase the contribution made by 
the Grenadian revolution to the cause of human liberation and 
social progress. During the four-and-a-half years of its 
existence, the Bishop regime unleashed the creative energy of 
the Grenadian people and introduced a series of measures to 
improve the position of the working class, the peasantry, 
women, youth and other oppressed groups in society. On account 
of the astute and fervent oratory of the island's leader, and 
the energy and originality devoted by the regime to Third 
World issues, Grenada emerged as a leading force in the 
Non-aligned Movement and acquired an international stature out 
of all proportion to the miniscule size of the country.
For four-and-a-half years the Bishop regime stood in open 
defiance of the mightiest power on earth and thwarted successive 
attempts to destabilize the revolution. Notwithstanding
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the humiliating circumstances of its denouement, there are many
positive lessons to be learnt from the Grenadian revolution.
This is something that is missed by Hugh 0'Shaughnessy in his
otherwise highly commendable journalistic account of the 
1
revolution. O'Shaughnessy makes no attempt to analyse the social 
and economic policies of the Bishop regime, and this lacuna 
prevents him from making a balanced assessment of the Grenadian 
experiment as a whole. Justifiably horrified and indignant at 
the massacre of Bishop and his supporters, he tends to dismiss 
altogether the political project of revolutionary transformation 
in the Caribbean. Another problem with 0'Shaughnessy's book, 
is that he accepts the label of Leninism which the Coard 
faction used to legitimise its move against Bishop. He thus 
implies that it was the ideas of Lenin which led to the 
destruction of the revolution. In chapter 3 we saw that the 
theory of socialist orientation was at variance with Lenin's 
writings on proletarian revolution in backward countries in 
several important respects. Yet the Coard faction went even 
further from the theory and practice of Lenin in their attempt 
to apply socialist orientation to Grenada. Contrary to the 
injunctions laid down by Lenin in his theory of the vanguard 
party, the NJM never held a party congress in its entire 
history, voting was seldom used to arrive at political decisions 
and members of the Central Committee were handpicked by Bernard 
Coard rather than elected by the rank and file. There are, 
undoubtedly, problems involved in Lenin's theory of the party, 
but the experience of Grenada does not throw any real light on 
the matter since the IMJPl did not institute even the most 
elementary forms of Lenin's theory. 0'Shaughnessy does not 
distinguish Lenin from his misguided followers, and in so 
doing makes invalid and unproven statements about the relevance
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of Lenin's ideas to Caribbean society.
There is, however, a way in which the Grenadian revolution 
brings into question Lenin's writings on revolution in backward 
countries. It relates to his observations on advanced socialist 
countries providing assistance to revolutions in the periphery 
in order to enable them to bypass capitalist development. 
Socialist orientation cites Lenin on this issue, and claims 
that the existence of the socialist system makes it possible 
for Third World countries to break loose from imperialist 
domination and embark on a path of socialist transformation.
The experience of Grenada shows that economic aid from the 
socialist countries is insufficient and inappropriate for 
socialist transformation in the Third World, and the official 
communist prescription that revolutionary states should blend 
socialist aid with financial assistance from the West is 
highly untenable on political grounds. Grenada was left in a 
sort of no man's land in which political and economic 
co-operation with the Socialist Bloc was not adequate to 
transform the society, and yet it was this co-operation which 
prevented the PRG from obtaining more funding from the West.
The socialist countries have been unable to provide the type 
of assistance that Lenin envisaged would enable backward 
countries to make a direct transition to socialism.
The guidelines put forward in the theory of socialist 
orientation about economic aid are not the only weaknesses of 
the theory. The experience of Grenada shows that there are 
serious flaws in many aspects of socialist orientation. The 
primary objection that should be made against the theory is 
that it is quintessentially authoritarian and elitist in 
character. Too great an emphasis is placed upon the 'hegemonic 
role' of the vanguard party during the revolutionary process,
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the notion of a monolithic one-party state is fundamentally 
intolerant and undemocratic, and no provision is made for 
political pluralism and the devolution of real power to mass 
organisations and organs of people's power. In its implementati01 
of socialist orientation, the Bishop regime was highly 
pragmatic and innovative and attempted to refrain from the 
use of overt repression. But there was a heavy-handed edge 
to many of the social and economic policies of the regime, 
which derived from the undemocratic character of the 
revolutionary ideology of the IMJM. The bloody conflict that 
took place in October 1983 was not simply an aberration, but 
the logical outcome of the authoritarian tendencies of the 
PRG. This is why it is not possible to go along with the
2assertion made by Anthony Payne, Paul Sutton and Tony Thorndike 
that the theory of socialist orientation simply needs 
'redevelopment' . Grenada is only the latest of a whole 
series of 'non-capitalist' or 'socialist-oriented' states 
that developed into military dictatorships, and this would 
indeed seem to suggest that the 'baby' of socialist 
orientation needs to be thrown out with the 'bathwater'.
What is needed is a new theory of revolutionary transformation 
which is firmly anchored in Caribbean, and not East European, 
reality, and has as its primary axiom the need to create 
institutions that will allow the people to run society.
After 184 years of chattel slavery, 320 years of colonialism 
and seven years of neo-coIonia1ism, the Grenadian people 
are not prepared to surrender power to any self-styled 
'hegemonic party'.
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